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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between the UN Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA) and the Palestinian nationalist movement in the refugee 
camps from 1967-82. It argues that UNRWA had a quasi-governmental role 
in the camps, and therefore inadvertently helped shape the development of 
Palestinian political nationalism in these spaces. Despite its formally apolitical 
standing as a humanitarian UN body, UNRWA’s impact on the ground was 
politically loaded; it was an international organisation whose work was 
juxtaposed with the camps’ nationalistic environments. This resulted in a 
symbiotic process, whereby Palestinian nationalist politics came to influence 
UNRWA’s work, and vice versa. 
 Such an outcome was the result of UNRWA’s long-standing intimate 
involvement with the Palestinian refugee camps, ever since it began 
operations in 1950 in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza. Yet it 
was also due in part to the agency of the refugees themselves, who were 
politically active and organised despite their structural disadvantage. When it 
came to UNRWA, they drew on their limited leverage as beneficiaries and 
lower-level employees. Just as Israel, the Western donor states and the Arab 
host states sought to use UNRWA to influence Palestinian politics, so the 
refugees challenged the Agency whenever they believed it to be acting against 
their political interests. UNRWA accordingly came to act as an intersection 
between the international sphere and Palestinian refugee politics.  
 In examining these dynamics, this thesis highlights the distinctiveness of 
the Palestinian refugee experience, as encapsulated by UNRWA’s unique 
institutional nature. It also provides an important case study of themes 
relevant beyond Palestinian history, including the politics of humanitarianism; 
the intersection between nationalism and internationalism; and the 
relationship of identity to territoriality. This thesis thus speaks to modern 
international history writ large, while also enriching understandings of 
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Palestinian and Levantine history in relation to the refugee camps, the UN 
and UNRWA. 
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Introduction 
 
‘UNRWA can do at once less and more than a State.’ 1 
UNRWA Chef de Cabinet, memo to Commissioner-General, 1970 
 
These words are as revealing as they are succinct. The United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) 
holds a role that is unique, complex and nebulous. Mandated by the UN and 
funded largely by Western states, UNRWA has served as the primary service 
provider for registered Palestinian refugees in the Levant since the early days 
of their collective dispossession. While the details of its large-scale relief 
programmes have changed over time, its presence in the region has been 
virtually coterminous with the Palestinians’ statelessness. Comparing the 
Agency’s work to that of a state thus alludes not only to its condition, but 
also to that of the Palestinian refugees whom it serves. 
Created in 1949 – the year after the Palestinian national dispossession 
known as the Nakba2 – UNRWA operates in the geographical areas home 
to the largest gatherings of Palestinian refugees: the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip (known after 1967 as the Occupied Palestinian Territories or OPT), 
along with Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. These areas are collectively known as 
the ‘five fields’ of UNRWA’s operations, and form the geographical scope 
of this thesis. The five fields are particularly significant as they host not only 
substantial Palestinian populations, but also the Palestinian refugee camps, 
administered by UNRWA, numbering 58 in total. 3  These camps, while 
historically home to only a minority of Palestinian refugees, 4  have a 
significance disproportionate to their numbers, and as such constitute the 
                                                 
1 Memo from UNRWA Chef de Cabinet to Commissioner-General, 6 August 1970, File RE230(WB) I, 
Box RE22, UNRWA Headquarters Archive (UHA), Amman.  
2 ‘Nakba’ is an Arabic term literally meaning ‘catastrophe’ or ‘disaster’, but most often used to denote the 
Palestinian dispossession of 1948. It was coined soon after the event by Syrian intellectual Constantine 
Zureik. See: Constantine Zureik, Ma’nā al-Nakba (Beirut: Dar al-'ilm lil-malayin, 1948). 
3 There are 58 formally recognised Palestinian refugee camps, not including numerous ‘unofficial’ camps, 
also known as settlements. See Appendices A-E. 
4 As will be explained over the course of this thesis, the majority of Palestinian refugees live not in camps 
but in towns and cities, both within UNRWA’s fields of operation and elsewhere.  
     
 17 
setting with which this thesis is most concerned. It is in the camps, home to 
thousands of stateless refugees, that UNRWA’s role has been the most 
influential and significant. As the host states have largely restricted their 
intervention in the camps to matters of security and policing, the onus has 
fallen on UNRWA to provide the services that are usually the domain of the 
modern nation-state: not only emergency relief but also healthcare, 
education and municipal services.  
 In this sense, and as the opening quotation shows, UNRWA’s role has 
transcended that of a simple aid agency. In theory, it was established as an 
apolitical relief organisation working to alleviate suffering among vulnerable 
refugees. In practice, it increasingly came to function as a quasi-government. 
While this was most noticeable in the Agency’s services, it could also be 
seen in how the Agency was responsible for identifying and registering 
Palestinian refugees, providing formal verification of their status, and issuing 
what was often their only official documentation. This made it a vital part of 
Palestinian history, and rendered it especially key to questions of their 
national identity as a stateless and scattered people. In the light of the 
Palestinians’ dispersal across the Middle East, UNRWA served – however 
inadvertently – as a commonality in the refugees’ experiences of exile, its 
work providing a shared frame of reference to counter the geographical and 
political variations of the five fields. 
 As an international aid agency, UNRWA typified many global post-war 
norms about shared international responsibility and humanitarian 
intervention. Yet at the same time, it was noticeably unique. The Agency 
was and remains the only UN body mandated to serve one particular group 
of people, namely the Palestinian refugees. As a result, the latter were barred 
from receiving services from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), which was created shortly after UNRWA with responsibility for 
all other refugees worldwide. UNRWA’s set-up thus created a distinctive 
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regime for the Palestinian refugees, which brought them both benefits and 
considerable disadvantages. 
 Most importantly, UNRWA’s role in the camps placed it in a unique 
position vis-à-vis the politics of Palestinian exile. The Nakba was a 
watershed moment for Palestinian national consciousness and political 
identity. The fate of the refugees became the most potent symbol of 
Palestinian dispossession, as the loss of Palestine came to partially level the 
earlier divisions of Palestinian society, and unite the people by way of their 
shared loss.5 Those who had lost the most, and who had the least to fall 
back on, ended up in the refugee camps that were quickly set up across the 
five fields, and then continuously administered by UNRWA after it began 
operations in May 1950.  
 The camps became central to the development of the Palestinian 
nationalist movement in exile, most noticeably when the latter took on a 
new ascendance in the period after 1967.6 As entirely Palestinian spaces, the 
camps were vital to the formation and incubation of nationalist ideas in 
exile, and strategies for bringing these ideas to fruition. They also provided 
the testing ground for post-1967 attempts by the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) to create a Palestinian para-state-in-exile, by building its 
own infrastructure and establishing some degree of territorial authority. A 
disproportionately high number of Palestinians who signed up to join the 
nationalist fighters known as fida ̄’iyyīn7 originated from the camps.  
 The post-1967 ascendance of the nationalist movement in the camps 
created new challenges for UNRWA, as the primary service provider and 
quasi-governmental authority in these spaces. A formally apolitical aid 
organisation, it now had to grapple with the intense politicisation of its areas 
                                                 
5 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of  Modern National Consciousness  (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997), p. 193. 
6 Karma Nabulsi, ‘Our strength is in the camps’, The Guardian, 17 September 2002, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/sep/17/comment, accessed 31 August 2017. 
7 Literally meaning ‘those who sacrifice themselves’, this term is generally used to denote Palestinian 
nationalist guerrillas.  
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of operation. Raising the stakes even further, the camps’ politicisation 
formed a central element of one of the most contentious conflicts of the 
modern era - a conflict that engaged not only the Middle Eastern region but 
also much of the wider world. All of this meant that the implicitly political 
nature of UNRWA’s work became increasingly noticeable, as heightened 
attention fell on the factors shaping Palestinian national identity and 
activism. As the significance of UNRWA’s work became increasingly 
loaded, the Agency faced intensifying yet conflicting demands from 
numerous parties: the Palestinian refugees it served, the Middle Eastern 
governments that hosted it, and the (largely Western) states that funded it.  
 The Agency’s struggles on this front signified the paradoxes that 
existed at the heart of its work. It was an international agency ensconced in a 
setting that was both national and, from the late 1960s, increasingly 
nationalist. Moreover, it was an apolitical organisation tasked with working 
in an environment that could not have been more politically charged. These 
paradoxes in turn speak to wider themes in the global norms of the later 
twentieth century and their relationship to Palestinian history. As a UN 
agency mandated to serve one group of vulnerable people, UNRWA 
signified not only international (in practice Western-dominated) 
interventionism in the name of humanitarianism, but also the UN’s long-
standing involvement in the fate of Palestine and its people. It was thus 
representative of how modern Palestinian history has so often been 
characterised by the juxtaposition of nationalist and internationalist themes . 
 With such themes in mind, this thesis investigates UNRWA’s role in 
the refugee camps during the Palestinian nationalist movement’s heyday, 
from 1967-82. It is premised on two notions: the camps’ central driving 
function in that movement at this time; and the vital role that UNRWA 
itself played in the camps. To unpack the dynamics of this set-up, the thesis 
asks a series of interrelated questions. What were the implications of the 
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camps’ nationalistic politicisation in this period for UNRWA, the 
international apolitical UN agency running them? How did the Agency 
interact with and influence the nationalist movement that became so 
prominent in the camps? Finally, how did these shifting dynamics affect 
UNRWA’s relations with the refugees it served, the Middle Eastern states 
that hosted it, and the ‘international community’ to which it was answerable? 
 The ‘international community’ itself is a complex and contested term 
requiring some further explanation here. Supposedly denoting global 
consensus and world opinion, it is in practice often dominated by Western 
powers, particularly the US, and thus rarely represents the true majority of 
international opinion. This was certainly true when it came to the historical 
actions of the so-called ‘international community’ in Palestine, which were 
driven largely by the strategic concerns of the US and the UK. It was 
accordingly noted on the previous page that supposedly ‘international’ 
humanitarian intervention via UNRWA was in practice Western-dominated. 
This thesis will use the term ‘international community’, largely in lieu of 
replacing it with another term that would be equally problematic, but with 
the awareness that the term refers to a Western-dominated system. For 
clarification, the term ‘wider world’ will be used when referring to the 
international sphere as a whole and not simply the Western-dominated 
power sphere.  
 Such considerations are especially pertinent to this thesis because it 
concerns an agency of the United Nations, which in theory is supposed to 
function as a formal representative of internationalist ideas and global 
consensus. In practice of course, the positioning of the UN has shared many 
of the wider problems inherent in the concept of the ‘international 
community’, with its positioning often determined by the Western global 
powers and the US in particular. To this day, the UN’s binding policies are 
determined by the Security Council (UNSC), comprised of the five 
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permanent members of Russia, China, France, the US and the UK. There 
are also ten rotating non-permanent members, which are structurally 
disempowered and do not hold the veto. It is the UNSC, and particularly its 
permanent members, that have the power to issue binding resolutions and 
determine supposedly ‘international’ military action, sanctions and 
peacekeeping options.8 
 The UN’s other central body, the General Assembly (UNGA), could 
be described much more accurately as international. It is made up of all UN 
Member States, with each holding equal representation therein. The nature 
of this set-up became increasingly significant from the late 1960s, when 
widespread decolonisation across Africa and Asia led to the admission of 
large numbers of newly-independent member states, drastically changing the 
UNGA’s make-up. As a result, its membership became increasingly distinct 
from that of the UNSC, in both size and political positioning. Many ex-
colonies were aligned with the politics of the Global South, and in particular 
tended to be sympathetic to the Palestinian national cause. 
 The UNGA has therefore been largely free of the superpower 
dominance that characterises the UNSC. However, it also holds 
considerably less power than the UNSC; while the UNGA can issue 
resolutions, they are not binding, and its main role in setting policy is to 
make recommendations.9 In perhaps the clearest single indication of the 
unequal balance of power between the two bodies, admission of new UN 
Member States must be approved by two-thirds of the UNGA and 9 of the 
UNSC’s 15 members – but can be barred by a simple veto from any of the 
UNSC’s five permanent members.  
 This uneven power distribution means that the Western domination of 
the UNSC has a knock-on effect on the nature of the UN as a whole. As 
shall be shown in this thesis, it resulted in a tendency for many Middle 
                                                 
8  UN, ‘The Security Council’, http://www.un.org/en/sc/, accessed 12 November 2018. 
9 UN, ‘About the General Assembly’, http://www.un.org/en/ga/ accessed 12 November 2018. 
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Easterners to view the UN with the suspicion that it ultimately served to 
further Western interests around the world. However, at the same time it 
should be noted that the UN is not and has never been a monolithic body. 
It is rather a complex and hybrid organisation driven by the competing 
interests of various Member States, and itself consisting of numerous bodies 
and agencies, albeit with some holding considerably more power than 
others. In view of the UN’s internal complexity, this thesis refers to its 
specific bodies (eg. UNSC or UNGA) wherever possible, to avoid 
oversimplifying and reducing it. 
 These distinctions are particularly significant when analysing UNRWA, 
which is mandated by and answerable to the UNGA. This set-up fuelled 
Western criticism of the Agency in the late 1960s and 1970s, as the UNGA 
made its aforementioned shift towards the Global South and an increasingly 
pro-Palestinian position. The fact that UNRWA was created by and 
answerable to the UNGA is therefore highly significant when analysing the 
Agency’s historical international positioning. However, there is a further 
layer of complexity derived from the fact that UNRWA’s mandatory 
accountability to the UNGA has always been juxtaposed with a financial 
reliance on overwhelmingly Western donor states. In other words, UNRWA 
was entwined with the ‘international community’ in both senses: the 
Western-dominated structures that drove the formal manifestations of this 
concept; and the more equitable representation of nations around the world 
through the UNGA. As such, UNRWA perfectly embodies the tensions 
inherent in the very concept of internationalism. As mentioned above, to 
avoid conflation this thesis uses precise and careful terminology that 
distinguishes between the so-called ‘international community’, the wider 
world, the UNSC and the UNGA.  
 Understanding this nuance about UNRWA’s positioning is particularly 
important when examining a period that saw major shifts in both the 
     
 23 
internal dynamics of the UN and the nature of the Palestinian nationalist 
movement. In the case of the latter, the years 1967-82 were pivotal, 
sometimes dubbed the era of the thawra (‘revolution’). This period saw the 
re-emergence and ascendance of Palestinian nationalism, grounded in the 
UNRWA-administered refugee camps. It was bookended by two watershed 
moments. First, the Arab states’ devastating defeat by Israel in 1967 – 
known in Arabic as al-Naksa or ‘the setback’ – cleared the way for 
Palestinian nationalist organisations to take charge of their own struggle for 
statehood. As Palestinian nationalism increasingly diverged from pan-
Arabism, militants known as fida ̄’iyyīn seized the opportunity to take over the 
PLO and emancipate it from the command of the Arab League. The newly 
‘Palestinianised’ PLO drew considerable support from the refugee camps, 
where it established its authority against the host states in a movement 
known as the thawra, based in Lebanon but with an impact felt across the 
region. Over the following decade, the PLO rose to global prominence and 
in 1974 even gained formal recognition at the UN – the very organisation 
from which UNRWA itself had emerged. Its heyday came to an abrupt end 
in 1982, when the Israeli siege of Beirut resulted in the PLO’s expulsion to 
Tunisia, and the dismantling of the quasi-state structures it had established 
inside Lebanon.  
 The fifteen-year period from 1967-82 was thus crucial to the histories 
of both the Palestinian nationalist movement and the refugee camps. It was 
also crucial for UNRWA, as a time when the Agency was compelled to 
contend with the double challenge posed by the Palestinian thawra in the 
Arab host states, and the onset of the Israeli occupation in the West Bank 
and Gaza (hereafter the Occupied Palestinian Territories: OPT). The ‘long 
1970s’ saw the Agency navigate the dynamics of the occupation and the 
need to cooperate directly with the Israeli government, alongside the 
repercussions of the PLO’s new ascendance in the camps. As such, the 
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period marked the most acute phase of UNRWA’s intersection with 
Palestinian national politics. It also brought the inherent contradictions of 
UNRWA’s work to the fore, as the disconnect between its ostensible 
purpose and the realities on the ground became increasingly glaring.  
 With such considerations in mind, this thesis probes the nature and 
impact of UNRWA’s interactions with the Palestinian nationalist movement 
in the refugee camps from 1967-82. In particular, it investigates the extent to 
which, and the ways in which, UNRWA’s central role in the camps helped 
shape Palestinian national identity among the refugees. In so doing it 
engages directly with the juxtaposition between nationalism and 
internationalism in Palestinian history. UNRWA has not only defined and 
determined who can be counted as a Palestinian refugee, but has also 
governed and shaped their spaces, transmitting international conventions 
and norms through its practices, policies and programmes in the camps. By 
exploring UNRWA’s impact within the framework of its status as a UN 
body, this PhD examines how far and in what ways the Agency acted as a 
conduit between the Palestinian refugees and the wider world.  
 
Thesis arguments  
 
The central contention of this thesis is that UNRWA functioned as a key 
factor in shaping the development of Palestinian political nationalism in the 
refugee camps from 1967-82. In other words, it argues that the Agency’s 
impact and influence was politically loaded in practice, if not ostensibly. To 
make this case, the thesis establishes and connects the two premises 
mentioned earlier: that the camps were central to the Palestinian nationalist 
movement during the thawra era; and that UNRWA acted as the quasi-
government in these camps. Having explained these points, the thesis then 
advances three arguments to expound how and why this set-up made 
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UNRWA a central, if overlooked, factor in the nationalist movement during 
this period. 
Firstly, it is argued that UNRWA, in its quasi-governmental role, came 
to act as a point of connection between the international sphere, which 
authorised and funded the Agency, and the Palestinian nationalist 
movement, which dominated and subsumed the camps where it worked. 
The intimate nature of UNRWA’s involvement in the camps meant that its 
work fused with the nationalist movement as it overtook these spaces during 
the thawra. This resulted in a symbiotic process, whereby Palestinian 
nationalist politics influenced the Agency’s work while at the same time the 
Agency’s work helped shape the development of Palestinian nationalist 
politics. Developments on the ground thus belied UNRWA’s official 
designation as an apolitical body.  
 Much of the discussion in this thesis focuses on the specific ways in 
which UNRWA’s influence on the Palestinian nationalist movement 
manifested itself. Particular attention is paid to two areas of the Agency’s 
work: its registration policy, which determined who ‘counted’ in official 
terms as a Palestinian refugee; and its education programme, which 
facilitated the dissemination of nationalist ideas in exclusively Palestinian 
spaces. Both elements show how the content of Palestinian nationalism at 
this time came to be influenced and shaped by international norms via 
UNRWA. The Agency’s programmes and policies all had to be approved by 
the UN, the donor states, and to a lesser extent the host states that allowed 
UNRWA to operate in their territories. As such, international standards and 
models regarding the nation-state, sovereignty, and national self-
determination became especially prominent in the otherwise often insular 
refugee camps. At the same time, UNRWA’s inherently transnational nature 
– as an organisation that operated consistently across numerous states – 
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helped reinforced the Palestinians’ shared national consciousness across the 
dispersal of their exile.  
The thesis’ second argument holds that all the parties involved with 
UNRWA’s work recognised and understood its function in essentially 
political terms, regardless of its formally apolitical status. The nature and 
content of the Agency’s interactions with the Arab host states, the Western 
donor states, Israel, the PLO and the Palestinian refugees themselves all 
signified that its work had an underlying political quality to it. This is 
particularly important in view of the fact that UNRWA was intrinsically 
dependent on the continuing support of these parties to be able to operate. 
As such, they actively helped shape the Agency, and had a direct influence 
on the continuation of its work over the decades. 
The third and final argument concentrates this broader analysis on the 
institutional representation of the Palestinian nationalist movement: the 
PLO. It contends that the PLO, like the host states and donor states, 
observed the political significance of UNRWA’s work and how it connected 
Palestinian nationalism to the international sphere. As a result, the PLO 
sought to use UNRWA as a tool for gaining greater legitimacy on the world 
stage. In particular, UNRWA’s prominent role in the refugee camps was a 
key component of the PLO’s internationalist strategy and its fixation on 
achieving legitimacy at the UN in the 1970s.  
 A number of themes underpin these arguments. In particular, the 
thesis affirms and explicates the considerable agency of the refugee camp 
communities themselves. Despite their extraordinary structural 
vulnerabilities, the refugees were politically organised and active from an 
early stage of their dispossession. Within the restricted framework of their 
disadvantage, they acted wherever possible to challenge the situation in 
which they found themselves and re-shape it along their own preferred lines.  
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Accordingly, this thesis includes numerous examples of how the refugees’ 
agency manifested itself over the years. In particular, it was a constant theme 
in their relationship with UNRWA, as they consistently challenged the 
Agency when they believed that it was acting against their political interests. 
 Furthermore, the political development of the camps in the years 1967-
82 – and particularly the role of UNRWA at this time – demonstrates the 
intersection between nationalism and internationalism that was a continuous 
feature of the Palestinian refugee camps in the Levant. As nationalistic 
environments organised and administered by an international body, the 
camps served as spaces for the quotidian interface between these 
theoretically opposing notions. As the nationalist movement came to 
consume the camps in the period from 1967 to 1982, its fusion with 
internationalism became particularly pronounced. The result was a 
construction of Palestinian nationalism with an evident international 
inflection.   
 In making these points, the thesis also highlights the distinctiveness of 
the Palestinian refugee experience, as encapsulated by UNRWA’s unique 
nature as an institution. It focuses in particular on the political implications 
of this distinctiveness, as the Palestinian nationalist movement navigated the 
dynamics of establishing its legitimacy in the international sphere. As is 
discussed below, many of these themes have heretofore been overlooked or 
insufficiently discussed in the scholarship. By examining them in depth, this 
thesis will fill this gap in the literature, and make an important contribution 
to understanding Palestinian history in relation to the refugee camps, the 
UN and UNRWA. 
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Original contribution 
 
By explicating UNRWA’s importance as a factor in the development of 
Palestinian nationalism, this PhD establishes a new historical narrative that 
enriches scholarly understanding of numerous subjects. In particular, it 
advances a more comprehensive characterisation of the Palestinian 
nationalist movement, as being deliberately situated in the international 
setting. Indeed, this thesis shows that the historical development of 
Palestinian nationalism cannot be fully understood outside of an 
international context. Such a depiction belies perceptions of Palestinian 
nationalism as atavistic, rooted in nostalgia, and detached from modern 
international history. This thesis shows that far from relying on a 
romanticised vision of a lost golden age, Palestinian nationalism was shaped 
by the workings of a contemporary, internationally-mandated and 
internationally-funded Agency. It was a modern movement, shaped by 
global conceptions of the nation-state that were standardised and expressed 
with institutions like the UN.  
In this way, the research presented here challenges wider 
interpretations about what has driven the Palestinian national consciousness. 
Specifically, it augments understandings of the PLO, presenting it as a 
movement that engaged directly and consistently with the global order. Such 
an assessment provides an important counter to tendencies to treat 
Palestinian history in isolation. In fact, Palestine has long been integrated 
into international history; UNRWA is one manifestation of a long-term 
trend across the twentieth century, previously evidenced by the international 
nature of the British Mandate. 
By recasting the nature of the Palestinian nationalist movement, this 
thesis also portrays UNRWA as an organisation of historical political 
significance. It depicts the Agency’s creation and operations as being 
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symptomatic of the long-running Palestinian entwinement with 
internationalism, manifested from 1945 in the form of continual UN 
interventions in the country - most notably, the Partition Plan of 1947.10 As 
such, UNRWA should be fully incorporated into Palestinian political 
histories despite its ostensibly apolitical status. Such a reconsideration of 
UNRWA’s role is one of this thesis’ most distinctive contributions to the 
scholarship, challenging the tendency to take the Agency’s formally apolitical 
status at face value. 
 This re-assessment of UNRWA also carries major implications for 
understanding the refugee camps that it has administered since 1950. As is 
outlined below, much of the analysis here focuses on the camps as spaces, 
probing how their spatial set-up enabled and incubated the Palestinian 
nationalist movement in exile. This engagement with the camps’ territorial 
distinctiveness breaks new ground in evaluating the Palestinian diaspora’s 
national consciousness, by analysing the intersection between territoriality, 
political dynamics, and social history.  
Furthermore, by focussing on the history of the camp populations, this 
thesis lays the groundwork for moving away from conventional paradigms 
in modern Middle Eastern history. Israeli-Palestinian history in particular is 
usually constructed around the periodisation of the wars from 1948 
onwards. Yet by focusing on the camp refugees, this thesis approaches the 
region’s history within the frame of social history rather than merely the 
dynamics of high politics, diplomacy and war. As will be shown here, the 
camps’ histories were marked not only by the well-known landmarks of 
1948 and 1967, but also by more grassroots developments such as the thawra 
of 1969, and shifts in UNRWA’s policies and programmes. Moreover, this 
thesis complicates the usual paradigm of the Arab-Israeli conflict that 
                                                 
10 UNGA Resolution 181 included the infamous ‘Partition Plan’ for Mandate Palestine. See: UNGA 
Resolution 181, A/RES/181(II), 29 November 1947, 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7F0AF2BD897689B785256C330061D253, accessed 31 
August 2017. 
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assumes a constant underlying division between Israel and the Arab states. 
Here, the division is often placed instead between the Palestinian refugees 
and the states governing them – meaning that Israel is categorised with the 
Arab host governments of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. 
In the contemporary context of the Syrian refugee crisis in the Middle 
East, findings about the history of the Palestinian camps are especially 
pertinent. The research presented here not only illuminates the nature of the 
refugee camp as a space, but also elucidates how and why international and 
regional approaches to refugee crises have changed over time. The subject 
has a particular contemporary relevance in view of the fact that many of the 
Middle Eastern states now hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees are also 
host to Palestinian camps. Moreover, their experience of the Palestinian 
precedent has had a direct bearing on these states’ policies towards Syrian 
refugees.11  
Finally, the significance of this research transcends disciplinary 
boundaries. It is relevant not only to Palestinian history but also to broader 
scholarship on nationalism, international development, humanitarianism, 
and the UN itself. In particular, it is pertinent to understanding the 
emergence and development of international humanitarianism in the 
decades after the Second World War. UNRWA constituted the UN’s 
response to the first large-scale humanitarian crisis it directly encountered. 
As such, it was both formative and exceptional - making it a vital case study 
for understanding the international dynamics of this era.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Anne Irfan, ‘The Palestinian precedent and the Syrian refugee crisis’, Your Middle East, 30 November 
2016, http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/culture/the-palestinian-precedent-and-the-syrian-refugee-
crisis_44193, accessed 1 November 2017.  
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Historiography 
 
Palestinian political history is one of the most widely-studied areas of the 
modern Middle East. Its complexity, controversy, and connection to 
numerous regional and global issues all make it the subject of considerable 
scholarly attention, not least because of its potential political implications. 
Indeed, Gilbert Achcar noted in 2016 that more PhD theses are completed 
each year on Palestine than on the rest of the Middle East combined. 12 
Moreover, a substantial proportion of this scholarship is devoted to the 
Palestinian national struggle, national identity and consciousness. This 
makes the particular subjects of the thesis especially contested in 
historiographical terms. Nevertheless, the concentration and clustering of 
the historiography around particular themes means that space remains for 
studies that approach these well-worn areas from a new angle – such as this 
one.   
 
Palestinian national history 
Works on Palestinian history have come not only from historians but also 
from scholars in the fields of anthropology, political science, international 
relations and international development. As a result, this is a subject with a 
strongly cross-disciplinary feel. It is also, of course, a highly controversial 
subject, with contemporary politics often directly or indirectly influencing 
knowledge production. While historiographical debates have now largely 
moved past the early contestations of the supposed ‘validity’ of Palestinian 
national identity, divisions remain over how it is conceptualised, assessed 
and interpreted.   
Nationalism itself is the subject of considerable scholarly debate. There 
are generally three schools of thought on the subject: primordialism, 
                                                 
12 Gilbert Achcar, ‘The importance of Palestine studies’, The Middle East in London:  SOAS Centenary  Special 
Issue, 12:5, Oct-Nov 2016, pp. 10-11. 
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(sometimes known as ‘perennialism’), modernism, and ethno-symbolism. 
Differences between these three groups are centred on the causal origins of 
nationalism. Primordialists posit that the concept of ‘the nation’ is 
historically rooted in pre-modern ethnic foundations,13 while modernists see 
it as a construct made possible only by the distinctive conditions of 
modernity.14 Bringing some synthesis to the debate, ethno-symbolists argue 
that while broad-based nationalism is a modern phenomenon, the nation 
itself predates modernity.15  
The primordialist-modernist debate is particularly prescient when it 
comes to Palestinian nationalism. In keeping with Israeli premier Golda 
Meir’s famous claim in 1969 that there was ‘no such thing’ as the Palestinian 
people, 16  the contention that Palestinian national identity is constructed 
rather than historically rooted has sometimes been used to undermine their 
national rights. Political commentators like Asaf Romirowsky have 
suggested that the Palestinians’ national identity is a construct and therefore 
fake, while Jewish Israeli identity is deep-rooted and fixed.17 Such ideas are 
more common in the political than the academic world, but scholarly 
assessments of the two nationalisms can still become loaded and highly 
charged. 18  For example, the political scientist Azar Gat – himself a 
perennialist – describes Jewish Israeli identity as ‘robust’, while neglecting to 
mention the Palestinians other than as part of the Arab peoples.19 
However, Gat is in the minority. Most scholars apply modernist 
conceptions of nationalism to the Palestinian case while contending that this 
                                                 
13 Adrian Hastings, The Construction of  Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). 
14 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006); T. O. Ranger and Eric J. Hobsbawm 
(ed.s), The Invention of  Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Ref lections on the Origin and Spread of  Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006); E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations 
and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
15 Anthony D. Smith, The Antiquity of  Nations (Oxford: Polity, 2004). 
16 The Sunday Times, 15 June 1969.  
17 See for example: Asaf Romirowsky, 'The Real Palestinian Refugee Problem', 
http://www.thetower.org/article/the-real-palestinian-refugee-crisis, accessed 25 July 2017. 
18 Shlomo Sand, The Invention of  the Jewish People (London: Verso, 2009), pp. 16-19. 
19 Azar Gat, Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of  Political Ethnicity and Nationalism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 311, 372. 
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approach does not invalidate the Palestinian nation’s legitimacy. In 
particular, the ideas of modernist theorist Benedict Anderson have been 
hugely influential in scholarly understandings of Palestinian national identity. 
Anderson conceptualises a nation as an ‘imagined political community’. He 
contends that the conditions of modernity make it possible for people to 
conceive of themselves as belonging to a community that is ‘both inherently 
limited and sovereign’; in other words, a nation.20  
Historians Rashid Khalidi and Yezid Sayigh have taken direct 
inspiration from Anderson in their works on Palestinian nationalism. Both 
write of ‘an imagined Palestinian community’ forged by the formative 
experiences of modernity.21 Moreover, Khalidi implicitly invokes Anderson’s 
ideas about the importance of symbols and institutions when he underlines 
the role of ‘education, postage stamps and coins’ in disseminating national 
identity in Mandate Palestine.22  More explicitly, Helen Lindholm Schulz 
applies the core elements of Anderson’s theory to the Palestinian case ; 
where Anderson wrote of the nationalistic ‘pilgrimage’ in social space, 
Schulz argues that the Palestinians’ shared experience of ‘wandering’ and 
exclusion is constitutive of their own imagined community. Similarly, she 
contends that the veneration of the land in Palestinian rhetoric is an 
example of the political self-love that Anderson cites as crucial to 
nationalism.23  
 Such prevalent use of modernist ideas means that the primary debate 
among scholars of Palestinian nationalism is not about the latter’s nature as 
primordialist or modernist, but rather about which elements of modernity 
inculcated a broad-based nationalist feeling among the Palestinians. In 
particular, there is a divide between those who attribute its rise to the impact 
                                                 
20 Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 5-7. 
21 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 27; R. Khalidi, Palestinian Identity , p. 28.  
22 R. Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 10. 
23 Helena Lindholm Schulz, The reconstruction of  Palestinian Nationalism: Between Revolution and Statehood 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 18, 88.  
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of Zionism, thus portraying Palestinian nationalism as essentially reactive, 
and those who argue that Palestinian nationalism emerged independently of 
Zionism. Almost without exception, every scholar who has worked on 
modern Palestinian history has engaged in one way or another with this 
fundamental historiographical divide.  
 Those who argue that Palestinian nationalism developed in reaction to 
Zionism include Colin Shindler, 24  Ann Mosely Lesch 25  and Yehoshua 
Porath.26 These scholars provide different chronologies for the emergence 
of Palestinian nationalism but nevertheless all hold that it came about in 
response to the arrival of Zionism in Palestine. Conversely, Muhammad 
Muslih, 27 Ghassan Shabaneh,28  and the aforementioned Rashid Khalidi, 29 
along with Ilan Pappe30 and Tom Segev,31 contend that Zionism was only 
one of a range of factors that precipitated the development of Palestinian 
nationalism. They suggest that Palestinian nationalism had a complex and 
multi-faceted trajectory that transcended the impact of Zionism alone.  
 In keeping with such an analysis, these scholars also contend that the 
Palestinian national consciousness emerged much earlier than Zionist-
centric interpretations suggest. Khalidi and Muslih trace it back to the late 
Ottoman period, citing examples of national newspapers and political 
discourse to demonstrate the existence of a Palestinian consciousness.32 In 
line with such ideas, this thesis presupposes that Palestinian nationalism 
long predated the establishment of Israel. The years 1967-82, which are the 
                                                 
24 Colin Shindler, A History of  Modern Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 49. 
25 Ann M. Lesch, Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939: The Frustration of  a Nationalist Movement  (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1979). 
26 Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence of  the Palestinian-Arab National Movement 1918-1929 (London: Cass, 1974). 
27 Muhammad Muslih, 'Arab Politics and the Rise of Palestinian Nationalism ', Journal of  Palestine Studies, 
16:4, 1987, pp. 77–94. 
28 Ghassan Shabaneh, 'Education and Identity: The Role of UNRWA’s Education Programmes in the 
Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism', Journal of  Refugee Studies, 25:4, 2012, pp. 491–513. 
29 R. Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 10, 28. 
30 Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of  Palestine (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), p. 236. 
31 Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the Mandate (London: Little, Brown and Company, 
2000), Part I. 
32 R. Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, pp. 28-34. Muslih, ‘Arab Politics and the Rise of Palestinian Nationalism’, 
pp. 77-83. 
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focus of this study, thus saw the revival and renewal of the nationalist 
movement rather than its creation ex nihilo. 
 There is much more scholarly consensus when it comes to periodising 
the development of Palestinian nationalism in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Both the Nakba of 1948 and the Naksa of 1967 are 
commonly identified as watershed moments for the nationalist movement. 
Helga Baumgarten’s work exemplifies this periodisation in how she 
identifies three key ‘phases/faces’ in the Palestinian nationalist movement 
since 1948. Baumgarten writes that what originated as pan-Arabism 
transmuted into exclusively Palestinian nationalism after 1967, before 
ultimately being overtaken by political Islam from the late 1980s. Each of 
these ‘phases’ of Palestinian nationalism grew out of the failure of its 
immediate predecessor, such that they all ultimately emanate from the 
Nakba.33  
The periodisation presented in this thesis is similarly anchored in the 
identification of 1948 as a watershed moment for Palestinian nationalism. 
As this thesis is most fundamentally concerned with the political history of 
the refugee camps, it follows that its analysis should adhere to the consensus 
around the Nakba’s significance (although it must be stressed that the 
original emergence of Palestinian nationalism predated 1948). Where this 
thesis takes an original route is in its analytical focus, which is concerned not 
with high politics or inter-state dynamics, but with the grass roots of both 
the Palestinian diaspora and the nationalist movement: the refugee camps. 
In incorporating an analysis based on grass roots developments, as well as 
those stemming from high politics, this thesis adds more layers to the 
periodisation laid out by Baumgarten and widely adopted in the existing 
historiography.   
                                                 
33 Helga Baumgarten, 'The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism’, Journal of  Palestine Studies, 34:4, 
2005, pp. 25-48.  
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Finally, more recent scholarship on nationalism has been characterised 
by two trends highly relevant to this thesis. First, reactions to the 
Eurocentrism of conventional theories of nationalism have resulted in an 
increasing fixation on African and Asian nationalisms. 34  The last twenty 
years have accordingly seen a rising number of studies of Arab nationalisms, 
most notably pioneered by Fred Halliday, as well as James Jankowski and 
Israel Gershoni in their joint edited volume.35 Such works have sought to 
reformulate understandings of nationalism on the basis of its development 
in the modern Middle East, thus moving away from the specificities of a 
Eurocentric approach. In the Palestinian case, works by Rashid Khalidi and 
Musa Budeiri have highlighted the role of overlapping identities; namely, 
that region, religion, kin and Arabism can coexist alongside the Palestinian 
nation in one’s self-identification without any necessary contradiction.36 This 
thesis uses the space created by such historiographical shifts to use the case 
of Palestinian nationalism as a means for questioning many conventional 
assumptions about nationalism and identity. 
The second and most recent trend in scholarship on nationalism 
concerns an increasing focus on the place of transnationalism. Rogers 
Brubaker and Craig Calhoun have both worked to revise earlier 
understandings of nationalism by considering how late 20 th century 
developments have challenged conventional ideas of the nation-state, in 
                                                 
34 See for example: Robert Malley, The Call f rom Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution, and the Turn to Islam 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Bruce J. Berman, ‘Nationalism in Post-Colonial Africa’, in 
John Breuilly (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of  the history of  nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
pp. 359-376; William Gould, Hindu Nationalism and the language of  politics in late colonial India (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004).   
35 James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni, ‘Introduction’, in James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (ed.s), 
Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. ix-xxvi. 
See also: Fred Halliday, ‘Nationalism in the Arab World since 1945’, in Breuilly (ed.), The Oxford Handbook 
of  the History of  Nationalism, pp. 435-452. 
36 Rashid Khalidi, ‘The Formation of Palestinian Identity: The Critical Years 1917-23’, in Jankowski and 
Gershoni, Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, pp. 171-190; Musa Budeiri, ‘The Palestinians: 
Tensions between Nationalist and Religious Identities’, in Jankowski and Gershoni, Rethinking Nationalism 
in the Arab Middle East, pp. 191-206. 
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view of the increasing transnationalism in both politics and business.37 In 
terms of specific case studies, Matthew Connelly provided one of the most 
influential models with his groundbreaking 2002 analysis of how the Front de 
Libération Nationale (FLN) used transnational alignments as a core element of 
its nationalist strategy for achieving Algerian independence in 1962.38 
Transnationalism has been most noticeably prevalent as a theme in 
scholarship on Kurdish nationalism - perhaps unsurprisingly, in view of the 
Kurdish people’s dispersal across numerous state borders. Martin van 
Bruinessen, Cengiz Gunes and Hamit Borzaslan have all highlighted the 
transnational nature of Kurdish national identity, and the corresponding 
transnationalism of institutions like the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 
and the Kurdish National Congress.39 Their work is especially pertinent here 
in view of the significant parallels between the Kurdish and Palestinian 
cases. This thesis accordingly makes particular use of van Bruinessen’s 
emphasis on the strong causal connection between exile and nationalism.40  
Furthermore, recent years have seen an increasing tendency for 
scholars to engage with the theme of transnationalism when analysing 
Palestinian nationalism specifically. For the purposes of this thesis, the most 
relevant of such works is Paul Chamberlin’s 2012 monograph The Global 
Offensive. Here, Chamberlin analyses the historical relationships between the 
PLO and Third Worldist movements, looking at how the Palestinian 
nationalist movement was situated on the world stage, including at the 
                                                 
37 Craig Calhoun, ‘Nationalism and the Contradictions of Modernity’, Berkeley Journal of  Sociology, 42, 1997-
98, pp. 1-30; Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010 edn). 
38 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origin of  the Po st-Cold War 
Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
39 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Transnational aspects of the Kurdish question’, Working Paper, Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, 2000; Marlies Casier and 
Olivier Grojean, ‘Between integration, autonomization and radicalisation. Hamit Borzarslan on the 
Kurdish Movement and the Turkish Left’, European Journal of  Turkish Studies, 14, 2012, 
https://journals.openedition.org/ejts/4663, accessed 29 October 2018; Cengiz Gunes, ‘Kurdish Politics in 
Turkey: “A Question of Identity”’, International Journal of  Kurdish Studies, 21:1-2, 2007, pp. 17-36.  
40 Van Bruinessen, ‘Transnational aspects of the Kurdish question’. 
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UN.41  He accordingly makes use of some of Connelly’s aforementioned 
ideas about the connections between the internationalist order and 
nationalist movements. This thesis builds on such interpretations by 
examining UNRWA’s place in this setup.  
Other recent historiography on Palestinian transnationalism is less 
directly relevant to this thesis, but has nevertheless informed the thinking 
behind it. Miriyam Aouragh, for example, argues that the internet has been 
crucial in facilitating transnational political activism in and around Palestine 42 
- making a claim more commonly found in studies of the Arab Spring.43 
This thesis similarly engages with the transnational nature of Palestinian 
political activism across the refugee camps, although its findings indicate 
that the internet provided a new tool for what was long-running trend, 
rather than initiating it.  
Elsewhere, recent historiographical contributions provide analyses of 
particular transnational connections between the Palestinians and other 
marginalised groups. Thus Steven Salaita looks at the former’s connections 
with Native Americans,44 while Michael Fischbach and Keith Feldman focus 
on their transnational solidarity with Black Power activists in the US. 45 
Salaita goes furthest in explicitly developing notions of transnationalism; his 
analysis is based around the concept of ‘inter/nationalism’, a term he 
explains as ‘an amalgamation of… solidarity, transnationalism, 
                                                 
41 Paul Chamberlin, The Global Of f ensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of  
the Post-Cold War Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
42 Miriyam Aouragh, Palestine Online: Transnationalism, the internet  and the construction of identity (London: IB 
Tauris, 2011). 
43 See for example: Nahed Eltantawy and Julie B. Wiest, ‘Social Media in the Egyptian Revolution: 
Reconsidering Resource Mobilization Theory’, International Journal of  Communication, 5, 2011, pp. 1207-1224.  
Gadi Wolsfeld, Elad Segev and Tamir Sheafer, ‘Social Media and the Arab Spring: Politics comes first’, 
International Journal of  Press/Politics, 18:2, 2013, pp. 115-137; Habibul Haque Khonkker, ‘Role of the New 
Media in the Arab Spring’, Globalizations, 8:5, 2011, pp. 675-679.  
44 Steven Salaita, Inter/Nationalism: Decolonizing Native America and Palestine (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2016).  
45 Michael Fischbach, Black Power and Palestine (Stanford: University of Stanford Press, 2018). Keith 
Feldman, A Shadow Over Palestine: The Imperial Lif e of  Race in America (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2015), ch. 2. 
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intersectionality, kinship, or intercommunalism’ among national 
communities rather than nation-states.46 
In keeping with such works, this thesis is based on the premise that 
Palestinian politics have long been characterised by transnationalist and 
internationalist elements. It draws on such themes with regard to both the 
transnational nature of UNRWA’s work – as it transcends the borders of the 
host states – and the related transnationalism of Palestinian nationalism at 
this time, as it organised itself across the borders of the shatāt (diaspora) and 
engaged with the wider world at the UN. Moreover, as much of the existing 
literature has a contemporary focus - Feldman and Salaita examine the 
Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign as an instance of 
transnationalism, 47  while Aouragh takes a similar approach to the 
International Solidarity Movement (ISM)48 - this thesis contextualises such 
cases by demonstrating the long-term presence of transnationalism in 
Palestinian national activism. 
 
Palestinian refugee camps 
The multi-faceted significance of the Palestinian refugee camps is widely 
acknowledged by scholars. While the camps were never home to the 
majority of Palestinians, or even the majority of Palestinian refugees, their 
function in sheltering the poorest and most desperate meant that they 
historically served as the largest recruiting grounds for the fida ̄’iyyīn. 
Moreover, they hold a symbolic importance, as the refugees’ decades-long 
entrenchment in the camps is taken to signify the Palestinian dedication to 
the right of return, as well as the national condition of statelessness. Khalidi, 
                                                 
46 Salaita, Inter/Nationalism, p. ix, xiv-xvii. 
47 Feldman, A Shadow Over Palestine, pp. 227-228. Salaita, Inter/Nationalism, ch. 2. 
48 Aouragh, Palestine Online, p. 19. 
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Schulz and Yezid Sayigh, along with Julie Peteet, Jeroen Gunning, Laleh 
Khalili and Rosemary Sayigh, among others, have all noted these points.49 
However, it is rare for analyses to extend far beyond this baseline 
acknowledgement of the refugees’ significance. Instead, they tend to relegate 
the refugee camp communities to a subsidiary role, whereby their 
importance to the nationalist movement is limited to providing the numbers 
to populate it. Detailed analyses of the camps’ place in Palestinian 
nationalism are rarely found in historical studies. Instead, the camp refugees 
are characterised as the ‘masses’ who followed behind the nationalist leaders 
– an interpretation encapsulated by Lebanese academic Samir Franjieh in 
1971,50 and most recently presented by Faris Giacaman in his 2013 article on 
the subject. 51  Many other historians address the political history of 
Palestinian camp communities only insofar as they have become entangled 
in the politics of the various host states. Kamal Salibi and Roger Owen have 
taken this approach concerning Lebanon; the same is true of journalists 
Robert Fisk and David Hirst, who specialise in the country.52 There is a 
smaller but still significant body of equivalent work on Jordan, such as that 
                                                 
49 Schulz, The reconstruction of  Palestinian Nationalism; Helena Lindholm Schulz, The Palestinian Diaspora: 
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Cambridge University Press, 2009); Adil Yahya,'The Role of the Refugee Camps', in Jamal Raji Nasser and 
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50 Samir Franjieh, 'How Revolutionary Is the Palestinian Resistance? A Marxist Interpretation', Journal of  
Palestine Studies, 1:2, 1972, pp. 52–60. 
51 Faris Giacaman, 'Political Representation and Armed Struggle’, Journal of  Palestine Studies, 43:1, 2013, pp. 
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52 Kamal Salibi, A House of  Many Mansions: The History of  Lebanon Reconsidered (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003); 
Roger Owen (ed.), Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon (London: Ithaca Press, 1976); Augustus R. Norton, 
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Abduction of  Lebanon (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2002); David Hirst, Beware of  Small 
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by Shaul Mishal, Naseer Aruri and Nigel Ashton.53 Such studies pay little 
attention to the histories of the camps themselves.  
 The works that do focus specifically on the refugees and the camps 
come not from historians but from scholars in other fields, chiefly 
anthropologists. In 1979 Rosemary Sayigh published her groundbreaking 
work The Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries . 54  With this, Sayigh 
challenged conventional depictions of the camp refugees as passive and 
parochial victims of fate. On the basis of extensive ethnographic fieldwork 
in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, she convincingly characterised the 
refugees as politically aware and engaged. Sayigh’s work was hugely 
influential in anthropology and the social sciences, leading to several 
revisions of previously conventional scholarly wisdom. Julie Peteet,55 Nell 
Gabiam, 56  Rochelle Davis 57  and Diana Allan 58  all followed in Sayigh’s 
footsteps when producing later anthropological studies of the camps, often 
from a micro perspective and usually concerned with Lebanon. This thesis 
builds on Sayigh’s primary contention regarding the camp communities’ 
political agency and organisation, with three important additions: first, the 
expansion of the geographical scope beyond Lebanon; second, the analysis 
of the camps’ spatial functionality; and third, the in-depth analysis of 
UNRWA’s role.  
 As the aforementioned anthropological works exemplify, there is an 
overwhelming tendency in the existing literature to focus on the camps in 
Lebanon. In many ways, this is understandable; it was in Lebanon that the 
                                                 
53 See for example: Shaul Mishal, West Bank/East Bank: The Palestinians in Jordan, 1949-1967 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1978); Naseer Aruri, 'The PLO and the Jordan Option', Third World Quarterly, 7:4, 
1985, pp. 882–906; Nigel J. Ashton, King Hussein of  Jordan: A Political Lif e (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2008).  
54 R. Sayigh, The Palestinians. 
55 Peteet, Landscape of  Hope and Despair. 
56 Nell Gabiam, The Politics of  Suf f ering: Syria’s Palestinian refugee camps (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 
2016).   
57 Rochelle Davis, Palestinian Village Histories: Geographies of  the Displaced (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2011).  
58 Diana Allan, Refugees of  the Revolution: Experiences of  Palestinian Exile (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2014).  
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PLO established and ran its ‘state-within-a-state’ in the 1970s, and in 
Lebanon that the camps have had arguably the greatest impact on both 
Palestinian politics and those of the region as a whole. However, this 
‘Lebanon-centrism’ within the literature, has resulted in the framing of these 
studies by the specific circumstances of the Lebanese state, rather than an 
analysis of the driving features of the camps themselves. A wider 
examination of the Palestinian camps across the Levant will allow for a 
closer scrutiny of these spaces, including some consideration of the 
institutional framework of the Agency responsible for them: UNRWA.  
 With this in mind, this thesis breaks new ground by examining the 
camps not only in Lebanon but also across the four other geographical 
fields in which they are located: Syria, Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza. As 
such it is the first macro study of the camps’ history across the region. Parts 
of the thesis do retain a particular focus on Lebanon (chiefly in Chapters 
Two and Five), in view of its historical importance as outlined above. 
However, this focus is positioned within the framework of a broader 
transnational study. In this way the thesis acknowledges and unpacks the 
field’s distinct significance as part of a wider examination of the region as a 
whole, rather than simply in isolation.  
 Moreover, this thesis engages closely what defines the camps as spaces. 
This aspect of their importance is largely overlooked; few existing studies 
address their spatial function, and certainly not using a historical approach 
and methodology. As already mentioned, the existing literature 
acknowledges the camps’ symbolic importance, but only in terms of the 
remaining presence of the refugees therein. Like the refugees, the camps 
themselves usually feature in the historiography in a subsidiary capacity, as 
launching pads or recruiting grounds for the nationalist organisations.59  
                                                 
59 See for example: Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising - Israel’s Third Front  (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1990); Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, Israel’s Lebanon War (London: Allen & 
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The consideration and assessment of the camps as spaces accordingly 
constitutes one of this thesis’ most important contributions to the 
historiography. It will situate the Palestinian refugee camps within broader 
relevant literature, particularly that of anthropologist Liisa Malkki on 
displacement and humanitarianism. In her 1995 book Purity and Exile, 
Malkki argued that the distinctive spatial nature of Hutu refugee camps in 
Tanzania serves to generate a much stronger sense of ethnic identity than 
can be found among those who have settled in the towns.60 This thesis takes 
a similar approach in looking at the significance of the spatial construction 
of the Palestinian refugee camps vis-à-vis national identity in exile.  
Furthermore, the analysis here engages with scholarship about the 
cognitive connection between defined territories and people’s perceptions of 
themselves in relation to the nation-state. David Newman, Anssi Paasi and 
Hanne Eggen Røislien have all written in different ways about this  subject, 
examining the intersection between political geography and national identity 
- a theme with strong relevance here.61 However, while Newman, Paasi and 
Røislien are concerned with the territoriality of states, this thesis applies 
such an approach to the territoriality of the Palestinian refugee camps. In so 
doing, it sheds new light on these camps’ transformation from spaces of 
external control to spaces of Palestinian autonomy. 
 
UNRWA 
As noted above, the research presented here is not exclusively concerned 
with the camps, but also engages with their institutional framework as 
                                                                                                                                            
Sayigh, 'The Palestinian Identity Among Camp Residents', Journal of  Palestine Studies, 6:3, 1977, pp. 3–22; 
Fuad Jabber, 'The Arab Regimes and the Palestinian Revolution, 1967-71', Journal of  Palestine Studies, 2:2, 
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1967 to October 1973', Middle Eastern Studies, 20:3, 1984, pp. 290–323; Franjieh, 'How Revolutionary Is the 
Palestinian Resistance? A Marxist Interpretation'. 
60 See for example: R. Sayigh, The Palestinians; Shabaneh, 'Education and Identity'. 
61 David Newman and Anssi Paasi, ‘Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World: Boundary 
Narratives in Political Geography’, Progress in Human Geography, 22:2, 1998, pp. 186-207. Hanne Eggen 
Røislien, ‘Where is the state of Israel? Testimonies from IDF Nachal soldiers on Israel’s territorial 
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provided by UNRWA. The Agency has been largely absent from historical 
scholarship on Palestinian politics, perhaps due to its ostensibly apolitical 
status. Academic studies of the Agency come mostly from social scientists 
concerned with its relief services and socio-economic impact rather than its 
political significance.62 For example, Michael Dumper, Randa Farah and Sari 
Hanafi have all examined the Agency’s work in the camps in relation to 
housing, employment and health.63  
 The literature on UNRWA has come foremost from social scientists 
looking at its organisational and departmental structures. Maya Rosenfeld, 
Benjamin Schiff and Jalal Al Husseini have all taken this approach in order 
to assess how the Agency operates.64 Their work includes examinations of 
UNRWA’s policy developments across the years, particularly its shift in 
focus from relief to resettlement and later to development and capacity-
building. Many have focused on more recent decades, with few scholars 
looking in depth at the period prior to the first intifada in 1987. Schiff’s 1995 
monograph Refugees unto the Third Generation is an exception, providing a 
near-comprehensive account of UNRWA’s operational development and 
challenges from 1950 to the late 1980s. 65  However, Schiff’s work is an 
institutional study rather than an analysis of UNRWA’s historical role in 
Palestinian politics.  
                                                 
62 See for example: Phillip Misselwitz and Sari Hanafi, 'Testing a New Paradigm: UNRWA’s Camp 
Improvement Programme', Refugee Survey Quarterly, 28:2–3, March 2010, pp. 360–88; Hisham Jabr, 'Housing 
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 Analyses that do address UNRWA’s political importance have tended 
to come in the form of highly partisan critiques.66 Many of the most striking 
such works come from the aforementioned Asaf Romirowksy, who 
positions himself as both a political analyst and an academic researcher. 
According to Romirowsky, UNRWA is an essentially political organisation 
that has not only enabled Palestinian nationalism but actually facilitated acts 
of terrorism, all the while deliberately maintaining the Palestinian refugee 
problem for political motives.67 Unsurprisingly, Romirowsky’s arguments are 
controversial and appear irreconcilable with the fact that until the beginning 
of 2018, UNRWA consistently received most of its funding from Israel’s 
closest ally, the US.68  Romirowksy’s failure to address this fundamental 
contradiction means that his attempts to examine UNRWA’s political role 
are plagued by a lack of intellectual rigour. 
 Aside from Romirowsky, recent years have seen a small number of 
scholars start to examine UNRWA within the framework of Palestinian 
political nationalism. Here too there has been a preponderance of political 
science, resulting in a contemporary focus. Jalal Al Husseini has written 
about UNRWA’s role in Palestinian politics from a top-down perspective, 
focussing on the relationship between UNRWA and the PLO.69 Along with 
Riccardo Bocco and Randa Farah, Al Husseini has also explored the politica l 
                                                 
66 See for example: David Bedein, Roadblock to Peace. How the UN Perpetuates the Arab-Israeli Conf lict: 
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tension between the Agency and the refugees over issues such as school 
syllabi and camp development. 70  Moreover, Michael Fischbach has 
examined the implications of UNRWA’s work for the fulfilment of the 
Palestinian refugees’ political rights.71 Yet they have all done so from a top-
down perspective, without any in-depth analysis of Palestinian nationalist 
consciousness among the refugees. 
 The most explicit study of the connection between UNRWA and 
Palestinian nationalism comes from Ghassan Shabaneh, who argues that the 
Agency’s fulfilment of state functions directly facilitated the reconstruction 
of Palestinian political nationalism after 1948.72 In focussing so explicitly on 
UNRWA’s role in Palestinian nationalism, Shabaneh takes a major step 
forward for studies of the Agency. He has significantly developed the ideas 
of some of the aforementioned scholars, who have looked at the Agency’s 
place in Palestinian politics to a lesser extent, and he convincingly makes the 
case for the significance of UNRWA schools in fostering a national identity 
among refugees. He also shows how the continuing existence of the camps 
facilitated national cohesion. However, Shabaneh’s analysis is limited to the 
contemporary era and does not probe historical developments in any depth. 
This thesis builds on Shabaneh’s foundation in order to do so. It 
explores not only how UNRWA operated as a quasi-state force to facilitate 
the development of nationalism in the camps, but also how its services 
influenced the movement in terms of both ideology and strategy. How did 
UNRWA’s large-scale education programme – acknowledged by Shabaneh 
as a vitally important force in the camps – affect conceptions of the state 
among Palestinian refugees? It is known that the nationalist organisations 
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recruited their members largely from the camps; how did the long-term 
presence of an international Agency in those same camps affect their 
strategy? The examination of these questions here will challenge the existing 
scholarship, but also build on it, and develop it. The thesis will draw upon 
these studies to better understand how UNRWA’s shifting services affected 
the refugees’ sense of national identity and their struggle for statehood.  
 This thesis will also make use of the core analysis of UNRWA 
provided by several legal scholars. Susan Akram, Jeff Handmaker and Lex 
Takkenberg73 have all examined how the Agency’s mandate functions and 
what this means for the Palestinian refugees. In the process, they explain 
how UNRWA has inadvertently shaped Palestinian identity in exile by 
determining who ‘counts’ as a ‘Palestinian refugee’. Their explanations often 
include some consideration of how UNRWA’s mandate and operations 
have maintained the Palestinians’ distinctiveness – partly because they are 
the only refugee population in the world not served by UNHCR. 74 This 
thesis builds on such analyses so as to challenge the scholarly tendency to 
take at face value UNRWA’s self-definition as apolitical. In so doing it will 
advance the historiography, both by highlighting UNRWA’s multi-faceted 
significance, and by reaching before the first intifada to analyse the Agency’s 
historical role in shaping Palestinian political nationalism in the camps. 
Three pertinent points have been established by scholars thus far: that 
the refugee camps were central to the rise of Palestinian political nationalism 
after 1967; that the UN has played a significant role in Palestinian history 
since the dying days of the British Mandate; and that UNRWA has been a 
pivotal force in managing the refugee camps since it was established in 1949 
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(albeit this third point has been made mostly by social scientists rather than 
historians).75 Yet the implications of these points remain unexamined. How 
did UNRWA contribute intentionally or inadvertently to the Palestinian 
political nationalism that developed in the camps after 1967? How did its 
place within the UN influence the strategy of the nationalist movement? 
Despite its absence from the historiography, UNRWA has great relevance to 
Palestinian national history. In demonstrating how, this research facilitates a 
greater understanding of the true nature of Palestinian nationalism and the 
factors that shaped it.  
 
Analytical framework 
 
The analysis undertaken in this thesis is grounded in theories of nationalism, 
national identity and national consciousness, and the relationship of these 
concepts to the state, transnationalism and internationalism. The analytical 
framework is constructed using particular conceptions of these complex 
terms, drawing on the theories outlined below.  
 
Nations, nationalism and the state 
Modernist conceptions of nationalism form the backbone of this thesis. The 
analytical framework is adopted from Benedict Anderson’s aforementioned 
theory of nationalism as a shared collective ‘imagining’ of one’s communal 
identity. Not all of Anderson’s ideas are applied here; Eurocentric elements 
such as his fixation on ‘print-capitalism’ are left out. Nevertheless, this thesis 
broadly aligns with Anderson’s definition of the national community as ‘a 
deep, horizontal comradeship’ that is not predetermined and fixed, but 
rather shaped by historical developments.76 The particular focus here is on 
                                                 
75 See for example: Benjamin Schiff, 'Between Occupier and Occupied: UNRWA in the West Bank and the 
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which developments shaped it, at what times and in what ways. This thesis 
argues that one key factor was the presence of the international organisation 
that came to partially fill the role of the state in the Palestinian refugee 
camps: UNRWA.  
 In its assessment of UNRWA’s role in the Palestinians’ national 
consciousness, this thesis also applies the ideas of another modernist 
theorist of nationalism: Ernest Gellner. Like Anderson, Gellner sees 
national identity as the variable product of particular conditions, but unlike 
Anderson he is less concerned with national communities’ self-perception 
and more focussed on the role of the state. Gellner defines nationalism as ‘a 
theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should 
not cut across political ones.’ Nationalism therefore presupposes political-
ethnic congruence - a presupposition promoted and driven by modern states 
as a tool for promoting their own power and legitimacy. Accordingly, 
Gellner argues that nationalism has generally emerged in the state’s 
‘conspicuous presence’, and very rarely in its absence.77  
 Ostensibly, the Palestinian case poses a challenge to Gellner’s state-
centric theory; here is a pervasive national identity that has not only survived 
but in fact flourished in the decades-long absence of a state. Accordingly, this 
thesis does not adopt Gellner’s ideas unquestioningly but rather takes a 
critical approach that synthesises his state-centric theory with more populist 
conceptualisations of nationalism. Using a critical evaluation of Gellner’s 
modernist framework, this thesis looks at how UNRWA’s quasi-
governmental role facilitated the development of this pre-existing nationalism 
across the camps. In investigating UNRWA in this guise, this thesis also 
adopts and applies the ideas of Michael Kagan, who contends that the UN 
often acts as a quasi-state in refugee situations. 78  While Kagan’s work 
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focuses on UNHCR, his ideas are arguably better suited to UNRWA, to 
which they are applied here.  
 
Transnationalism and internationalism 
To examine UNRWA’s transnationalist role, this thesis draws on the ideas 
of Michael Kearney. Kearney defines ‘transnationalism’ in terms of 
processes that are anchored in numerous nation-states while simultaneously 
transcending them. 79  The former point is crucial, as it means that 
transnationalism is not separate to or detached from the concept of the 
nation-state, but rather embedded in it. Raka Ray similarly argues that the 
concept of transnationalism presupposes the existence of the nation-state – 
or more accurately, of numerous nation-states.80 This thesis applies such 
ideas to the transnational aspect of UNRWA’s work, as the latter 
implemented the same structures across the state borders of the five fields. 
Kearney also cites migration itself as an obvious example of 
transnationalism, thus underlining its applicability to the Palestinian refugee 
case.81  
UNRWA’s transnationalism is juxtaposed with its internationalism. To 
assess the latter, the analysis here is grounded in notions of the post -1945 
new global order, in which power was increasingly expressed through 
certified international dynamics - a development examined in depth by 
historian Mark Mazower.82 Various historians have previously made use of 
such ideas, mostly notably Matthew Connelly in his aforementioned study of 
how the FLN won the Algerian campaign for independence not on the 
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battlefield but on the global diplomatic stage.83 Paul Chamberlin has made 
similar points when studying the historical strategies of the PLO, although 
UNRWA was absent from his analysis.84 In keeping with such approaches, 
this thesis assesses how UNRWA fitted into the internationalist strategy of 
the Palestinian nationalist movement. 
 
The refugee camp as a space  
In addition to UNRWA’s work, the other unit of analysis here is that of the 
Palestinian refugee camp. To assess the latter, this thesis applies a modified 
version of Giorgio Agamben’s ideas about camps as ‘spaces of exception’. 
Agamben contends that ‘the camp’ – meaning any demarcated area 
containing a concentrated population – is a space that exists outside the 
usual socio-political norms. As a result, exceptional standards become the 
norm therein. 85  This conceptualisation is arguably applicable to the 
Palestinian refugee camps, the separateness of which has become embedded 
over many decades and is reinforced in some host states (most notably 
Lebanon) by their exclusion from the government’s jurisdiction. 
 However, Agamben’s theory is flawed in how it depoliticises the camps 
and underplays the refugees themselves. It is also ahistorical; in treating the 
camp as a standard unit and drawing generalities accordingly, Agamben 
impedes the possibility of analysing the specific contextual factors shaping 
particular camps. This thesis therefore modifies Agamben’s theory so as to 
acknowledge the exceptionalism of the Palestinian refugee camps without 
disregarding the influence of the states that host them, the UN agency that 
administers them, and the refugees who reside in them. In the process, it is 
further informed by the ideas of Adam Ramadan and Simon Turner, who 
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speak of ‘overlapping’ and  ‘hybrid’ sovereignties in refugee camps, rather 
than treating them as hermetically sealed from their surroundings.86 The 
resulting analytical framework makes it possible to assess the Palestinian 
refugee camps as unique spaces whilst still taking a historical approach to 
understanding the particular reasons for their development over time. 
 
Methodology and sources 
 
While Palestinian history is one of the most intensively studied subjects in 
academia, it is also one of the most difficult to examine. The ongoing nature 
of the Palestinian refugee crisis – still unresolved 70 years after it began – 
makes it especially imperative to approach any historical study of the subject 
with care. This is exacerbated further by the heavy politicisation and major 
controversies of Palestinian and Israeli history, not to mention the Arab-
Israeli conflict more broadly, which risk clouding any objective historical 
work. 
Researching a stateless and dispersed people like the Palestinians 
creates particular methodological changes. The findings of this thesis are 
based on empirical research and qualitative methodology, investigating 
questions about experiences, causation and impact in a particular socio-
political setting. Archival documents form the backbone of this thesis, 
supplemented with a small number of non-archival written sources as well 
as oral history. However, the peculiarities of the Palestinian situation have 
made locating and accessing these sources a complex process. Most 
significantly, the absence of a Palestinian national archive means that 
sources must be pieced together instead from a range of different 
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collections around the region and the world.87 To these practical challenges 
can be added the complex implications of archival curation and 
classification, as discussed by Ann Laura Stoler in her influential work, and 
the resulting need for care when working with documentary collections.88 
Recent years have seen an increasing focus on the issues surrounding 
Palestinian archives, particularly in the context of continuing political 
upheaval and conflict in the Middle East. In 2009, Beshara Doumani 
commented on the rising interest in archives in Palestinian society, tying it 
to the ongoing national dispossession and the democratising impact of 
archival digitisation.89 Three years later, historian Lauren Banko built on 
both Doumani’s observations and the earlier work of anthropologist Ted 
Swedenburg90 to write an in-depth account of the methodological challenges 
that academics encounter when seeking to research Palestinian history. 91  
Banko contended that the rising interest in archives is juxtaposed with a 
serious set of obstacles to accessing archival collections in the West Bank 
and Jerusalem, particularly but not exclusively for Palestinian historians.  
Such scholarship from Banko, Swedenburg and Doumani has helped 
inform the organisation of this research. Aware of the methodological 
repercussions of this subject’s heavy politicisation, I sought to construct my 
research questions in such a way that they could be investigated using 
sources that are sufficiently plentiful, accessible and reliable. In planning my 
research, I drew particularly heavily on the discussions in Salim Tamari’s 
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edited volume on researching Palestinian refugee history.92  This volume sees 
Tamari et al assess the scholarly implications of the sources’ global dispersal, 
and the challenges of compiling a comprehensive narrative in view of this. 
As Tamari is one of the few scholars to have conducted research in 
UNRWA’s archive, his analysis is particularly pertinent to this thesis.  
When it comes to this research project, matters are complicated further 
by the fact that the contemporary situation in UNRWA’s five fields is hardly 
conducive to academic research of any kind. When I began my PhD in 
2014, Syria was in its third year of civil war, while Gaza had been under a 
continuous blockade for seven years. Both situations are ongoing at the time 
of writing today. While I had hoped to conduct research in the West Bank 
and Israel, I was unfortunately denied access at the Allenby Bridge.93 This 
was particularly regrettable as the Israeli State Archives house a considerable 
collection of documents relevant to Palestinian history both before and after 
1948.94 As a result, my research has mostly been conducted in UNRWA’s 
remaining two fields of operation: Lebanon and Jordan.  
 Fortunately, these two fields contain considerable archival material. 
Lebanon, probably the most open country in the Arab world, has a range of 
archival collections, detailed comprehensively by Sara Scalenghe and Nadya 
Sbaiti in their 2004 series of articles.95 Having hosted the PLO headquarters 
for much of the period discussed in this thesis, Lebanon is still home to a 
number of important documents about Palestinian history. Of particular 
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relevance to this thesis are those held by the Institute for Palestine Studies 
(IPS), and the American University of Beirut (AUB) archive at the Nami 
Jafet Memorial Library.  
In particular, the IPS holds the back catalogues of Palestinian 
nationalist journals including the PLO’s Palestine: PLO Information Bulletin 
(1975-91) and Samed (1978-2013), as well as the back catalogue of 
UNRWA’s newsletter Palestine Refugees Today (first published in 1960). Used 
in tandem with UNRWA’s internal documentation, the latter collection is 
particularly useful for illuminating the nature of the Agency’s external 
communications and the differences between its private and public faces. 
Indeed, this latter contrast is reflected in the variation between the contents 
of the public communications found at the IPS, and that of the behind-the-
scenes documents in UNRWA’s own collection, discussed below.  
There is a further contrast with the sources found at the AUB archive, 
which contains historical posters and literature from Palestinian nationalist 
organisations during the thawra era. These provide important information 
about the Palestinian political discourse at this critical time, which often 
serves as vital context for understanding the UNRWA documents discussed 
above. This serves as just one example of the value of using various archival 
collections in tandem. While AUB has been working for several years on its 
Palestinian Oral History Archive, it is not yet available to researchers and 
therefore did not form part of this research.96  
 Meanwhile, Jordan is home to the primary archive of UNRWA itself, 
which is situated in the Agency’s Headquarters compound on the outskirts 
of Amman. Known as the Central Registry, this archive constitutes a huge 
and largely untapped resource, containing a vast span of data and records 
about Palestinian refugee history since the late 1940s. As it is usually closed, 
much of its material remains unknown to researchers, and I was lucky to be 
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granted access for the purposes of this project. As a result, this thesis is 
based on a considerable quantity of material previously unseen by 
academics. The sources in question include internal memos, planning 
documents, meeting notes and correspondence. Policy records and legal 
advisory letters provide evidence of UNRWA’s activities and impact in the 
camps over the years. Historical memoranda and meeting notes reveal the 
nature of internal discussions over the Agency’s work and its relations with 
the refugee communities across the various camps.  
 Moreover, the Central Registry holds planning documents for 
UNRWA’s large-scale education programme, which by the 1970s had 
become an increasingly central element of both Agency activity and refugee 
life in the camps. The school syllabi and documentation about staff strikes 
indicate the major struggles that went on between the Agency’s attempts to 
enforce international protocols, and the refugees’ efforts to incorporate 
nationalist ideology into their education system. Many documents in the 
Central Registry also illuminate the perspective of the refugees themselves, 
as the trail of correspondence between camp representatives and UNRWA 
staff demonstrates how this relationship evolved over time and indicates the 
major points of tension. Finally, correspondence between senior Agency 
management, host state authorities and donor governments provides 
important information about international perceptions of UNRWA’s 
evolving role and relationships. 
 The Central Registry is not without methodological challenges, 
however. As a closed archive, it lacks comprehensive organisation and has 
no classification system in place. As Salim Tamari and Elia Zureik note in 
the aforementioned volume, institutional failure to implement a coherent 
system of record-keeping over the years has resulted in gaps. Repeated 
geographical relocations have compounded this. To this day, the UNRWA 
Central Registry does not serve as the Agency’s comprehensive archive; 
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some files are housed at UNRWA’s centre in Gaza instead, although these 
cover more recent years and were therefore not needed for this thesis.97 Of 
bigger methodological concern were the possible gaps in its records, made 
worse by insufficient information about what had been maintained and 
disposed of over the years. The absence of an archivist in Amman 
exacerbates the issues; instead, researchers like myself must liaise with 
different administrators over which files they wish to consult.  
 Partly to counter these archival limitations, I consulted further 
UNRWA documents at the UN’s main archive in New York. This archive 
contains records of the Agency’s communications with  UN Headquarters, 
and thus provides crucial background information for analysing the context 
in which UNRWA’s policies were planned, as well as details about the 
Agency’s intended strategic purpose and its relationships with central UN 
departments. Correspondence with and about the PLO also illuminates this 
perspective, revealing how those within the PLO perceived UNRWA’s role 
and vice versa. Moreover, the UN’s online record collection includes 
resolutions, statements and annual reports highly relevant to the study of 
UNRWA’s work in the camps.98  
 My work in the New York archive alongside the Amman collection 
turned out to be especially significant in view of the distinctions between 
their contents. While several files are duplicated in both collections, there 
are also noticeable differences. I viewed certain documents in New York to 
which I was denied access in Amman, usually concerning relations with the 
PLO. Sources from the New York archive were also particularly illuminating 
about the UN Secretariat’s concerns over UNRWA’s potential politicisation, 
and thus indicated the complexity and variation within the UN. The fact 
that it was permissible to photograph and copy sources in New York, but 
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not in Amman – even when viewing the same documents – further 
highlighting the differentiation. Again, this demonstrates the methodological 
value in using various archival collections in tandem, particularly when they 
contain significant gaps.  
In addition to these sources, this thesis also draws on a small number 
of archival collections in the UK, which is pertinent as the former Mandate 
power in Palestine and UNRWA’s second biggest donor state, after the US. 
The British National Archives in London hold accounts of discussions in 
government and diplomatic circles about UNRWA, the refugee camps and 
Palestinian politics. They also have records of historical UN debates over 
UNRWA, discussions among the Agency’s donor states, and information 
about high points of tension and difficulties in the Agency’s operations.  
Meanwhile Oxford University’s Middle East Centre Archive (MECA) 
holds numerous records from independent organisations – chiefly aid 
agencies – that operated in the Levant in the mid-twentieth century. These 
include reports about the Palestinian refugee camps in the early years of 
UNRWA’s operations, which are useful for tracing the camps’ development 
across the decades. The reports also feature observations about the refugees’ 
reactions to the Agency’s creation and operations. Additionally, Oxford 
University’s website ‘The Palestinian Revolution’ contains a wealth of 
primary source material pertinent to this study, including memoirs, 
declarations, communiqués, and excerpts from nationalist publications.99 
 There are other archival collections relevant to the history of 
Palestinian nationalism that have regrettably been lost to researchers. As 
part of its moves to establish a government-in-exile, the PLO itself created 
an archive in Lebanon in the 1970s. Its Beirut-based Palestinian Research 
Centre (PRC) worked to produce literature about the national cause, 
publishing monographs and essays about Palestine and Israel. When the 
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Israeli army besieged Beirut in 1982, it looted the PRC archives and 
destroyed the buildings housing these materials. 100 Israeli scholar Raphael 
Israeli, who subsequently gained access to the seized files, published some 
of them in his edited volume PLO in Lebanon: Selected documents, along with 
his own analysis.101 The publication was highly controversial, with Yezid 
Sayigh and Rashid Khalidi contending that it was selective, inaccurate, 
poorly translated, and deliberately misleading. 102  The scarcity of PLO 
sources has compelled me to use Israeli’s book for my research here, 
although I have relied on my own translations.  
 Of course, Israeli’s book contains only a tiny proportion of the full 
body of PLO archival documents. Although the Israeli government returned 
some of seized PLO documents as part of a prisoner swap in 1983, the 
material has not been preserved for posterity. In a detailed study in 2016, 
archivist Hana Sleiman succeeded in tracing the remains of the PLO archive 
to the Algerian desert, where it is now damaged and inaccessible.103 Many 
other Palestinian sources, from the PLO and otherwise, are in Israel, 
although not necessarily accessible to researchers. The process of making 
them so is ongoing; historian Rona Sela recently gained access to Palestinian 
photos and films that were seized in 1982, and has been working to make 
them available.104 
 It is important to note that a considerable number of sources relevant 
to Palestinian history are in fact non-literate. In recent decades, oral history 
has become a hugely popular methodology for researching Palestinian 
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topics, particularly in the refugee camps. A substantial proportion of 
scholarship on the Palestinian refugee camps, much of it very influential, has 
drawn on oral history ethnographies. This formed the basis of Rosemary 
Sayigh’s groundbreaking work The Palestinians,105 first published in 1979, and 
was also used in aforementioned more recent anthropological studies by 
Peteet, Davis, Allan, and Gabiam.106 
The use of oral history has numerous advantages in reducing 
researchers’ reliance on the aforementioned problematic archives. However, 
it is not free of problems either. Like documentary sources – and particularly 
written memoirs and testimonies - oral history interviews and questionnaires 
can be blighted by faulty memories, dishonesty and reticence, as well as 
‘retrospective bias’ whereby individuals’ memories of historical events are 
influenced by subsequent developments. Furthermore, there are specific 
criticisms and controversies attached to the use of oral history methodology 
when researching the Palestinian refugee camps. In 2012, Mayssoun 
Sukarieh and Stuart Tannock published an influential art icle arguing that 
fieldwork has now become damaging to the refugee camps, using Shatila as 
an example.107 The article triggered new discussions in the academy about 
the impact of intensive fieldwork in Palestinian camps,108 with calls from 
some refugees for an end to the practice.109  
 Partly because of these concerns, oral history interviews are used as a 
supplementary source in this thesis, rather than forming the backbone of the 
research. In Jordan, Lebanon, the Netherlands, the US and the UK, I 
conducted interviews with current and former senior UNRWA management 
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to find out more about the Agency. My interviewees included the former 
UNRWA Commissioner-General Filippo Grandi; the Director of 
UNRWA’s Representative Office in New York; the Head of the UNRWA 
Ethics Office; the Director of UNRWA’s Representative Office in 
Washington DC; and a former Gaza Programme Officer. I was also able to 
speak to some Palestinian refugees who had encountered UNRWA in 
various guises, including Abdel Bari Atwan, Afif Safieh, Salman Abu Sitta 
and Abdelfattah Abu Srour. Their testimonies enriched the documentary 
evidence with personal anecdotes and accounts of the daily reality of 
Palestinian exile. 
In addition to these archival documents and oral evidence, the research 
here is supplemented with a small number of published primary sources. 
These largely consist of memoirs published by Palestinian refugees, 
nationalist leaders and UN officials. Of particular value is the burgeoning 
genre of Anglophone memoirs by Palestinian refugees, often recounting life 
in the camps. First pioneered by Fawaz Turki with The Disinherited in 1972, 
this field has become increasingly populated over the years.110 Turki himself 
went on to publish two more autobiographical accounts,111 and has since 
been joined by Ghada Karmi, Abdel Bari Atwan, Ramzy Baroud and Salman 
Abu Sitta, all Palestinian refugees themselves. 112  Palestinian nationalist 
figures Abu Iyad, Bassam Abu Sharif, Shafiq al Hout, Leila Khaled and 
Mu’in Basisu have also published their memoirs. 113  An important recent 
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contribution came with Yasir Suleiman’s 2016 edited collection of 
testimonies from Palestinians around the world, including several who had 
grown up in camps during the thawra period.114  As such, it has proved 
invaluable for this thesis. From UNRWA’s side, only John Davis 
(Commissioner-General from 1959-63) has published a memoir, which is 
also used as a source here.115 
As is the case with all primary sources, published memoirs should be 
approached critically. In common with oral history sources in particular, 
they can be subject to the flaws of memory and the potential for 
retrospective bias.  Nevertheless, they comprise an important source for 
retaining the refugees’ agency by relaying their experiences and perceptions 
of UNRWA. All these testimonies and recollections are used to enrich the 
archival findings. It is clear that there is no straightforward route to 
researching Palestinian history. Without disregarding the numerous potential 
pitfalls, this thesis seeks to counter the methodological challenges by way of 
careful research that draws on a broad base of primary source material, 
comprising both written and oral elements and taken from a wide 
geographical range of national and organisational archives.  
 
Chapter structure 
 
This thesis is organised into six chapters, each of which probes a different 
element of the dynamics between UNRWA, the Palestinian refugees, and 
the nationalist movement during the thawra period. Chapter One covers the 
establishment of UNRWA and the basics of its set-up in the camps. It 
identifies and analyses the key developments of the first period of 
UNRWA’s operations, from its creation in 1949 until 1957, when it 
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abandoned the resettlement drive that characterised its early work. The 
chapter thus establishes the objectives with which UNRWA was originally 
created, the foundations of its relationship with the refugees themselves, and 
the early components of its role in the camps. In so doing, it shows that this 
early period established the foundational framework of UNRWA’s 
operations in three ways: the Agency’s formative and quasi-governmental 
role in the refugees’ experiences of exile; the refugees’ view of UNRWA as a 
political body; and the complex and intimate nature of the relationship 
between the two. 
Building on this, Chapter Two then examines the nationalistic 
transformation of the refugee camps, brought about by the impact of the 
1967 War and the resulting Palestinian thawra. It defines the content and 
nature of the Palestinian nationalist movement that became so dominant at 
this time, and in doing so sets the scene for the subsequent analysis of how 
this movement intersected with UNRWA. Chapter Two establishes a 
number of points that are critical to this thesis’ central argument: that 
UNRWA played a key role in shaping the identity of the camps; that the 
camps as spaces were central to the Palestinian nationalist movement’s re-
emergence after 1967; and that the refugees themselves, far from being 
passive victims, were active in driving events and shaping the dynamics of 
the environment in which they found themselves.  
The remaining chapters are organised thematically, each addressing 
different elements of the Agency’s relationships, function and impact in the 
years 1967-82. Chapter Three looks at UNRWA’s ‘international re lations’ 
with the Arab host states, the Western donor states, and Israel. It asks how 
UNRWA’s inherent reliance on the global order shaped its role in the camps 
and its political positioning after 1967. Central to this chapter is the 
argument that UNRWA’s international relations reflected its hybrid identity 
as a quasi-state, an aid agency, and an international body consumed in a 
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nationalistic environment. The chapter also highlights common themes in 
UNRWA’s relations, particularly the fact that it was consistently perceived 
on all sides as a political body, albeit in different ways and with different 
implications. It underlines the Agency’s inherent internationalism, which is 
juxtaposed elsewhere in the thesis with the fervent nationalism of its 
environment.  
Chapter Four probes many of the same questions but from a different 
angle. It focuses on UNRWA’s relationship with the Palestinian refugees it 
served, asking how the latter perceived and related to the Agency at a time 
of nationalist fervour in the camps. Flagging up the complexity of 
UNRWA’s role – a point previously highlighted in Chapter Three – Chapter 
Four argues that the refugees saw the Agency’s work as international 
evidence of their political rights. This meant that despite its claims to be 
apolitical, UNRWA played an essential, if inadvertent, role in the refugees’ 
understanding of their national identity and their national struggle – two 
concepts with highly political meanings.  
Chapter Five builds on the foundations established in the previous 
chapters to engage closely with the dynamics and questions at the heart of 
this thesis. It examines how UNRWA’s long-term presence and 
programmes in the camps affected nationalist ideas and national identity 
among the Palestinian refugees. Drawing on modernist theories of 
nationalism, Chapter Five argues that as the closest thing the refugees had to 
a national government in the camp, UNRWA played an essential role in how 
nationalist ideas were constructed at this time and in this setting. The 
Agency’s registration policy and education programme had an especially 
potent impact, with the result that its work became ‘Palestinianised’ just as 
the nationalist movement became to some extent ‘internationalised’. 
Finally, Chapter Six drills down on this latter point to probe how the 
Palestinian nationalist structures of the PLO saw and made use of UNRWA 
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at this time. Underlying this analysis is the supposition that the PLO 
institutionalised Palestinian nationalism; as such, its interactions with 
UNRWA are vital for understanding the latter’s relationship with this 
movement. With this in mind, Chapter Six argues that the PLO formally 
represented the paradoxical nature of the refugees’ views of UNRWA; while 
criticising the Agency’s politics and seeking to contain its power in the 
camps, the PLO simultaneously recognised the need for its services. It 
accordingly sought to make use of the potential that UNRWA’s 
international status provided to its political cause, by using the Agency as a 
tool for accessing the ‘international community’ and gaining legitimacy for 
its struggle at the UN. 
 Over the course of these six chapters, this thesis breaks new ground in 
the scholarly understanding of Palestinian national history, and the place of 
UNRWA and the refugee camps therein. In recasting UNRWA as a body of 
political significance, and recasting Palestinian nationalism as an 
internationally-engaged movement, it challenges the conventional 
understanding of a topic with far-reaching historical and contemporary 
important. The resulting analysis is one with deep-seated relevance not only 
to Palestinian history, but also to the wider history of the Levant, as well as 
the UN, the notion of the refugee camp, and the intersection between 
migration and national identity in the twentieth century. 
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Chapter One: 
The Establishment of UNRWA, c.1949-57 
 
‘[UNRWA] was created for the purpose of transferring the refugees from direct relief to 
works projects…. By so doing it was felt that the morale of the refugees would be improved 
and that they would be reintegrated into the economy of the Near East instead of 
deteriorating in idleness…’1 
Howard Kennedy, UNRWA director, June 1950 
 
From a very early stage, UNRWA played an essential formative role in the 
refugees’ experiences of exile. The Agency was established the year after the 
Nakba to serve the refugees’ needs, and quickly became the closest thing 
many of them had to a government. Its quasi-governmental function was 
particularly noticeable in the refugee camps, which the host states largely 
disregarded except when it came to security. As the Palestinian refugees 
remained stateless, UNRWA became an intricate part of their daily lives, 
administering large-scale healthcare and education programmes. Its presence 
and services would later gain a heavily politicised significance, inadvertently 
contributing to the new forms of Palestinian political nationalism that 
emerged after the 1967 Arab defeat. Yet the foundations for this were 
established much earlier, during the first period of UNRWA’s operations.  
This chapter examines UNRWA’s origins and its role among the 
Palestinians in the first era of its work, from the beginning of the refugee 
crisis until the Agency’s abandonment of its early resettlement policy in 
1957. It explores the impact of UNRWA’s creation and services, the 
refugees’ responses to the latter, and the lasting significance of these years. 
It is argued here that the developments of this period laid the foundations 
for UNRWA’s later role in Palestinian political nationalism, in two key ways.  
Firstly, this period saw UNRWA establish itself as a quasi-
governmental body, closely entwined with the refugees’ lives and the nature 
                                                 
1 Press Statement by Howard Kennedy, UNRWA Director, 15 June 1950, FO 1018/73, The National 
Archives, London, UK (TNA). 
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of their exile. This was most markedly the case in the refugee camps, where 
UNRWA had the highest visibility and where its beneficiaries faced the 
greatest need. Secondly, and more importantly, this chapter will show that 
from the beginning of the Agency’s operations, the Palestinian refugees 
perceived and responded to it as a political body rather than a mere aid 
agency - with some justification. The disputes over UNRWA’s resettlement 
schemes, which dominated much of this early period, showed this most 
clearly. The resulting changes in UNRWA’s programmes remained a fixture 
of its work for decades to come. The dynamics and developments of this 
early period thus set the tone for the following decades, in which UNRWA 
would play a significant role in the refugees’ political nationalism. 
 These findings will be presented here over the course of three sections. 
First, this chapter examines how the beginning of the Palestinian refugee 
crisis left thousands destitute and paved the way for UNRWA’s creation. 
The second section then looks at the formation of UNRWA and the 
significance of its early operations, including its evolution into a quasi-
governmental body. Finally, the third section turns to the Palestinian 
refugees themselves, examining their responses to their new ‘quasi-
government’. In this way, this chapter will show that UNRWA’s omission 
from political studies of Palestinian history has been not only erroneous but 
also misleading, resulting in an incomplete understanding of Palestinian 
nationalism. UNRWA played a vital role in shaping Palestinian exile, and the 
foundations for this were laid in the first seven years of its operations. 
 
The Beginning of the Palestinian Refugee Crisis 
 
The Palestinians’ decades-long history as a large-scale refugee population 
began with the war of 1948, which resulted in the creation of the state of 
Israel and the mass exodus of around three-quarters of the Arab population 
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of Palestine. The history of this war has been highly contested, due in large 
part to its serious political implications. However, the nature of these 
contestations has changed over time. Older historiographical debates about 
the Nakba focused on how many Palestinians went into exile in 1948, the 
reasons for their flight, and the question of culpability. While these subjects 
are undoubtedly important, they also come with limitations. More recent 
scholarship has accordingly paid greater attention to the social history and 
experiences of Palestinians themselves, often also providing important 
evidence and documentation. 
 When it comes to the older historiographical debates about the Nakba, 
the dividing lines have usually been drawn between traditionalist and neo-
traditionalist Israeli historians on one side, and Arab historians and Israeli 
revisionists (sometimes known as the Israeli ‘New Historians’) on the other.2 
One of the most central disputes concerns the simple question of how many 
Palestinians were exiled in 1948. Estimates for the figure range from around 
500,000 to nearly one million, with a great deal of political significance often 
attached to the number; unsurprisingly, critics of Israel tend towards higher 
estimates.3 This thesis uses the figure of 750,000, which has been verified by 
independent observers at the UN as a plausible approximation.4  
Aside from the question of numbers, much of the conventional 
historiographical debate focussed on the reasons for the Palest inian flight in 
1948. Israeli traditionalist historians like Jon and David Kimche – and post-
revisionists who came later, like Shabtai Teveth and Efraim Karsh – have 
                                                 
2 Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch, ‘From Taboo to the Negotiable: The Israeli New Historians and the Changing 
Representation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem’, Perspectives on Politics, 5:2, June 2007, pp. 241-258. 
3 For lower estimates see: Efraim Karsh, ‘How many Palestinian refugees were there?’ 
http://www.meforum.org/2875/how-many-palestinian-arab-refugees, accessed 25 July 2017; Shabtai 
Teveth, ‘Review: The Palestine Arab Refugee Problem and Its Origins’, Middle Eastern Studies, 26:2, April 
1990, pp. 214-249. For higher estimates see: Benny Morris, The Birth of  the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 1; Ilan Pappe, ‘The 1948 Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine’, 
Journal of  Palestine Studies, 36:1, Autumn 2006, p. 6; Nur Masalha, Expulsion of  the Palestinians: The Concept of  
‘Transf er’ in Zionist Political Thought 1882-1948 (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), p. 175. 
4 UN Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, First Interim Report, No. 66979, 16 November 1949, 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/648C3D9CF58AF0888525753C00746F31, accessed 4 
June 2017. 
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cited Arab evacuation orders as the cause of the Palestinians’ flight, 
contending that Israel bears no responsibility for the refugee crisis.5 The 
opposing interpretation attributes the exodus to Zionist expulsion; Israeli 
New Historians Simha Flapan, Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim and Ilan Pappe 
concur with Arab traditionalists like Constantine Zureik and A.W. Kayyali 
that the Palestinians were driven out by planned Zionist military campaigns.6 
Pappe even contends that their expulsion should be treated as a case of 
ethnic cleansing.7 It is certainly clear from the considerable archival evidence 
unearthed by the New Historians that Zionist forces did organise and 
execute plans to expel the Palestinians in 1947-49. 
However, one striking shared feature of these otherwise conflicting 
interpretations is that they all underplay the agency of the Palestinian people 
themselves, depicting them as mere respondents to either the Arab regimes 
or the Zionist forces. Even Walid Khalidi and Nur Masalha, who centralise 
the plight of the Palestinian refugees, still rely heavily on Israeli and Zionist 
sources to make their arguments, with the result that they focus on Zionist 
actions and minimise the role of the Palestinians. 8  The Israeli New 
Historians similarly continue to depict the Palestinian refugees as largely 
passive, presenting interpretations that evoke sympathy for them but still 
deny them agency.  
In fact, the refugees’ own accounts clearly undermine any suggestion 
that they were purely passive in the Nakba. On the contrary, the events of 
the late 1940s were comparable to subsequent decades in how the 
                                                 
5 Jon and David Kimche, Both Sides of  the Hill: Britain and the Palestine War (London: Secker & Warburg, 
1960). Efraim Karsh, Fabricating Israeli History: The ‘New Historians’ (London: Frank Cass, 1997). Teveth, 
‘Review’. 
6 Simha Flapan, The Birth of  Israel: Myths and Realities (London: Croom Helm, 1987). Benny Morris, The Birth 
of  the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-49 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Avi Shlaim, The 
Politics of  Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists, and Palestine, 1921-51 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
Ilan Pappe, The Making of  the Arab-Israeli Conf lict, 1947-51 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992). Constantine 
Zureik,  Ma’nā al-Nakba (Beirut: Dar al-'ilm lil-malayin, 1948); A. W. Kayyali, Palestine: A Modern History  
(London: Croom Helm, 1978).  
7 Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of  Palestine (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006).  
8 Walid Khalidi, ‘Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine’, Journal of  Palestine Studies, 18:1, 
Autumn 1988, pp. 4-33. Masalha, Expulsion of  the Palestinians. 
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Palestinians exercised whatever agency they had, however limited. A useful 
conceptual framework here is Rashid Khalidi’s idea of a structural ‘iron cage’ 
constraining the Palestinians’ movements but not restricting them 
altogether. 9  When it came to the Nakba, many refugees recall initially 
deciding to arm themselves and defend their land, before later fleeing upon 
hearing of massacres elsewhere. News of the Deir Yassin massacre in April 
1948 had a particularly significant impact in causing people to flee.10 Elias 
Shoufani, a Palestinian from the Galilee, recalls the intense fear triggered in 
his village by reports of rapes taking place nearby, with many men 
consequently choosing to evacuate their families in order to protect the 
women’s honour.11 Abu Iyad, a refugee from Jaffa and later co-founder of 
Fatah, has similar recollections.12 
Dilemmas over whether to stay and defend the land or leave to protect 
one’s family are a common theme in many refugees’ testimonies. In several 
cases, men sent their families abroad while staying on themselves to fight.13 
Others judged that fighting would be futile in view of the devastating losses 
of the 1936-39 Revolt. All left with a view to returning imminently.14 The 
consciousness of these decisions must be considered in order for analyses of 
the Nakba to be comprehensive. This is especially important in view of the 
fact that Palestinian agency was a continuous theme of subsequent events, 
not least concerning UNRWA and the refugee camps. The Palestinian 
refugees’ vulnerability did not automatically translate into passivity. 
 
<Figure 1 unavailable due to copyright> 
                                                 
9 Rashid Khalidi, The Iron Cage: The Story of  the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007). 
10 The Palestinian response to the Deir Yassin massacre is recorded in: Leila Khaled with George Hajjar, 
My People Shall Live: The Autobiography of  a Revolutionary (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), p. 25; 
Ghada Karmi, In Search of  Fatima: A Palestinian Story (London: Verso, 2002), p. 125; Menachem Begin, The 
Revolt, trans. Samuel Katz (London: Butler & Tanner, 1979), p. 165. 
11 Elias Shoufani, ‘The Fall of a Village’, Journal of  Palestine Studies, 1:4, Summer 1972, pp. 108-121.  
12 Abu Iyad with Eric Rouleau, My Home, My Land: A Narrative of  the Palestinian Struggle (New York: Times 
Books, 1978), p. 4. 
13 Khaled, My People Shall Live, pp. 25-26.  
14 Shafiq al-Hout, My Lif e in the PLO: The Inside Story of  the Palestinian Struggle (New York: Pluto Press, 2011), 
trans. Hader Al Hout and Leila Othman, p. 19. 
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While many earlier works on the Nakba tended to overlook this, recent 
decades have seen an increasing scholarly focus on the Palestinians 
themselves. Rashid Khalidi and Issa Khalaf both emphasise the importance 
of the Palestinians’ actions and choices in events. They point out that 
Palestinian society was not merely the static recipient of external events but 
was itself active and changing in ways that ultimately, if inadvertently, 
facilitated its collapse. Khalidi argues that the unsuccessful outcome of the 
Palestinians’ activism during the 1936-39 Revolt caused lasting damage to 
their military, political, social and economic capabilities, leaving them greatly 
weakened when facing the Zionists’ sophisticated infrastructure.15 Similarly, 
Khalaf contends that the decision of many Palestinian peasants to seek 
urban work in the decades prior to the Nakba created social dislocation that 
rendered them divided and vulnerable. 16  Both Khalidi and Khalaf thus 
present the Palestinians as active participants in events.  
A similar approach can be found in some ethnographic works, which 
highlight how the Palestinian refugees continued to show their agency even 
as they faced life in exile, with very little formal power. In particular, 
Rosemary Sayigh has emphasised the experiences of women and other 
subalterns, particularly those from the poorest backgrounds who ended up 
in camps.17 Sayigh’s work has been highly influential in encouraging a greater 
scholarly focus on the voices of the most marginalised refugees. More 
recently, for example, Rochelle Davis has examined how the local dynamics 
of Palestinian villages helped shape the events of 1948, and how refugees 
subsequently worked to retain their village histories in exile.18 Such studies 
                                                 
15 Rashid Khalidi, ‘The Palestinians and 1948: the underlying causes of failure’, in Eugene Rogan and Avi 
Shlaim (ed.s), The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of  1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), pp. 12-36.  
16 Issa Khalaf, ‘The effect of socio-economic change on Arab societal collapse in Mandate Palestine’ 
International Journal of  Middle East Studies, 29:1, February 1997, pp. 93-112. 
17 Rosemary Sayigh, The Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries (London: Zed Books, 2007 edn). 
Rosemary Sayigh, Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon (London: Zed Books, 1994). 
18 Rochelle Davis, Palestinian Village Histories: Geographies of  the Displaced (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2011). 
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enrich the historiography of the Nakba by placing the refugees’ own 
testimonies at its centre – an approach that also forms the basis of this 
thesis.  
 
Early Exile 
Notwithstanding the serious disagreements between historians over what 
happened in 1948, none dispute that the Nakba was a seismic event in 
Palestinian history. Scholars on all sides have described the mass exodus as a 
trauma, 19  a humiliation, 20  cataclysmic, 21  shattering, 22  ‘a great human and 
national tragedy’, 23  and a ‘turning point’. 24  It is clear that however it 
happened, the Nakba was the seminal event in modern Palestinian history, 
with lasting political, social, economic and psychological effects. The 
conditions of early exile ushered in a new era for the Palestinians, and as will 
be shown here, ultimately provided the foundations for their political 
regeneration. It thus encapsulated the common connection between exile 
and nationalism.25  
All Palestinians felt the devastation of the Nakba, albeit to different 
degrees. Only a small number (around 150,000) remained in their homes, in 
the land that became Israel. 26  The majority became refugees, leaving 
Palestine on a journey sometimes referred to as al-hijra (Fig.s 1-3). The less 
fortunate had to make this journey on foot, enduring exhaustion, hunger 
and sickness over hundreds of miles. As most Palestinians left during the 
summer, they had to contend with extreme heat and dehydration. Children 
                                                 
19 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of  Modern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997), p. 22.  
20 R. Sayigh, The Palestinians. p. 100. 
21 Edward Said, Out of  Place: A Memoir (London: Granta, 1999), p. 109. 
22 Morris, Birth of  the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, p. 14.  
23 Teveth, ‘Review’, p. 248.  
24 Flapan, The Birth of  Israel, p. 4.  
25 For more on this generic connection, see: Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Transnational aspects of the Kurdish 
question’, Working Paper, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 
Florence, 2000; Liisa H. Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees 
in Tanzania (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1995).  
26 R. Khalidi, The Iron Cage, p. 136.    
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and the elderly were the most vulnerable, sometimes succumbing to illness 
or even dying en route. Survivors later recalled having to eat grass and drink 
their own urine.27 Many were left with horrifying stories; one refugee from 
Galilee has told of how she carried both her babies in a bowl on her head, 
only to discover when she arrived in Lebanon that they were both dead.28 
Another, aged eight at the time of the Nakba, remembers a woman giving 
birth on the side of the road as they trekked north to Lebanon.29 Abu Iyad 
recalls people drowning while attempting to flee coastal Palestine by sea.30 
The experience of the hijra would become an essential element of the 
Palestinian collective memory in the years to come.31 
 
<Figure 2 unavailable due to copyright> 
<Figure 3 unavailable due to copyright> 
 
 After completing the journey, the refugees then had to contend with 
their new lives in exile. The fortunate ones had the money, connections and 
in some cases the foreign passports to re-build their lives and businesses in 
new homes, all the while hoping to return. Others were not so lucky, and 
had to survive in makeshift shelters, tents or caves (Fig.s 4-5).32  
The Palestinian diaspora spread across Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt 
and Iraq, into the Gulf and out of the Middle East to Europe and parts of 
North and South America. Thousands of refugees remained in historic 
Palestine, but in towns and regions far away from their homes. None of the 
land remained under Palestinian control, as it was now divided between 
Israel, Egypt and Jordan (which annexed the West Bank in 1950). As 
                                                 
27 R. Sayigh, The Palestinians, p. 106 
28 John Halaka, ‘Ghosts of Comfort and Chaos’, Jadaliyya, 31 March 2013, 
http://cci.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/10784/ghosts-of-comfort-and-chaos, accessed 12 June 2017. 
29 Fawaz Turki, Exile’s Return: The Making of  a Palestinian American (New York: Free Press, 1994), p. 3.  
30 Abu Iyad, My Home, My Land, p. 4.  
31 R. Sayigh, The Palestinians, pp. 105-107. Ilana Feldman, ‘Home as a Refrain: Remembering and Living 
Displacement in Gaza’, History and Memory, 18:2, 2006, pp. 23-28. 
32 UNRWA, Palestine Refugees Today 76, December 1973, Institute of Palestine Studies, Beirut (IPS).   
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Miriyam Aouragh writes, 1948 thus engendered the creation of the 
Palestinian ‘transnational community’.33 
 Reflecting this division, the Palestinians themselves were now assigned 
a complex set of legal statuses, which differed depending on their location. 
Those who remained in what became Israel could apply for citizenship from 
1952, but were placed under martial law until 1966.34 Those in the West 
Bank and Jordan could take Jordanian citizenship from 1949, but most 
other Palestinian refugees in the Arab world now found themselves 
stateless, with their Palestinian passports and identity documents defunct.35 
Palestinians in Gaza received identity and travel documents from the 
Egyptian military administration that ruled the territory until 1967. 36 
Meanwhile Palestinians who had fled elsewhere in the region, including 
Lebanon and Syria, were reliant on their respective host states to issue them 
with the necessary documentation – which was not always forthcoming.37 
The early years of Palestinian exile (called al-ghurba) saw many of the 
refugees surviving in dire conditions, 38  with international aid workers 
commenting on the situation’s unsustainability. 39 All faced the emotional 
and psychological trauma of having lost their homes, land, and in some 
cases loved ones.40 On top of this, many also had to deal with destitution, as 
they now found themselves poverty-stricken, homeless and hungry.41 The 
poorest refugees took shelter in tents provided by the UN and relied on 
international aid agencies for emergency relief (Fig. 5). Inadequate food and 
                                                 
33 Miriyam Aouragh, Palestine Online: Transnationalism, the internet and the construction of identity (London: IB 
Tauris, 2011), p. 77. 
34 R. Khalidi, The Iron Cage, p. 136, 191. On the restrictions faced by Palestinian citizens of Israel, see: Yezid 
Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949-93 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), pp. 37-38. 
35 Y. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 40-41. 
36 Ibid., p. 41. See also: Jean-Pierre Filiu, Gaza: A History (London: Hurst, 2015), p. 77. 
37 Y. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 41.  
38 Al Hout, My Lif e in the PLO, p. 19.  
39 See for example: Statement by A. Willard Jones, Executive Secretary of the Near East Christian Council 
Committee for Refugee Work, May 1955, Jerusalem and East Mission Collection GB165-0161, File 2, Box 
73, Middle East Centre Archive, St Antony’s College, Oxford (MECA).  
40 Edward Said, ‘Afterword: the consequences of 1948’ in Rogan and Shlaim, The War for Palestine, p. 248.  
41 Letter from UK Embassy in Washington DC to UK Foreign Office, 10 January 1950, FO 371/82242, 
TNA. 
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poor hygiene caused considerable health and developmental problems, 
particularly among children. 42  International observers reported that the 
situation was creating widespread disillusionment and depression among the 
refugees.43 Yet there were also signs of activism and determination; some 
refugees even wrote formal letters to international governments, imploring 
them to address the situation and implement their lawful rights.44  
The UN intervened to organise the refugee camps that were emerging 
to shelter Palestinians in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza. 
In the early years, international observers noted the grim nature of life inside 
the camps (Fig. 5), which the UNESCO Director described in late 1949 as 
‘wretched’.45 The refugees’ own accounts underline this.46 Fawaz Turki, a 
refugee from Haifa, describes in his memoir the hardship of his early life in 
Burj al-Barajneh camp in Lebanon, where residents faced an alternation of 
torrential rain, bitter frost and fierce heat. In such conditions the tents 
deteriorated quickly, leaving many refugees exposed to the elements. Turki 
recalls how everyone in the camp was unemployed and hungry, and families 
were so poor that mothers used the sacks of UN flour rations to make 
underwear for their children. 47  Even other Palestinian refugees were 
horrified by life in the camps.48 In her memoir, Leila Khaled, also a refugee 
from Haifa, recalls visiting a friend in an unnamed camp in Lebanon during 
her childhood. There Khaled observed ‘the despair of deprivation’ in the 
form of ‘bare-footed children with swollen stomachs, pale mothers with 
                                                 
42 Dr Leslie Houseden, Report on the Refugee Children in the Middle East, 28 August 1953, Sir Edward 
Spears Collection, GB165-0269, File 2, Box 15, MECA. 
43 See for example: Letter from British Embassy in Washington DC to UK Foreign Office, 10 January 
1950, FO 371/82242; UK Foreign Office Brief on Palestine Refugees, 1950, FO 371/82243, both TNA. 
44 See for example: Letter from Ali Ahmed al-Abed, Wavell Refugee Camp, to Clement Attlee, 21 June 
1950; Letter from U. E. Ammar to British Consul in Beirut, 10 June 1950, both in FO 1018/73, TNA 
[Arabic]. 
45 Letter from Jaime Torres Bodet, UNESCO Director-General, to Ministry of External Affairs in 
Colombo, 18 November 1949, ED 157/366, TNA. 
46 ‘Refugee reminiscences III: Nuseirat’s Abu Hisham’, in UNRWA, Palestine Refugees Today , 126, May 1990, 
Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University (RSC).  
47 Fawaz Turki, The Disinherited: Journal of  a Palestinian Exile (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 
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sickly babies [and] poverty and hunger.’49 The camps thus encapsulated the 
worst elements of Palestinian suffering in exile, particularly in the immediate 
aftermath of the Nakba.  
 
<Figure 4 unavailable due to copyright> 
<Figure 5 unavailable due to copyright> 
 
 As Khaled’s account indicates, it was by no means the case that all 
Palestinian refugees lived in the camps. In the years after the Nakba, the UN 
estimated that less than 40% of all registered Palestinian refugees were living 
in sixty official camps.50 This estimate did not take account of the thousands 
of exiled Palestinians who had not registered with the UN, so the true 
proportion was even lower. However, the camp refugees held a significance 
disproportionate to their numbers. They comprised the poorest and most 
disadvantaged social groups, who had suffered the most as a result of exile. 
Their continuing survival in the camps came to symbolise the lasting effects 
of the Nakba, and would have serious repercussions in the years to come.  
 
The Creation of UNRWA 
 
The severe need among Palestinian refugees did not go unnoticed. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Nakba, the League of Red Cross Societies and 
other international aid agencies, including some American Christian 
charities, worked with the host governments to provide services to alleviate 
                                                 
49 Khaled, My People Shall Live, pp. 35-36. 
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the situation. 51  Having been formally responsible for Palestine since 
February 1947, when the British had announced plans to terminate the 
Mandate, the UN played a central role from the beginning.52 In July 1948 it 
established the sixty-day Disaster Relief Project (UNDRP), which was 
succeeded in November by UN Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR).53 
UNRPR coordinated the aid effort by recruiting other organisations to 
distribute UN supplies. In January 1949, it commissioned the American 
Friends Service Committee (AFSC) to run an organised relief programme in 
Gaza, which had the highest proportion of refugees and the fewest 
resources. 54  By the beginning of 1950, there were more than 950,000 
Palestinian refugees on UNRPR’s ration rolls.55 
 As well as addressing the humanitarian elements of the refugee crisis, 
the UN also sought to resolve its political causes. On 11 December 1948, 
the UNGA passed Resolution 194, calling for the Palestine refugees to be 
allowed to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours. 
The Resolution also created the Conciliation Commission for Palestine 
(UNCCP) to mediate the conflict.56 In theory, the UNCCP should have 
worked to implement Resolution 194, in line with the official stance of the 
UN.57 In practice, it quickly encountered strong resistance from the newly-
formed Israeli government, with Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion making 
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it clear that the return of the refugees en masse was inconceivable.58 Seeking 
alternative solutions, in August 1949 the UNCCP created the Economic 
Survey Mission (ESM, known informally as the ‘Clapp Commission’ after its 
leader Gordon Clapp) to tour the Arab countries and investigate ways to 
alleviate the refugees’ suffering.  
 The ESM’s first report, submitted in November 1949, had lasting 
repercussions for the Palestinian refugees and their relationship with the 
UN. While still speaking of ‘repatriation’, it engaged much more closely with 
the idea of settling the refugees permanently outside Palestine. To facilitate 
this, the report recommended the creation of a specific agency to direct a 
works programme that would integrate the refugees into the host 
countries.59 The UN accordingly now looked at replacing UNRPR, which 
was premised on the presumed imminent resolution of the refugee crisis,60 
with a more comprehensive relief system.61 In December 1949, the UNGA 
adopted the ESM’s recommendations in Resolution 302(IV): 
The General Assembly…. establishes the United Nations and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to carry out in 
collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works 
programmes as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission.62  
 
All the Arab governments, as well as Israel itself, voted in support of the 
resolution, 63  with the latter well-disposed towards the ESM’s work. 64 
UNRWA was thus created. 
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Figure 1: Map of UNRWA’s Fields of Operation, https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work,  
accessed 1 June 2018. 
 
 
 The Agency began operations on 1 May 1950 in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza 
and Jordan (which at that time included the West Bank). It did not work in 
Egypt, despite the significant number of Palestinians there, 65  or in Iraq, 
although UNRWA did run a placement office in Baghdad until the late 
1950s.66 It also provided assistance to Jewish refugees in Israel until 1952, 
when it closed its office there at the request of the Israeli government.  67 
Basic agreements with the Arab host governments established the terms of 
UNRWA’s role, with responsibilities divided on the basis that ‘the Agency 
provides a camp administration staff and operates certain facilities and 
programmes within the camps in co-ordination with the host Government 
[which is] responsible for the security services’. 68  The terms of this 
agreement show the major role that UNRWA’s work played in the camps – 
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and vice versa – from the beginning.  As a visible element of camp life from 
the early 1950s, the Agency quickly became a formative element of 
Palestinian exile, at least in the fields where it was operative.  
 The Agency’s large-scale new services came with caveats. Across all 
four of its fields, UNRWA was mandated to serve Palestine refugees, not 
Palestinian refugees. The distinction was crucial, meaning that the Agency 
served refugees from Palestine, rather than those who happened to be 
Palestinian. It was this that enabled UNRWA to provide services to Jewish 
refugees in Israel in its early years. Importantly, neither UNGA Resolution 
194 nor 302 contained any definition of exactly who constituted a ‘Palestine 
refugee’.69  Instead, UNRWA adopted a working definition of a ‘refugee 
from Palestine’ as: 
a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of 
two years preceding the conflict in 1948, and who, as a result of this 
conflict, lost both his home and his means of livelihood and took 
refuge in 1948 in one of the countries where UNRWA provides 
relief.70  
 
In formally codifying the definition of a ‘refugee from Palestine’ like this, 
UNRWA played an important part in shaping their identity at an official 
level early on. In effect, this definition generated exclusions as well as 
providing some official endorsement. This was not entirely accidental; 
donor pressure for UNRWA to limit the number of relief recipients had 
informed the construction of such a narrowly drawn definition.71 As a result, 
UNRWA services were rendered out of bounds to those Palestinians who 
had left after 1948, or who had sought refuge outside its fields of 
operation.72 These exclusions caused some resentment, not least because 
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many of those who were ineligible were as destitute as the formally-
registered Palestine refugees – or in some cases, even more so.73 Moreover, 
UNRPR’s comparatively loose criteria meant that some refugees lost out 
when UNRWA’s stricter definition came into force. Nevertheless, the 
Agency maintained that some limitations were necessary in order for it to 
provide effective services.74  
 
Early Operations: UNRWA as quasi-government  
The difference in criteria was not the only thing that distinguished UNRWA 
from UNRPR. Other differences included the fact that UNRWA provided 
services to the refugees directly, rather than acting as a coordinator in the 
vein of UNRPR. Moreover, while UNRWA remained – at least in theory – a 
temporary Agency with a short-term mandate, it nevertheless took a more 
comprehensive approach than UNRPR to meeting the refugees’ needs. 
UNRWA ran major relief programmes through which it established its own 
schools, clinics and health centres, as well as systems for procuring and 
distributing rations.75 Accordingly, the Agency quickly became the primary 
service provider across the refugee camps in the 1950s, with a much more 
visible presence than UNRPR. Tellingly, the refugees themselves would later 
refer to this period as ’ayyām al-UNRWA (‘the days of UNRWA’), signifying 
the Agency's centrality to their lives.76 
 UNRWA’s comprehensive approach to relief meant that observers 
often described it as a small-scale government, with some even dubbing it 
‘the Blue State’.77  Senior UNRWA management themselves characterised 
their work as ‘quasi-governmental’, both internally and in official external 
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communications.78 The term accurately reflected the nature of UNRWA’s 
work in the camps, where it administered services that would usually be the 
domain of the state, from health and education to sanitation and roads. 
While the host governments retained legislative and judicial power over the 
camps – a point that UNRWA officials were continually keen to emphasise 
– they did not actively manage them other than in matters of security. 79 
Moreover, unlike most other relief organisations – including UNHCR, the 
other UN refugee agency – UNRWA served the Palestine refugees 
exclusively. This set-up facilitated its fast evolution into a quasi-government, 
made easier still by the statelessness of its beneficiaries. 80  As the only 
internationally-recognised authority that connected the Palestinians across 
national borders, UNRWA’s significance went far beyond that of a typical 
aid agency.81  
 In one display of UNRWA’s quasi-state functioning, a key element of 
its work in these early years was the planned resettlement of the refugees in 
the host countries, as originally recommended by the ESM. 82  Although 
UNGA Resolution 194 had called for the return of the Palestine refugees to 
their homes – a point often highlighted by the refugees themselves – behind 
the scenes UN officials were increasingly looking to the refugees’ integration 
into the host countries as an alternative solution.83 This was encouraged by 
the US and the UK, which were the biggest global powers involved. They 
both looked unfavourably on the idea of return and publicly voiced support 
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for the refugees’ resettlement in Arab states. 84  In line with the ESM’s 
aforementioned report, they saw UNRWA as a tool for achieving this; the 
UK government even stated internally that UNRWA had in fact been 
created as a means to implement resettlement.85  
 The UNGA, to which UNRWA reported, officially endorsed the 
resettlement policy in Resolution 513, also authorising a $200 million 
‘Reintegration Fund’ with which the Agency could implement the full 
integration of the Palestine refugees into the host countries over a three-year 
period.86 UNRWA quickly established employment schemes to facilitate the 
refugees’ economic integration - this was the ‘Works’ that went alongside 
the ‘Relief’ in its title.87 In this way, UNRWA was working not merely to 
provide relief but to actually implement a political solution to the Palestine 
refugee crisis, despite the official insistence that it had no mandate to do 
so. 88  Four decades later, UNRWA Commissioner-General Giorgio 
Giacomelli would acknowledge in an interview that the Agency had initially 
been created in part to facilitate the refugees’ resettlement.89 
 Indeed, the evidence shows that many of UNRWA’s activities in the 
1950s were driven by the objective of implementing resettlement. 90  In 
keeping with the aims of integration and long-term development, UNRWA 
worked to stabilise the infrastructure in the refugee camps. By 1955, it had 
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replaced all the refugee tents in Gaza with huts (Fig. 7).91 Four years later, 
the Director reported the same achievement across all of UNRWA’s fields 
of operation.92 In undertaking this kind of structural improvement work, 
UNRWA was unmistakably acting in the guise of government – despite its 
persistent claims that the camps were the domain of the host governments. 
However, UNRWA’s quasi-governmental approach was inherently 
problematic. It may have been the de facto government in the camps, but it 
had been installed by an international body, and as such lacked legitimacy in 
the eyes of the refugees whom it served. While most camp refugees saw 
UNRWA as being far more significant than a standard aid agency, this was 
not necessarily a good thing. They regarded UNRWA as a political body, 
and responded to it accordingly. This remained the cornerstone of their 
attitude towards the Agency throughout the twentieth century. 
 
<Figure 7 unavailable due to copyright> 
 
The Refugees’ Responses to UNRWA 
 
The Palestinian refugees’ responses to UNRWA’s operations cannot be 
properly understood outside the context of their relationship with the UN. 
From early on, the Palestinian refugees viewed the UN with serious hostility. 
Elfan Rees, a British aid worker who visited the Palestinian camps across the 
Middle East in 1949, reported that he encountered ‘at least as much 
criticism of United Nations [sic] as I found anti-Semitism’. According to his 
report, ‘a visit from someone suspected of representing United Nations [sic] 
produces an immediate display of black flags and almost inevitably a hostile 
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demonstration.’93 As Rees and other international aid workers found, many 
Palestinian refugees saw the UN as their enemy; in fact, they commonly 
blamed it for their dispossession.94 UNRWA management themselves were 
well aware of this. Director John Blandford Jr. noted in his 1951 Report to 
the UNGA that ‘the United Nations…are considered by the refugee to be 
entirely responsible for both his past and present misfortunes [sic]’.95  
The Palestinian refugees’ general opinion of the UN was thus not only 
hostile but also mistrustful. In directing their ire at the UN in this way, the 
refugees implicitly acknowledged the internationalisation of their situation. 
Many understood that Palestine’s fate had been dominated and determined 
by the world powers for many decades, and they wanted those same world 
powers to remedy the injustice that they had suffered. For this, they looked 
to the UN, which had proposed and endorsed the partition of Palestine in 
the first place with Resolution 181 in 1947.96 As Lori Allen points out, the 
UN’s central role in Palestinian affairs was also acknowledged by the world 
powers, albeit not publicly.97 In 1949, the Foreign Secretary of the UK, the 
former Mandate power in Palestine, wrote that the country had been 
‘governed from the UN’ for much of the late 1940s.98 As those years had 
not ended positively for the Palestinians, it followed that they should view 
the UN with antagonism.  
The Palestinians’ hostility towards the UN had serious ramifications 
for UNRWA, which was tarred with the same brush. In the refugees’ eyes, 
the UN and UNRWA were part of the same power base that had created 
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Israel and turned them into refugees.99 Fawaz Turki recalls that during his 
childhood in the 1950s, the residents of Burj al-Barajneh camp identified 
their enemies as ‘the UNRWA officials, the American governments, the 
Zionists, the British…’100 In other words, they were all bracketed together. 
Similarly, in 1963 the former Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin al-Husseini told 
the Director of UNRWA Affairs in Lebanon that many refugees 
approached the Agency with suspicion because it ‘is a subsidiary Agency of 
the UN which is responsible for the Palestine problem as a whole’.101 To 
make matters worse, UNRWA was known to receive ongoing financial and 
diplomatic support from the US and the UK, which many Palestinians saw 
as their primary political foes.102 The UK in particular could not be trusted, 
having supported Zionism in the Balfour Declaration and incorporated this 
into its Mandate for Palestine. 103  Many refugees worried that British 
influence at the UN in general and UNRWA in particular was causing the 
Agency to work against their national interests.104  
UNRWA’s status as a UN body created a perception among the 
refugees that would become a hallmark of Palestinian attitudes for decades 
to come: the belief that UNRWA was a political organisation rather than 
simply an aid agency. UNRWA’s insistence that it was apolitical and merely 
concerned with relief fell on deaf ears. Many refugees feared that UNRWA’s 
operations had a furtive political purpose and that it was secretly working to 
keep them in exile. Strikingly, this theme could be found across the region. 
In 1955, for example, a group of refugee students in Lebanon declared to 
UNRWA, ‘you have come… to complete the conspiracy and deprive us of 
any chance to return to our usurped paradise.’105 The same year, Gaza camp 
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community leader Ahmad al Yamani distributed a pamphlet accusing 
UNRWA of conspiring with Israel to prevent return - which was particularly 
significant in view of the fact that Yamani was himself an UNRWA 
schoolteacher. The publication Al Tha’r, an organ of the Arab Nationalist 
Movement (ANM), regularly made similar accusations that the Agency 
sought to settle the Palestinians in exile. 106 In doing so it articulated the 
suspicions of many refugees that the real motive behind UNRWA’s relief 
operations was to block their return to their homeland, as per the wishes of 
the Western powers.  
The dynamics were further complicated by the fact that the majority of 
UNRWA employees at lower levels were themselves Palestine refugees, 
while senior management were exclusively ‘international’ and in practice 
overwhelmingly Western.107 This hierarchy reinforced the refugees’ feeling 
that the Agency was neo-colonial. Indeed, despite the ‘Palestinianised’ 
nature of much of the Agency’s workforce, even its Palestinian employees 
were largely suspicious of its true motives, as the case of Yamani indicates.108 
Many shared the fear that UNRWA’s creation had been contrived to keep 
them in exile while the new state of Israel established itself – indeed, the 
UNGA Resolution that had created UNRWA spoke of the need not only ‘to 
prevent conditions of starvation and distress’ among the refugees but also 
‘to further conditions of peace and stability.’ 109 As one Palestinian UNRWA 
employee in Lebanon told anthropologist Rosemary Sayigh, ‘UNRWA and 
the host governments intend that we should be absorbed in seeking our 
daily bread and never have time to work seriously to regain our country.’ 110 
Although she was herself part of the Agency, the refugee in question still did 
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not trust it. In her study of 1950s Gaza, Ilana Feldman identified similar 
sentiments.111 Many feared that UNRWA belonged to the pro-Israeli side, 
seeking to distract the Palestinians from political campaigning by making 
them eternal victims, dependent on aid.  
The behaviour of UNRWA’s management sometimes fuelled these 
fears, albeit unintentionally. Despite their continuous insistence that their 
work was apolitical, they were still happy to allude to its political effects 
when it suited them. In particular, UNRWA directors frequently emphasised 
the Agency’s positive impact on political stability in the Middle East when 
appealing for funding from donor states, which were nearly all Western. In 
1951, Blandford spoke proudly of how the Agency ‘kept the situation [in the 
camps] under control’, stating that this was ‘not one of the less significant 
performances of UNRWA.’112  The Agency’s official newsletters regularly 
extolled its stabilising effects, not least when exhorting UN Member States 
to provide or increase their financial support. 113 Similarly, from the very 
beginning the UK government, one of UNRWA’s major donors, justified its 
financial support for the Agency on the grounds of a feared ‘threat to 
stability in the Middle East’.114 It implored other Western states to provide 
funding for the same reason.115 As many of the refugees saw it, UNRWA’s 
work was therefore delivering outcomes that were politically desirable to 
those world powers that supported Israel, and to Israel itself.  
UNRWA’s continuous failure to consult the refugees on its work in the 
1950s tended to exacerbate their suspicion and concern. As a group calling 
itself the Badge of the Arab Palestine Youth in Lebanon complained, ‘the 
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Relief Agency behave as if it was a Government having a fixed aspect [sic], 
enacting rules and regulations to apply to the emigrants (as if they were its 
subjects).’ 116  The nature of this complaint clearly reflects the refugees’ 
feeling that UNRWA lacked legitimacy as a pseudo-government. Similarly, 
Turki objected in his memoir to the time and energy that the UNRWA 
Director devoted to meeting Arab League committees, while ignoring 
Palestinian representatives. The Agency’s perceived disinterest in discussing 
its services with the refugees led him to dub it ‘our contemptuous 
stepmother’. 117  Turki’s choice of phrase perfectly encapsulates the 
combination of intimacy and hostility that characterised the refugees’ 
relationship with UNRWA, starting in the first decade of its operations and 
continuing thereafter. 
 
Rejecting Resettlement 
The refugees’ fears about UNRWA’s politicised motives were not entirely  
groundless.118 As already mentioned, UNRWA’s main objective in the 1950s 
was to resettle the refugees in the Arab host countries, largely through the 
job programmes and ‘reintegration’ schemes proposed by the ESM. 119 
Unsurprisingly, many Palestinians were highly suspicious of the schemes, 
taking them as evidence that the Agency’s real purpose was to counter and 
ultimately obliterate their right of return by permanently settling them 
outside Palestine. As early as 1950, a Palestinian refugee organisation 
claimed that the Agency’s Works programme was ‘a project prepared by the 
Imperialists [sic]’.120  
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  Arguably their suspicions were justified. In a private meeting with 
UNESCO in 1952, UNRWA Director Blandford said that he was ‘doing his 
best’ to persuade the Arab governments to agree to Palestinian 
resettlement.121  John Davis, who served as Commissioner-General from 
1959-63, later wrote in his memoir that the Agency had gone wrong in not 
focussing sufficiently on economic development and integrating the 
refugees.122 Yet in the eyes of the refugees, even a minimal focus on their 
integration outside Palestine was unacceptable. Resettlement quickly became 
a major source of tension in UNRWA’s relationship with the refugees, 
whose reactions to the Agency’s job schemes varied from passive reluctance 
to outright hostility.123  
The refugees’ opposition meant that UNRWA experienced 
considerable problems in carrying out its work. A British doctor working in 
the camps in the early 1950s observed how the Agency was facing 
difficulties in implementing some of its projects because it lacked the 
cooperation of the people. 124  Blandford confirmed as much in his 1951 
Report to the General Assembly, where he recorded: 
demonstrations over the census operation, strikes against the medical 
and welfare services, strikes for cash payment instead of relief, strikes 
against making any improvements, such as school buildings, in camps 
in case this might mean permanent resettlement.125 
 
As a result of these obstacles, UNRWA made little progress in its attempts 
to resettle the refugees, and its Works and reintegration schemes ultimately 
failed.126 Of the 878,000 refugees registered with the Agency in the early 
1950s, the largest number ever employed under its Works Programme was 
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12,000, and in less than a year this had dwindled to 812. 127  In 1956, 
Commissioner-General Henry Labouisse stated in his Report to the General 
Assembly that the refugees ‘have remained opposed to the development of 
large scale projects for self-support, which they erroneously link with 
permanent resettlement…’128 Whether the link was erroneous or not, the 
refugees’ opposition was palpable and apparently unbreakable.   
As Blandford had noted, the refugees’ hostility extended to UNRWA’s 
camp improvement programmes. They saw these schemes in a similar light , 
as a strategy designed to prevent their return to Palestine by making them 
more comfortable in exile. As a result, UNRWA’s efforts to develop and 
even beautify the camps often met with opposition so fierce that they 
became impossible to implement. Turki recalls in his memoir how the 
residents of Burj al-Barajneh camp uprooted the trees planted by UNRWA 
in protest at the perceived attempt to settle them permanently outside 
Palestine.129 As shown in Blandford’s Report, such demonstrations were by 
no means limited to that camp alone.130 Using the same rationale, some 
refugees also rejected early attempts to replace their tents with solid houses. 
Interestingly Gaza was the only field in which UNRWA was able to do so 
without fierce resistance – perhaps because its high population density had 
partially defused the refugees’ concerns about reintegration. Yet even in 
Gaza, the refugees still fervently opposed other proposals for 
resettlement.131  
As time went on, the Agency increasingly found that its focus on jobs 
and resettlement was not only unpopular, but also costly and inefficient.132 
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Consequently, it came to consider a change in focus 133  – although only 
much later would it acknowledge that the refugees’ resistance to 
resettlement had been the major reason for this.134 From the mid-1950s, the 
management was focussing on education as an alternative approach.135 By 
1957, it had quietly dispensed with its Works schemes.136 Schools were now 
declared the new priority.137 1957 thus marked the end of what could be 
considered the first era of UNRWA’s work, as distinguished by a 
preoccupation with employment schemes as a long-term solution to the 
immediate emergency of the refugee crisis. The subsequent shift to 
education injected a new steadiness and routine into UNRWA’s operations 
over the ensuing decade, until the 1967 War upturned everything in the 
region once again and returned both UNRWA and the refugees to a state of 
emergency.138 
The Agency’s shift in emphasis to education was momentous. 
Although UNRWA had been responsible for camp schools since it began 
operations in 1950, it had run its education programme on a small scale for 
the first half of that decade. 139  That now changed, as the education 
programme, developed in partnership with UNESCO and based on the host 
country curricula, expanded significantly (Fig. 9). 140  The number of 
UNRWA schools increased from 61 in 1950 to 386 in 1958. 141  In 
subsequent years, UNRWA’s school programme developed into a modern-
style education system, operating at elementary and middle school level and 
also providing university scholarships to exceptional students. From 1960, 
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education became the largest single UNRWA programme in terms of 
investment, funding and personnel.142  
 
<Figure 8 unavailable due to copyright> 
<Figure 9 unavailable due to copyright> 
 
It is crucial to note that UNRWA’s shift in focus to educat ion came 
partly in response to demands from the refugees themselves. While the latter 
were overwhelmingly averse to the Works schemes, they responded to the 
prospect of education with great enthusiasm, shared by everyone from 
teachers and administrators to the students themselves and their parents.143 
Indeed, the earliest camp schooling predated UNRWA, as refugees had set 
up makeshift lessons in tents or even the open air (Fig. 8).144 In his memoir, 
Turki describes how most camp residents saw education as a way out of 
poverty and deprivation, and were consequently always seeking academic 
and training opportunities.145 Scholars Maya Rosenfeld and Yezid Sayigh 
argue that having lost the land that had defined them and been their main 
currency for generations, the camp refugees – overwhelmingly of peasant 
origin – looked to education as the key to improving their prospects. 146 
However, there was also a deeper rationale at play. Many felt that they had 
lost their country in 1948 because of ignorance.147 Education was thus not 
only the key to better employment opportunities, but also a tool for 
reclaiming Palestine. As such, it was the polar opposite of the hated 
‘reintegration’ schemes.  
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The significance of UNRWA’s policy shifts in this period can be 
observed by way of three lasting effects. First, the refugees’ collective 
memory of the Agency’s early resettlement policy cast a long shadow over 
its reputation in their eyes. Years later, the legacy of resettlement still had a 
serious impact on UNRWA’s policies. Any attempts by the Agency to 
improve the camps faced an uphill struggle, as such projects were tainted by 
their perceived association with resettlement. 148  UNRWA management 
continually worried about whether particular camp policies might be 
conflated with resettlement.149 Most refugees only came to embrace the idea 
of camp improvement after several decades, and there is considerable 
scholarly debate over exactly when they ceased to see it as mutually 
exclusive with return to Palestine. Riccardo Bocco and Lex Takkenberg 
place the shift in the late 1980s, meaning that the resettlement policy still 
shaped refugee attitudes for decades after it ended.150 Most other scholars, 
such as Nell Gabiam, Sari Hanafi and Phillip Misselwitz, argue that the 
refugees continued resisting camp improvement until the early twenty-first 
century, and in some cases still do.151  
 Secondly, UNRWA’s switch in focus to schooling in this period 
established the organisation as what a later Commissioner-General would 
term ‘an institution predominantly concerned with education’. 152  This 
became the badge of the Agency’s work in future years. UNRWA’s 
comprehensive education system meant that a generation of Palestinian 
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refugees overtook their Arab counterparts in educational attainment.153 The 
developments of the years 1949-57 thus established the programme that 
would become the core of the Agency’s work, and indeed of its significance, 
for much of its existence. However, by involving itself in education, 
UNRWA increasingly, if inadvertently, became incorporated into Palestinian 
politics. Its education programme was vital in reaffirming and strengthening 
the Palestinian national identity in exile 154  – as is discussed in depth in 
Chapter Five. The seeds of this were sown in the 1950s. 
Thirdly and perhaps most interestingly, UNRWA’s repudiation of 
resettlement in favour of education is an early example of the impact of 
Palestinian agency. The refugees’ popular demand for schooling was well-
known even at UN level - as early as 1952, a UN Working Group spoke of 
the great pressure coming from Palestinian refugees for adequate 
education. 155  In abandoning resettlement for greater investment in 
education, UNRWA ultimately capitulated to this demand. Accordingly, the 
shift signifies the intricate and complex relationship between UNRWA and 
the refugees, which were to become increasingly enmeshed over the 
decades. In particular, the latter’s demand for education demonstrates the 
sense of entitlement they felt with regard to the Agency. As shall be 
explored next, this was a hallmark of their behaviour towards UNRWA 
from very early on.  
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Entitlement and Responsibility: UNRWA as validation  
Although the Palestine refugees were undeniably hostile towards UNRWA, 
it is important to note that this did not translate into a wholesale rejection of 
its work. While the refugees largely viewed the Agency with suspicion, they 
did not seek to remove themselves from its orbit entirely. On the contrary, 
many Palestinian refugees saw UNRWA’s existence and programmes as a 
sign of international responsibility for their plight.156 Accordingly, they felt 
entitled to its services.157 The aforementioned Badge of the Arab Palestine 
Youth even explicitly declared that ‘the Services of our Agency are our 
rights and not favours or charity from her [sic]’. 158  This attitude was 
inherently tied to the refugees’ view of the UN. The thinking went that until 
the Palestinians were afforded the repatriation guaranteed in Resolution 194, 
it was the UN’s duty to provide them with essential services. 
External observers quickly picked up on this perception of UNRWA 
services as rights, which took hold soon after the Agency began operations. 
One international aid worker in the camps recorded in a 1953 Report that 
the refugees saw the UN as culpable for their dispossession and accordingly 
responsible for their wellbeing until they could return. 159  Moreover, 
UNRWA officials themselves understood that the refugees accepted their 
provision of services on these terms. As early as 1951, Blandford wrote in 
his Report to the UNGA: 
[The Palestine refugees] say that they have lost faith in United 
Nations action since, after more than thirty months, the General 
Assembly resolution recommending their return home…has never 
been implemented…. The relief given by the Agency is therefore 
considered as a right….160 
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The Palestinian refugees thus saw UNRWA as being much more than a 
simple aid agency. It was a symbol of the international debt towards them 
and therefore of their rights. Importantly, these rights were not only 
humanitarian, but also political, relating as they did to the lost national 
homeland.161  In this way, UNRWA’s significance easily transcended the 
humanitarian field.  
 This understanding was not limited to the general principle of 
UNRWA’s work but also applied to specific services. In the 1950s, 
UNRWA staff reported that the refugees saw their ration cards as proof of 
their eligibility for repatriation in Palestine - in other words, as a sign of their 
national rights.162 This belief directly influenced their behaviour. When the 
Jordanian government offered the Palestinian refugees full economic 
integration in exchange for their UNRWA cards in 1959, only 8,000 took up 
the offer out of hundreds of thousands. 163  UNRWA services were thus 
treated not just as a right but as actual evidence of the Palestine refugees’ 
identity.164 UNRWA itself was seen as a symbol of the continuing after-
effects of the Nakba, the refugees’ ongoing plight and the international 
responsibility for finding a solution.165 In this way the fact of UNRWA’s 
existence – not to mention its presence in the camps - came to represent 
Palestinian political and legal rights.166  
 The significance that the refugees attached to their ration cards is 
especially intriguing in view of the fact that in the early years, UNRWA’s 
provision of rations was a major source of resentment. Many refugees 
complained that the rations were insufficient. Turki recalls that UNRWA’s 
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monthly ration supplies only provided families in the camp with enough 
food to last a week.167 Similarly, Khaled describes the rations she received 
from UNRWA as meagre, providing only a bare subsistence.168 Such claims 
are supported by external evidence. In 1953, Dr Leslie Houseden carried out 
a comprehensive study of the Palestinian camps across the Middle East, 
reporting that many refugees were surviving on insufficient food supplies. 169 
Blandford himself acknowledged in his 1951 Report that ‘the diet provided 
by the standard ration is not by any means a balanced one’ – although he 
added that the refugees receiving it were still nutritionally better-off than 
many of their neighbours.170  
 The refugees expressed their grievances by framing the rations’ 
insufficiency as an infringement of their rights. The provision of rations 
signified an entitlement and not a privilege, so many refugees saw the 
limitations on them as unacceptable. In view of the perceived international 
debt owed to them, they were unmoved by the explanation that the 
Agency’s severe financial difficulties necessitated such cuts. Discerning that 
the required money could be found within the UN system as a whole, they 
did not accept that it could not be channelled towards their needs – 
especially when they observed the high salaries of UNRWA’s international 
staff.171 In the refugees’ eyes, UNRWA’s services were granted in lieu of the 
land they had lost, and as such should be fixed and non-negotiable.172 The 
long-term repercussions of this idea are discussed in depth in Chapter Four.  
One final point needs to be emphasised here. Although the refugees 
felt entitled to UNRWA’s services, this did not mean that they were happy 
about it. In fact, many refugees strongly resented the Agency, which Turki 
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described as ‘that ubiquitous symbol of shame in our lives’.173 There was a 
strong sense among the refugees that life in the camps was fundamentally 
humiliating and that UNRWA’s services stripped them of their dignity.174 
Abdel Bari Atwan, who grew up in Deir al-Balah camp in Gaza, writes in his 
memoir of how reliance on UNRWA invoked feelings of impotence and 
frustration in his father.175 Similarly, both Khaled and Turki recall the shame 
and degradation that their parents felt over having to collect their rations 
from the UNRWA provisions bureau. 176  The Agency’s aid may have 
represented the Palestinians’ international rights, but it also signified their 
national defeat. The refugees thus generally sought to draw whatever meagre 
benefits they could from the Agency – relief, healthcare, education – while 
keeping up their demands for real justice. Their attitude towards UNRWA 
services tended to be one of grudging entitlement, not gratitude; the 
Agency’s programmes were rights, not charity, and as such they did not 
merit anything more.  
 
Conclusion   
 
The years 1949-57 were highly significant for UNRWA and the Palestinian 
refugees, establishing the foundations of their relationship and respective 
roles. While this was a relatively quiet time for Palestinian nationalist activity, 
it was crucial in laying the basis for UNRWA’s significance, its interactions 
with the refugees, and the broader relationship of both to the UN it self. 
Created four years after the UN, UNRWA constituted the latter’s first 
approach to a major humanitarian crisis. Uniquely formed to serve only the 
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Palestine refugees, UNRWA was closely entwined with their daily lives from 
the beginning, quickly becoming a formative element of the Palestinian 
exile. Its work signified the ongoing ‘internationalisation’ of the ‘Palestine 
question’, which had started when the League of Nations created the British 
Mandate in 1922. It also demonstrated the complex relationship between 
politics and humanitarianism that came to characterise much of the 
Palestinian refugees’ exile.  
Soon after UNRWA began operations in 1950, its first Director 
Howard Kennedy declared that the Agency had been created to ‘reintegrate’ 
the Palestine refugees into the region.177  Seven years later, the Agency’s 
management recognised this policy as a failure and quietly discarded it in 
favour of a new focus on education. This would prove a successful and 
momentous move, as the Agency quickly became known primarily for its 
schools. Moreover, this development was due in no small part to the 
refugees’ hostility to resettlement, and their resulting opposition to the 
Agency’s early Works schemes. In replacing resettlement with education, 
UNRWA recognised the need to work in tandem with the refugees. This 
exemplified the intimacy of their relationship, which was driven by a 
combination of dependency, hostility and entitlement.  
The Palestinian refugees always saw UNRWA as being much more 
than a simple aid agency. It was, in their view, a sign of the ‘international 
community’‘s debt to them; its services were entitlements rather than acts of 
generosity. Most importantly, they viewed UNRWA as a politicised and 
even a political organisation, despite the management’s continuous 
insistence that its work was purely humanitarian and entirely apolitical. 178 As 
has been shown here, many refugees saw the Agency as being in league with 
the pro-Israeli Western powers. They accordingly feared that its real purpose 
was to undermine their national cause. UNRWA’s early resettlement policy 
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was taken as proof of this, and its legacy had a lasting impact as this 
perception became deeply embedded in the Palestinian refugees’ collective 
consciousness. 
 This chapter has further established that from the beginning, 
UNRWA’s work was tied most closely to the refugee camps. Although not 
all Palestinian refugees lived in the camps, this was where the greatest need 
could be found and accordingly where the Agency acted in its most 
pronounced quasi-governmental role. However, UNRWA’s intimacy with 
the camps was to have serious consequences. As the host states remained 
largely uninvolved in running the camps, UNRWA came to be seen as 
responsible for them. This became problematic for the supposedly-apolitical 
Agency as the camps subsequently came to take centre stage in the 
Palestinians’ nationalist campaign. The fact that the Palestin ian refugees 
themselves largely viewed UNRWA as a political body did not help matters. 
With this in mind, the significance of the camps’ politicisation is examined 
in depth in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Two 
From Refuge to Revolution: The Impact of 1967 
 
‘We are dispersed from our country, our homes, and our people…. Use your powers to 
send us back.’1 
Ali Ahmed Al ‘Abed, Palestinian refugee in Wavel Camp, Lebanon, 1950 
 
‘We waited for 20 full years. Nothing happened. Our people remained in their camps, in 
their tents.’2 
George Habash, PFLP leader, 1968 
 
In the years after the Nakba, many of the dreams and desires of the 
Palestinian refugees were profoundly nationalist. They related 
overwhelmingly to the lost Palestinian homeland (al-waṭan) and their much-
hoped-for eventual reunion with it. Yet on a day-to-day basis the refugees’ 
concerns were much more basic. As they endured and resisted the miserable 
conditions of the refugee camps, many focussed on surviving and 
supporting themselves and their families. The combination of poverty, 
trauma, and host state repression meant that political activism in the camps 
was minimal in the two decades after the Nakba. With little means of taking 
direct action, many of the older generations of refugees looked to the Arab 
governments to realise their hopes of return. This changed dramatically with 
the Arab defeat of 1967, known in Arabic as al naksa (‘the setback’).  
This chapter examines Palestinian politics in the refugee camps in the 
decades after the Nakba. Acknowledging the importance of the 1967 defeat 
for Palestinian nationalism, it studies the form and nature of camp politics 
before and after this turning point. It will therefore temporarily move away 
from the thesis’ general focus on UNRWA. By investigating questions about 
the camps’ distinctiveness and significance as political spaces, this chapter 
lays the foundation for subsequently considering UNRWA’s political role. 
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 The question of the Naksa’s impact is tied to core historiographical 
disputes about Palestinian nationalism. While there is broad consensus 
about the momentousness of 1967, what it meant for Palestinian 
nationalism is disputed. In keeping with Golda Meir’s infamous statement 
that ‘there is no such people as the Palestinians’, 3  several political 
commentators and a smaller number of scholars have argued that a 
distinctive Palestinian national identity did not exist prior to 1967. 4 
According to this interpretation, the idea of the Palestinians as a separate 
national people only took hold once the 1967 War had destroyed many of 
the tenets of pan-Arabism.  
 However, this argument has been effectively discredited. Most notably, 
Rashid Khalidi has drawn on the evidence of Palestinian historical 
institutions, newspapers and publications to show definitively that a 
Palestinian national consciousness and identity existed not only before 1967 
but well before the Nakba.5 Rather than ushering in the creation of this 
national identity from scratch, both the Nakba and the Naksa acted as 
pivotal events in shaping the development of a consciousness that was 
already deeply rooted. As Khalidi, Pappe and Lindholm Schulz all argue, the 
Naksa prompted Palestinian nationalism to re-emerge in a new form, but did not 
give birth to it.6   
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This chapter builds on Khalidi’s interpretation with a view to 
understanding Palestinian national identity, consciousness and politics in the 
refugee camps before and after 1967. Based on evidence from refugee 
testimonies and memoirs, as well as archival documents from UNRWA and 
the UN, it is argued here that the camps’ significance within Palestinian 
nationalism stemmed from their long-running distinctiveness, in which 
UNRWA played a key role. This distinctiveness enabled the camps to play 
an essential ‘incubating’ role in the nationalist movement that re-emerged 
after 1967. It will thus be shown here that the camps were more significant 
to this movement’s development than is often understood. As the quasi-
governmental authority in the camps, UNRWA comprised a key element in 
the role they played.  
These arguments are presented here over the course of three sections. 
First, this chapter looks at the state of politics in the refugee camps before 
1967. It examines how UNRWA shaped the camps and helped render them 
distinctive spaces, thus inadvertently enabling their vital political role later 
on. The second section then focuses on the impact of the Naksa, examining 
how this devastating defeat destroyed Palestinian faith in the Arab regimes 
and ushered in new forms of Palestinian nationalism. Finally, the third 
section considers what this meant for the form and nature of nationalistic 
camp politics after 1967. In so doing, the chapter will establish the camps’ 
centrality to Palestinian nationalist politics in this period. 
 
Waiting to Return: The refugee camps before 1967 
 
The camps’ spatial function and distinctiveness is crucial to their particular 
significance. From the early aftermath of the Nakba, the camps across the 
region were distinguished from surrounding areas by variables including 
socio-economic conditions, physical infrastructure and appearance, and 
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governance and administration. Of these, the first factor was the most 
obvious difference. Poverty levels were noticeably higher inside the camps 
than elsewhere, and as discussed in Chapter One, conditions therein were 
usually dire. Abdel Bari Atwan recalls that his family’s mud hut in Deir al-
Balah camp in Gaza, also inhabited by scorpions and rats, was ‘luxury’ 
compared to the tents around it.7 Food was limited and physical sickness 
was rife, while poverty, homelessness and high unemployment meant that 
mental illness was often common too.8  
 
<Figure 10 unavailable due to copyright> 
 
Poverty also gave the camps’ distinctiveness a physical dimension, as 
the presence of tents, slum-like structures and narrow alleys distinguished 
them from neighbouring towns and villages (Fig. 10). In some cases the 
camps were also formally demarcated, although the extent of this varied 
between the camps and across the five fields. In Lebanon, where it was 
probably greatest, refugees needed permits to leave their camps and venture 
into the surrounding areas. By contrast, the West Bank saw considerable 
movement and integration between camps, towns and villages. For this 
reason, the sociologist Sari Hanafi has distinguished between ‘open’ and 
‘closed’ camps, arguing that the former were standard in the West Bank and 
the latter were the norm in Lebanon.9 
The demarcation of the camps enabled the host governments to treat 
them as sites of control. Yet it also enabled the refugees to retain the feeling 
of a national community in exile. Recalling his 1950s childhood in Burj al 
Barajneh camp, Fawaz Turki writes that the latter’s physical isolation 
                                                 
7 Abdel Bari Atwan, A Country of  Words: A Palestinian Journey f rom the Refug ee Camp to the Front Page (London: 
Saqi, 2008), p. 15, 27, 33. 
8 Shafiq Al Hout, My Lif e in the PLO: The Inside Story of  the Palestinian Struggle  (New York: Pluto, 2011), trans. 
Hader Al Hout and Leila Othman, p. 78. 
9 Sari Hanafi, ‘Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon: Laboratory of Indocile Identity Formation’, in 
Muhammad Ali Khalidi (ed.), Manif estations of  Identity: The Lived Reality of  Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon 
(Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010), p. 48, 58. 
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provided shelter and a form of protection for Palestinian identity, which was 
otherwise vulnerable to erosion. In Turki’s eyes, the camps’ set-up enabled 
the refugees to maintain their connections to Palestine, 10  ultimately 
reinforcing their traditions and customs: 
As we grew up [in the camps], we lived Palestine every day. We talked 
Palestine every day. For we had not, in fact, left it in 1948. We had 
simply taken it with us.11  
 
Rosemary Sayigh agrees that the camps became ‘foci of Palestinianism’, as 
their cordoning off from the outside areas inevitably crystallised and 
reinforced the residents’ Palestinian identity.12 She writes that as a result, 
‘town refugees’ tended to feel a far greater affinity with the host nation and 
culture than those in the camps.13 
In practical terms, older generations of refugees helped preserve the 
collective memory of Palestine in the camps by passing down not only their 
memories, but also the deeds and keys to the houses left behind in 1948. As 
a result, the generations born in the camps continued to identify themselves 
as belonging to whichever town or village their parents had left during the 
Nakba.14 Remembrance of the pre-Nakba days was a crucial element of 
camp life, both as a coping mechanism and as a way to keep the Palestinian 
identity alive. Matar ‘Abdelrahim, a refugee from Akka who lived in an 
unnamed camp in Syria, recalls how reliving former village life helped the 
community withstand the difficulties of exile and camp life. 15 This fixation 
                                                 
10 Fawaz Turki, Exile’s Return: The Making of  a Palestinian American  (New York: Free Press, 1993), p. 167. 
11 Fawaz Turki, Soul in Exile: Lives of  a Palestinian Revolutionary  (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988), p. 
36. 
12 Rosemary Sayigh, The Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries (London: Zed Books, 2007), p. 112. 
13 Rosemary Sayigh, ‘The Palestinian Identity among Camp Residents’, Journal of  Palestine Studies, 6:3, 1977, 
p. 7. In fact, this phenomenon is not unique to the Palestinian refugees. When observing Hutu refugees in 
Tanzania, anthropologist Lissa Malkki found that the camps served as sites of separateness and functioned 
to preserve a ‘pure’ national identity in much the same way. Liisa H. Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, 
Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1995), pp. 3-
4. 
14 Al Hout, My Lif e in the PLO, p. 18. 
15 Rochelle Davis, ‘Matar ‘Abdelrahim: From a Palestinian Village to a Syrian Refugee Camp’ in Mark 
LeVine and Gershon Shafir (ed.s), Struggle and Survival in Palestine/Israel (London: University of California 
Press, 2012), p. 16.  
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on their former homeland meant that, as Turki observes, it was the camp 
refugees more than anyone else who kept ‘the notion of al-‘awda [return] 
alive’.16 
This was signified by the ways in which many refugees further 
exacerbated the camps’ distinctiveness by imprinting signs of their presence 
inside. As discussed in Chapter One, in the early post-Nakba days it was 
common for Palestinian refugees to resist the development and 
beautification of the camps, which they saw as tied to plans for their 
permanent resettlement outside Palestine. However, they were willing to 
impose their presence on their surroundings in other ways - most notably, 
by physically re-creating pre-1948 Palestine in the camps. Customary 
remembrance practices saw many camp streets and quarters named after 
places left behind in 1948.17 This was even true of some camps themselves; 
Wavel refugee camp in Lebanon and Jerash refugee camp in Jordan were 
known informally as al-Jalil and Gaza respectively, after the origins of their 
residents. This function of the camps in ‘re-creating’ Palestine after the 
Nakba proved important in maintaining the consciousness of a national 
community in exile.  
In some cases the refugees took this further, and subdivided their 
camps such that neighbourhoods housed people from the same parts of 
Palestine.18 Accordingly, the Tarashha quarter of Burj al-Barajneh camp was 
named after the hometown of its residents, who originated from the village 
of Tarshiha; the same logic applied to ‘Amqa quarter of Ein el-Helweh 
                                                 
16 Turki, Exile’s Return, p. 10, 63-66, 167-169.  
17 These remembrance practices are recalled and discussed in: Salman Abu Sitta, ‘The Invisible Face of the 
Occupier’, in Yasir Suleiman (ed), Being Palestinian: Personal Ref lections on Palestinian Identity in the Diaspora 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), pp. 40-43; Muhammad Ali Khalidi and Diane Riskedahl, 
‘The Lived Reality of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon’, in M. A. Khalidi, Manif estations of  Identity, p. 6; Julie 
Peteet, Landscape of  Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee Camps (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2009), pp. 111-112; Rochelle Davis, Palestinian Village Histories: Geographies of  the Displaced (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2011), p. 214.  
18 Davis, Palestinian Village Histories, p. 214 
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camp. 19 People also tended to apply village social norms to these camp 
quarters; Julie Peteet writes of how women often wore their informal house 
clothes when in their own neighbourhood quarters, but changed into formal 
visiting clothes when going to other parts of the camp.20 This kind of set-up 
turned the camps into their own internal realms, clearly distinct from 
elsewhere.  
UNRWA itself also played a central role in establishing the camps’ 
distinctiveness. As the administering authority across the camps, in many it 
was also the main provider of social services, and the main employer. It thus 
constituted a vital characteristic and distinguishing feature of their internal 
culture.21 In physical terms, the presence of UNRWA institutions, such as 
schools, clinics and ration centres, helped demarcate the camps from 
surrounding areas (Fig. 11). Entrances to the camps were marked by 
prominent signs in the UN’s shade of blue, providing the name of the 
Agency and of the camp in English and Arabic. It was physical features such 
as these that led some observers to speak of ‘the Blue State’.22 
  
<Figure 11 unavailable due to copyright> 
 
In more conceptual terms, UNRWA’s work also helped codify the 
separateness of the camp refugees. By limiting its services only to those 
formally acknowledged as ‘Palestine refugees’, it provided a concrete 
practical indication of their status and thus fuelled the formation of a 
‘Palestinian refugee’ identity. In this sense, the Agency’s work was 
particularly significant in Palestinian fields like Gaza, where, as Ilana 
Feldman argues, it helped formalise the distinction between ‘native’ 
                                                 
19 M.A. Khalidi and Riskedahl, ‘The Lived Reality of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon’ , p. 6. Peteet, 
Landscape of  Hope and Despair, pp. 111-112. 
20 Peteet, Landscape of  Hope and Despair, p. 119. 
21 UNRWA Department of Operations, Technical Instruction No. 1, nd, File RE 230 Part II, Box 65, 
UHA. See also: Jean-Pierre Filiu, Gaza: A History (London: Hurst, 2015), p. 79. 
22 Riccardo Bocco, ‘UNRWA and the Palestinian refugees: A History within History’, Refugee Survey 
Quarterly, 28:2-3, 2010, p. 234.  
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Palestinians and refugees.23 This in turn augmented the separateness of the 
camps, which were of course inhabited almost entirely by registered 
refugees. As such, they came to encapsulate the latter’s distinctiveness. 
Moreover, UNRWA’s formative role in shaping the camps’ identification 
signified the continuous presence of internationalism in modern Palestinian 
history. 
 In the Arab host states, many of the local populations acted to 
reinforce the refugees’ separateness. This was most pronounced in Lebanon, 
where sectarianism and internal tensions combined to create widespread 
hostility towards the Palestinian refugees soon after their arrival. 24 Rosemary 
Sayigh has written at length on the Lebanese population’s antipathy towards 
the Palestinians, which she argues began soon after the Nakba. 25 Sayigh 
recorded testimonies in which Palestinian refugees recalled receiving abuse 
from southern Lebanese villagers during the hijra.26 The conceptualisation of 
the refugee camps as ‘Other’ started at this base level; some Lebanese locals 
even referred to them as ‘zoos’.27  
Disdain towards the camps was not limited to host populations. Leila 
Khaled recounts in her memoir how she and other ‘town’ refugees in 
Lebanon looked down on those in the camps as ‘the scum of the earth’.28 
Even Palestinian regions saw palpable tensions between ‘natives’ and 
refugees, with those in the camps at the bottom of the hierarchy. UNRWA’s 
codification of the differences inadvertently aided this differentiation. The 
divisions were particularly pronounced in Gaza, where the population 
                                                 
23 Ilana Feldman, Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, Authority, and the Work of  Rule, 1917-1967 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2008), p. 128.  
24 This is observed in: Dr Leslie Houseden, 1953 Report, MECA. See also: Jihane Sfeir, ‘Palestinians in 
Lebanon: The Birth of the “Enemy Within”’ in M. A. Khalidi, Manif estations of  Identity , pp. 13-31; Turki, 
Exile’s Return, p. 132, 185. 
25 Rosemary Sayigh, Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon  (London: Zed Books, 1993). See 
also: Mayssoun Sukarieh, ‘Speaking Palestinian: An Interview with Rosemary Sayigh’, Journal of  Palestine 
Studies, 38:4, Summer 2009, p. 28; R. Sayigh, The Palestinians, p. 132.  
26 R. Sayigh, The Palestinians, p. 106. 
27 Helena Lindholm Schulz, The Palestinian Diaspora: Formation of  identities and politics of  homeland (London: 
Routledge, 2003), p. 60. 
28 Leila Khaled, My People Shall Live: The Autobiography of  a Revolutionary (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
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increased more than threefold as a result of the Nakba.29 Ramzy Baroud, a 
refugee from an unnamed camp in the Strip, recalls in his memoir how the 
influx of more than 200,000 refugees into the Gaza Strip in 1948, set against 
a ‘native’ population of just 80,000, ‘opened the door wide for hostility 
towards the vulnerable refugees’. 30  Feldman writes similarly that many 
‘native’ Gazans felt resentment towards the refugees, as the latter were 
eligible for more aid and relief services, which many of the former 
desperately needed.31  
These social and communal tensions further reinforced the camps’ 
separateness. Widespread anti-Palestinian hostility engendered a shared 
solidarity among many camp residents, regardless of which particular camp 
they came from, as to varying extents they all experienced this distancing 
from the rest of society.32 In other words, the refugee camps were distinctive 
even within the Palestinian diaspora before 1967. This would prove 
important in the post-Naksa period, as the camps’ containment facilitated 
the promotion and expression of Palestinian national identity, while 
simultaneously providing nationalist organisations with ready-made bases 
for their operations.   
 
Camp politics before the Naksa 
The camps’ physical and social separation went hand-in-hand with the 
detachment of many refugees from politics in the early years of exile. As 
they grappled with the trauma and aftermath of losing their homes and 
livelihoods, many focussed on survival in the face of the dire conditions that 
characterised life in the camps. For this reason Jean-Pierre Filiu has called 
them ‘the generation of mourning.’ 33  Their apolitical approach was 
                                                 
29 Filiu, Gaza, pp. 69-71, 74.  
30 Ramzy Baroud, My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story (London: Pluto, 2010), p. 41.  
31 Feldman, Governing Gaza, pp. 128-135, 148-149. See also: Ilana Feldman, ‘Home as a Refrain: 
Remembering and Living Displacement in Gaza’, History and Memory, 18:2, Fall-Winter 2006, p. 27.  
32 Turki, Exile’s Return, p. 167.  
33 Filiu, Gaza, p. 55. 
     
 111 
facilitated by the fact that many camp refugees were fala ̄ḥīn (peasants) who 
lacked political consciousness and the resulting inclination to activism. 34 
Moreover, as Atwan writes, the executions and exiles of most Palestinian 
leaders during the 1936-39 Revolt had left the refugees with little means of 
political organisation.35  Indeed, Khalidi argues that the fallout from the 
Revolt’s failure was critical to subsequent weaknesses in Palestinian national 
politics, as it resulted in the loss of large numbers of men, the confiscation 
of weapons, and serious damage to the economy.36  
The precariousness of the Palestinians’ situation in the Arab host states 
– covered in depth in Chapter Three – fuelled this reluctance to participate 
in politics. After the outcome of the 1936-39 Revolt, many feared that such 
activity would imperil them. Turki recalls that when he and his sister first 
became interested in politics as teenagers, their mother admonished them 
for endangering their educations. Turki himself provides some rat ionale for 
this, writing that ‘till the emergence of the Palestinian Revolution in 1967, it 
was illegal for Palestinians to engage in any kind of political activity.’37 The 
refugees’ feeling of vulnerability was augmented by their perception that in 
1948 they had fallen victim to the plans of major internat ional powers, 
which had resources far beyond their reach. This led many to conclude that 
political activity was both futile and dangerous.  
 As a result, political activism in the camps was relatively limited in the 
years 1948-67. Palestinian identity was expressed in the form of opposition 
to Zionism and calls for return, which remained the ultimate goal and 
dream;38 in another instance of political naming practices, refugees sought to 
call Jabal al-Hussein camp in Jordan the Camp of Return, but were barred 
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from doing so by the government.39 The refugees’ desire for return was 
significant enough to be noted at the international level. In 1950, the 
Jordanian delegation to a UN meeting on Palestinian refugees contended 
that ‘nothing could be more unrealistic than to believe that the refugees 
would abandon hope of returning to their homes.’40 Aid agencies working in 
the camps reported similar observations. 41  Tellingly, many refugees 
continued to look to the international community to deliver this; in the 
1950s, UNRWA recorded repeated fierce calls from the refugees for the 
right of return to be implemented in line with UN Resolution 194.42  
These calls were not merely rhetorical. In the early post-Nakba years, 
some refugees actually tried to make return a reality, risking their lives by 
attempting to cross into what was now Israel.43 Benny Morris has examined 
the history of these so-called ‘infiltrations’ into Israel in detail, writing that 
thousands of Palestinians crossed the border illegally every year from 1949-
56, with a peak of 16,000 recorded cases in 1952. Although these were 
sometimes ambush or vengeance operations, Morris writes that many 
Palestinian ‘infiltrators’ were motivated by more basic desires: to retrieve 
possessions, visit relatives, reap their crops – especially as many were acutely 
hungry in exile – or simply look at their old homes. In some cases refugees 
attempted to cross Israel in order to reach the West Bank from Gaza, or 
vice versa.44 
Numerous refugees have provided personal accounts of such return 
journeys. Atwan and ‘Abdelrahim both write that their fathers successfully 
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made brief visits to their former homes after the Nakba to collect 
possessions they had left behind during the original flight .45 Many more died 
trying. In June 1950, the New York Times reported that dozens of civilians 
had died of thirst and exhaustion in the desert, while attempting to enter 
Israel from Gaza and elsewhere.46 Those who survived the journey were 
often shot and killed on entering Israel. 47  Baroud recalls hearing horror 
stories in his childhood of a cousin who was captured and brutally killed 
when crossing over.48 
 The practice of ‘infiltrating’ indicates what is perhaps most crucial to 
understand about the camps at this time; while the refugees were victims by 
many measures, they were not passive. Far from accepting their fate, they 
sought to confront it at every opportunity. The ways in which they did this 
ranged from crossing the border to petitioning UNRWA to recreating 
Palestine in exile. Their ability to take decisive action was highly constrained 
by the structures that disadvantaged them at every turn, but this did not 
mean that they did not try. 
Many of the structures in question were imposed by the Arab host 
states, which continually oppressed and disempowered the Palestinian 
refugees while outwardly claiming to serve their interests. As is discussed in 
Chapter Three, all three of the Arab host regimes opposed Palestinian 
nationalist activism, for varying reasons. The resulting repression goes a long 
way to explaining the reluctance of many refugees to become involved in 
political activism in the years 1948-67. It also explains their vocal calls for 
return, which was uncontroversial in the political context of the Arab host 
states. In fact, with the possible exception of Jordan, the Arab states saw 
return as the preferable course of action for the Palestinians. Calling for it 
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was therefore relatively straightforward and, most importantly, low-risk for 
the vulnerable camp refugees.  
However, the situation was quite different when it came to other forms 
of political activism that might pose a threat to the Arab regimes. As a 
result, it was usually suppressed. Journalist David Hirst has recorded that the 
Lebanese authorities frequently told Palestinian refugees at this time, ‘all you 
have to do is eat and sleep… the Arab armies will get your country back for 
you.’49 In the years after the Nakba, many Palestinian refugees believed this. 
Often traumatised by the devastating losses of 1948, many sought solace in 
the promises of the Arab regimes to defeat Israel and win them back their 
old homes. As a result, those Palestinians who were politically active at this 
time were often affiliated with the pan-Arab movement, inspired by 
Constantine Zureik’s argument that Arab disunity had enabled the Nakba.50 
For example, George Habash, a refugee from Lydda, founded the Arab 
Nationalist Movement (ḥarakat al-qawmiyyin al-‘arab or ANM) in Beirut in 
1953 with the explicit purpose of uniting the Arab peoples.51  
 Palestinian-centric exceptions had only a minor role in this period. The 
most obvious example is Yasir Arafat’s Fatah, which was established in 1959 
by exiled Palestinians in Kuwait.52 Fatah gained some traction in the early 
1960s as first the breakup of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1961 and 
then the success of the Algerian revolution the following year made the first 
challenges to pan-Arabism. However, Fatah’s role continued to be relatively 
marginal as the majority of Palestinian activists remained subordinate to the 
Arab states at this time. 53  Meanwhile Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the most 
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prominent Palestinian nationalist leader in the 1930s and 1940s, saw his 
authority completely truncated after the Nakba; he was compelled to defer 
to the Egyptian regime as a de facto condition of his exile in Cairo, and then 
had to move to Beirut in 1959 after falling out with Egyptian President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser.54 
 Indeed, it was Nasser who directed both the pan-Arab movement and 
the subjugation of Palestinian nationalism at this time. His rise to power 
after the 1952 Egyptian revolution provided huge impetus for the Arab 
nationalist movement, as he promised a turnaround in Arab fortunes. His 
successful nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in 1956 consolidated 
his position as the darling of the Arab people; Filiu writes that after this it 
became ‘sacrilegious’ to criticise Nasser, with even his communist critics 
now feting his achievements.55 Nasser himself was determined to maintain 
this position of unrivalled dominance; in 1964, the Arab League created the 
PLO at his behest, as a way of containing any potential threats to his 
power.56 
 For the Palestinians, Nasser’s success with Suez provided hope that the 
great powers could be defeated.57 Fatah founding member Abu Iyad recalls 
how he consequently came to believe that ‘everything was now possible, 
including the liberation of Palestine’.58 Nasser was particularly popular in 
Palestinian refugee camps, where people pinned their hopes of return on 
him 59  (with the exception of some in Gaza who experienced political 
repression under his regime).60 Atwan writes that Nasser was the hero of his 
camp in Gaza,61 while Turki recalls seeing his picture displayed on mud 
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houses and makeshift shelters everywhere in the camps in Lebanon.62 In 
Jordan, where the Palestinian refugees constituted more than half the 
population after 1948, their support for Nasser was potent enough to 
become a factor in prompting King Hussein’s involvement in the 1967 
War.63 He feared that distancing himself from Nasser’s battle against Israel 
might trigger a popular uprising against his regime in Jordan.  
The camp refugees’ faith in Nasser’s promises to defeat Israel and 
liberate Palestine shows that they had certainly not given up on politics in 
the years 1948-67 – quite the opposite. However, they tended to express 
their political convictions at this time through the Arab regimes, rather than 
by way of direct action. Indeed, in her periodisation of the Palestinian 
nationalist movement, Baumgarten writes that the dominant form of 
Palestinian nationalism in the years 1948-67 was pan-Arabism.64 The camp 
residents’ profound belief in this approach would be shaken severely in the 
June 1967 War, with serious repercussions for the entire region.  
 
Al Naksa: The Setback 
 
1967 was a turning point for the Middle East. In six days, Israel defeated the 
Arab coalition of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and nearly quadrupled it s size. It 
seized East Jerusalem, and occupied the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the 
Golan Heights and the Sinai, thus acquiring land from all three Arab states. 
At least 300,000 Palestinians fled their homes, more than half for the second 
time;65 UNRWA reported that most went to Jordan (Fig. 12).66 The 614,110 
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registered Palestinian refugees who remained in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip (now the OPT) found their lives now governed by the occupying 
Israeli army.67  
 
<Figure 12 unavailable due to copyright> 
 
The Naksa sent shockwaves throughout the region. 68  For the 
Palestinians, it engendered feelings of despondency, frustration, and 
renewed shame and humiliation, as the losses of the Nakba were extended 
and magnified. 69  The refugees’ resulting devastation and trauma was 
widespread and visceral, its significance continually emphasised in 
Palestinian memoirs and testimonies.70 Abu Iyad described the defeat as 
‘overwhelming, crushing, humiliating.’ 71  In particular, it seriously 
undermined the power and status of the Arab regimes in the eyes of many 
Palestinians. Not only had they failed in their promises to reverse the 
Nakba, but they had significantly worsened its impact. Palestinian nationalist 
Mustafa Barghouti, who was living in Ramallah at the time, recalled the 
aftershock in a 2005 interview: 
The feeling of injustice was very strong… There was also the sense of 
failure – that the Nasserite approach had failed, and we had to find 
something else. How had such a tiny country as Israel been able to 
beat all the Arab armies?72  
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Like Barghouti, many Palestinians now ceased to believe the Arab regimes’ 
promises that they would liberate their homeland. Conversely, the feeling 
took hold that trusting the Arab leaders had been one of the major mistakes 
of the first war. Leila Khaled states that the effect was visceral, leading the 
Arab armies to lose their ‘moral credibility’ in the eyes of the Palestinians.73  
 As Barghouti’s comment indicates, the cult of Nasser was one of the 
biggest victims of the defeat. While Nasser retained immense popularity - 
UNRWA officials reported widespread school absenteeism in the West 
Bank following his death in 197074 - the Naksa nevertheless led increasing 
numbers of young Palestinians to question whether he could really win back 
Palestine for them.75 This included those who had previously been affiliated 
to his pan-Arab movement; in Gaza, where the ANM had had 1,200 active 
members before the Naksa, only 213 confirmed their membership in the 
summer after the War.76 Similarly, Palestinian nationalist Bassam Abu Sharif 
recalls that the defeat seriously damaged George Habash’s previously close 
relationship with Nasser, whom he no longer trusted. 77  Habash now 
abandoned the ANM and formed a new organisation, the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (al-jabha al-sha‘biya litaḥrīr filasṭīn or PFLP).78 To 
make matters worse, after 1967 Nasser himself lessened his support for the 
Palestinian nationalist fighters (known as fidā’iyyīn) to avoid any greater 
reputational damage, as he considered the potential advantages of a 
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diplomatic agreement with Israel instead. 79  Many fidā’iyyīn reacted with 
dismay. 
 As the Palestinians grew disillusioned with the Arab regimes’ 
unfulfilled promises of liberation, their national struggle against Israel 
became increasingly framed in Palestinian rather than pan-Arab terms.80 The 
refugees in particular now sought to seize control of their own destinies by 
taking direct action against Israel. The rising number of attacks on Israel by 
non-state actors signified the Palestinian nationalist movement’s growing 
independence from the rest of the Arab world. 81  As the ‘question of 
Palestine’ continued to be entwined with the international community, both 
UNRWA and the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights 
of the Palestinian People (CEIRPP) formally acknowledged the catalysing 
effect of 1967 on the Palestinian nationalist movement.82 The refugee camps 
took a leading role in the latter’s new manifestations.  
 
New forms of Palestinian nationalism: the rise of the fida ̄’iyyīn  
Palestinian disenchantment with the Arab governments in general and 
Nasser in particular created an unofficial vacancy for new heroes and leaders 
in refugee communities after 1967. This enabled the fidā’iyyīn to come to the 
forefront. Although Palestinian nationalist guerrilla groups had existed 
before 1967 – Fatah proclaimed 1965 as the official starting date of its 
‘revolution’83 – the Naksa amplified their prominence and propelled them to 
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a new status as leaders of the nationalist struggle. In this setting, the fida ̄’iyyīn 
found some of their greatest success in the refugee camps, in terms of both 
recruitment and popularity.84  British Army official Major Derek Cooper, 
who coordinated aid efforts for refugees in Amman in 1967, identified 
camp-born refugees as ‘the hard core of the Resistance and Commando 
groups’ at that time.85  
 The fidā’iyyīn’s particular success in the camps can be explained by the 
latter’s disempowerment, which made Palestinian proponents of direct 
action especially appealing. Rex Brynen argues that the fidā‘iyyīn had three 
main objectives at this time: revitalising Palestinian national identity; 
reminding Israel and the world of the Palestinian people’s existence; and 
stoking the Arab-Israeli confrontation in order to ultimately liberate historic 
Palestine.86 Brynen’s reference to ‘revitalising’ Palestinian national identity 
chimes with the arguments of Khalidi, Pappe and Schulz that it re-emerged 
in this period.87 All three objectives appealed particularly to the Palestinians 
living in the camps, who were disillusioned, dispirited, and seeking an 
antidote to the devastations of the Nakba and the Naksa. The fidā’iyyīn’s 
direct action provided a way of countering their widespread feelings of 
helplessness. Indeed, Ramzy Baroud writes that his father Mohammed 
joined the fida ̄’iyyīn precisely because he saw their actions as a way to 
overcome his humiliation.88 In a controversial statement in 1972, even the 
Israeli politician Arye Eliav, a Labor Member of the Knesset, said that the 
fida ̄’iyyīn had ‘raised the Arabs’ morale for some time, by becoming symbols 
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of heroism and self-sacrifice’ (in keeping with the literal meaning of 
fida ̄’iyyīn).89 
The fidā’iyyīn also benefited from the practical repercussions of the 
Naksa. The discrediting of the Arab regimes – in the eyes of the Arab 
populations as well as the Palestinian diaspora – meant that they could no 
longer repress Palestinian nationalist activity, when their own attempts to 
defeat Israel had been so shamefully unsuccessful. 90 On the contrary, many 
regimes believed that the fidā’iyyīn served as a useful diversion from the 
defeat, and provided an alternative source of hope to the general population. 
Across the Arab world they were accordingly now given permission to 
openly recruit, train, and publicise their activities.91 According to Abu Iyad, 
the weakness of the Jordanian regime after the Naksa led King Hussein to 
release many militants and ‘close his eyes’ to fida ̄’iyyīn bases along the Jordan 
River.92 In Gaza, the removal of the Egyptian regime gave more freedom to 
the Palestinian movements that Nasser had suppressed. 
 The change was epitomised by the fidā’iyyīn’s takeover of the very 
structure that the Arab regimes had established to contain them: the PLO. 
While it had functioned from 1964-67 as a subordinate to Nasser, its 
position was now transformed. Late in 1967, Ahmed Shuqairi, Nasser’s 
favoured PLO Chairman, resigned. The following year, the fida ̄’iyyīn 
organisations formally took control of the PLO and in doing so fully 
emancipated it from Nasser’s grip. It was now dominated by Fatah, the 
PFLP, and later Nayef Hawatmeh’s breakaway Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (al-jabha al-dīmūqra ̄ṭiya litaḥrīr filasṭīn or DFLP).  
 This PLO was exclusively Palestinian in its concerns, and explicitly 
militant in its actions, taking a leading role in the emergence of what 
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Rosemary Sayigh terms ‘political Palestinianism.’93 In 1968, it adopted a new 
Covenant calling on all Palestinians to fight for their rights. In an indication 
of the ongoing internationalism of the Palestinian struggle, it did so on the 
very grounds that the international community had failed to secure these 
rights for them.94 Symbolically, the PLO also came to establish its own radio 
station, ṣawt filasṭīn (‘The Voice of Palestine’) which for many Palestinians 
took the place of Nasser’s legendary ṣawt al-‘arab.95 The radio station played 
a crucial part in spreading Fatah’s discourse of nationalism, armed struggle 
and revolution, through speeches and songs.96  Specifically, it fuelled the 
iconisation of the fida ̄’iyyīn with its regular tributes to martyrs and battles.97  
The fida ̄’iyyīn’s rising prominence at this time was not limited to the 
Palestinian diaspora or even to the Arab world. Indeed, while the nationalist 
movement emphasised its ‘Palestinian-ness’ and its distinctiveness from the 
Arab regimes, it was neither insular nor solely inward-looking. Strategically, 
the fidā’iyyīn actively engaged with the wider world, launching an increasing 
number of international operations from the late 1960s. As a result, their 
profile on the world stage rose. Most famously, in 1969 PFLP militants Leila 
Khaled and Salim Issawi hijacked a plane flying from Rome to Tel Aviv, in 
the mistaken belief that Yitzhak Rabin was on board.98 After the plane made 
an emergency landing in Damascus, the story made news worldwide, with 
added interest stemming from the fact that Khaled was a woman. Indeed, 
one of the passengers later spoke of being struck by Khaled’s youth and 
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glamour. 99  Khaled quickly gained an international profile, becoming so 
recognised that she even had plastic surgery to enable her to undertake 
further hijackings undetected.100 
 However, Khaled was by no means the most high-profile fidā‘ī(a) of 
this era. The same year that she hijacked the plane, Fatah leader Yasir Arafat 
(also known as Abu ‘Ammar) was elected the new Chairman of the PLO. 
Retaining the position continuously until his death 35 years later, Arafat 
quickly became the most well-known and recognisable Palestinian in the 
world, as well as in the camps. Unlike Nasser, Arafat was relatively 
unconcerned with pan-Arab politics. He focussed exclusively on Palestinian 
liberation – albeit often with an appeal to the world stage. This was a 
welcome change to many Palestinian refugees in the aftermath of the Naksa. 
Fatah’s operations against Israel made Arafat a rising star and a hero among 
many Palestinians; Atwan recalls widespread hero-worship of him in the 
Gaza camps, with Fatah’s revolutionary songs sung at camp parties and even 
in schools.101 Nor was Arafat’s following limited to the Palestinians, as he 
also enjoyed the admiration of many other Arabs at this time. As the 
Lebanese Army General Escort Jonny Abdo later put it , ‘before 1967 
everyone wanted to be photographed with Abdel Nasser. After 67 Abdel 
Nasser wanted to be photographed with Abu ‘Ammar’.102  However, the 
Naksa alone was not sufficient to make Arafat into a hero of this magnitude. 
That status was conferred as a result of the Battle of Karama nine months 
later.  
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The Battle of Karama  
The infamous Battle of Karama was fought between the Israeli army, the 
Jordanian army, and Fatah. Karama was a Jordanian town close to the river, 
where Fatah had established a base from which it launched attacks on Israeli 
forces in the West Bank. Following months of continuing clashes, the Israeli 
army crossed the River Jordan on 21 March 1968 with the aim of destroying 
the fidā’iyyīn’s bases in Karama. Confident of a victory, they were surprised 
to face considerable resistance from both Fatah and the Jordanian army. 
Although Israel succeeded in dismantling the Karama military camp, it 
endured surprisingly high casualties, with 32 soldiers killed and 70 
wounded. 103  The Israeli army inflicted far higher losses on Fatah – an 
estimated 170 killed and another 100 captured104 – but, crucially, it failed in 
its goal of destroying the organisation.105 Fatah thus quickly claimed the 
Battle as a victory over Israel, quietly disregarding the fact that the Jordanian 
army had played the bigger part in the outcome, and giving the Palestinian 
people a much-needed morale boost in the process. 
 The impact of the Battle of Karama was immediate across the 
Palestinian diaspora. Atwan, who was living in Amman at the time, recalls 
how the city ‘erupted in jubilation’ at the news, with thousands pouring onto 
the streets to celebrate as captured Israeli tanks were paraded and 
displayed.106 The fidā’iyyīn quickly gained an almost-mythical status, enjoying 
a popular legitimacy that had never applied to Shuqairi’s PLO. Photos of the 
Karama martyrs were now displayed throughout refugee camps in Lebanon, 
Syria and Jordan, and inside many homes in the OPT. Pictures of Arafat in 
particular were common – his biographer Said Aburish contends that this 
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marked the moment when Arafat became ‘Mr Palestine’.107 Hani al-Hasan, a 
Fatah official from Yarmouk camp in Syria, has said that Arafat’s leadership 
was unchallengeable after Karama.108  
Both Abu Iyad and Bassam Abu Sharif write that the Battle was also 
crucial in restoring Palestinian dignity – which, fittingly, is the literal 
meaning of karāma – after the devastation and humiliation of the Nakba.109 
The victory had a major impact on the Palestinian psyche, with many seeing 
it as a precursor to the pending full recovery of Palestine.110 In practical 
terms, Karama was hugely important in giving rise to a much greater degree 
of political activism across the diaspora, and ‘recasting’ the Palestinian image 
as one associated with courage and sacrifice, rather than dispossession and 
victimhood.111  
There was a strongly generational element to the post-Karama dynamic 
in the camps. It particularly inspired those who were too young to 
remember life in Palestine. The ‘Nakba generation’ ( jīl al-Nakba) was now 
overtaken by the ‘revolutionary generation’ ( jīl al-thawra).112  Turki writes that 
after Karama, ‘all of us [in the camps] wanted to join the resistance and 
struggle for freedom. As it turns out, most of us did.’ 113  Flooded with 
donations and volunteers, Fatah became a mass movement virtually 
overnight.114 A reported 5,000 Palestinians tried to join in the subsequent 48 
hours;115 according to Abu Iyad, its limited capacity meant that only 900 
could be accepted. Fatah went on to expand its average number of monthly 
operations from 12 in 1967 to 279 in the first eight months of 1970.116  
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The Battle of Karama thus became a powerful symbol for Palestinian 
strength and steadfastness (ṣumūd) and effectively launched Fatah as a major 
player on the world stage. On 13 December 1968, Time magazine covered 
the Battle in detail, featuring Arafat on the cover with the strapline ‘The 
Arab Commandos: Defiant New Force in the Middle East.’ 117  The 
accompanying article acknowledged the fida ̄’iyyīn’s international significance, 
having even drawn in the US State Department during the course of 
production.118  
The new recruitment and prestige also bought the PLO considerably 
more clout in its negotiations with the Arab regimes. It now successfully 
pressured the latter to allow the fida ̄’iyyīn greater freedom of action. Rashid 
Khalidi argues that the PLO leadership was aided in this by its widespread 
support among the Arab populations, buoyed by the perceived contrast 
between Fatah’s success at Karama, and the inability of the Syrian, Jordanian 
and Egyptian armies to hold their ground against Israel in the 1967 War less 
than a year earlier. 119 As a result, many Arab governments were keen to 
share in Fatah’s popularity and started supplying the fida ̄’iyyīn with rockets, 
military transport and artillery. Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Algeria also expanded 
the fidā’iyyīn’s training facilities, while many of the wealthy Gulf states 
contributed millions of dollars.120 In the clearest single sign of Arab attempts 
to capitalise on the fida ̄’iyyīn’s new popularity, King Hussein even declared 
himself a fidā‘ī. 121  Five years after the Battle of Karama, the Jordanian 
government issued a commemorative stamp, keen to share in the glory.122 
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 Khalidi characterises the Battle of Karama as a classic foundation 
myth, and with good reason.123 Alongside the Balfour Declaration, the UN 
Partition Resolution, the Deir Yassin massacre, and the Nakba itself, 
Karama became a significant reference point in narratives of Palestinian 
history.124 Khaled describes it as ‘a turning point’, Atwan as an event ‘etched 
in the collective memory of the Palestinian people.’ 125  Many Palestinian 
refugees continued to celebrate its anniversary as a national holiday 
thereafter; on 21 March 1970, UNRWA staff reported significant school 
absenteeism due to commemorations of the Battle’s second anniversary.126 
Observations such as this have led Laleh Khalili to argue that the 
commemorisation of Karama, which continued for decades, was far more 
significant than the Battle itself. The refugee camps were key to its 
iconisation, with many camp neighbourhoods subsequently named 
‘Karama’.127  
Both Fatah in particular and the PLO in general made great use of the 
Karama myth, capitalising on its positive reception.128 On the Battle’s first 
anniversary, Fatah produced commemorative postage stamps. For years it 
continued to organise commemorations among the Palestinian population, 
using photos and tokens to help mythologise the Battle further.129 Nor was 
this invocation merely symbolic. Eleven years after Karama, the PLO 
invoked its memory in order to denounce the Camp David Accords, 
producing posters that proclaimed abṭāl al karama saihizmūn al khiyāna (‘the 
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heroes of Karama will overcome the treason’).130 Even other PLO parties 
made use of its memory in their own narratives; the DFLP organ Al Huriya 
described Karama as the ‘beginning of the real ṣumūd (steadfastness)’.131 
 
 
Figure 2: Fatah commemorative stamp for the first anniversary of the Battle of Karama, 1969,  The 
Palestine Poster Project Archives, http://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/al-karameh-
battle-anniversary-stamps, accessed 6 April 2016. 
 Explanations vary as to how and why this mythology developed. 
Khalidi sees it as a classic case of the PLO claiming victory from defeat, as 
they would later do following their eviction from Lebanon in 1982. 132 
Inversely, security analyst W. Andrew Terrill attributes the mythologising of 
Karama to the Palestinian people’s receptiveness to positive national news 
in the aftermath of the Naksa.133 Either way, it is universally agreed that 
Karama became a seminal moment in the Palestinian national narrative. 
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Indeed, four months later, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) amended 
the PLO Charter to reflect a shift towards armed struggle. 134 Its campaign 
had now been established beyond all possible doubt as specifically 
Palestinian, rather than broadly Arab.  
 
‘Nests of the Resistance’: Camp Politics after 1967 
 
The camp refugees’ participation in the post-Naksa struggle was fervent, 
immediate, and wide-ranging. As the Naksa facilitated the necessary shifts in 
Palestinian politics, the camps’ potential for political activism was realised. 
They now developed into what one refugee would describe decades later as 
‘nests of the resistance’.135 This was demonstrated most immediately by the 
camp refugees’ overwhelming enthusiasm for joining the fidā’iyyīn. Fatah, the 
PFLP and the DFLP all found their most fertile recruiting grounds in the 
camps, where fida ̄’iyyīn activity was most prominent. 136  In the 
aforementioned recruitment rush that followed the Battle of Karama, the 
camps provided numerous fighters and in some cases went on to function 
as bases for fida ̄’iyyīn operations. This latter function was made possible by a 
development that characterised the post-Naksa shift and centred entirely 
around the camps: the ‘Palestinian revolution’.137 
 
Al-thawra al-filasṭīniya: The Palestinian Revolution  
The Palestinian revolution was the clearest demonstration of the refugee 
camps’ centrality to the nationalist movement that re-emerged after 1967. 
With the Arab regimes discredited, the Palestinians now sought to challenge 
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their power in the camps and take control of their own spaces. Across the 
Arab host states, and most notably in Lebanon, the late 1960s saw 
Palestinian fighters force out the Arab regimes’ security forces and take 
charge of the camps themselves. State attempts to regain control were 
unsuccessful; when Lebanese police entered Nahr el-Bared camp in 1969 in 
a bid to demolish the Fatah office, the residents took them hostage. By 
October that year, refugees in all 17 camps in Lebanon138 had ejected the 
police, the army and the state security forces, with armed Palestinians taking 
control instead.139 
 This was not a temporary change. In November 1969, Nasser brokered 
a deal between the Lebanese Army and the PLO that formally recognised 
the fida ̄’iyyīn’s control of the refugee camps in Lebanon. The Cairo 
Agreement, as it became known, placed the UNRWA-run camps under the 
authority of the PLO instead of the Lebanese state. It also sanctioned 
fida ̄’iyyīn activity in south-east Lebanon and permitted Palestinians to 
participate in armed struggle – including launching attacks on Israel from 
Lebanese soil.140 It therefore legitimised the new status quo and gave formal 
cover for the fida ̄’iyyīn to act independently of the Lebanese state.  
 Lebanon therefore served as the base for the Palestinian insurrection in 
this period. Its historical centrality within the development of the Palestinian 
nationalist movement can be explained chiefly by the weakness of the 
central Lebanese state, which enabled the fidā’iyyīn to take control of the 
refugee camps there and legitimise this new arrangement via the Cairo 
Agreement. In turn, this meant that from the late 1960s UNRWA had to 
pay particular attention to events in the camps in Lebanon, which often 
drove bigger developments in Palestinian politics. As a result, Lebanon 
holds a particular significance to the history of both the Palestinian refugee 
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camps and, by extension, the more general activities of UNRWA – a 
significance that is reflected in Lebanon’s centrality throughout much of this 
chapter.  
 However, while the thawra  was based in the camps in Lebanon, it was 
not limited to these spaces. Instead, the movement transcended national 
borders, albeit with varying degrees of impact. As Miriyam Aouragh writes, 
this period saw increasing expressions of solidarity among Palestinians 
across borders.141 From late 1969 until 1972, a wave of agitation and strikes 
in solidarity with Lebanon swept the Gaza camps,142 spreading to a lesser 
extent to the West Bank as well. 143  In 1972, UNRWA’s Gaza Director 
reported that around 500 young men had travelled from Gaza to Lebanon 
on illegally purchased Omani passports, with the intention of joining the 
thawra in its hub.144 Their journeys signified both the solidarity that existed 
between Palestinian refugees across the region, and the increasing 
internationalism of their nationalist movement.  
 With the camps in the Arab states now guarded by armed Palestinians, 
residents could freely engage in political activity and openly express their 
national identity. The impact was immediate and transformative. As the 
camps were released from the authority of the host states, internal activities 
became demonstrably ‘Palestinianised’. The fidā’iyyīn established popular 
committees to organise defence, public hygiene, sports and cultural facilities, 
all with a strongly nationalist tilt. Education had a particular importance, 
seen as key to the struggle, and so the popular committees established out-
of-school training programmes to inculcate a nationalist consciousness in 
refugee children from a young age.145 These programmes, of which Fatah’s 
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ashbāl (‘lion cubs’, for boys) and zahrāt (‘flowers’, for girls) were the largest, 
provided basic military training as well as education in Palestinian and 
political history. They would have major ramifications for UNRWA’s 
education programme in the camps, as is discussed in depth in Chapter Five. 
With the camps now under full Palestinian control, they became hubs of 
transnational activism, both within the shatāt and beyond. In the 1970s, 
various camp communities received visits from a range of international 
actors; both Keith Feldman and Michael Fischbach note that these visitors 
included Black Power leaders from the US, as well as activists from 
communist organisations in Italy and Germany.146   
 It is revealing that camp residents commonly use the term thawra 
(‘revolution’) to describe these events. Although the ‘Palestinian revolution’ 
did not fit the conventional criteria of overthrowing a national government, 
it did involve the ousting and replacement of state security authorities in the 
camps. In so doing, it turned the camps’ spatial separateness on its head, 
from being a feature that enabled state control to one that facilitated and 
incubated autonomous political activism. From the perspective of many 
refugees, it was therefore just as significant as a change in central 
government. The use of the term thawra also indicates the magnitude of the 
psychological impact, as the perception of Palestinian ‘self-rule’ in the camps 
was important in overcoming the feelings of powerlessness that had plagued 
many refugees since the Nakba. Fatah’s slogan ‘revolution until victory 
(thawra ḥata ̄ al-naṣr)’ now prevailed. 
 The resulting shift in the refugees’ self-perception was shaped by the 
role of the fidā’iyyīn. Many exiled Palestinians now constructed their identity 
as that of fighters rather than refugees, rejecting the UNRWA imagery that 
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focused on the latter.147 For this reason, the sociologist Mohammad Bamyeh 
has argued that the major effect of the 1967 War was to transform the 
refugee issue from a humanitarian one to a political one.148 This had long 
been a sore point; Leila Khaled complained that constantly categorising 
Palestinians as ‘refugees’ served to deny them their national peoplehood and 
with it their political rights. 149  The PLO endorsed and encouraged the 
change, with Fatah in particular keen to associate the thawra with the 
rejection of the Palestinians’ post-1948 psychology.150 In 1964, the PNC 
passed a resolution to describe refugees as ‘returners’, in order to stress their 
agency; the term was subsequently used in PLO publications.151 Speaking in 
January 1971, Arafat said, ‘we create a new people, instead of being refugees 
to be fighters. This is very important. We were refugees, homeless, we 
become now fighters, freedom fighters [sic].’ 152 
 As Arafat’s comment shows, the ‘new’ identity of the refugees was 
inextricably linked with the armed and militant nature of the nationalist 
struggle. Arafat himself firmly believed that only violence would win results 
for the Palestinians.153 Assessing this, Yezid Sayigh has argued that after the 
Battle of Karama, armed struggle came to form the core of the Palestinian 
nationalist movement, with the result that participation in it became the 
main source of nationalist legitimacy for most Palestinians.154 Militarisation 
was most evident in the refugee camps, which were now guarded and to 
some degree managed by armed fighters, with mixed results. On the one 
hand, the presence of armed fidā‘iyyīn gave the camps new levels of 
protection and defence against hostile agents like the Lebanese state security 
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forces. In her research, Rosemary Sayigh encountered many refugees who 
spoke positively of the thawra’s liberating and empowering effects in this 
way.155 On the other hand, as time went on there were reports that some 
camp residents were tiring of the clashes and violence resulting from the 
fida ̄‘iyyīn’s presence, particularly as the latter splintered and in-fighting 
increased.156 
 For UNRWA, the camps’ new militancy had highly problematic 
repercussions. As discussed in detail in Chapter Three, the international 
attention given to the fidā‘iyyīn takeover meant that UNRWA now found 
itself caught in the diplomatic crossfire, with rising concerns about what the 
US State Department spoke of as ‘the role of fedayeen in UNRWA’s camps 
[sic]’. 157  As UNRWA depended on Western funding to operate, the 
implications were potentially serious. This would become an ongoing 
problem for UNRWA in the years to come, as the camps became tied in the 
international consciousness to both the Agency and the militant nationalist 
movement.  
 These associations also permeated the Palestinian world. In 
negotiations with Israel decades later, Arafat refused to renounce the right 
of return on the explicit grounds that the Palestinian nationalist revolution 
had arisen from the refugee camps in the first place. According to one of his 
advisors, Arafat stated that ‘any [peace] agreement [with Israel] that did not 
include a just solution for the refugee problem would engender an even 
stronger revolution’.158 As this comment shows, the image of the camps as 
bastions of militant nationalism was lasting. As a result, they also gained a 
lasting respect in much of the diaspora, where they were characterised as the 
‘true’ Palestinians. 
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The ‘Insider Diaspora’: Camps in the West Bank and Gaza after 1967  
While the Palestinian revolution was underway in much of the Arab world, 
the refugee camps in the newly-occupied West Bank and Gaza (OPT) were 
experiencing a different change in authority. Of all the camps, it was these 
that were the most directly affected by the 1967 War. Many had been 
seriously damaged by the fighting, to the point that UNRWA made claims 
to the Israeli government for $323,400 in property damage in 1967.159 Even 
more significantly, these camps were now under Israeli occupation, meaning 
that the refugees were governed by the newly-established Israeli military 
governorate. As a result, they had regular direct contact with the enemy state 
for the first time since 1948.160 At the same time, they were distanced from 
the camps in the rest of the diaspora, which remained under Arab 
administration. UNRWA unofficially acknowledged the difference, 
commenting internally that ‘for political reasons the situation should not be 
entirely equated in the occupied territories to that in the other three Fields 
[sic].’161  
 Somewhat ironically, the Israeli occupation meant that the West Bank 
and Gaza were re-united under the same sovereign power, making it easier 
for nationalists to organise across the two fields. In fact, it was this territory 
that the PLO was initially determined to dominate, pressing the population 
to take a more assertive stance against the Israeli occupation.162 Within this 
context, the refugee camps had a particular potential for functioning as hubs 
of Palestinian nationalism and militancy. Accordingly, they quickly became 
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the main target of Israeli crackdowns, as the Israeli military recognised the 
politicisation of the camps and tried to act to quell any potential disorder.  
 Its approach took numerous forms. In 1969 for example, the army 
demolished shelters in Amary and Kalandia camps in the West Bank on the 
grounds that ‘occupants had been aiding and abetting terrorist activities.’163 
This became the standard rationalisation for such practices; five years later, 
Israeli representatives claimed at a meeting of the UN Special Political 
Committee that ‘attack[s on] refugee camps...had been directed solely 
against bases and other installations of the terrorist organisations.’164 Nor 
was the approach short-lived; into the late 1970s and thereafter, Israel 
continued to impose curfews and closures on the camps, a point noted by 
the UNRWA Commissioner-General in his 1979 report to the UNGA.165 
However, Israeli policy was not standardised across the West Bank and 
Gaza. Israel saw the West Bank as a far more desirable acquisition than 
Gaza; the former was home to a number of sacred religious sites and could 
also provide it with significant strategic depth. Accordingly, the late 1960s 
saw numerous discussions in the Israeli government about whether to annex 
the West Bank, where the first Israeli settlement was built soon after the 
June War.166 The matter was complicated by the fact that the West Bank’s 
administrative status was more complex than that of Gaza; Jordan had 
annexed the territory in 1950, and would not relinquish its claim until 1988. 
In the case of the refugee camps, there was an additional quasi-state layer in 
the form of UNRWA.  
Compared to the West Bank, the situation in Gaza was administratively 
more straightforward. In 19 years of governance, Egypt had never annexed 
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the territory, meaning that its status was theoretically less disputed. 
However, Israel considered Gaza much less desirable than the West Bank as 
a possible site of annexation. There was a long-standing view in Israeli 
governmental circles – held with some justification – that Gaza’s acute 
poverty, high proportion of refugees, and population density rendered it 
exceptionally radical.167 Israeli policy in Gaza was therefore fundamentally 
different to its approach to the West Bank. While in both cases it targeted 
the refugee camps, its operations were more piecemeal in the West Bank, 
consisting of clampdowns, closures and curfews. 168 In Gaza, Israel went 
further and sought to remove the camps’ potential for militancy altogether 
by dismantling their structures. 
 Israel pursued this objective through a combination of policies. In 
order to ‘dilute’ the concentration of refugees that was seen as a direct cause 
of radicalisation, the Israeli authorities annexed some camps to towns and 
sought to integrate the refugees into local neighbourhoods.169 In the most 
crowded camps, the military authorities demolished housing and shelters, 
widened the roads to facilitate patrolling, and – most controversially – 
sought to resettle some of the refugee population in the Sinai and the West 
Bank.170 In total, almost 38,000 refugees were uprooted for the second or 
third time and resettled elsewhere in Gaza, or in Jordan and the Sinai.  
 As a result of both this policy and the impact of the June War, the 
population of Gaza fell dramatically from 385,000 in 1967 to 334,000 the 
following year. Moreover, Israel continued the policy into the next decade. 
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From July 1971, more than 2,500 houses were demolished in Jabalia, Rafah 
and Shati camps, and 320 km of road were cleared to make them suitable 
for patrols. 171  UNRWA estimated that more than 15,000 refugees were 
affected by demolitions in the summer of 1971 alone.172 Many complained 
about increased overcrowding as a result of Israeli demolitions.173 
Ostensibly, the Israeli government justified these actions as ‘measures 
necessary to restore law and order in the camps and security [sic]’, and 
insisted that they had been successful in reducing terrorist activity in 
Gaza.’174 In private, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the US 
Embassy in Tel Aviv that the moves were part of a plan to ‘thin out the 
population’. 175  This was politically-motivated, as Gaza’s high population 
density was seen to be directly connected to its politicisation and militancy. 
As the most densely-populated spaces, the camps lay at the heart of this. In 
his comprehensive history of the Gaza Strip, Jean-Pierre Filiu argues that 
these policies were in fact designed to forcibly integrate the refugee camps 
into Gaza’s existing urban fabric, and thus weaken their militant potential. 176 
Among Palestinians, the policies were seen to be part of a plan to dissolve 
the refugees’ political identity and undermine the right of return. Some 
protested openly; in 1972 the Gaza City mayor was dismissed after he 
refused to provide municipal services to Shati camp on these grounds.177 
Twelve years into the occupation, the Israeli government affirmed 
again that its policy towards the Gaza camps had been justified. In a letter to 
the UN Secretary General, the Permanent Representative of Israel Yehuda 
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Blum wrote that Israeli policy had created ‘a vast amelioration in the 
economic and social condition of the refugees [in the Gaza camps].’ He 
added that Israeli housing projects had enabled refugees to move outside 
‘the squalid conditions of the camps.’178 Yet whatever the socio-economic 
effect of the policy, it had definitively failed to quell the potential for 
political organisation and activism. The centrality of the camps within the 
Palestinian nationalist movement would prove enduring across all five fields, 
with far-reaching consequences for Israel, UNRWA, the Arab host states, 
and the Palestinians themselves.  
 
Fala ̄ḥīn and fida ̄‘iyyīn 
It has already been noted that the rise of the fida ̄‘iyyīn shaped the camp 
refugees’ new self-identification as active fighters. At the same time, the 
camps’ central role within the nationalist movement directly informed the 
re-emerging ideological conception of ‘Palestinian-ism’. In keeping with the 
camps’ significance, the idea of ‘Palestinian-ness’ became imbued with the 
cultural customs and norms of those social groups that dominated the 
refugee camps. The vast majority of camp refugees were fala ̄ḥīn (peasants or 
farmers) from rural villages in pre-1948 Palestine.179 These people had had 
the least means to support themselves after the Nakba, and consequently 
mostly ended up in camps. As they and their descendants swelled the ranks 
of the fida ̄‘iyyīn, so Palestinian nationalist expression tapped into older ideas 
about rural village culture.  
These ideas often centred around the perceived purity of the peasant 
lifestyle. In her memoir, Leila Khaled paraphrases what a middle-class 
Palestinian teacher in Lebanon told her about the fala ̄ḥīn: 
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[The falāḥīn] are the true children of Palestine because they live on the 
land, and cultivate and harvest it. Virtue is a part of the people of the 
land, and the simple folk are the backbone of all societies. Those 
peasants did not leave Palestine willingly like the rich people who 
now live in villas in Cairo and Beirut… those are the people of 
Palestine.180 
 
As this comment shows, the peasants’ close and explicit link to the 
Palestinian land made them the perfect emblem of the nationalist campaign 
to reclaim it. With the struggle focussed so intensely on the land, the 
falāḥīn’s attachment to it was seen as a sign of their virtue. Such perceptions 
were widespread; with striking similarities to Khaled’s recollection, Ghada 
Karmi, a refugee from Jerusalem, describes how her urban middle-class 
family and their circles perceived this social group: 
The fellahin [sic], judged uneducated and backward on the one hand, 
were also seen as symbols of tenacity, simplicity and steadfastness on 
the other. They represented continuity and tradition and the essence 
of what is was to be Palestinian.181 
 
It is this latter point that is most important. Ideas of ‘what it was to be 
Palestinian’ were anchored in the perceived characteristics of the falāḥīn – 
who, by no coincidence, were now largely living in the refugee camps.  
Karmi points out elsewhere that it was the traditions and customs of 
the falāḥīn, not those of the urban elites, that distinguished Palestinian 
culture from its neighbours. 182  This meant that fala ̄ḥīn culture proved 
particularly effective when asserting a specifically Palestinian national identity 
– which was of course a key idea after 1967.183 Accordingly, the fida ̄‘iyyīn 
drew heavily on the typical imagery of the fellahin in order to convey a sense 
of ‘Palestinian-ness’. Arafat, who came from an urban background and had 
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grown up in Cairo and Jerusalem, led the fida ̄‘iyyīn’s widespread adoption of 
the kūfiyya as a throwback to the peasant headdress of the 1936 Revolt. 184 
Political posters and songs made use of peasant imagery that related to the 
land and portrayed the Palestinians as deeply rooted therein. 185  Some 
nationalist organisations explicitly linked the peasant tending of the land to 
the struggle to reclaim it; the PFLP presented Palestine as the ‘land of 
oranges, land of revolutionaries [arḍ al-burtaqa ̄l, arḍ al-thawa ̄r]’.186 
Conceptually, both the fala ̄ḥīn and the camp refugees were also central 
to the idea of ṣumūd, a core element of the Palestinian nationalist struggle in 
this period. Meaning ‘steadfastness’ or ‘perseverance’, ṣumūd was used to 
denote steady and determined resistance, and accordingly drew on many of 
the commonly-understood characteristics of falāḥīn culture as described by 
Karmi and Khaled. The word was a mainstay of PLO literature and artwork, 
alongside imagery of the falāḥīn and fidā‘iyyīn – both of which were seen as 
demonstrating ṣumūd in their respective forms of commitment to the 
Palestinian land.187 Particular visual expressions of ṣumūd included the olive 
tree, with its obvious connection to fala ̄ḥīn culture.188 
After 1948, the fala ̄ḥīn were effectively ‘urbanised’ by way of their re-
location in concentrated refugee camps, usually located close to built -up 
areas. However, the idea that they constituted the ‘true’ Palestinians was 
extended in turn to the camp refugees, whose refusal to give up on the right 
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of return became a new sign of ṣumūd. In 1978, Arafat wrote in a letter to 
UN Secretary-General Waldheim: 
the fact that [the refugees] have continued to live in tents for over 30 
years is eloquent testimony to the determination of our people and 
their tenacity with regard to their right to return to their homes… 189 
 
Of course, at the time of writing it had been many years since the Palestinian 
camps had consisted of tents. Arafat’s references to the latter is ind icative of 
the near-romantic symbolism sometimes ascribed to the camps in nationalist 
rhetoric.  
This notion of the camps as the most authentically Palestinian spaces 
was far-reaching. Najwa Al Qattan, a Palestinian who grew up in Beirut, 
recalls how her family felt shame over the fact that they did not live in the 
camps and were therefore ‘abandoning’ their ‘Palestinian-ness’.190 As this 
shows, the camps came to serve in the minds of many as ‘Palestine in exile’, 
not least because of their connection to first the falāḥīn, and later the 
fida ̄‘iyyīn. By 1967, an entire generation had grown up away from the 
traditional agricultural life of the villages. This made it impossible for 
agricultural traditions to continue in the same way, and yet they took on a 
hallowed significance as symbols of the lost motherland. 
   
Conclusion   
     
The politics of the Palestinian refugee camps are typical of the wider region 
in that they can be periodised using 1967 as a watershed. In the camps, as in 
the wider Arab world, the Naksa served as a turning point for political 
expression, ideas and activism. Its transformative effect on Palestinian 
nationalist activity thus changed the political culture in the camps. Whereas 
in the 1950s refugees like Ali Ahmed Al ‘Abed had called on governments 
                                                 
189 Arafat, letter to Waldheim, 22 March 1978, S-0899-0013-07, UNA. 
190 Najwa Al Qattan, ‘An Ornithologist from Iceland’, in Suleiman, Being Palestinian, pp. 54-55.  
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to implement the right of return, by the late 1960s they had lost faith in the 
latter’s willingness and ability to do so.191 Before 1967, Palestinian efforts to 
reverse the Nakba had usually been small-scale, consisting of individual 
‘infiltration’ attempts and limited early fidā‘iyyīn operations, with the latter 
largely subordinate to the Arab regimes. After 1967, the Palestinian national 
movement became self-driven, organised and highly active. In both 
ideological and practical terms, the refugee camps were central to driving 
this new movement. 
Yet this paradigm of the 1967 watershed risks obscuring another truth 
about the history of the refugee camps. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
Naksa’s significance was common to both the camps and the wider Arab 
world, this chapter has also shown that in many ways the camps functioned 
as distinctive spaces, even within the Palestinian diaspora and certainly 
before the Naksa. Indeed, it is the camps’ uniqueness and particularities that 
merit the specific study of them missing from much of the existing 
literature. Distinguished from surrounding areas by their makeshift physical 
appearances, high levels of socio-economic disadvantage, and the presence 
of UNRWA institutions, the camps could be easily identified. In some cases, 
their demarcation was formalised, as permits were required to enter and 
leave the camps.  
It was this long-established distinctiveness that enabled the camps to 
function so effectively as bases for the post-67 Palestinian thawra. Their role 
in the latter has commonly been understated, as historical studies of 
Palestinian nationalism tend to take a top-down approach, focussing on 
organisations like the Palestine Arab Higher Committee (AHC) and later the 
PLO and Fatah.192 As a result, the camps have too often been depicted as 
mere respondents to external events, rather than as an essential element of 
                                                 
191 Letter from Ali Ahmed Al ‘Abed, FO 1018/73, TNA. 
192 See for example: R. Khalidi, The Iron Cage; Y. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State; Baumgarten, 
‘The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism’; Franjieh, 'How Revolutionary Is the Palestinian 
Resistance?' 
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the developments taking place. In fact, they were a formative part of the 
movement that emerged after 1967, as manifested in the nationalistic 
mythologising of the falāḥīn, the refugees, and the connection of both to the 
fida ̄‘iyyīn.  
The question remains of what this meant for UNRWA, as the de facto 
quasi-government in the refugee camps. As the latter became not only 
politicised but also militarised, the Agency struggled to retain its supposedly 
apolitical nature and neutral reputation. From 1969 it faced increasing calls 
to advocate for the Palestinian refugees’ cause on the world stage. Yet when 
responding to such demands, it was severely constrained by the nature of its 
set-up. As an international organisation mandated by the UN and funded by 
Western donor states, UNRWA was bound by multiple considerations. Both 
the Western states that funded the Agency and the Arab states that hosted it 
were highly bemused by the possible implications of the camps’ 
politicisation during this period. Their relationships with UNRWA, and their 
views of its quasi-state role in the camps during the thawra years, are 
examined in depth in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three: 
UNRWA’s International Relations 
 
‘UNRWA walks a tightrope between the aspirations of the Palestinians and the stance 
of the host Governments and Arab contributors on the one hand and, on the other, the 
requirements which its major contributors wish to see satisfied and on which their support 
is to some degree dependent. On occasion the two are compatible; more often they are not.’ 1 
Office of the UNRWA Commissioner-General, 1979 
 
The political significance of UNRWA’s work in the refugee camps did not 
go unnoticed. On the contrary, its intersection with the Palestinian 
nationalist movement became a key constituent of its relations with the host 
and donor states, which were for various reasons all hostile to the PLO’s 
ascent and accordingly suspicious of the Agency’s role in the camps. Their 
qualms created unending problems for UNRWA. Despite the quasi-state 
nature of its work in the camps, the Agency had no real independence 
financially or operatively. Without a regular income, it relied entirely on 
voluntary donations from UN member states (chiefly the US) to fund its 
programmes. At the same time, its lack of legal jurisdiction meant that it 
could only operate at the invitation of the host states: Jordan, Lebanon, 
Syria, and the Israeli occupying power in the West Bank and Gaza.2 As a 
result, UNRWA’s essential internationalism generated added tensions as its 
work became increasingly ensconced in the camps’ nationalism during the 
thawra years. 
This chapter probes the complications that stemmed from this 
inherent tension in UNRWA’s positioning. It seeks to explicate how the 
camps’ politicisation affected UNRWA’s relations with the host and donor 
states, particularly in terms of how they perceived the Agency’s connection 
to and impact on the Palestinian nationalist movement. In the process, it 
also asks how UNRWA’s internationalism shaped its activities and political 
                                                 
1 Office of the Commissioner-General, memo, ‘UNRWA’s Mandate’, 16 May 1979, File OR110 II, Box 
OR1, UHA. 
2 Interview with Filippo Grandi, former UNRWA Commissioner-General, Beirut, 19 January 2015. 
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positioning in the camps. Finally, it considers the extent to which 
UNRWA’s international relations reflected its quasi-state role in the camps, 
and the ways in which it did so.  
The archives of both UNRWA and the UN headquarters provide 
ample evidence to illuminate these questions. Drawing on the relevant 
documents, this chapter argues that the complexity of UNRWA’s 
relationships with the host states and the donor states was demonstrative of 
its hybrid identity, as an international quasi-state consumed in the camps’ 
nationalist environments. In keeping with such internal conflict, its 
difficulties were not limited to a clash with one government alone; instead it 
faced conflicts on numerous fronts sometimes simultaneously.  
 Yet despite the variety of disagreements and accusations, there were 
certain underlying commonalities. None of the donor or host states saw the 
Agency as solely humanitarian; on the contrary, they all treated it as an 
organisation that was essentially political in its purpose and significance. 
They accordingly assessed its impact through a political lens – albeit with 
varying priorities – and, tellingly, tended to focus on the camps. When it 
came to the latter, the host states and donor states all saw Palestinian 
nationalism as an unwelcome development, and feared that UNRWA’s work 
was fuelling the refugees’ national identity and consciousness. At the same 
time, they preferred the Agency to the Palestinian organisations that might 
otherwise run the camps.  
In the case of the Arab host states and Israel, they also benefited 
fiscally from UNRWA’s operations, which saved them the cost of providing 
services to the refugees themselves. In this regard, there were fewer 
differences between Israel and the Arab host states than between the donor 
and host states; while the latter wanted the Agency to deliver as many 
services as possible, the former wanted the reverse.3 UNRWA’s relations 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
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with these states therefore challenge conventional paradigms about political 
dynamics in the Middle East that assume a constant polarity between Israel 
and the Arab states. In this case, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria  in fact 
held common concerns and interests, albeit without acknowledging their 
similar positioning in this regard. This chapter’s examination of UNRWA’s 
international relations therefore holds a broader significance relevant to 
more general understandings of political dynamics and machinations in the 
twentieth-century Levant.   
In presenting such analyses, this chapter provides an important 
historiographical contribution to scholarship that is surprisingly limited. 
Benjamin Schiff’s comprehensive survey of the Agency includes an 
extensive discussion of how its operations were shaped by its relations with 
the Arab host states, Israel, and the donor states.4 However, much of the 
other literature mentions the subject only passingly. Brief discussions can be 
found in works by Rex Brynen,5 Lex Takkenberg,6 Rosemary Sayigh7 and 
Yezid Sayigh, 8  but there is no in-depth analysis of how UNRWA’s 
international relations signified and shaped the politics of its work vis-à-vis 
Palestinian nationalism. In addressing this subject, this chapter deepens the 
current historiographical understanding by providing a deeper analysis of the 
conflicting characteristics at the heart of the Agency’s role: international yet 
national, apolitical yet political, local yet global.  
The chapter also illuminates some of this thesis’ key underlying 
themes. UNRWA’s international relations illustrate the importance of the 
camps to the thawra, and the significance of UNRWA’s quasi-state role 
                                                 
4 Benjamin Schiff, Refugees Unto the Third Generation: UN Aid to Palestinians (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1995).  
5 Rex Brynen, ‘UNRWA as Avatar: Current debates on the Agency – and their Implications’, in Sari 
Hanafi, Leila Hilal and Lex Takkenberg (ed.s), UNRWA and Palestinian Refugees: From Relief  and Works to 
Human Development (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 263-283. 
6 Lex Takkenberg, 'UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees after Sixty Years: Some Reflections', Refugee 
Survey Quarterly , 28:2–3, 2010, pp. 253-259. 
7 Rosemary Sayigh, The Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries (London: Zed Books, 2007), pp. 113-117. 
8 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 41-54. 
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therein. The Agency could not remain detached from these spaces’ heavy 
politicisation, and in fact increasingly came to serve as their de facto 
representative on the world stage. Studying the Agency’s international 
relations thus provides a way to understand and analyse its political role 
from another angle. Hemmed in by politics on all sides, UNRWA’s 
international relations in the years 1967-82 showed decisively that it had 
become inextricably entangled with the rise of Palestinian nationalism in the 
refugee camps.  
 
The Arab Host States and UNRWA: Power and Paradox 
 
The Arab host states’ relationships with UNRWA were shaped by their 
remarkably complex and at times inconsistent policies towards their 
Palestinian populations. While Arab leaders all imbued their public speeches 
with calls for Palestinian liberation, internally they feared the repercussions 
of hosting a powerful nationalist movement. The exact reasons for this 
anxiety varied from state to state, but they were always tied to concerns 
about instability and threats to the regimes’ power, particularly if Palestinian 
militancy attracted Israeli retaliation. Similarly, their approaches to UNRWA 
were framed by concerns about the potential threat it might pose to the 
power and authority of the state. Jordan, Syria and Lebanon all frequently 
disagreed with the Agency over the limits of its jurisdiction. In turn, the 
latter complained about host state interference in its staff appointments, 
programmes and freedom of movement.  
 These tensions were most acute when it came to the refugee camps, 
where UNRWA’s dependence on the host states was greatest. Although the 
camps were administered by the Agency, they never existed independently 
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and were not extra-territorial spaces.9  Instead they came under the legal 
jurisdiction of the state in which they were located, with ‘the host 
Government responsible for the security services within the camp[s].’10 As 
UNRWA had no legislative or police power, it was reliant on the host states 
to maintain order in the camps, while it provided quasi-state services. This 
set-up caused endless problems for UNRWA, as the host states often 
blamed it for disorder among the camp residents. The increasing 
prominence of fidā’iyyīn organisations in the camps after 1967 only worsened 
relations, especially when the latter clashed with government forces. In 
essence, the Arab host states wanted the Agency to serve their interests , and 
became frustrated and hostile when it did not. 
 Alongside such power struggles was the Arab host states’ common 
concern that UNRWA should continue to provide its services to the 
Palestinian refugees. They had voted for the Agency’s creation in 1949 and 
certainly did not want to see it disbanded.11 Its work benefited the Arab host 
states by relieving them of the financial burden of caring for the refugees; it 
even paid them subsidies for the Palestinian refugee children who were 
educated in state schools. 12  Its dissolution would therefore have highly 
undesirable consequences for the Arab governments, who consequently all 
supported the view that the international community (by which they meant 
the West) should bear responsibility for the needs of the refugees while their 
plight remained unresolved – and that this responsibility was enacted in the 
form of the UN and UNRWA.13 As a result, the Arab states’ clampdowns 
                                                 
9 See for example: John Rennie, ‘Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA’, A/8413, 30 June 
1971, 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/A81D27231BA0BF4985256AA8006C6BFD, accessed 
31 August 2017. 
10 UNRWA General Cabinet, ‘Administration of Refugee Camps’, 12 September 1970; E/Bank Field Relief 
Services Officer, memo to Director of Relief Services, ‘Agency Camps’, OP/AD/100, 3 March 1970, both 
File RE400 II, No Box, UHA. 
11 Takkenberg, 'UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees after Sixty Years', p. 255. 
12 UNRWA Education Subsidies, June 1979, File RE230(G-2)II, Box RE91, UHA. 
13 Brynen, ‘UNRWA as Avatar’, p. 6. 
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on the Agency’s power and authority were juxtaposed with demands for it to 
maximise its service provision. 
To complicate matters further still, the Arab host states’ attitudes to 
UNRWA were framed by their perception of it as a force underlining 
Palestinian separateness. Officially, they supported this notion; all three 
governments spoke publicly of Palestinian nationhood and made calls for 
the refugees to be allowed to return home. In reality, the Arab host states 
responded to the idea of a separate Palestinian nationhood with varying 
degrees of hostility. Both the Jordanian and Syrian regimes wanted to absorb 
the Palestinian refugees into a greater state, albeit in different ways. 
Meanwhile the Lebanese government wanted the Palestinians to remain 
separate from the rest of society, but feared that a strong sense of 
Palestinian nationhood might threaten the already-weak central government 
in Beirut. Accordingly, all three were instinctively dubious of any 
organisation that might reinforce Palestinian nationalism – including 
UNRWA. Yet at the same time, they ultimately supported UNRWA’s work 
for the benefits it brought them. The policies that stemmed from this 
inconsistent basis were complicated and sometimes even erratic. The details 
could vary considerably from state to state, and accordingly each shall be 
examined in turn here. 
 
Syria and UNRWA: Control and interference 
Syria was consistently the most welcoming Arab host state for Palestinian 
refugees. As Nell Gabiam observes, the country provided its Palestinian 
population with more benefits and entitlements than either Jordan or 
Lebanon. 14  Just a few years after the Nakba, most of the Palestinian 
population in Syria were working and, unlike in neighbouring countries, 
                                                 
14 Nell Gabiam, The Politics of  Suf f ering: Syria’s Palestinian refugee camps (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2016), pp. 18-25.  
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were relatively settled.15 Law No. 260, passed in 1956, gave Palestinians the 
same rights and obligations as Syrian citizens, except for voting and standing 
for political office.16 They had full access to state education and healthcare 
services, with their affairs administered by the Palestine Arab Refugee 
Institute (PARI). 17  Despite the frequent upheavals of Syria’s numerous 
coups in the 1950s and 1960s, these entitlements remained constant. 
 The coups finally came to an end with the ascendancy of Hafiz al-Asad. 
The Ba’ath Party to which Asad belonged first took power in 1963, with an 
internal coup three years later. Air Force General Asad rose through the 
ranks to become Defence Minister in 1966, Prime Minister in 1970 and 
President the following year - a position he retained until his death in 2000. 
Throughout this time Asad’s primary concern remained that of regime 
maintenance, as he fixated on removing any potential threat to his authority 
- including that which might be posed by a powerful Palestinian nationalist 
movement. This was twinned with his determination to claim the mantle of 
leader of the Arab world, a position that had been vacated with Nasser’s 
death in 1970. As a result, his regime keenly promoted the notion that he 
would defend the Arabs against the perceived threat posed by Israel, which 
went hand-in-hand with presenting Asad as the saviour of the Palestinians.18  
Accordingly, when Asad took power he keenly continued with policies 
granting entitlements to Palestinians in Syria. While PARI was renamed the 
General Administration for Palestine Arab Refugees (GAPAR) in 1974, this 
was more of a rebranding exercise than a strategic change. Indeed, Asad was 
eager to highlight Syrian support for the Palestinian refugees when extoling 
his regime’s pan-Arab solidarity. Unsurprisingly, this had direct ramifications 
                                                 
15 Dr Leslie Houseden, Report on the Refugee Children in the Middle East, 28 August 1953, Sir Edward 
Spears Collection, GB165-0269, File 2, Box 15, MECA. 
16 Gabiam, The Politics of  Suf f ering, p. 21. 
17 UNRWA Inter Office Memo, ‘Preparatory Education – Syria’, 13 February 1961, File RE230(S)I, Box 
RE21, UHA. 
18 Patrick Seale with Maureen McConville, Asad of  Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 
1990), p. 348. 
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for UNRWA; Asad also cited his government’s support for UNRWA’s 
programmes in Syria as evidence of both his pro-Palestinian credentials, and 
his respect for the UN and the international community.19 The policies had a 
noticeable impact, with senior UNRWA officials commenting internally on 
how Palestinian refugees in Syria benefited from enjoying the same 
opportunities as Syrian citizens.20 
Syria’s plentiful provision of services to Palestinian refugees also 
directly benefited UNRWA, by relieving it of the need to provide the 
intensive services required elsewhere. As a result, UNRWA was less active in 
this field than in others, with staff commenting, ‘it is not possible to deny 
that the Agency does benefit [in Syria] from the exceptionally generous 
arrangement…’21 GAPAR officials were often keen to underline the point in 
their interactions with the Agency, as Syrian generosity towards Palestinian 
refugees put them in a stronger negotiating position than either Jordan or 
Lebanon. When campaigning for UNRWA to implement new programmes, 
for example, the Syrian government highlighted the savings that the Agency 
had made as a result of the government’s provision of free education to 
Palestinian refugees.22  
Yet the consequences for UNRWA were not entirely positive. The 
Syrian government’s close involvement in service provision to Palestinian 
refugees also meant that UNRWA faced considerable encroachments on its 
autonomy in the country. As well as being the most generous Arab host 
state in terms of its services towards the Palestinian refugees, Syria was also 
the most authoritarian regional regime and accordingly the most draconian 
in how it approached outsider entities like UNRWA. 23 Asad consistently 
                                                 
19 See for example: Syrian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Makhos, letter to Secretary-General Thant, 9 August 
1967, File LEG480/4(S) IV, Box LEG23, UHA. 
20 John Defrates, letter to Magnus Ehrenstrom, 4 August 1972, PU140/3, File LEG480/4(S) IV, Box 
LEG23, UHA.  
21 UNRWA Confidential Cabinet Memo No. 76/61, 18 September 1961, File RE230(S)I, Box RE21, UHA. 
22 See for example: Notes of a Meeting between PARI and UNRWA, 12 September 1961, File RE230(S)I, 
Box RE21, UHA. 
23 Schiff, Refugees unto the Third Generation , p. 90, 109. 
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clamped down on any potential threats to his authority, and despite its UN 
status, UNRWA was not immune to the suppression that characterised 
much of Syrian state policy at this time. The Agency may have been 
apolitical – at least in theory – but it was still an internationally-supported 
quasi-governmental authority, in charge of self-contained camps that housed 
hundreds of thousands of foreigners. As such, the Asad regime quickly 
concluded that UNRWA’s power needed to be contained.  
The totalitarian nature of the Syrian regime gave it several routes to 
achieving this. It continually imposed restraints on the Agency’s autonomy 
and immunity by clamping down on its rights and entitlements as a UN 
body, and thus asserting its own greater power.24 In 1967, for instance, the 
Syrian government enacted a decree excluding local UN staff from the usual 
privileges and immunities, meaning inter alia that they could now be inducted 
into the military and needed PARI-issued permits to travel.25 This caused no 
end of problems for UNRWA when managing personnel, the vast majority 
of whom were local. The situation became so challenging that in 1973 the 
Agency appealed to the UN Office of Legal Affairs for assistance.26 In a 
similar vein, the Syrian government frequently refused the transfer of 
refugees to other UNRWA fields. 27  It further ignored the Agency’s 
immunities as a UN body by failing to acknowledge its special position vis-à-
vis taxation on imports.28 
As well as disregarding UNRWA’s UN privileges, the Syrian regime 
also constantly interfered in its internal affairs. This was not new – as early 
as 1954, Director Henry Labouisse had seen fit to note in his report to the 
UNGA that the Syrian authorities had a tendency ‘to treat [UNRWA] as a 
                                                 
24 DUA/Syria, Memo to Acting Commissioner-General, 9 October 1969, File OR130/2(S)IV, Box OR17, 
UHA. 
25 Schiff, Refugees Unto the Third Generation, p. 86 
26 UNRWA General Counsel, letter to Director of UN General Legal Division, 22 September 1973, S-
1066-0065-06, UNA. 
27 M. Beroudiaux, letter to Chief of Relief Operations Division, 11 February 1970, File RE210(S)I, Box 
RE7, UHA. 
28 DUA/Syria, memo to Director of Personnel, 2 May 1983, File LEG480/4(S)IV, Box LEG23, UHA. 
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quasi-national institution subject to the control and authority of the Syrian 
Government’.29  Three years later, Labouisse reported to the UN Special 
Political Committee about numerous incidents whereby Syrian military 
police had entered UNRWA premises without permission, and seized and 
deported Agency officials.30 However, although Syrian denial of UNRWA’s 
autonomy predated the Asad presidency, such interventionism became 
particularly marked under his rule.  
As Schiff observes in detail, Asad’s regime frequently meddled in 
UNRWA’s personnel matters, placing strong pressure on the Agency to hire 
its preferred candidates,31 who were often government employees.32 At other 
times the regime pushed aggressively for the employment of Syrian staff 
rather than internationals, partly as a show of force, partly as a matter of 
prestige, and partly as a way of ensuring its own continued power over the 
Agency’s internal affairs.33 Robert Gallagher, who worked as Director of 
UNRWA Operations in Syria in the 1980s, later stated that: 
GAPAR doesn’t really have to control the Agency because they control 
the staff. Basically, in Syria the Syrians are in control, and they really 
are. And they are ruthlessly in control….  People owe their loyalty 
more to them, or to the Ba’ath Party in positions on our staff [than to 
the Agency]…34 
 
In other words, the Syrian government enacted its authority over UNRWA 
by integrating its contingent directly within the Agency’s internal affairs. 
This gave the UNRWA-host state relationship a totalitarian character that 
could not be found elsewhere. 
                                                 
29 Henry Labouisse, ‘Report of the UNRWA Director’, A/2717, 30 June 1954, 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/1ce874ab1832a53e852570bb006dfaf6/29b65fb0fee24daa0
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30 Statement of UNRWA Director Henry Labouisse before the Special Political Committee, 11 February 
1957, Box 195, Andrew Cordier Collection, CU.  
31 Schiff, Refugees Unto the Third Generation, pp. 91-93 
32 See for example: UNRWA Commissioner-General, letter to PARI Director General, 19 August 1972, 
File LEG480/4(S)IV, Box LEG23, UHA. 
33 See for example: UNRWA DUA/Syria, letter to UNRWA Commissioner-General, 22 August 1978; 
Deputy Commissioner-General, memo to Acting Director of Personnel, 11 November 1980, both File 
LEG480/4(S)IV, Box LEG23, UHA. 
34 Quoted in Schiff, Refugees Unto the Third Generation, p. 93 
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As a result, the Agency had to perform a balancing act between 
resisting the government’s interference and cooperating with its service 
provision. Management expressed repeated concerns that they were 
becoming a mere wing of the Syrian government. As early as 1969, 
UNRWA’s Director of Affairs in Syria wrote formally that the Agency had 
‘lost practically all semblance of independence’ in the Field, and asked the 
UN Headquarters in New York to take action.35  Three years later, the 
Commissioner-General raised the issue directly with the PARI Director 
General: 
UNRWA can only operate, and obtain the funds for, its programmes 
for the Palestine refugees if it functions as a United Nations 
organisation, and to do so it must adhere to the principles and the 
practices that regulate United Nations organisations.36 
 
Such calls made little impact. Ten years later, UNRWA directors in Syria 
were still facing the same problems, as the Agency’s Field Director wrote of 
his frustrations over ‘direct interference in appointment of staff’ and claimed 
that ‘we have not pursued [our] privileges and immunities with sufficient 
vigour in the past.’37 His observations strongly implied that the Syrian regime 
had been largely successful in its attempts to restrain UNRWA’s autonomy. 
The situation was complicated further by Asad’s paradoxical stance on 
Palestinian nationalism itself. Ostensibly, his regime was the leading backer 
of the Palestinian national cause, frequently denouncing Israel and calling for 
the refugees to be allowed to return home. Moreover, as both Rosemary 
Sayigh and Asad’s biographer Patrick Seale note, the Syrian government 
substantiated this stance with action.38 Unlike Jordan and Lebanon, but in 
common with Egypt and Algeria, it provided the fida ̄’iyyīn with arms and 
                                                 
35 DUA/Syria, memo to Acting Commissioner-General, 9 October 1969, File OR130/2(S) IV, Box OR17, 
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36 UNRWA Commissioner-General, letter to PARI Director General, 19 August 1972, File 
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 156 
training facilities. Syria was also the only Arab state that attempted to protect 
the fidā’iyyīn in Jordan during Black September. 39  Asad reinforced this 
position with his strong support for the 1974 Rabat declaration, in which the 
Arab League recognised the PLO as ‘the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people’.40  
However, behind the scenes, Asad’s stance on the Palestinian national 
cause in general, and the PLO in particular, was much more complicated.41 
Although the Ba’athists preached pan-Arab unity and their own form of 
secular socialism, Asad’s real priority was regime maintenance. Indeed, even 
his pro-Palestinian positioning on Black September and the Rabat 
Declaration was driven in part by the desire to buttress his power against 
that of rival King Hussein. When it came to internal Syrian affairs, stability 
was maintained at the price of Asad’s total monopolisation of power, and 
the brutal suppression of any opposition or unrest.  
Such subjugation extended to the regime’s approach to the Palestinian 
refugee camps.42 Asad clamped down on any Palestinian militancy that might 
rival his power by threatening his regime directly or more generally 
endangering state security. His pro-Palestinian stance did not temper the 
brutal suppression of their political activism. The Syrian government 
accordingly paid stipends to camp mukhtārs (community leaders) and 
informers who kept control and clamped down on political agitation among 
the refugees. This policy also had direct implications for UNRWA. 
Whenever possible, the Asad regime used the Agency to enforce its 
repression of Palestinian nationalism, for example by making registration 
with UNRWA a prerequisite for Palestinians to be issued with identity cards 
or travel documents. 43  This served the dual purpose of subordinating 
                                                 
39 Seale, Asad of  Syria, pp. 157-159.  See pp. 166-167 on Black September.  
40 Seale, Asad of  Syria, p. 254. 
41 Ibid., p. 254, 282, 462.  
42 See Appendix D on the Palestinian refugee camps in Syria.  
43 Y. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 41-49. 
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UNRWA’s authority to that of the state, and simultaneously clamping down 
on any risk of independent Palestinian activism. Despite UNRWA’s claims 
to be apolitical, it could not avoid being co-opted even indirectly into the 
Syrian state’s policies. 
Asad’s concerns about the Palestinian nationalist movement grew as 
the thawra brought the fidā’iyyīn new power. To maintain control, he pursued 
a policy of divide and rule, providing material support to some nationalist 
organisations while opposing and confining others. As Defence Minister in 
1969, he lay down new directives that prohibited certain fida ̄’iyyīn groups 
from operating in Syria. Those that were allowed in the country st ill saw 
their training areas limited, and were banned from carrying arms in public or 
marching without a permit.44  
As the largest and most prominent fidā’iyyīn organisation, Fatah was 
one of Asad’s earliest and most consistent targets. His hostility towards it 
was fuelled by his personal dislike of Arafat.45 The animosity between the 
two men dated back to the late 1960s, when Defence Minister Asad had 
imprisoned Arafat and his associates for insubordination. Their antipathy 
subsequently ebbed and flowed over the years, with Asad variously 
supporting Arafat in his battles against Habash and King Hussein, and then 
seeking to undermine him when he became too dominant.46 During the 
Lebanese Civil War, their hostility escalated into open warfare, as Syria sided 
with the Maronite forces against the Palestinians. A Syrian-Palestinian battle 
in south Lebanon in 1976 served to crystallise Arafat’s enmity with Asad.47 
Seven years later, Arafat’s forces in Tripoli clashed with the Syrian-backed 
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PFLP-GC and various Fatah splinter groups, supported by Asad. Arafat 
went on to openly accuse Syria of seeking to control the Palestinians.48  
Asad’s selective support for the fidā’iyyīn in Lebanon is indicative of his 
policy’s paradoxes when it came to the Palestinian nationalist movement. 
While he restricted the fidā’iyyīn’s activities in Syria, he not only allowed them 
to act in Lebanon but actually directed them to proceed there. This apparent 
inconsistency is in fact unsurprising; Asad’s suppression of Palestinian 
militancy was driven by his desire to preserve his authority, and as such 
could be reversed whenever – or wherever – he judged that the fidā’iyyīn 
could be used as an instrument for extending his power. In Lebanon, he 
judged that Fatah posed a threat to his authority, and therefore aided rival 
Palestinian factions. In particular, Asad made use of the Syrian-Palestinian 
faction al-Saiqa, established by the Ba’ath Party in 1966, to challenge Fatah’s 
authority within the PLO. Staffed only by those loyal to the Syrian regime, 
al-Saiqa became a key tool in Asad’s intervention in Lebanon.49 Observing 
how Syria was using al-Saiqa to undermine his power, Arafat briefly expelled 
the organisation from the PLO in 1976. 
Al-Saiqa encapsulates the complexity of Asad’s stance on Palestinian 
nationalism, as he pursued vastly different relationships with the various 
Palestinian factions, practising realpolitik rather than holding firm to any 
particular principle. His take on UNRWA was similarly double-edged. On 
the one hand, his government favoured the counterweight that the Agency 
could provide to the Fatah-dominated PLO in the refugee camps. It 
certainly preferred UNRWA to the alternatives, which were likely to be far 
less malleable and politically docile than the formally-neutral Agency. On the 
other hand, the Syrian government was concerned that the Agency’s 
presence and work created an alternative quasi-governmental authority 
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within the country and ultimately underlined Palestinian separateness, which 
in turn placed implicit limitations on the state’s authority.  
UNRWA’s Deputy Commissioner-General privately acknowledged the 
problems in 1980, when he wrote that the Agency’s tensions with the Syrian 
regime were ‘a product of the continuation after 30 years of programmes 
which are normally conducted by a government’. 50  The Syrian-UNRWA 
relationship thus encapsulated the difficulties of the Agency’s quasi-state 
positioning, whereby it balanced its supposed autonomy in the camps with 
its ultimate dependence on the host states’ support and acquiescence. In the 
Syrian context, Asad’s inconsistent approach to the Palestinian nationalist 
movement added an extra layer of complication. Struggling to maintain its 
balance in such a setting, UNRWA found itself unable to avoid the politics 
from which it claimed to be entirely detached.  
 
Lebanon and UNRWA: Conflict and insecurity  
The Lebanese government tended to support UNRWA’s work more 
wholeheartedly than its Syrian counterpart. However, the weak and 
fragmented nature of the Lebanese state, combined with the tensions within 
its confessional political system, made the situation inherently difficult. 
Lebanese society was precariously balanced between numerous different 
ethno-religious groups, each with its own insularity and unfriendliness to 
outsiders – including Palestinians. 51  Observers noted that from the 
beginning, the Lebanese general population were more hostile than either 
the Syrian or the Jordanian populations towards the Palestinian refugees.52 
This had inevitable consequences for UNRWA, as the refugees’ main service 
provider and unofficial representative.  
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Internal developments in Lebanon in this period complicated 
UNRWA’s work there further still. From the late 1960s, the PLO 
established a state-within-a-state in the south of the country, which became 
informally known as ‘Fatahland’ and was legitimised by the 1969 Cairo 
Agreement discussed in Chapter Two. Then in 1975, the entire country 
descended into a fifteen-year-long civil war. For much of the period 1967-
82, Lebanon was thus characterised by varying degrees of instability, with 
the Palestinian refugees often at the centre of it. As the central government 
increasingly lost its hold on much of the country, it also lost its authority in 
coordinating UNRWA’s operations on the ground. Nevertheless, its stance 
remained structurally significant for the Agency, not least when the latter 
was pleading its case on the world stage. 
The Lebanese government’s approach to UNRWA is best understood 
within the framework of its views regarding the Palestinian refugees in 
general and the camps in particular. 53  PLO official Shafiq Al Hout has 
contended that ‘the basis that has always underpinned Lebanese policy 
towards the [Palestinian] refugees has been fear.’54 Specifically, there were 
three fears at play. Firstly, as Al Hout himself notes, the Lebanese 
government was anxious that militancy in the Palestinian camps might 
provoke an Israeli attack on the country.55 Secondly, there were concerns 
that if the overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim Palestinians became integrated into 
Lebanese society (a process known as tawtīn), they would threaten the 
country’s delicately balanced consociational system. This fear was 
particularly acute among the political establishment, which was dominated 
disproportionately, if by no means exclusively, by Maronite Christians. 
Linked to this was the third fear: that the Palestinian population might 
become sufficiently strong to rise up and threaten the authority of the state 
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altogether.56 The Lebanese government accordingly sought to suppress any 
activity that might lead to the realisation of these fears. 
In the years before 1967, it was able to do so relatively easily. The 
Nakba saw roughly 100,000 Palestinians flee to Lebanon, making them 
around a tenth of the population at the time.57 Over the next two decades, 
the Lebanese government targeted the camp refugees, whom it deemed the 
most likely to form a nationalist movement in the post-Nakba era. On this 
point, the Lebanese government’s assessment was correct – the first 
Palestinian political movement after 1948 did indeed emerge in the camps, in 
the form of the aforementioned ANM.  
 
<Figure 14 unavailable due to copyright> 
 
As non-citizens without visas, the Palestinian refugees came under the 
domain of the Lebanese army’s security agency, the Deuxième Bureau (DB). 
The DB had a notorious reputation among Palestinians in the 1950s and 
1960s. Al Hout described it as an ‘absolute ruler… [with] an iron fist’; Fawaz 
Turki recalls DB agents intruding into refugee shelters to terrorise the 
residents.58 The DB clamped down tightly on any attempts at Palestinian 
nationalist activism in the camps, banning the display of Palestinian flags and 
insignia. 59  Its Head Joseph Kaylani explained his mantra thus: ‘The 
Palestinian is like a spring: if you step on him he stays quiet, but if you take 
your foot off, he’ll hit you in the face.’60  
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In particular, the DB used its power to grant or deny permits as a way 
of containing any potential agitation.61 Far more than in Syria or Jordan, the 
Palestinians in Lebanon faced severe restrictions on their right to work, 
move or travel, which only the DB could allow. They were so disempowered 
that permission was required even for refugees in one camp to visit relatives 
or friends in another. 62  Anyone who attended political meetings in the 
camps was subsequently denied such permits; the same measure was later 
implemented for those activists who had taken refuge in Lebanon after 
Black September. Any Palestinian who left Lebanon for military training 
abroad found themselves barred from returning.63  
Like its Syrian counterpart, the Lebanese government paid stipends to 
camp mukhtārs and informers who kept control and maintained order 
inside.64 From 1959-74, it also used Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the former Mufti 
of Jerusalem, as an instrument of control. In exchange for the residency 
permit that allowed him to live in Beirut until his death, the Lebanese 
authorities allegedly made use of the standing he still had in some parts of 
the Palestinian diaspora by recruiting him to pacify refugee discontent and 
potential nationalist agitation in the camps.65 
The repressive Lebanese policy had a multi-faceted effect on UNRWA. 
On the one hand, it fostered relative stability in the camps for much of the 
first two decades of the Agency’s operations, though this came at the cost of 
serious blowback thereafter. More significantly, the Lebanese government 
had judged that UNRWA’s work complemented its approach to the 
Palestinians, which led it to give more open support to the Agency’s work 
than some of the other host states.66 Indeed, Lebanon was the only Arab 
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host state to join the UN Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA 
when this was set up at the end of 1970.67  
In the eyes of the Lebanese government, UNRWA’s work benefited its 
interests regarding the Palestinians in two ways. Firstly, it helped prevent 
tawṭīn by underlining the Palestinian refugees’ separateness from the 
Lebanese population.68 Secondly, its provision of basic services promoted 
stability among the refugees, and, in theory at least, minimised the chances 
of agitation and violence. Moreover in practical terms, UNRWA’s 
registration system provided a way for the Lebanese government to keep 
tabs on the refugees and to enforce its permit policy; as in Syria, Palestinians 
in Lebanon needed UNRWA registration cards to be eligible for permits.69 
Again, the Agency found itself co-opted into the policies and ploys of the 
host state, unable to avoid their essentially political nature despite its 
supposedly apolitical status.  
Lebanese policy towards the Palestinian refugees also had explicitly 
negative repercussions for UNRWA. The refugees’ difficulties in acquiring 
Lebanese work permits resulted in extremely high levels of unemployment 
among the Palestinian population there, which in turn generated a greater 
need for UNRWA’s relief programmes.70 Of the three Arab host states, it 
was only in Lebanon that the proportion of Palestinian refugees living in 
camps actually increased in the post-Nakba decades.71 Although this was 
partly due to influxes of new refugees after 1967 and 1970 (discussed 
below), it was also a clear indicator of poverty levels. The Palestinian 
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refugees who did not live in the camps were those who had prospered 
sufficiently to move into permanent accommodation in towns and cities, 
and in Lebanon this group was notably smaller than in Jordan or Syria. As 
UNRWA faced rising financial problems from the 1960s, high demands on 
its services became an increasing problem.  
Moreover, the repressive nature of the Lebanese policy towards the 
refugees resulted in frequent police interventions inside the camps, which 
impaired UNRWA’s operations. Local Agency personnel were not exempt 
from police interrogations, and it was not uncommon for Palestinian staff 
members to be arrested, questioned or even expelled from the camps.72 On 
one particularly difficult occasion, UNRWA staff were unable to access any 
camps in Lebanon after the governmental Department of Affairs of 
Palestinian Refugees (DAPR) implemented particularly severe repressive 
measures.73 
Furthermore, the Lebanese government’s relatively supportive position 
on UNRWA’s work had its limitations. Although Lebanon was less intrusive 
in UNRWA’s operations than either Jordan or Syria - partly because of the 
weakness of the state - this did not mean that the Agency escaped 
interference altogether. As in Syria, the government often tried to interfere 
in the Agency’s recruitment decisions, despite the formal agreement that it 
would only ever intervene on security grounds.74 On one occasion, DAPR 
temporarily suspended communications with UNRWA in protest at its 
hiring decisions.75  
There was also tension over the scope of the Agency’s activities. 
Despite the fact that UNRWA provided some of its most extensive 
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programmes in Lebanon, the government still pushed it to go further.76 For 
example, the 1970s saw continuous disagreements over Palestinian refugees 
born after 1965. The Agency initially claimed that its budget deficit 
prevented it from serving them while the Lebanese government insisted that 
they were UNRWA’s responsibility.77 Their relationship was thus blighted 
by the same tensions over jurisdiction and services that existed in Syria, 
differing in degree rather than kind. 
The rise of the PLO in Lebanon in the late 1960s added an extra layer 
of complexity to UNRWA’s relationship with this host state, which could 
not be found elsewhere. As discussed in Chapter Two, the thawra of 1969 
saw the fida ̄’iyyīn take over the camps and oust the Lebanese authorities that 
had been policing them. 78  In many cases, the residents of the camps 
themselves took up arms to contest Lebanese control, retaliating against 
years of being targeted by the authorities.79 The weak Lebanese government 
had little choice but to accept the situation, which was formalised in the 
1969 Cairo Agreement explained in Chapter Two. 80  Lebanon was now 
central to the Palestinian struggle; in a press interview, Abu Iyad said that 
‘Lebanon is the lung through which we breathe politically… and it is also 
the lung which sustains the existence of the Palestinian Revolution.’81 
Needless to say, this had major implications for UNRWA.  
Commissioner-General Michelmore noted in his 1970 Report that the 
‘enhanced political consciousness of the Palestinian refugee community…. 
[had] raised basic questions of authority and identification [in the camps].’82 
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In practical terms, the takeover extended to some of the Agency’s 
installations, which were now occupied by militant organisations.83 With the 
fida ̄’iyyīn in charge of the camps, the Agency’s position became increasingly 
precarious. 
The situation intensified after Black September in 1970 (covered in the 
next section). The Palestinian defeat in Jordan saw thousands of fida ̄’iyyīn 
flood into Lebanon with their families, boosting the number of Palestinians 
there by many thousands and creating further challenges for the authorities 
in trying to control them. By some estimates, the number of Palestinians 
who entered Lebanon after Black September was almost as high as the 
influx at the time of the Nakba. 84  The camps, which the Lebanese 
authorities had always seen as a cause for concern, now became ‘factories of 
men for the Palestinian revolution’. 85  All this meant that UNRWA was 
prevented from carrying out its functions in Lebanon even before the civil 
war formally began in 1975. Once the war was underway, the deteriorating 
security situation made UNRWA’s operations almost impossible.86  
These difficulties solidified the Agency’s generally cooperative 
relationship with the Lebanese government. The latter certainly did not 
favour a Palestinian takeover, and accordingly supported UNRWA’s 
attempts to regain control of its installations. 87  However, its power was 
increasingly on the wane, and would only shrink further in subsequent years. 
Ostensibly the Agency still recognised and deferred to the government’s 
authority, but in practice it was the Palestinian factions who were in 
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charge.88 The Agency now dealt increasingly with the PLO, especially when 
it came to the south of the country.89  As Rosemary Sayigh points out, 
authority in the camps lay not with the national government but with the 
PLO-organised Palestinian popular committees. 90  The Lebanese 
government was extremely unhappy about this, but in reality there was little 
it could do. Its long-standing support for UNRWA’s work may have been 
gratefully received, but in the years 1967-82 it became increasingly irrelevant.  
 
Jordan and UNRWA: Containment and integration 
Jordan is an unusual case in numerous ways. While Lebanon and Syria both 
have significant Palestinian populations, only in Jordan do the Palestinians 
form the demographic majority. It is estimated that approximately 60% of 
the refugee population outside historic Palestine can be found in Jordan, and 
around a third of the Jordanian population carry UNRWA registration 
cards.91 This has raised repeated questions about the nature of Jordanian 
national identity, with scholars including Laurie Brand and Karma Nabulsi 
writing in depth about the extent to which a ‘Jordanian people’ can be 
distinguished from the country’s Palestinian population.92 Moreover, Jordan 
was historically much more entwined with Palestine than either Syria or 
Lebanon. It had formed part of the British Mandate of Palestine, albeit with 
autonomous government under the separate emirate of Transjordan. After 
Israel was created, Jordan shared the longest border with it. Unlike either 
Syria or Lebanon, the Jordanian government staked a claim to part of 
historic Palestine, having annexed the West Bank in 1950 to the chagrin of 
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many Palestinians. 93  All this meant that Jordan was more intimately 
connected to the fate of the Palestinian refugees than any other Arab state.  
 Jordan is further unique in that unlike Lebanon and Syria, it was 
governed by the same regime continuously in the post-Nakba period. 
Notwithstanding the upheaval of Abdullah I’s assassination in 1951, the 
Hashemite dynasty retained power continuously, most notably with the long 
rule of King Hussein from 1952 until his death in 1999. This resulted in a 
notable consistency in Jordanian policy towards its Palestinian population. 
Moreover, unlike Lebanon and to a lesser degree Syria, Jordan sought not to 
exclude or separate the Palestinian refugees, but rather to absorb them.  
 Jordan had pursued this objective since the 1940s, when Abdullah I 
had made a secret deal with the Jewish Agency to divide Palestine between 
them. 94  The aftermath of the Nakba provided his government with an 
opportunity to push for this formally on the diplomatic stage. At a meeting 
of the UN Ad Hoc Political Committee in December 1950, the Jordanian 
delegation insisted that the ‘vast majority’ of Palestinian refugees favoured 
unification of the two banks95 – which of course had already been rendered 
a fait accompli by the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank earlier that year. 
This went hand-in-hand with the suppression of a distinctive Palestinian 
national identity; Yezid Sayigh writes that at the time of the annexation, 
Abdullah also issued a royal decree banning the use of the term ‘Palestine’ in 
any official document, in favour of ‘East Bank’ and ‘West Bank’.96  
 Jordanian domestic policy towards the Palestinian refugees was 
grounded in the same principles, seeking to obliterate any trace of 
‘Palestinian separateness’ among the refugees. As explained in Chapter One, 
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Jordan was the only Arab host state to offer them citizenship;97 Rosemary 
Sayigh writes that although this was technically optional, the government 
placed strong pressure on Palestinians to accept it, by making citizenship a 
prerequisite for working in the public sector, registering births, and acquiring 
travel documents.98  It was keen for Palestinians to identify primarily as 
Jordanian citizens, not refugees, and even prohibited the use of the term 
‘refugee’ in political reports in the 1950s.99 Such moves reinforced the idea 
that despite its official calls for the refugees’ return, Jordan really favoured 
their permanent reintegration. Indeed Western diplomats noted that, unlike 
every other Arab state, Jordanian officials did not express any opposition to 
resettlement in early meetings after the Nakba.100 
Like his grandfather, King Hussein favoured the incorporation of the 
West Bank into the Hashemite kingdom, and the expansion and assertion of 
his own power over the Palestinian population therein. His biographer Nigel 
Ashton has observed how these objectives informed his response to the rise 
of the Palestinian nationalist movement in the early decades of his reign.101 
Hussein’s government opposed the nationalist affirmation of the refugees’ 
separateness, and accordingly sought to contain the movement. Accordingly, 
in the early 1960s Jordan threatened to cancel the passports of anyone 
involved in Palestinian political agitation. As Leila Khaled recalls angrily in 
her autobiography, the Jordanian authorities also barred nationalist activists 
considered too ‘radical’ from attending the Palestine National Congress in 
Jerusalem in 1964.102  
After the Naksa, Jordanian concerns about the Palestinian nationalist 
movement increased markedly. The PLO’s assertion of a separate 
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Palestinian identity was now buoyed by its heightened stature across the 
Arab world. Of particular alarm to the Jordanian regime were the radical 
demands of the PLO’s most hardline factions, the PFLP and the DFLP. 
Both groups sought a full revolution in the Arab world as a necessary 
precursor to Palestinian liberation. Habash and Hawatmeh were Marxists 
openly committed to the overthrow of King Hussein, whom they 
considered a reactionary. 103  As the PLO came to take control of the 
Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan after the Naksa, the Jordanian regime 
became increasingly concerned that the organisation’s assertion of 
Palestinian separateness could threaten the state.  
Matters came to a head in 1970, when the PFLP hijacked four planes 
and held the foreign hostages in Palestinian-controlled areas of the country, 
directly challenging Jordanian sovereignty. As the Jordanian army sought to 
free the hostages, King Hussein declared martial law and went to war with 
the fida ̄’iyyīn, surrounding and shelling the areas where they were based – 
including the refugee camps.104 Black September, as it came to be known, 
ended with the fidā’iyyīn’s surrender and exile to Lebanon, and was thus a 
victory for the Jordanian government. However, it caused lasting damage to 
Hussein’s reputation in the eyes of many Palestinians across the region and 
around the world. Fawaz Turki later wrote that ‘the confrontations with 
Hussein’s troops in September 1970 were the most traumatic experience in 
modern Palestinian history’105 – apparently putting it even above the Nakba.  
 
<Figure 15 unavailable due to copyright> 
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The Jordanian government’s relationship with UNRWA unfolded 
within this setting. Having signed an agreement with the Agency in 1951, the 
government formally facilitated its operations in the country.106 Yet at the 
same time, UNRWA’s work implicitly challenged the Jordanian objective of 
Palestinian integration. The very premise of the Agency’s existence was 
based on the idea of the Palestinian refugees’ distinctiveness within the host 
states - and in catering exclusively to the Palestinians, UNRWA underlined 
their separateness. As such, it inadvertently placed itself at odds with 
Jordanian government policy. In 1956, King Hussein had said that ‘the 
organisations which seek to separate Palestinians from Jordanians are 
traitors helping Zionism in its aim of undermining the Arab camp.’107 As Avi 
Plascow argues, UNRWA could be seen as one such organisation. In 
recognising and treating the Palestinians as a group in their own right, the 
Agency inadvertently preserved and boosted their separateness and with it 
their sense of unique identity.108 
The refugees’ approach to UNRWA fortified such concerns. Many 
Palestinians in Jordan continued to identify primarily as refugees from 
Palestine, not Jordanian citizens. Indeed, many reacted uneasily to receiving 
Jordanian citizenship, for fear that it would undermine their right to return 
to Palestine. Some even sent petitions to the Arab League calling for a 
revision of the Jordanian policy. 109 This affected UNRWA because in the 
absence of valid Palestinian documentation, many refugees turned to their 
UNRWA registration cards as a preferred alternative form of identity. Najeh 
Jarrar and Jalal Al Husseini both write that this preference was tied to the 
nationalistic symbolism of the cards, discussed in depth in Chapter Five.110 It 
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inevitably drew UNRWA directly into the discussion over Palestinian-
Jordanian identity, and was a further nail in the coffin of the Agency’s claims 
to be separate from politics. From the perspective of the Jordanian regime, 
then, UNRWA could be seen as a potential hindrance to the realisation of its 
objectives. 
Yet at the same time, the Jordanian government was in no way 
equipped to get rid of the Agency. In the 1960s, UNRWA was feeding about 
one-third of the country’s population and thus relieving the government of a 
substantial financial burden. 111  Expelling UNRWA and taking over its 
services was simply not an option; indeed, like other host states, Jordan 
actually complained when UNRWA made cuts to its service provision.112 
Therefore instead of opposing UNRWA outright, the Jordanian government 
sought to contain its significance and authority by continually asserting its 
own power. In this sense, the Jordanian government’s approach had much 
in common with that of its Syrian counterpart. Like Syria, Jordan was 
apprehensive about allowing UNRWA to develop into a fully-fledged rival 
authority – an apprehension that became particularly pronounced in the 
aftermath of Black September.113  
As the Jordanian government worked to decisively reassert its 
authority, UNRWA faced repeated encroachments on its immunities, most 
often in the form of searches and detentions of staff members. 114 
Unsurprisingly, the government was most concerned with any UNRWA 
employees who had a history of activism. On occasion, it tried 
unsuccessfully to deport such staff members. As a result, UNRWA 
repeatedly issued ‘reminders’ of the principle of UN inviolability , continually 
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notifying staff that they could not get involved in politics.115 As in Syria and 
Lebanon, UNRWA had to maintain a difficult balance in Jordan between 
cooperating with the government while maintaining its own autonomy.116  
Jordanian hostility towards UNRWA manifested itself most clearly in 
the years 1967-82 in disagreements over the West Bank. Despite Jordan’s 
loss of the territory during the Naksa, King Hussein did not formally 
renounce his claim on it for another 21 years. In 1969, he stated, ‘I can never 
renounce the West Bank… This idea of a so-called [separate Palestinian] 
entity has no reality’.117 Three years later, he announced a plan to establish a 
federation of the two banks, to be known as the United Arab Kingdom.118 
In view of this, he was strongly opposed to UNRWA’s designation of the 
West Bank as a separate Field of Operations after 1967, and to its 
establishment of a new Field Office in Jerusalem. In 1969 his government 
joined with those of Syria and Lebanon to declare that ‘the East and West 
banks of Jordan are integral parts of one entity; therefore, the centre of all 
the Agency’s operations on both banks should be confined to Amman.’ 119 
Again, UNRWA’s provision of welfare services became inescapably tainted 
with political significance.   
Furthermore, the Jordanian government alleged that in working with 
Israel in the West Bank, UNRWA was legitimising the occupation.120 In a 
sign of its continuing involvement in the territory, Jordan also protested at 
the Israeli policy of relocating families from Gaza to the West Bank in 
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1970. 121  As the Jordanian government continued to claim rightful 
jurisdiction over the West Bank throughout this period, the Agency had to 
proceed with extreme care. Even in the 1980s, UNRWA still had to issue 
clarifications that its use of the term ‘east Jordan’ referred to a geographical 
area and not a legal status,122 and continued to include a similar disclaimer in 
its annual reports.123 
It is thus clear that Jordan saw UNRWA’s significance to extend far 
beyond that of a mere aid agency. There was a general feeling that the 
Agency’s work had the effect of bolstering Palestinian nationhood, and  for 
varying reasons all three Arab host states saw this as undesirable. However, 
there was no easy solution. Like Syria and Lebanon, Jordan faced a quandary 
when it came to dealing with UNRWA; it badly needed the financial relief of 
the Agency’s services, yet it did not want the resulting headache of a 
potential rival authority in the country. Moreover, all three Arab host states 
ultimately saw UNRWA as preferable to any of the alternative sources of 
authority in the Palestinian refugee camps. Their relationships with the 
Agency were accordingly characterised by a paradoxical combination of 
hostility, suspicion, control, and dependency.  
 
Israel and UNRWA: Suspicion and self-interest 
 
UNRWA’s relationship with Israel was distinctive. Notwithstanding the 
many difficulties that the Agency encountered with the Arab host states, the 
latter all endorsed the same official line as UNRWA in calling for the 
refugees’ return to their pre-1948 homes. By contrast, Israel was virulently 
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opposed to the refugees’ return; in common with some of the Western 
donor states, it favoured an end to their refugee status to facilitate their 
permanent resettlement elsewhere. In its political positioning, Israel was 
therefore fundamentally at odds with the Agency. Moreover, as an 
occupying power rather than a conventional host state, the very premise of 
its relationship with the Agency was antagonistic. It was inherently 
suspicious of the Palestinian refugees and by extension UNRWA. In fact, 
Rex Brynen writes that successive Israeli governments believed that the 
Agency perpetuated the refugee crisis and in doing so encouraged 
Palestinian agitation against them. 124  In 1978, for example, the Israel 
Information Centre, which fell under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, issued a pamphlet claiming that UNRWA had compelled 
Palestinians to retain their refugee status, and ‘refused to challenge the 
Arabs’ exploitation of refugee misery’.125 
While this would appear to suggest that Israel’s relationship with 
UNRWA was relentlessly combative, the reality was more complicated; in 
this sense too, Israel’s relationship with the Agency was similar to those of 
the Arab host states. Despite its suspicions, the Israeli state generally 
supported UNRWA’s work. Takkenberg points out that it had voted for the 
Agency’s creation in 1949 and requested the continuation of its services in 
the OPT after 1967.126 At the heart of Israel’s policy towards UNRWA lay a 
paradox; it suspected the Agency of supporting and empowering political 
nationalism among Palestinian refugees, but also recognised that UNRWA’s 
programmes ultimately served Israeli interests.  
These interests were numerous. By providing quasi-state services to 
more than half the population in the West Bank and Gaza, UNRWA 
relieved Israel of the financial burden it would otherwise have incurred as 
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the occupying power (for the same reason, many Palestinian nationalists 
later accused the Agency of facilitating the occupation).127 As a result, Israel’s 
view of the Agency came to mirror those of the Arab host states in being 
essentially paradoxical: it performed a balancing act between critiquing 
UNRWA’s politics and welcoming its service provision. In a further 
similarity, many Israeli officials believed that UNRWA’s services ultimately 
created stability in the OPT and lessened the Palestinians’ resentment of the 
occupation by improving their economic conditions.128 As a result, they did 
not want to see UNRWA’s services discontinued, despite their concerns. 
Like the Arab host states, Israel was far more invested in the status quo than 
its rhetoric suggested.  
 
The Occupation and the Camps 
For the first 19 years of its existence, Israel had limited direct dealings with 
UNRWA. From 1950-52, the Agency provided services to Jewish refugees 
inside Israel, who qualified for support as ‘refugees from Palestine’ after the 
1948 War.129 At the time of the 1949 Israeli-Arab armistice agreements, the 
UN counted around 45,000 Jewish refugees in Israel, mostly from the West 
Bank. 130  When UNRWA began operations the following year, it found 
17,000 Jewish refugees and 28,000 Arab refugees inside Israel on its 
registration rolls.131 UNRWA worked with the new Israeli government to 
provide services to these people until 1952, when its programmes inside 
Israel were discontinued at the latter’s request. Aside from negotiations 
during the brief Israeli occupation of Gaza in 1956, the two bodies 
subsequently had minimal contact until 1967. 
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The events of that year dramatically changed their relationship. Israel’s 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza brought more than half a million 
registered Palestinian refugees and 27 camps132 under Israeli military rule. 133 
In order to continue providing its services in these areas, UNRWA now had 
to work with the Israeli authorities, but doing so came with risks. Any visible 
cooperation with Israel would damage the Agency’s reputation among the 
Palestinians, who blamed the Israeli state for their exile. It also risked 
jeopardising UNRWA’s relations with the Arab host states, who accused it 
of collaborating with the occupation.134 Those within UNRWA were well 
aware of the difficulties. In 1968, the Agency’s West Bank Director wrote in 
a private letter that UNRWA’s work in an Israeli-occupied area served to 
‘compound’ the refugee problem ‘rather than contributing to  a satisfactory 
solution.’135 Yet there was no real alternative other than for UNRWA to 
neglect its mandate.  
The situation was made even more difficult by the long-standing Israeli 
perception that UNRWA was politically aligned to the cause of Palestinian 
nationalism. Michael Comay, the lead Israeli negotiator with UNRWA in 
1967, remarked that this feeling was widespread: ‘we’d worked up a lot of 
grievances against UNRWA. In general we thought that UNRWA had 
simply become an instrument to perpetuate the Arab refugee problem.’136 
Despite the government’s subsequent decision to support UNRWA’s work, 
such feelings never went away.137 Labor politician Shimon Peres, who went 
on to become President of Israel, wrote in 1970: 
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Who, in fact, is an ‘Arab refugee’? The official answer is one who 
receives aid from UNRWA… and who is in possession of an 
UNRWA refugee-ration-card [sic]. The criterion for receiving such a 
card is not lack of means but the individual’s personal history. If he 
left his permanent home twenty years ago and proceeded to another 
land, he is a refugee. In fact, of course, a refugee is one who has no 
home, no employment, no freedom of movement, and no hopes of a 
better future.138 
 
As Peres’ words show, senior Israeli politicians held UNRWA’s extensive 
services directly responsible for the continuing existence of a large 
Palestinian refugee population. 
 At the same time, the Israeli authorities realised the serious practical 
and financial problems they would incur if they eliminated the Agency in the 
OPT.139 Accordingly, the two sides quickly reached an understanding in June 
1967. In what became known as the Michelmore-Comay Agreement, Israel 
requested that UNRWA continue to provide services to refugees in the 
West Bank and Gaza, and agreed to facilitate its operations.140 To avoid 
accusations of partisanship from the Arab host states, UNRWA’s Legal 
Department explicitly stated that this Agreement did ‘not imply any 
recognition’ of the Israeli occupation as legitimate. 141  Indeed, UNRWA 
emphasised continually that it held to the UN’s condemnation of the 
occupation laid out in Security Council Resolution 242.142 Such an approach 
risked aggravating Israel, but at least enabled UNRWA to remain within the 
guidelines of the UN and thus minimise the criticism directed exclusively at 
the Agency.  
 Nevertheless, there were problems inherent in the Michelmore-Comay 
Agreement from the beginning. Its ambiguous division of responsibilities in 
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the refugee camps was particularly troublesome – perhaps unsurprisingly, in 
view of these spaces’ importance as political hubs. In theory, tasks were 
divided such that UNRWA maintained ‘custody’ rights and continued to 
provide services in the camps, while Israel took charge of affairs relating to 
security and law and order. 143  In practice, this left a great deal up to 
interpretation. In the following years, Israel and UNRWA clashed repeatedly 
over the issue of jurisdiction in the camps. These clashes were inherently 
tied to two central themes of UNRWA’s work: its political significance and 
its quasi-state role.  
Like the Arab host states, Israel was keen to emphasise UNRWA’s 
duty to provide services to the refugees and play down its own 
responsibility. It therefore declared the camps to be ‘essentially the 
responsibility of UNRWA’.144 In fact, the Agency did expand its work in the 
OPT camps after 1967, and its Legal Adviser notified staff that due to the 
situation there, ‘the Agency may have to assume a larger profile in 
[governmental functions in the OPT] than in the [Arab] host countries.’145 
UNRWA-appointed Camp Services Officers were thus made responsible for 
maintaining internal order and ensuring ‘that camp residents comply with 
the Agency’s camp rules and regulations… initiating enforcement 
procedures when necessary.’146 In these ways, the quasi-state characteristics 
of UNRWA’s work expanded and became particularly pronounced in the 
OPT camps, as it not only provided welfare services but also acted as the 
quasi-judiciary and arbiter. 
However, this increasing movement into the usual domain of a state 
carried with it particular risks for UNRWA. If UNRWA-appointed officers 
were responsible for the camp residents’ compliance with rules, then it 
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followed that the Agency could also be held responsible for the refugees’ 
behaviour if they broke the law or became involved in militant political 
activism - as was common. In this way, the two most loaded aspects of 
UNRWA’s work coincided; the more it evolved into a quasi-state, the more 
it entered politicised territory and found its actions tinged with an 
increasingly political significance. Nowhere was this pronounced than in the 
highly charged and confrontational environment of the OPT.  
The consequences were especially problematic because, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, the Israeli government tended to target the camps in its 
crackdowns on nationalist activity. This frequently led to heightened 
tensions with UNRWA. While Israel insisted that its actions were consistent 
with the Michelmore-Comay Agreement, it regularly disagreed with the 
Agency over what should come under the domain of ‘security’. In the Israeli 
government’s view, this included the right to take measures against 
politically-active camp residents who were hostile to the authorities. 147 
However, UNRWA management complained that the Israeli interventions 
in the camps showed a disregard for the UN-granted immunity of their 
installations. 148  In 1981, for instance, the Agency’s West Bank Director 
opposed the construction of a new road through Ein El Sultan Camp, 
claiming that this would encroach on a site ‘held and  operated by the 
Agency in trust.’149 The following year, he complained to the Commissioner-
General that the Israeli authorities were infringing on the terms of 
Michelmore-Comay by continually entering the camps, and stated that the 
Israeli army’s actions were impeding the Agency from carrying out its 
work.150  
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 In turn, the Israeli authorities resented what they perceived as 
UNRWA’s inappropriate level of interference in security matters. They 
accused UNRWA of showing bias in its willingness to condemn Israeli  
action while not taking issue with aggression from the Palestinians. 151 
Moreover, Israeli officials argued that their actions in the camps were 
justified in view of UNRWA’s poor record on maintaining security. 
Addressing the clash of jurisdictions in the camps, the Israeli Senior Liaison 
Officer for Civil Administration in the West Bank contended at one point 
that ‘law and order in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] is under IDF 
responsibility’, on the grounds that ‘ever since 1967 experience has shown 
that UNRWA is not capable of handling security problems.’152 Israel claimed 
further justification for its policy in the camps after its invasion of Lebanon 
in 1982 brought forth evidence that the PLO was using UNRWA facilities 
for political and military purposes. 153  Protesting directly to the UN, the 
Israeli government declared not only that the camps were terrorist hotbeds, 
but also that UNRWA could not be trusted to maintain order inside.154  
These grievances are indicative of the commonalities between Israel 
and the Arab host states in their dealings with UNRWA. Their relationships 
were all characterised by clashes over jurisdiction, autonomy and immunity 
– although of course in Israel’s case, the issue was rendered even tenser by 
its fundamentally antagonistic relationship with UNRWA’s beneficiaries. 
Moreover, Israel, like the Arab host states, perceived UNRWA as a political 
body, and thus reacted to its activities through a political lens. Yet in other 
ways the dynamics of UNRWA’s work in Israel were distinctive; in the 
setting of the occupation, the Agency increasingly came to represent and 
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advocate for the Palestinian refugees and the camps, implicitly treating the 
latter as its own spheres. This was illustrative of both the Agency’s  quasi-
state role and the camps’ significance as distinctive spaces, in political as well 
as geographical and social terms.  
 
The politics of UNRWA’s work  
When it came to UNRWA’s services, its education programme proved the 
biggest source of tension in its relations with Israel. Successive Israeli 
governments complained that the UNRWA schools taught a ‘Palestinian 
narrative’.155 In fact, the Agency’s schools in the OPT did not follow a 
particular UNRWA syllabus, but rather subscribed to the Jordanian 
curriculum in the West Bank and the Egyptian one in Gaza. Nevertheless, 
the Israeli authorities contended that the Agency’s use of these countries’ 
textbooks and maps constituted an endorsement of their content. This was 
especially problematic because of the strong perception that the said content 
advocated hostility to Israel.156  
Accordingly, the Israeli government closely examined the situation in 
UNRWA’s OPT schools after 1967. It alleged that the textbooks promoted 
anti-Semitism through biased historical narratives and maps. 157  The 
clearance system that UNRWA had set up with UNESCO was deemed 
insufficient, and all textbooks now had to be approved by the Israeli 
Education Ministry as well.158 The latter regularly refused the importation of 
certain books even after they had been cleared by UNESCO.159 Some were 
reprinted with the offending passages left out. 160  Again, the issue of 
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jurisdiction was raised, with the Commissioner-General instructing field 
staff to ‘maintain local autonomy… [and] maximum independence in our 
operations’, while avoiding action that would damage their relations with 
Israel.161 
Further controversy arose over the findings of Israeli school 
inspectors, who were mostly concerned with maps, books and mottos.162 In 
1969, they found slogans on the walls of camp schools, declaring ‘this is my 
land and my father died here/ we should destroy our enemies’, as well as 
‘the Jews conquered our holy Jerusalem’, ‘we are all fidā’iyyīn’, ‘the jails are 
for heroes’, and ‘it is our duty to sacrifice ourselves for our country.’163 The 
Agency played down the slogans’ significance in discussions with Israel, but 
internal correspondence reveals serious concern. In a letter to the 
Commissioner-General in 1969, the West Bank Director confided, ‘I believe 
UNRWA to be vulnerable in these matters’.164  
 UNRWA’s status as a UN agency did not help matters. Many Israelis 
believed that the UNGA of the 1970s was in the hands of the pro-
Palestinian ‘Third Worldist’ states, and was therefore biased against them.165 
They took UNGA Resolution 3379, which declared Zionism to be a form of 
racism, as proof of this.166 As one of only two UN agencies to report directly 
to the UNGA, UNRWA was closely tied to it and was therefore tarred with 
the same brush.167  The accusations of anti-Israeli bias grew from 1974 
onwards, as the UNGA repeatedly called on UNRWA to report on Israel’s 
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compliance with resolutions, thus essentially forcing it into a political role 
and making it increasingly difficult to characterise the Agency as solely 
humanitarian (a development discussed further in Chapter Six).168 
More than once, Israel complained to the UN about the Agency’s 
politicisation. In 1974, the Israeli Permanent Representative to the UN 
claimed that ‘for years the annual debates in the General Assembly on the 
reports of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA have been exploited by 
Arab and other delegations for political and propaganda purposes.’169 The 
Israeli government also condemned the monitoring role that the UN had 
assigned to UNRWA, claiming that this contravened the Agency’s 
humanitarian mandate by politicising it. Yet Israel always stopped short of 
calling for the Agency’s dissolution, as the benefits of its work continued to 
outweigh the drawbacks. 
Moreover, Israel was at times guilty itself of drawing UNRWA into a 
political role. As part of its protests about the presence of Palestinian 
nationalist ideology in UNRWA schools, Israel complained to UNRWA 
about students’ political demonstrations. 170  It pressured the Agency to 
dismiss headteachers who were perceived to be encouraging political 
disorder,171 and at times threatened to close schools for this reason.172 These 
overtures are particularly interesting because of what they reveal about how 
the Israeli government perceived UNRWA’s role. While it formally objected 
to the UN giving UNRWA a monitoring role in the OPT, the Israeli 
government itself nevertheless called the Agency to acts of political 
monitoring when it wanted to see its policies enforced. 
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It is thus evident that in common with the Arab host states, Israel 
walked a tightrope in its relationship with UNRWA. On the one hand, it 
was highly suspicious of UNRWA’s embedded role in the refugee camps, 
which it saw as nests of Palestinian militancy. On the other hand, 
UNRWA’s operations in the OPT saved Israel millions of dollars in service 
provision. Israel’s dealings with the Agency were accordingly inconsistent 
and complicated, as it sought to limit UNRWA’s power while always 
ensuring that its core programmes could and would continue.  
 
The Donor States and UNRWA: Leverage through welfare 
 
UNRWA’s operations were ultimately dependent on donor aid. Funding 
came from a small number of donor states, which were overwhelmingly 
Western; the US consistently provided the largest proportion of UNRWA’s 
budget, followed by the UK, Canada and France.173 These states provided 
the Agency with substantial donations that were reasonably consistent but 
ultimately voluntary, giving them considerable leverage over the Agency’s 
work. By contrast, the Arab states consistently refused to contribute to the 
Agency’s General Fund,174 contending that the Western states had enabled 
the Palestinian dispossession in 1948 and were therefore responsible for 
supporting the refugees.175  
 The Western donor states strongly denied that their financial support 
for UNRWA constituted any form of penance for their actions in 1948. As 
Brynen notes, they instead framed their donations in utilitarian terms. 176 
However, the fact that UNRWA’s funding came largely from Western states 
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undoubtedly influenced its standing, and unsurprisingly generated suspicions 
among the refugees about the Agency’s real motives. Such suspicions were 
reinforced by the preponderance of American, British and Canadian 
nationals within the Agency’s top personnel, as well as the presence of the 
UK, US, France and Belgium on the UNRWA Advisory Commission, 
alongside Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Turkey. Indeed, when the UK 
invited Canada to join the Commission in 1958, British diplomats expressed 
concern that the Western over-representation might provoke Arab 
complaints.177  
 There is some scholarly agreement that UNRWA’s background and 
funding imbued it with a certain kind of politicisation. Schiff argues that 
Western financial support for UNRWA automatically gave the Agency a 
quasi-colonial feel, which was reinforced by the internal hierarchy between 
international and local staff.178 Going further, Rosemary Sayigh points out 
that UNRWA’s biggest donor states were all allies of Israel, and suggests 
that they sought to use the Agency as a way of phasing out the ‘refugee 
problem’.179 As shown in Chapter One, there is evidence to substantiate this; 
for at least the first decade of UNRWA’s operations, it was fixated on 
engineering the Palestinian refugees’ permanent resettlement in the Arab 
host countries through its ‘Works’ schemes. Yet even after these schemes 
failed, the same Western states continued to fund the Agency’s operations, 
largely because they still saw it as an important stabilising force in a volatile 
region.  
 As this shows, UNRWA’s critics were correct in their contentions that 
the Western states’ motives for funding the Agency were not simply 
humanitarian, but came with a political edge. Most statesmen understood 
that without basic services, the refugees would be more likely to turn to 
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political extremism. In the context of the Cold War, the political extremism 
they feared most was communism, and as Schiff argues, there was a 
particular anxiety that without aid many Palestinian refugees might be 
susceptible to its charms.180 In providing basic services to forestall absolute 
poverty, UNRWA’s work became a crucial part of the strategy for 
combating communism and preventing revolution within the Middle East.181 
Indeed, in diplomatic circles the US and UK made the case for funding the 
Agency on these very grounds, alerting statesmen of the potential ‘threat to 
stability’ that might otherwise arise.182 Internally, UK government officials 
openly acknowledged that their reasons for supporting UNRWA were 
‘overwhelmingly political’. 183 The Foreign Office described the Agency in 
1977 as ‘an important humanitarian and political priority’ [italics added].184  
 UNRWA management took heed of these motives. When appealing 
for the voluntary donations it desperately needed, the Agency continually 
emphasised its importance as a stabilising force in the Middle East. Its 
newsletter Palestine Refugees Today made the point repeatedly, explicitly stating 
that cuts in UNRWA’s funding and services could lead to ‘very serious 
effects on stability’.185 In 1971, a UN Appeal to address UNRWA’s funding 
shortages stated similarly that continued shortages would ‘increase the 
tensions and contribute to the instability of the situation in the area’.186 To 
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many Palestinians, this was exactly the problem with UNRWA; it sought to 
mollify them and thus quieten their nationalist ardour.187 Yet for the Agency, 
it was the most effective way to secure funding and ensure that its 
operations could continue.  
 
The politics of aid 
The years 1967-82 saw discernible changes in UNRWA’s relations with the 
donor states, which had been smooth and effective for the first two decades 
of its operations. From the late 1960s, the donor states became increasingly 
concerned about the impact of the thawra in the refugee camps, and the 
implications for UNRWA. The US, UNRWA’s largest donor, considered 
the PLO a terrorist organisation and virulently opposed any cooperation 
with it. Many Western European states took a similar position, albeit less 
forcefully. As their motivations for funding UNRWA were tied to its 
perceived value in preventing political extremism, its apparent connections 
to the PLO led many to question the purpose of continuing to support it.  
 Essentially, the donor states feared that UNRWA was becoming a 
markedly political Palestinian organisation rather than an international aid 
agency. At UN meetings in the 1970s, international parties expressed 
concerns about funding an Agency that had become, in their eyes, 
inappropriately political. In his 1974 Report, Commissioner-General Rennie 
himself acknowledged ‘growing [international] recognition of the political 
dimension of the Palestine refugee problem’ and added that this was 
adversely affecting perceptions of the Agency.188 The British Foreign Office, 
while admitting internally that it contributed to UNRWA for 
‘overwhelmingly political’ reasons, also realised the dangers of going too far 
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in this direction and was ‘anxious to reduce [UNRWA’s] political overtones 
to the minimum.’189 In 1978 nine nations, including the US, UK and France, 
abstained to vote on renewing UNRWA’s mandate after several Arab states 
amended the resolution to include the assertion that ‘any attempt to restrict, 
or attach conditions to… the right of return’ was ‘inadmissable’.190 The nine 
nations contended that this was inappropriately political for the mandate of 
a welfare agency. Although the mandate was successfully renewed 
nevertheless, the abstention was indicative of how the politics question was 
increasingly creating practical problems for UNRWA.  
 The subject was particularly controversial when it came to the US, 
UNRWA’s largest donor. As the thawra brought new international attention 
to the fidā’iyyīn and the camps, some American critics of UNRWA charged it 
with providing aid to refugees who belonged to anti-Israeli terrorist 
groups.191 In  1970, the US government attached to its financial support the 
condition that: 
UNRWA take all possible measures to assure that no part of the 
United States contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to any 
refugee who is receiving military training as a member of the so-called 
Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) or any other guerrilla-type 
organization.192 
 
American concerns about UNRWA’s political positioning reached a 
crescendo in the early 1980s, during the most ideological period of the 
Reagan administration. Although some diplomats at the time argued that 
Washington’s leading support for UNRWA enhanced its relations with the 
Arab world, others objected that the Agency was anti-Israel and pro-PLO. 
Tensions came to a head when the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 led 
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to the discovery of a PLO training camp at the UNRWA Vocational 
Training Centre (VTC) in Siblin.193 The Reagan administration condemned 
UNRWA for having allowed the PLO to use the Centre for improper 
activities, including allegedly storing military equipment and indoctrinating 
students. At this stage the US reiterated its warning that funding for the 
Agency must not go towards guerrilla organisations.194 Yet it did not speak 
of defunding UNRWA, conscious that the status quo gave it considerable 
leverage, and that the Agency was still far preferable to the alternatives.  
 Unsurprisingly, UNRWA management were alarmed by the donor 
states’ criticisms. Tellingly, they identified the Agency’s quasi-governmental 
role in the camps as the main reason for concerns about its politicisation. 
The notes from an internal UNRWA meeting in 1970 reveal ‘concern about 
the effect of UNRWA’s reputation of identification with the camps, with its 
implication of responsibility for the activities of refugees residing in them.’195 
In response, senior Agency staff tried to distance UNRWA from the camps 
in the international consciousness. In repeated official statements from the 
mid-1970s, they publicly emphasised the limitations of the Agency’s power 
in the camps, and sought to highlight its work with non-camp refugees 
instead. Successive Commissioner-Generals emphasised that UNRWA had 
no legislative power over the camps and did not control or supervise camp 
residents.196  
To underline this further, UNRWA management even attempted to 
modify official terminology in order to create distance between the Agency 
and the camps. In 1970, the Director of Relief Services suggested to the 
Commissioner-General that it would be preferable to say that UNRWA 
‘supervises’ rather than ‘operates’ or ‘administers’ the camps, in order to play 
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down its power.197 The following year, the Deputy Commissioner-General 
issued a memo to Directors in all fields, telling them to ‘adopt terminology 
which will… discourage total identification of UNRWA with refugee 
camps.’ Accordingly, a ‘Camp Leader’ became an ‘UNRWA Services 
Officer’, although the accompanying suggestion of making a ‘refugee camp’ 
into a ‘refugee community’ was ineffectual. 198 From 1969 until the 1980s, 
Commissioner-Generals repeatedly stated in their annual reports that ‘the 
expression “UNRWA refugee camps” is misleading’.199  
Yet despite these efforts, the term ‘UNRWA refugee camp’ remained 
in use informally, much to the dismay of those trying to instigate the 
changes. These attempts to create distance, while ultimately unsuccessful, 
are important in demonstrating the camps’ centrality to the Palestinian 
nationalist movement, and the extent to which they defined broader 
perceptions of UNRWA – not to mention the increasing impossibility of 
presenting the Agency’s work as entirely detached from the quagmire of 
Palestinian politics. 
  
Conclusion 
 
The state of UNRWA’s international relations in the years 1967-82 is highly 
revealing. These years saw UNRWA’s work in the refugee camps come to 
define its purpose in the eyes of the world, despite the protestations of 
senior management that the Agency’s role in the camps was limited. 
Moreover, UNRWA’s association with the camps caused the Agency 
particular problems in view of the latter’s centrality to the thawra. As the 
host states and donor states all opposed the rising Palestinian nationalist 
movement – albeit for differing reasons and to different degrees – they 
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became increasingly suspicious of UNRWA’s operations, which they feared 
might be enabling the movement’s ascendance in the camps .  
 Yet at the same time none of these states wanted to see the Agency 
abolished. Even Israel, which was the most vocally critical of UNRWA’s 
work, supported the continuation of its services; like the Arab host states, it 
was more invested in the status quo than its rhetoric suggested. Similarly, 
the donor states’ relationship with the Agency was characterised by a 
paradox, as their frequent criticism of UNRWA was juxtaposed with a 
refusal to countenance any alternatives. In this sense, UNRWA’s 
international relations also challenges paradigms about regional dynamics; 
despite the enmity between Israel and the Arab states, their relationships 
with both the Agency and the Palestinian nationalist movement were 
characterised by a striking degree of similarity. As an example, then, this 
topic is indicative of how examining UNRWA’s history can produce 
findings of wider relevance to the region, in this case by challenging 
simplistic binaries about the positioning of different states.  
 Furthermore, UNRWA’s foreign relations in the years 1967-82 
underline both the Agency’s internationalism and its quasi-state nature. 
Despite UNRWA’s limited autonomy and ultimate dependency on 
international funding, its unique place vis-à-vis the Palestinian refugee 
situation gave it a discernibly quasi-state positioning in many of its 
international relations. UNRWA often acted as the refugees’ de facto 
diplomatic representative, and the host states and donor states tended to 
look to it to undertake matters of jurisdiction in the camps. While regularly 
complaining about its unreasonable politicisation, they were all happy to use 
it to their own ends when it suited them. As such, UNRWA’s inter-state 
dynamics reinforced its quasi-state positioning and its de facto political 
significance – in line with how the donor states and the host states perceived 
it.  
     
 193 
 The pressures on UNRWA did not only come from the host states and 
donor states. Over the years, the Agency also experienced numerous 
challenges in its relationship with the refugees it served. While this group’s 
leverage was structurally far more limited than that of the host or donor 
states, UNRWA was ultimately unable to function on a day-to-day basis 
without the basic cooperation of the refugees themselves. As such, this was 
a relationship no less critical to the Agency’s operations. The tensions and 
characteristics of this more intimate relationship are accordingly examined in 
depth in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Four 
UNRWA’s domestic relations: The refugees and the Agency 
 
“The Jews got Israel and we got UNRWA.”1 
Salah Salah, Head of PNC Refugee Committee, 2014 
 
Leading PLO figure Salah Salah once remarked that two major grievances 
dogged UNRWA’s relationship with the Palestinian refugees. The first was 
operational; the refugees frequently complained that UNRWA’s service 
provision was inadequate for their needs. The second was political; they 
regularly protested the Agency’s political positioning, or lack thereof, in 
representing and protecting their rights. 2  The nature of these grievances 
reflects the refugees’ perceptions of UNRWA, as both a Palestinian quas i-
state and a local address for the UN. The Palestinians overwhelmingly saw 
the UN to be a political stakeholder in their situation, meaning that they 
perceived UNRWA as a fundamentally political organisation. Such a 
viewpoint was at odds with UNRWA’s formal status as an apolitical aid 
agency. The resulting divergence in understanding UNRWA’s purpose made 
its relationship with the refugees just as complex and paradoxical as the 
international relations detailed in Chapter Three – and just as centred 
around the Agency’s international status.  
This chapter probes the nature of UNRWA’s relationship with the 
Palestinian refugees from 1967-82. It asks how the refugees perceived 
UNRWA’s role and purpose, with a particular focus on their understanding 
of its quasi-state nature and its relation to the Palestinian nationalist cause. It 
also examines how UNRWA responded to these perceptions and tensions, 
both in terms of formal policy and through the informal behaviour of senior 
staff. This chapter thus addresses many of the same themes as the previous 
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one, but from the perspective of UNRWA’s beneficiaries rather than its 
hosts and providers. UNRWA’s functioning as a Palestinian quasi-state and 
its resulting relationship with the Palestinian nationalist movement, which is 
the central concern of this thesis, cannot be understood without considering 
the key tenets and tensions of its interactions with the refugee community. 
In examining the latter, the chapter establishes a key aspect of the 
framework for this thesis.   
 UNRWA has been intimately connected with the refugees’ daily lives 
since 1950. Accordingly, its relationship with them has been vulnerable to 
the impact of wider changes in the region, including an array of political, 
geographical and historical factors. The set-up is complicated further by the 
fact that neither the Palestinian refugees nor UNRWA itself is monolithic. 
The former are a diverse community whose experiences can vary 
considerably. The latter is a messy hybrid of the Western states that fund it 
and populate its senior ranks, the Arab states that host it, and the Palestinian 
refugees that staff its junior levels and receive its services. As a result, 
UNRWA’s relationship with the refugees is not fixed or static, but dynamic 
and mutable. The paradoxical and at times even contradictory nature of the 
refugees’ attitudes towards UNRWA has been mirrored in the Agency’s 
responses to them, which were variously patronising, dismissive, loyal, 
protective, and solicitous. 
        Such complexities can be explained by disparities in the parties’ 
respective understandings of the Agency’s role. While figures on all sides 
have described UNRWA as a ‘quasi-state’, interpretations of what this 
means differ considerably. The Agency – here meaning UNRWA senior 
management, who were exclusively ‘international’ and in practice almost 
entirely Western citizens – tended to speak of UNRWA as a ‘quasi-state’ to 
denote the governmental nature of its health and education programmes. By 
contrast, most Palestinian refugees saw UNRWA as a quasi-state not only in 
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terms of its services, but in how it constituted a substitute for the real state 
lost in 1948 – a feeling encapsulated in Salah Salah’s comment that ‘the Jews 
got Israel and we got UNRWA’.3 This perception is grounded in UNRWA’s 
UN status, which led many refugees to see its work as compensation for the 
UN’s culpability in enabling the original partition of Palestine by way of 
UNGA Resolution 181.4 According to this viewpoint, UNRWA signified 
international responsibility for the Palestinian plight; as such, the refugees 
treated it as not a welfare agency but a political symbol of their rights. 
 As this chapter will show, such ideas directly informed the Palestinian 
refugees’ expectations. They saw UNRWA’s services not as charity but as 
entitlements; an UNRWA registration card signified not only one’s eligibility 
for services, but also one’s political rights as an internationally-recognised 
refugee. Accordingly, any moves by the Agency to reduce its services were 
greeted with horrified protests, as the refugees feared that their political 
rights were being undermined. On the same grounds, many held UNRWA 
responsible for their protection and resented its perceived failure to 
advocate for them politically on the world stage. In some cases, this fuelled 
suspicions that the Agency was a foreign implant, which served the 
objectives of its Western donor states and the Western-dominated UN. The 
case of the Palestinians thus rebuts many common assumptions about 
refugees and aid, as the former’s structural vulnerability did not prevent 
them from actively shaping the terms of their relationship with UNRWA. 
It is argued here that UNRWA’s international status was key to its 
relationship with the Palestinian refugees, driving their perceptions and 
interactions. In making such an argument, this chapter contributes an 
important angle to the historiography. Peteet, Gabiam, Al Husseini, Brynen 
and Schiff have all acknowledged the Agency’s historical significance in the 
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refugees’ daily lives.5 Moreover, Schiff and Gabiam, along with Randa Farah, 
Sari Hanafi and Esmat Elhalaby have effectively shown the complex 
dynamics of the UNRWA-refugee relationship. 6  However, they have 
generally neglected the significance of UNRWA’s internationalism in this 
relationship – an omission which is redressed here.  
 This chapter is organised into three sections. The first looks at the 
underlying notions that drove the refugees’ perceptions of UNRWA, 
focussing on how its UN affiliation was seen to mark it out as inescapably 
political and suspiciously close to the West. The second and third sections 
then examine the dominant representations of UNRWA, as shaped by both 
the refugees and the Agency itself. Specifically, the second section 
investigates the feelings of entitlement and ownership that stemmed from 
the refugees’ views of UNRWA’s quasi-state role, while the third focuses on 
their suspicion that UNRWA was a foreign implant. Accordingly, this 
chapter will demonstrate the reasons for the refugees’ paradoxical 
relationship with the Agency, whereby they simultaneously regarded it as a 
manifestation of their political rights and a suspicious foreign implant. In 
doing so it will uncover the key elements of the relationship that provided 
the framework and foundations for UNRWA’s interactions with the 
Palestinian nationalist movement during the thawra.  
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The refugees’ perceptions: UNRWA as UN body  
 
For many refugees, the circumstances of UNRWA’s set-up were pivotal to 
how they understood its significance. In particular, many of their 
judgements about the Agency were based on the fact that it was a UN body 
reliant on Western funding. Their grievances and sense of entitlement were 
regularly framed in terms of the Agency’s affiliation to the UN, which they 
understood in overwhelmingly political terms. As discussed in Chapter One, 
this association did not bode well for the Agency. The Palestinians had been 
largely hostile towards the UN ever since UNGA Resolution 181 had 
approved the partition of Palestine in November 1947.7 In the eyes of some, 
it was further tainted by the actions of its predecessor, the League of 
Nations, in legitimising British rule from 1922.8 Moreover, as Farah has 
pointed out, suspicion towards the UN from Arabs in general and 
Palestinians in particular was exacerbated by its decision to admit Israel as a 
full Member State in May 1949, while the refugees remained dispossessed 
and stateless.9  
 The resulting Palestinian hostility towards the UN also extended to 
UNRWA.10 To many refugees, the Agency was simply the local face of the 
Western-dominated international community that oversaw the UN.11 They 
accordingly approached it with considerable suspicion and sometimes 
outright hostility; indeed, Hanafi has identified mistrust as the dominant 
feature of the relationship.12 Schiff writes of how many refugees suspected 
that UNRWA was functioning as a tool of imperialist Western diplomacy in 
the Middle East, and refugees’ testimonies corroborate this. 13  In his 
                                                 
7 UNGA Resolution 181, Future government of  Palestine, A/RES/181(II), 29 November 1947. 
8 The Palestine Mandate, 24 July 1922, GB165-0161, File 1, Box 69, MECA.  
9 Farah, ‘Uneasy but necessary’, p. 5.  
10 Philip Issa, ‘Abu Maher al Yamani and the Unheralded Palestinian leadership in 1950s Lebanon’, MA 
thesis, University of Texas, 2015, p. 67. 
11 Interview with Zizette Darkazally, UNRWA Chief Communications Officer, Beirut, 26 January 2015.  
12 Hanafi, ‘UNRWA as a “phantom  sovereign”’, p. 132.  
13 Schiff, Refugees unto the Third Generation , p. 101. 
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autobiography, for example, Fawaz Turki disdainfully described UNRWA as 
an agency of ‘the very body [the UN] that was responsible for our original 
displacement.’14 Hajj Amin el Husseini made the same point to the Director 
of UNRWA Affairs in Lebanon in 1963, when asked why so many 
Palestinians mistrusted the Agency.15  
Such suspicion did not only manifest itself in the refugees’ words. 
Some saw UNRWA’s UN status as sufficient grounds to organise against it. 
In 1960, a group calling themselves the ‘Badge of the Arab Palestine Youth 
in Lebanon’ – previously mentioned in Chapter One – issued the following 
statement: 
the UN who is in the origin a cause in the disaster cannot be 
considered the suitable Organisation to solve the Palestine Problem… 
the Relief Agency [UNRWA] is a danger threatening [the Palestinian] 
cause particularly because it executes the many projects according to an 
Imperialistic Jewish plan [sic].16 
 
It is clear from this statement that UNRWA’s UN status led some refugees 
to perceive it as a political organisation and not merely a welfare agency as it 
claimed. Such perceptions were fuelled by the knowledge that UNRWA 
received the bulk of its funding from Western states which were allied to 
Israel. As explained in Chapter Three, UNRWA’s operations relied on 
voluntary donations from Western governments, chiefly the US and UK.17 
In the eyes of many refugees, these were the two states most hostile to their 
interests. 18  As a result, their financial power over the Agency created 
suspicions about its real intentions.19  
 
                                                 
14 Fawaz Turki, Exile’s Return: The Making of  a Palestinian-American (New York: Free Press, 1994), p. 153.  
15 Note DUA/L-1, 21 November 1963, File RE 150 II, Box RE 3, UHA.  
16 Badge of the Arab Palestine Youth in Lebanon, Statement, 1 January 1960, File RE150 I, Box RE3, 
UHA [UNRWA translation]. 
17 Review of UNRWA by the twentieth session of the General Assembly, nd, S-1066-0065-0007, UNA.  
18 On the US’ historical policy in Palestine, see: Irene Gendzier, Dying to Forget: Oil, Power, Palestine, and the 
Foundations of  US Policy in the Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). When it came to 
the UK, many Palestinians continued to feel aggrieved over the Balfour Declaration. See for example: Issa 
Nakhleh, Statement to the UNGA, 14 November 1974, S-0907-0012-0006, UNA; PLO information bulletin, 
3, 16, 1 November 1977, IPS. 
19 Schiff, Refugees unto the Third Generation, p. 46.  
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To make matters worse, UNRWA’s internal staffing structures ensured 
that power remained in the hands of its ‘international’ employees – who 
were in reality nearly always Western. The Palestinian refugees who 
constituted the vast majority of UNRWA employees were consistently, if 
unofficially, blocked from positions of senior management.20 This caused 
considerable resentment, and gave added weight to the feeling that the 
Agency was really a neo-colonial body imposed on the Middle East by the 
West. Further evidence of the latter was drawn from the fact that until the 
appointment of Turkish diplomat İlter Türkmen in 1991, every UNRWA 
Director and Commissioner-General had been North American or Western 
European21 - and the same has been true since Türkmen’s departure in 1996.  
The refugees’ suspicions about UNRWA were thus clearly and closely 
tied to its international set-up at the UN. Yet as Peteet points out, the 
refugees’ views of the latter were often ambiguous, 22 and suspicion was not 
the only sentiment. UNRWA’s status as a UN body also created a strong 
sense of entitlement. Many refugees felt that UNRWA existed as an 
international obligation, even a meagre form of compensation, for the 
world’s abandonment of them in 1947-48; and as previously explained, they 
held the Western powers largely responsible, in view of their dominant 
position in global politics. 23  Interestingly John Davis, who served as 
UNRWA’s Commissioner-General from 1959-63, later made a similar point, 
describing the Agency as ‘one of the prices – and perhaps the cheapest – 
that the international community was paying for not having to solve with 
equity the political problems of the refugees.’24 
                                                 
20 On proportions of Palestinian staff at UNRWA see: Palestine Refugees Today , 74, December 1972; 80, 
December 1974, both at IPS. Palestine Refugees Today 93, July 1980, RSC. 
21 'UNRWA, 1950-90: Serving Palestine refugees', Box GP59.3 UNRWA, RSC. 
22 Peteet, Landscape of  Hope and Despair, p. 91. 
23 Ilana Feldman, Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, Authority and the Work of  Rule (London: Duke University Press, 
2008), p. 138. 
24 Elhalaby, ‘Paradoxes of UNRWA’. 
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In the eyes of the refugees, this made UNRWA an international 
symbol and signifier of their political and legal rights.25 As such, its services 
were their entitlement, its registration cards proof of their political rights.26 
This idea remained pervasive despite UNRWA’s denials of such an 
interpretation. 27  Consequently, the refugees were keen for the Agency’s 
work to continue, despite their criticisms of it, and tended to react with 
alarm to any suggestion that it might be dissolved before their plight was 
resolved.28   
Moreover, many refugees were keen to take advantage of having a 
‘local address’ for the UN in their midst. They saw UNRWA’s affiliation as 
sufficiently significant to try to use the Agency as a medium for reaching the 
UN. In 1961, a group of refugees in Jordan wrote to the Commissioner-
General, first asking him for water and then requesting that he: 
Inform the United Nations that we will never be able to forget our 
dear homeland, no matter how long we shall have to endure this 
miserable condition. We shall not accept any substitute for our 
homeland, nor relinquish it for any bribe.29  
 
Then on the fifteenth anniversary of the Partition Plan, a group of refugees 
in Lebanon distributed a pamphlet around the camps calling for a boycott of 
UNRWA services in order to ‘make our objections and persistence heard by 
the United Nations.’30 This conception of UNRWA continued to hold sway 
in later years. In 1968, Palestinian women’s associations across the OPT sent 
petitions protesting the occupation to both UNRWA Commissioner-
General Michelmore and Secretary-General Thant. 31  Three years later, 
                                                 
25 Brynen, ‘UNRWA as Avatar’, pp. 267-269. Randa Farah, 'UNRWA: Through the Eyes of Its Refugee 
Employees in Jordan', Refugee Survey Quarterly, 28:2–3, March 2010, p. 390. 
26 Nell Gabiam, ‘When “Humanitarianism” becomes “development”: The Politics of International Aid in 
Syria’s Palestinian refugee camps’, American Anthropologist, 114, 1, 2012, p. 101. 
27 Interview with Matthew Reynolds, Director of UNRWA Representative Office in Washington, and 
Chris McGrath, UNRWA Liaison Officer, Washington DC, 7 April 2016.  
28 Interview with Hasna Rida, former UNRWA Education Research Assistant, Beirut, 7 December 2016.  
29 Quoted in Elhalaby, ‘Paradoxes of UNRWA’. 
30 ‘The Palestinians in Lebanon’, Statement, 29 November 1962, File RE150 I, Box RE3, UHA.  
31 Petitions from citizens of the Jordan West Bank and Gaza Strip – Arab sector of Jerusalem, 20 May 
1968, S-0667-0006-03, UNA.  
     
 202 
refugees in Gaza appealed unsuccessfully to UNRWA to compel the UN to 
stop Israeli house demolitions.32 The idea of reaching the UN via UNRWA 
was therefore a pervasive one.  
The nature of the refugees’ most major grievances against the Agency 
reflects this simultaneous presence of suspicion and entitlement. Their 
complaints were usually expressed within the framework of UNRWA’s 
international status, with the refugees pointing to the Agency’s place at the 
UN when complaining about its inadequacies. Their feelings of entitlement 
stemmed from the UN’s failings in 1947-48; their suspicion was based on 
the UN’s perceived neo-colonial structures.33 The implications of each of 
these elements for the refugee-Agency relationship shall now be examined 
in turn.   
 
Entitlement and ownership: UNRWA as quasi-state 
 
The Palestinian refugees were not alone in probing the political meaning of 
aid programmes. Many scholars have asked similar questions. 
Anthropologist Lissa Malkki argues that aid-based humanitarian 
interventions tend to depoliticise refugees by treating them as individual 
humanitarian subjects outside of their collective historical and geographical 
contexts.34 Didier Fassin similarly writes that humanitarian regimes compel 
recipients to become ‘not political subjects but moral objects’, losing agency 
and autonomy.35 The Palestinian refugees comprise an instructive case study 
here, as their situation is both highly political and governed by a decades-
long aid regime in the form of UNRWA. By examining the latter’s historical 
                                                 
32 Code cable 53, Rennie to Guyer/Urquhart, 13 August 1971, S-0169-0009-09, UNA.  
33 On the UN’s neo-colonial dynamics see: Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of  Empire and the 
Ideological Origins of  the United Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).  
34 Liisa H. Malkki, ‘Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization’, Cultural 
Anthropology , 11:3, August 1996, pp. 377-404.  
35 Didier Fassin, ‘Inequality of Lives, Hierarchies of Humanity: Moral commitments and ethical dilemmas 
of humanitarianism’, in Ilana Feldman (ed.), The Government of  Threat and Care (Duke Univeristy Press, 2010), 
pp. 238-255.  
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development, this thesis contributes a new angle to the broader scholarly 
discussion on the politics of aid, through a long-term case study.  
 The political significance of aid is particularly acute in the Palestinian 
case, in view of the tendency for international political discourse in the 
decades after the Nakba to separate the humanitarian ‘Arab refugee’ issue 
from the political Palestinian nationalist struggle.36 As Hanafi writes, such a 
distinction meant that UNRWA’s work risked undermining the refugees’ 
political resistance, by presenting their plight in purely humanitarian terms.37 
It is argued here that the refugees were themselves aware of this risk, and 
accordingly consistently rejected the notion that UNRWA’s services 
constituted aid. Instead, they insistently saw it as a political organisation, and 
accepted its relief services as rights, not charity.  
Their approach was fuelled by the fact that many Palestinian refugees 
found the idea of receiving aid to be shameful and humiliating, particularly if 
they had previously been self-sufficient agriculturalists in pre-1948 
Palestine. 38  They further resented the implication that their plight was 
humanitarian rather than political. In 1953, notables from villages in 
southern Palestine held a conference for refugees in Gaza, where they stated 
that ‘we want to return home. We do not want [UN] food and shelter.’ 39 
With these words, they made it clear that aid could never be a substitute for 
political action, and that they would not accept it as such. This would prove 
a lasting motif among the Palestinian refugees. As discussed in Chapter 
                                                 
36 Paul Chamberlin, The Global Of f ensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of  
the Post-Cold War Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 34-35. Brynen, ‘UNRWA as Avatar’, 
pp. 263-264. Peteet, Landscape of  Hope and Despair, p. 124. For an example of depoliticised Western 
depictions of the Palestinian refugee problem see: Sands of  Sorrow (1950), 
https://archive.org/details/sands_of_sorrow, accessed 6 June 2017.  
37 Hanafi, ‘UNRWA as “phantom sovereign”’, pp. 132-133.  
38 On the refugees’ feelings of humiliation see: Fawaz Turki, Soul in Exile: Lives of  a Palestinian Revolutionary 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988), p. 55; Turki, The Disinherited, pp. 56-57; Leila Khaled, My People 
Shall Live: The Autobiography of  a Revolutionary (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), pp. 28-36; Abdel Bari 
Atwan, A Country of  Words: A Palestinian Journey f rom the Refugee Camp to the Front Page  (London: Saqi, 2008), p. 
27; Feldman, Governing Gaza, p. 129.  
39 Quoted in Salman Abu Sitta, Mapping My Return: A Palestinian Memoir (New York: American University of 
Cairo Press, 2016), p. 118.  
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Two, even the term ‘refugee’ itself was unpopular due to its connotations of 
powerlessness and denationalisation.40 
Such foundations shaped how the refugees responded to UNRWA’s 
services. While they did not refuse the Agency’s provisions, they were 
adamant in accepting them on their own terms, as entitlements rather than 
charity.41 Provisions such as rations were not considered welfare but political 
proof of their refugee status and resulting political rights – a persistent 
construction noted by Peteet, Gabiam, Feldman and Kagan.42 As discussed 
in Chapter One, the Badge of the Arab Palestine Youth in Lebanon 
proclaimed in its 1960 statement that ‘the services of our Agency are our 
rights and not favours or charity from her’.43 The language of this phrase is 
doubly telling, even in translation – not only do the refugees speak of 
services as rights, but they also refer to UNRWA as ‘our’ Agency [wikālatna], 
indicating a sense of ownership over its operations. This reflects a long -
running intimacy between the two, which was so pronounced that their 
relationship has often been characterised in familial terms. Al Husseini calls 
it ‘a difficult but lasting marriage’,44 while Turki used the aforementioned 
less positive moniker of ‘our contemptuous stepmother’ to describe the 
Agency.45  
Al Husseini further argues that the kind of sustained politicisation 
outlined above was crucial in enabling the refugees to avoid mass 
psychological dependence on aid and retain a sense of autonomy. 46  Yet 
Farah points out that there is an inherent paradox in the UNRWA-refugee 
                                                 
40 Peteet, Landscape of  Hope and Despair, p. 124. 
41 Interview with Maria Kekeliova, former UNRWA Operations Support Officer in Gaza, Almere, 18 
September 2015. 
42 Feldman, Governing Gaza, p. 138. Gabiam, ‘When “Humanitarianism” becomes “development”’, p. 96, 
101. Michael Kagan, ‘“We live in a country of UNHCR:” The UN surrogate state and refugee policy in the 
Middle East’, Research Paper No. 201, February 2011, p. 4. Peteet, Landscape of  Hope and Despair, p. 81.  
43 Badge of the Arab Palestine Youth in Lebanon, Statement, 1 January 1960, File RE150 I, Box RE3, 
UHA [UNRWA translation]. 
44 Jalal Al Husseini, ‘UNRWA and the Refugees: A Difficult but Lasting Marriage’, Journal of  Palestine Studies, 
40:1, Autumn 2010, pp. 6-26. 
45 Fawaz Turki, The Disinherited: Journal of  a Palestinian Exile (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 58.  
46 Al Husseini, ‘UNRWA and the Refugees’, p. 8.  
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relationship as a result; the Agency’s work is based on providing services to 
beneficiaries, but the refugees conceptualise themselves in fundamentally 
political terms.47 It is argued here that the most important feature of this 
paradox was the refugees’ success in establishing and maintaining their 
contrarian view of the Agency’s services, despite their position of 
vulnerability and structural powerlessness. The following sections outline 
the ways in which they managed to do so.   
 
UNRWA Services: Demands, complaints and cuts 
UNRWA’s provision of services constituted its raison d'être in the camps, and 
was in many ways the backbone of its relationship with the Palestinian 
refugees. Maria Kekeliova, a former UNRWA employee in Gaza, has 
commented on the direct correlation between the Agency’s provision of 
services and the level of harmony in UNRWA-refugee relations; whenever 
cuts in the former were announced, problems in the latter ensued.48 Again, 
this was usually based on the notion of services as rights, with the refugees 
tending to argue that they were entitled to more than they were receiving. 49 
This understanding was deep-seated enough for the refugees to 
organise formal protests on its basis from very early on. In 1961, the 
Chairman of the Damascus branch of the General Union of Palestine 
Students (GUPS) wrote to the UNRWA Area Director complaining about 
the Agency’s ‘trifle assistance’, and calling for increased services for the 
refugees. He framed these demands in terms of the refugees’ political 
entitlements: 
It is the duty of UNRWA to alleviate the pains of [the Palestine 
refugees]… The responsible persons in UNRWA are called not to 
forget that the people of Palestine have been wronged and oppressed. 
                                                 
47 Farah, ‘Uneasy but Necessary’, p. 5.  
48 Interview with Maria Kekeliova, former UNRWA Operations Support Officer in Gaza, Almere, 18 
September 2015. 
49 Schiff, Refugees Unto the Third Generation , p. 101. 
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It is the duty of humanity which caused this oppression to secure for 
this people the means of tranquillity and easiness. [sic]  50  
 
In other words, UNRWA services were a form of penance from the 
international community and as such, there could be no excuse for their 
inadequacy.51 
In keeping with this perspective, any reductions in UNRWA services 
were met not only with fierce protests, but with outrage and alarm over their 
implications. If the services were evidence of international duty towards the 
refugees, then it followed that service reductions may be a sign of this duty 
being relinquished. UNRWA itself was long aware of how dominant this 
idea was. As early as 1956, Director Labouisse had expressed his concern 
that the refugees would perceive programme cuts as ‘part of a politically 
inspired programme of gradual withdrawal of UN support.’52 Around the 
same time, the Jordanian government protested UNRWA’s investigations 
into its registration rolls, fearing that the move would precipitate mass 
protests.53 This intervention by a host government shows how such ideas 
were not only long-standing, but also significant enough to be noted by 
numerous parties.  
The refugees’ alarm over cuts tended to be particularly acute when it 
came to actions by the Agency to restrict its eligibility criteria, which 
generated fears of a greater plan to dissolve UNRWA and abandon the 
refugees altogether.54 As a result, the latter were always quick to organise 
against any such measures. In the West Bank, camp residents refused rations 
                                                 
50 Chairman of the Damascus Branch of the General Union of Palestine Students, letter to 
DUO/Damascus, 27 August 1961, File RE230(S)1, Box RE21, UHA. 
51 Milton Viorst, Reaching for the Olive Branch: UNRWA and Peace in the Middle East (Washingon DC: Middle 
East Institute, 1984), p. 66. Brynen, ‘UNRWA as Avatar’, pp. 267-269.  
52 Henry Labouisse, Memo of Conversation with UN Secretary-General, 25 July 1956, File OR 100 I, Box 
OR1, UHA. 
53 John Reddaway, ‘UNRWA: a second look at the record – were the critics mistaken?’, New Middle East , 
16, January 1970, p. 21. Ilana Feldman, ‘The Challenges of Categories: UNRWA and the Definition of a 
“Palestine Refugee”’, Journal of  Refugee Studies, 25:3, 2012, p. 396. 
54 Interview with Yazid Zahda, UNRWA West Bank Officer, The Hague, 16 September 2015. Interview 
with Matthias Schmale, Director of UNRWA Representative Office in New York and former UNRWA 
Director in Lebanon, New York, 24 February 2017. 
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in November 1967 in protest at intensified eligibility checks and attempts by 
UNRWA to reduce its recipient lists.55 Six years later, unregistered refugees 
in Syria protested an UNRWA directive for them to pay school fees, 
insisting that an UNRWA education was their right as Palestinian refugees.56  
Such anxieties intensified after UNRWA began making systematic 
service cuts in the 1970s, in an attempt to tackle its funding shortfall. This 
fed directly into fears that its work was being gradually dissolved. Agency 
management were aware of this, but reasoned that the deficit left them with 
no other option. Voicing internal concerns about the possible repercussions, 
UNRWA official Thomas Jamieson wrote to a colleague that any 
termination in services ‘would most probably create major despair…and 
suspicion.’57  
Unsurprisingly, he was proven correct. The late 1970s saw the refugees 
organise mass protests against the UNRWA cuts, doing everything possible 
to voice their opposition. Abdullah Bishaway, the mukhtār of Balata camp in 
the West Bank, reiterated the refugees’ sense of entitlement regarding 
UNRWA when he wrote to the Commissioner-General in 1979 that ‘we are 
your responsibility and you should provide us with relief, care and 
services.’58 That same year, Bishawy and other mukhtārs from camps in the 
West Bank organised strikes and sit-ins to protest UNRWA reductions in 
services and rations.59  Agency staff on the ground reported to the UN 
Secretariat in New York that the large-scale strikes were hindering 
operations.60 
                                                 
55 UNRWA Public Information Office, Press note, 11 November 1967, File RE140-1(3)I, Box RE3, UHA. 
56 DUA/Lebanon, Memo to Acting Commissioner-General, 19 December 1970, File RE210-03(L), Box 
RE7, UHA. 
57 Thomas Jamieson, Statement ‘Palestine Refugee Problem’, nd, File OR110 II, Box OR1, UHA.  
58 Abdullah Bishawy, letter to UNRWA Commissioner-General, 22 October 1979, File RE410(WB) II, 
Box RE65, UHA.  
59 UNRWA Jordan Public Information Office, Press Review 49/79, 21 March 1979, File RE410(WB) II, 
Box RE65, UHA. 
60 See for example: Code cable, Sharif to Van Wijk, 27 May 1976, S-0169-0010-0001, UNA.  
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From the Agency’s perspective, it found itself stuck on the receiving 
end of the refugees’ complaints without having the power to properly 
address them. As noted at the outset of Chapter Three, the Commissioner-
General’s office stated in 1979 that ‘UNRWA walks a tightrope between the 
aspirations of the Palestinians and the stance of the host Governments … 
on the one hand and, on the other, the requirements [of] its major 
contributors.’61 As a result, senior management responded to the West Bank 
protests that year with some frustration. In his reply to Bishawy, UNRWA’s 
Director of Administration, Relief and Information wrote: 
Contrary to your belief, the Commissioner-General has drawn 
attention to the plight of the Palestine refugees in his Annual Report 
to the UN General Assembly and has just appealed once again to 
Member States of the UN for the funds necessary to maintain and 
improve UNRWA’s services to the refugees.62 
 
This response is telling. While rebutting the suggestion that UNRWA was 
doing nothing to support the Palestinian refugees, Director Defrates also 
highlights the Agency’s place in the wider picture. He implicitly points out 
that while UNRWA has highlighted the refugees’ plight to the UN, it is 
ultimately dependent on the latter’s Member States to provide it with the 
necessary funding in order for it to act. In making this point, Defrates seeks 
to assert the Agency’s concern for the refugees while at the same time 
emphasising the limitations of what it can do. As Ghida Frangieh writes, it 
was essentially committed to an obligation for which it was not the decision-
maker.63 However, such protestations from Agency staff failed to quell the 
refugees’ complaints.  
As explained in Chapter One, the refugees placed a special importance 
on education. They therefore reacted to cuts in this programme with 
                                                 
61 Office of UNRWA Commissioner-General, Memo, 16 May 1979, File OR110 II, Box OR1, UHA.  
62 John F. Defrates, letter to Abdullah Bishawy, 6 November 1979, File RE410(WB) II, Box RE65, UHA. 
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particular alarm. In 1970, refugees at two camps in Jordan organised strikes 
in response to rumours that eligibility for registration at UNRWA schools 
was to be restricted.64  The rumours turned out to be false; in fact UNRWA 
management were aware of education’s importance and accordingly tried to 
protect it from the cuts for as long as possible.65 However they could not do 
so completely. The 1970s saw the Agency decrease its education grants, 
prompting student sit-ins at schools in Lebanon. 66 As its financial situation 
worsened, UNRWA introduced double- and triple-shifting in its schools 
from 1978, meaning that two or three different groups of students would be 
taught over the course of a single day (Fig. 16). This allowed UNRWA to 
save resources but reduced the students’ access to teaching. In 1981 the 
Agency went even further, distributing provisional termination notices to 
5,000 teachers in Jordan and Syria. In keeping with their long-term 
concerns, many refugees took this as the first move in a greater plan to 
liquidate the Agency completely and consign their cause to international 
oblivion.67  
The variation in the assistance that host states provided to the refugees, 
detailed in Chapter Three, meant that the UNRWA cuts did not have an 
equal impact across the fields. Yet the refugees’ opposition to them, and the 
grounds on which it was based, tended to be universal. Across the Agency’s 
fields, the refugees maintained the line that its services were their right. They 
consistently rejected the Agency’s defence that its funding shortfall 
compelled it to distinguish between them and prioritise some beneficiaries 
over others.68 This marked one way in which UNRWA helped maintain the 
                                                 
64 Note for the Record of a Meeting with the Minister of Development & Reconstruction at 10:00 on 6 
April 1970, File RE230(J)III, Box RE20, UHA. 
65 This was explained in an article of the UNRWA newsletter in 1970. Palestine Refugees Today , 65, December 
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66 Field Administrative Officer Lebanon, Memo to Commissioner General, 30 May 1970, File RE230(L-1) 
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67 ‘UNRWA’s mid-life crisis’, Middle East International, 13 November 1981.  
68 Interview with Zizette Darkazally, UNRWA Chief Communications Officer, Beirut, 26 January 2015.   
     
 210 
refugees’ shared Palestinian consciousness across the borders of the host 
states, as is discussed in more depth in Chapter Five. As Ghassan Shabaneh 
argues, this was a key part of the Agency’s significance, regardless of the fact 
that from UNRWA’s perspective such an effect was inadvertent and 
unintended.69  
 
<Figure 16 unavailable due to copyright> 
 
UNRWA and refugee rights 
The depth and nature of the refugees’ feelings of entitlement towards 
UNRWA’s services are indicative of its de facto role as their quasi-state 
government. Salah Salah’s comment that ‘the Jews got Israel and we got 
UNRWA’, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, is highly revealing in this 
sense.70  In juxtaposing the creation of Israel with the establishment of 
UNRWA, Salah alludes to the idea that the Agency emerged directly out of 
the UN’s failure to guarantee the Palestinian state envisioned in Resolution 
181. He also invokes a deeper idea prevalent among many refugees: that 
UNRWA is an inferior compensation prize given to the Palestinians while 
their Jewish counterparts got a fully-fledged nation-state with a full 
infrastructure and army. Such thinking has fuelled criticism of UNRWA as a 
toothless quasi-state that lacked sufficient funding and, in the eyes of many 
refugees, failed to properly advocate for their rights on the world stage.   
 This analysis of course begs the question of what really constitutes a 
‘state’ at all. Max Weber famously defined the state as ‘a human community 
that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force in a particular territory’. 71  More recently Anthony D. Smith has 
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similarly emphasised the state’s monopolisation of coercion.72 Using these 
definitions, UNRWA obviously falls far short of being anything close to a 
state. It lacks any kind of security or policing apparatus to impose its will, 
does not hold territory and remains a guest at the invitation of the various 
host states. The Agency itself has consistently highlighted this when trying 
to distance itself from the camps’ militancy, emphasising that it was not 
involved in the domain of security services, and as such did not manage the 
camps as extra-territorial spaces.73 
 However, UNRWA does fulfil some of the other functions of the 
modern state in its provision of services. In taking responsibility for 
providing large-scale health and education programmes to a particular group 
of people in certain demarcated territories, UNRWA holds some of the 
roles that would otherwise fall to a state. Hanafi speaks of it as a ‘phantom 
sovereign’, highlighting the effects of state-like power that emanate from 
UNRWA’s services, and the way in which the refugees perceive its role as a 
result.74 UNRWA thus holds some of the governmental features of a state 
without its security functions – hence being referred to here as a ‘quasi-
state’. This makes it worthy of consideration in discussions about the 
relationship between state, government, citizens and national identity.  
The implications of UNRWA’s quasi-state nature for Palestinian 
national identity are examined in depth in the next chapter. The focus here 
is on the more fundamental question of how this role was understood by 
the Agency and refugees respectively, and what the resulting contestations 
meant for their relationship. It was generally agreed by all parties that 
UNRWA’s large-scale health and education programmes were in many ways 
                                                 
72 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), p. 12.  
73 See for example: Haycock, Memo OP/AD/100 to Director of Relief Services, 3 March 1970; Extract 
from General Cabinet Meeting, 14 September 1970, both in File RE400 II, No Box, UHA. Sinha, Memo 
to Deputy Commissioner-General, 5 March 1980; Memo CM13/80, Office of the Commissioner-General, 
3 June 1980, both in File RE410(WB) II, Box RE65, UHA. UNRWA, Palestine Refugees Today , 69, October 
1971; 80, December 1974; 83, March 1977, all in IPS. Letter from C. William Kontos, UNRWA Acting 
Commissioner-General, New York Times, 8 July 1972.  
74 Hanafi, ‘UNRWA as “phantom sovereign”’.  
     
 212 
equivalent to those usually provided by a functioning state to its citizens.75 
Matthias Schmale, the former UNRWA Director in Lebanon, has 
commented that Palestinian refugees often told him that they saw the 
Agency as akin to a government in its provision of services.76 However, 
UNRWA management diverged from the refugees when it came to how 
they interpreted the repercussions of this. 
For many refugees, the quasi-state nature of UNRWA’s work fed 
directly into their aforementioned sense of entitlement to its services. When 
non-registered Palestinian refugees in Syria protested at having to pay 
UNRWA school fees, they did so on the grounds that ‘it is their right, as 
Palestinians, to have their education at UNRWA schools free of charge 
[emphasis added].’77 The reference to their Palestinian nationality is telling; 
the terminology implies that UNRWA has an obligation to all Palestinians, 
just as a national government would to all its citizens. In a more explicit 
expression of this idea, the Lebanon Branch of the GUPS spoke of 
UNRWA’s ‘commitments towards its populace,’ stating that ‘right of tuition 
should be granted to all Palestinians who simply hold the Palestine 
nationality…’78  
Interestingly, the former UNRWA Commissioner-General Filippo 
Grandi recently expounded a similar idea when defending the Agency’s 
practice of providing free healthcare education to all registered refugees, 
regardless of their individual financial circumstances. Grandi argued that all 
registered refugees should be entitled to use UNRWA schools and hospitals, 
just as any Italian citizen can access free state education and healthcare in 
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Italy. By using the Italian state analogy, he made a direct if unacknowledged 
reference to UNRWA’s quasi-state nature.79 Schmale did the same when 
explaining the rationale behind universal entitlement to UNRWA’s health 
and education programmes, as opposed to its more specialised services.80 
This perception of UNRWA as a quasi-state has also generated an 
expectation of protection from many refugees, especially in times of 
particular vulnerability. Roy Skinner, the Agency’s former Director in 
Jerusalem, has said that the refugees instinctively look to UNRWA in times 
of trouble, and there is clear evidence of this from very early on.81 As early 
as 1955, when Israeli forces killed a Palestinian boy during an attack on 
Gaza known as the Gaza Raid, the community responded with 
demonstrations that targeted the Agency as well as the Egyptian 
administration.82 This is a highly telling indication of how the refugees saw 
UNRWA as a form of government even on a par with the Egyptian state. It 
also shows how they understood the Agency’s role in a way that extended 
beyond merely providing services; in their eyes, UNRWA’s quasi-state role 
meant that it was responsible for protecting them. The boy’s death was 
therefore a failing on the Agency’s part as well as on that of the Egyptian 
government.  
It is crucial to note that the response to the Gaza Raid was not a one-
off but rather an early example of numerous lasting trends in the refugees’ 
relationship with UNRWA. It exemplified both their attempts to turn the 
conventional aid relationship on its head by using the Agency to demand 
their rights; and their charge that it not only provided insufficient services 
but also failed to protect them. These themes only intensified after 1967, 
particularly in the OPT. As discussed in Chapter Two, this period saw the 
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Israeli occupying authorities demolish camp structures in Gaza and forcibly 
transfer refugees to new residences, sometimes outside Gaza altogether.83 
The refugees, highly vulnerable and lacking any substantive representative 
authority, implored UNRWA to take action on their behalf.  
In fact, the Agency was not completely unresponsive to such calls. 
Senior management sometimes advocated for the refugees’ rights – albeit 
not as frequently or forcefully as the refugees wanted them to. 
Commissioner-Generals regularly called for the implementation of the right 
of return in their annual reports to the UNGA,84 in keeping with Resolution 
194.85 After the onset of the Israeli occupation, successive Commissioner-
Generals also used their reports to highlight rights abuses in the OPT, such 
as restrictions on freedom of movement and militaristic punitive measures 
against the camps. 86  In 1968, Michelmore formally spoke out on 
disagreements over the status of those Palestinians displaced by the 1967 
War, demanding that the right of return be implemented for all refugees 
from Palestine.87 Later years saw senior UNRWA management take their 
complaints over the treatment of refugees in the OPT - including over the 
aforementioned policies in Gaza - directly to the Israeli authorities.88  
With such acts of advocacy, UNRWA management fuelled notions 
that the Agency was a quasi-state representing the Palestinian refugees. In so 
doing, they also challenged – inadvertently or otherwise – the formal 
restrictions on the Agency’s role. Unlike UNHCR, UNRWA never had a 
formal mandate for protection. Its forays into the field of protection were 
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therefore always ad hoc and informal. While this arguably left the 
Palestinians at a disadvantage when compared to other refugees,89 it would 
be inaccurate to say that the Agency did not pursue protection activities at 
all. In fact, its advocacy was often driven by senior management themselves, 
who privately expressed sympathy and even outrage over the politics of the 
refugees’ plight. 90 
On occasion, staff sympathy for the refugees even extended to 
empathy for their criticisms of UNRWA. In his 1975 report to the UNGA, 
Commissioner-General Rennie wrote that the refugees’ tendency to view the 
Agency’s financial and logistic problems through a political lens was 
‘understandable’. 91  In a statement four years later, his successor Olof 
Rydbeck similarly demonstrated a clear grasp of the refugees’ understanding 
of UNRWA’s role: 
…because of the quasi-governmental nature of the services that 
UNRWA provides, the acknowledged status as a refugee under 
UNRWA rules to many refugees has come to acquire the character of 
an internationally recognized proof of their Palestinian identity….92 
 
It is particularly significant here that Rydbeck acknowledged the 
implications of UNRWA’s quasi-governmental nature. In the same 
statement he noted that ceasing UNRWA’s services before the refugees’ 
situation had been resolved ‘would be seen by all refugees, yes by all 
Palestinians, as a failure of the international community to meet its moral 
and political obligations towards [them].’93  
 Such perceptions, as noted by Rydbeck, were ultimately the product of 
UNRWA’s limitations as a quasi-state. In addition to lacking the monopoly 
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on force that usually characterises the modern state, it also faced particular 
deficiencies in its relationship with its ‘citizens’, namely the refugees. As the 
latter did not fund UNRWA’s work through taxes or any equivalent 
payment, they did not have the direct investment in the Agency’s operations 
that would have created accountability in the relationship. Instead UNRWA 
was funded by, and answerable to, the Western donor states.94  This created 
a lopsided dynamic whereby the refugees saw UNRWA as ‘their’ Agency but 
did not have the financial leverage to call it to account or make it genuinely 
answerable to their demands – fuelling the notion that the Agency was 
ultimately a foreign implant controlled by the West. The latter perception is 
examined in depth next.  
 
Suspicion and hostility: UNRWA as foreign implant  
 
As already discussed, the Palestinian refugees saw both the UN and 
UNRWA as essentially political organisations. Moreover, the Western 
domination of international politics led many to fear that UNRWA was 
positioned against their political interests. UNRWA itself has always insisted 
that it has an entirely apolitical mandate, consistently rejecting calls to take 
on a political role. 95  However, the reality is rather more complicated. 
Gabiam argues that there is a fundamental incompatibility between 
UNRWA’s claims to be apolitical and its engagement with such a highly 
politicised arena – an incompatibility which the Agency has sometimes 
privately acknowledged.96 Aware of this and sceptical of UNRWA’s claims 
to be apolitical, the refugees have long called for it to be more active in 
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political campaigning and advocacy.97 UNRWA’s perceived shortcomings in 
this area, combined with its UN affiliation and Western funding, have 
fuelled the concern among many refugees that it might be a foreign implant 
with antagonistic ulterior motives. This suspicion sat uncomfortably 
alongside the aforementioned intimacy with the Agency as a state substitute, 
and the resulting paradox generated many of the inconsistencies and 
complexities in the relationship.  
 UNRWA’s early involvement in the ‘reintegration’ projects of the 
1950s, discussed in Chapter One, did nothing to allay such suspicions. The 
projects, while ultimately unsuccessful, played a formative role in the 
refugees’ impressions of UNRWA, and did lasting harm to the 
relationship.98 As the American journalist Milton Viorst noted, they also 
served to highlight the inherent contradiction between the UN’s 
commitment to repatriation and UNRWA’s mission of economic 
development.99 As a result, the refugees concluded that UNRWA’s actions 
were not only political, but politically hostile to their own interests – 
particularly as the reintegration programme was supported by the US.100 The 
episode was thus pivotal to the refugees’ long-running suspicion that 
UNRWA was operating with a hidden political purpose foreign to their 
interests.   
UNRWA’s paternalistic approach did nothing to diminish the 
perception that it was a neo-colonial body. The Agency’s frequent failure to 
consult the refugees about its programmes had been a major grievance 
during the ‘reintegration’ schemes, and remained a sore point in later 
years. 101  While UNRWA consulted more with Palestinians in camps in 
Lebanon during the thawra period – as is discussed in depth in Chapter Five 
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– it otherwise tended to exclude them from its programme design and 
implementation.102 After spending time observing UNRWA’s operations in 
the early 1980s, Viorst remarked that the biggest stain on the Agency’s 
record was its persistent ‘paternalism’. He added that  every Commissioner-
General acknowledged this, with Rydbeck telling him in a formal interview 
that UNRWA had made too many decisions over the years on behalf of the 
Palestinians.103 Yet Viorst did not discuss the particularly problematic nature 
of such paternalism in a setting where many refugees already feared that 
UNRWA had been sent in as a foreign implant to suppress their national 
cause. 
 This representation of UNRWA appeared to be exemplified by its 
internal staffing structure. While registered Palestinian refugees formed the 
bulk of the Agency’s personnel, they were consistently denied senior 
positions. 104  Although this was not an official rule, management spoke 
openly in internal communications of the need to exclude Palestinians from 
high-level roles. In 1957, UNRWA’s Chief Administrative Officer wrote to 
the UN Chief of Purchase and Transportation: 
Most of the [UNRWA] staff is locally recruited and their training and 
approach to any situation follows the customs and practices of the 
Middle East. The same results cannot be obtained from locally 
recruited staff as could be expected from a European or American 
staff. We find this to be true at our own Headquarters here [in Gaza], 
I regret to say.105 
 
Such condescension was typical and not confined to the time. Ten years 
later, when navigating the new reality of Israeli occupation, the Director of 
Education wrote to the Commissioner-General that UNRWA education in 
the OPT should be headed by ‘an Arabic-speaking non-Arab International’, 
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as the required relationship with the Israeli authorities would ‘be beyond the 
capacity of a Palestinian Area staff member to cope with satisfactorily’.106 
In turn, Palestinian staff often resented the perceived snobbery and 
arrogance of their international colleagues, seeing the latter’s behaviour as 
disrespectful.107 While the level of tension between local and international 
staff ebbed and flowed, the causes were fairly consistent, always stemming 
from the differential status and salaries of international and local staff. 108 
This meant that UNRWA’s international staffing system tended to come in 
for particular criticism at times of service cuts. Knowing that international 
staff received higher salaries, many locals felt that funds were being wrongly 
allocated to the top tier of wages rather than going to services for the 
refugees.109  In 1973, the Jordanian publication Al Lewa claimed that the 
UNRWA deficit was 'imaginary' if one considered the gross inequality 
between the salaries of foreign staff and the costs of services to refugees. 110 
Tensions were exacerbated by the short-term nature of most international 
postings with the Agency, which hindered the potential for staff familiarity 
and acclimatisation.111 
In many ways, Palestinian employees of UNRWA encapsulated the 
paradoxes of the Agency-refugee relationship. They tended to identify 
primarily as Palestinian refugees rather than UN staff - an identification that 
was reinforced by UNRWA’s exclusive two-tiered structure. As such they 
were often unable to separate themselves from the complicated feelings that 
many refugees had about the Agency, and generally did not differ from the 
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rest of the Palestinian community in being frequently critical of it.112 Farah 
notes that Palestinian UNRWA staff often spoke with a dual voice, 
switching between ‘us’ (refugees) and ‘it’ (the Agency’), with ‘them’ used to 
denote UNRWA’s international staff. 113  Yet despite this sense of 
separateness, Palestinian staff’s UNRWA affiliation could still affect how 
they were perceived in the community. On occasion, they were cast as 
‘traitors’ for colluding with a pro-Western body.114 More often, they were 
the subject of envy due to their comparatively good wages, conditions and 
job security.115 Again, complexity and paradox dominated the situation.  
 
After 1967: UNRWA as Israeli collaborator  
The notion of UNRWA as a foreign implant, and the accompanying 
criticisms of its political positioning, grew legs after 1967. There were two 
key reasons for this. Firstly, the new reality in the OPT meant that UNRWA 
was now working with the Israeli authorities to implement its services there. 
Some regarded this as an act of collaboration, or even an endorsement of 
the Israeli occupation. 116  Secondly, the Palestinian thawra in the camps 
outside the OPT led to increasingly overt politicisation and activism among 
the refugees, which in turn created new difficulties for the supposedly 
apolitical UNRWA.117 
UNRWA’s Palestinian staff were at the heart of both issues. A 
particular point of tension in the OPT concerned Israeli interference in the 
running of UNRWA schools. The introduction of new screenings and 
school inspections were seen as evidence that the Agency was in league with 
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the refugees’ enemies. The UNRWA schoolteachers were themselves 
overwhelmingly Palestinian; they were also unionised, and already in regular 
conflict with the Agency over pay and conditions.118 Unsurprisingly, they 
became central to the controversy. Many joined the students in going on 
strike to protest the Israeli interventions.119 New Israeli policies heightened 
tensions further, as UNRWA teachers found themselves screened for 
security, with the Agency unable to stop the practice.  120   
 Some of the biggest tensions erupted over the Israeli insistence on 
inspecting textbooks before they could be used. This created long delays 
that left teachers without the resources they needed to work. In February 
1970, teachers’ committees in the West Bank sent a series of letters and 
petitions to UNRWA complaining that the terms of the Agency’s agreement 
with Israel were leaving them unable to do their jobs. The UNRWA 
Education Officer for the West Bank noted that ‘the tone of all [the 
teachers’ communications] was full of bitterness.’ 121  A memo from the 
Nablus Area Teachers’ Committee accused UNRWA of failing to fulfil its 
obligations, in another manifestation of the refugees’ underlying views of 
the Agency as their de facto government.122  
 Meanwhile, UNRWA was facing related tensions with its Palestinian 
staff outside the OPT. As the thawra took hold, the struggle to liberate 
Palestine came to dominate the discourse in the camps.123 UNRWA staff 
increasingly took issue with the Agency’s refusal to formally engage with the 
politics of their plight. While they were prohibited from politicising their 
work for the Agency, many were unwilling to stay out of politics altogether, 
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and in fact sought to fuse their humanitarianism with nationalism, for 
example by informally incorporating nationalist ideas into their teaching.124 
The problem was significant enough for UNRWA to acknowledge it 
publicly. A 1970 issue of its newsletter Palestine Refugees Today stated that local 
staff’s attitudes had come to reflect the rise of ‘the Palestine politico -military 
organisations’ in the camps, raising concerns about how to maintain the 
Agency’s apolitical status in Lebanon and Jordan.125 
 Tensions came to a head in 1970 with the so-called ‘memorandum 
controversy’. Following the PFLP’s high-profile plane hijackings, covered in 
Chapter Two, UN Secretary-General Thant issued a statement condemning 
such activities as ‘deplorable criminal acts [that] are savage and inhuman.’126 
Many Palestinians, regarding the PFLP as a resistance movement, took 
umbrage at what they saw as the latest case of the UN siding with Israel. In 
response, 125 Palestinian staff at the UNRWA Headquarters in Beirut sent a 
memorandum to Thant and Commissioner-General Michelmore, 
condemning the former’s statement.127 The memo was also published in the 
Arabic press.  
 The reaction from management was severe. Both Michelmore and the 
UN Secretariat in New York ruled that the memo was irreconcilable with 
the signatories’ positions as UN staff members. 128  UNRWA insisted on 
impartiality and independence among its staff, regardless of their private 
political beliefs.129 Accordingly, the Agency ordered those who had signed 
the memo to withdraw their signatures immediately; those who refused to 
do so were dismissed.130  From the perspective of UN management, the 
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matter was straightforward and even obvious: employees could not engage 
in political activism contrary to the stance of the Agency, much less openly 
condemn the Secretary-General, while they served as its staff. Yet for the 
staff members involved, the incident exemplified the difficulties of their 
positions and the complexities of their affiliation to the Agency.  
 The reaction of UNRWA management to the memo appeared to typify 
the dismissive and patronising attitude prevalent in the culture of 
development work in the later twentieth century – an attitude which further 
aggrieved many refugees.131 When dealing with the controversy, Michelmore 
commented to Thant that some Palestinian staff members may have signed 
the memo in question under duress, and that many others had refused to 
sign it. While this may or may not have been true – Michelmore provided no 
evidence - the dismissive tone does not suggest any engagement with the 
strength of feeling behind the memo, or the reasons for it. This was not 
helped by the fact that like many other Commissioner-Generals, 
Michelmore did not speak Arabic and could not communicate directly with 
many of the refugees.132 In the same cable, he mentions that he has been 
informed of the various translation options for the memo, without being 
sure of which is the most accurate.133 The controversy thus encapsulated 
many of the tensions at the heart of the relationship between the UN, 
UNRWA, the Palestinian refugees whom it served, and the Palestinian 
refugees who served it.   
The memorandum controversy was far from the end of the problems. 
The following year, further political confrontations erupted when refugees 
at camps across the five fields went on strike in solidarity with Palestinians 
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in Jordan. The strikes targeted UNRWA on the grounds that it was in league 
with the political enemies of the fida ̄’iyyīn. In a statement, the General Union 
of Palestinian Teachers (GUPT) condemned the Agency’s ‘conspiracies’ to 
‘liquefy this revolution’, and contended that the strike was a ‘warning’ to 
UNRWA’s ‘malignant methods’. 134  The ‘revolution’ in question was of 
course the Palestinian thawra in Jordan, although the statement did not 
specify what the Agency’s ‘malignant methods’ were. The GUPT’s hostility 
towards UNRWA was particularly significant in view of their simultaneous 
standing as registered refugees, UNRWA employees and nationalist activists. 
In this sense it served as another case study of the fundamental difficulties 
of the relationship. 
 In 1974, Commissioner-General Rennie took the unusual step of 
raising the Agency’s tensions with its local staff with the UNGA. In his 
annual report, he stated that ‘staff relations weigh heavily’ and that ‘a 
disquieting feature of the year has been increasing resort by staff to action 
intended to coerce the Agency into meeting their demands [sic]’.135 That 
Rennie chose to raise this issue at such a high and public level is indicative 
of its seriousness. As he himself noted, the problem could not be easily 
overcome as it was rooted in the foundations of the situation, which made it 
extremely difficult for Palestinian staff members to be indifferent to political 
flashpoints. The following year, he reported to the UNGA that the staff 
now ‘relied on reasoned argument and orderly procedure… rather than the 
more coercive tactics’. 136  Yet while Rennie presented this as an 
improvement, the essence of the situation remained unchanged. There 
would be many more incidents to come.  
                                                 
134 General Union of Palestinian Teachers, Statement, 21 February 1971, File RE230(L-5), Box RE21, 
UHA. 
135 John Rennie, ‘Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA’, A/9613, 30 June 1974, FCO 93/570 
B, TNA, paragraphs 19, 166, 167.   
136 John Rennie, ‘Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA’, A/10013, 30 June 1975, 
https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N75/213/46/PDF/N7521346.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 27 March 
2017, paragraph 158.  
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Relocation of HQ: UNRWA as neo-colonial  
Palestinian suspicions that UNRWA was a foreign implant were heightened 
when the Agency moved its headquarters from Beirut to Vienna in 1978, 
following a previous temporary transfer out of Lebanon two years earlier. 137 
Commissioner-General Thomas McElhiney had expected the move to be 
uncontroversial, in view of the muted Arab response to the 1976 transfer 
and the evident impossibility of continuing to operate in the middle of the 
Lebanese Civil War.138  However, he was proven wrong. When the move 
was announced,139 all three Arab host governments, along with Egypt and 
Qatar, publicly voiced their opposition to the UN Secretary-General on 
‘psychological, political and financial’ grounds. 140  They argued that the 
presence of UNRWA headquarters in an Arab country indicated the UN’s 
continuing involvement in the Palestinians’ plight and ‘helped to counter 
rumours that UNRWA might be relinquishing its responsibilities.’ 141  In 
making such a statement, the Arab governments tapped into the Palestinian 
refugees’ long-running anxieties and situated the issue of the headquarters’ 
location within wider political concerns.  
This became a definitive strategy for the Arab host states when it came 
to the struggle over UNRWA’s location. The Jordanian Foreign Minister 
subsequently sent a note to Secretary-General Waldheim, expressing his 
government’s disapproval of the headquarters’ transfer and arguing that the 
Agency could have found suitable premises in Amman instead. He 
contended that the transfer ‘has implications connected with a tendency [for 
UNRWA] to disengage gradually from its responsibilities towards the 
                                                 
137 Schiff, Refugees unto the Third Generation , pp. 70-71.  
138 McElhiney, letter to Waldheim, 15 April 1978; Code cable No. 10, McElhiney to 1 May 1978, both S- 
1066-0066-04, UNA. 
139 UN Press Release PAL/1420, ‘Relocation of UNRWA Headquarters’, 13 June 1978, S-1066-0066-04, 
UNA. 
140 Miles to McElhiney, code cable, 20 June 1978, S-1066-0066-04, UNA.  
141 Notes of the meeting between the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives from the Arab 
Group, 19 June, S-1079-0005-09, UNA. 
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refugees.’ 142  While UNRWA dismissed such suggestions as unjustified, 
international actors including Oxfam endorsed the Jordanian stance.143 
The refugees themselves were deeply unhappy about the move, none 
more so than UNRWA’s Palestinian staff. In keeping with the Arab states’ 
protestations, they feared that the headquarters’ transfer signified UNRWA’s 
long-suspected manipulation by the West, and was designed to usher in its 
gradual withdrawal of services ahead of the international abandonment of 
the Palestinian refugees. 144  Aligning itself with such feelings, the PLO 
responded to the transfer announcement by sending its own direct note to 
Waldheim, arguing that the terms of UNRWA’s work required it to be based 
in the Middle East: 
…this decision involves serious political and social consequences and 
seems to imply that, henceforward, UNRWA will progressively 
abandon the provision of humanitarian services to the Palestinian 
refugees… The PLO believes that this decision has been taken in 
response to pressures from imperialist and Zionist forces to compel 
UNRWA to shirk its international responsibilities and obligations 
towards the Palestinian refugees…. There is now a widespread fear 
among the Palestinian refugees that UNRWA might soon completely 
abolish all the services it provides, and the decision of the 
Commissioner-General to transfer UNRWA’s headquarters to Europe 
has especially increased this fear.145 
 
Dismissing the Agency’s security concerns about remaining in the Middle 
East, the PLO called on Waldheim to reverse the relocation. Its campaign 
had some success at the UN level; in 1978 and 1979, the UNGA passed 
resolutions requesting that UNRWA headquarters be reunified in its area of 
operations as soon as possible. Although the Agency agreed to do so in 
theory,146 the headquarters remained in Vienna from 1979 until 1991, when 
                                                 
142 Permanent Representative of Jordan, Note to Waldheim, 28 June 1978, S-1066-0066-04, UNA.  
143 Brian Walker, letter to McElhiney, 5 July 1978; Code cable, McElhiney to Miles 29, 15 July 1978, both 
S-1066-0066-04, UNA. 
144 ‘UNRWA’s mid-life crisis’, Middle East International, 13 November 1981. 
145 PLO Political Department, Note to Waldheim, 26 June 1978, S-1066-0066-04, UNA. 
146 Waldheim, letter to Hasan Ibrahim, 18 September 1980; Note for the Record of Meeting between 
Deputy Commissioner-General and Hassan Ibrahim, 15 June 1981, both S-0354-0003-0012, UNA.  
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it was relocated to Gaza in the context of the Oslo Agreement.147 Its long 
stretch in Europe did nothing to alleviate the refugees’ anxieties and 
suspicions about UNRWA’s true political purpose and affiliation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The nature and tensions of UNRWA’s relationship with the Palestinian 
refugees are central to its history. UNRWA needed the refugees’ acceptance 
and cooperation to be able to function. In some ways this was no problem; 
with the occasional exception, the refugees generally supported UNRWA’s 
existence and favoured its continuation until their plight was resolved. 
Indeed, as this chapter has shown, many deeply feared its dissolution and 
vehemently protested any indication that UNRWA might be diminished. At 
least in this sense, they strongly supported the Agency and its work.  
Problems thus arose not over the fact of UNRWA’s work, but rather 
over its nature and purpose. Tensions stemmed from the fundamentally 
different interpretations of the latter held by the refugees and the Agency 
respectively. From the perspective of the Agency’s senior management, 
UNRWA was a purely humanitarian body that existed to provide apolitical 
welfare services. For the refugees, including many of those who worked for 
the Agency, this was a misnomer; their situation was essentially political and 
an organisation like UNRWA could not engage with it so intricately while 
remaining entirely apolitical. As a result, many refugees criticised UNRWA 
for insufficiently advocating for their rights, or worried that it was operating 
with the ulterior motive of undermining their political interests.  
 In detailing the complexities of UNRWA’s relationship with the 
Palestinian refugees, this chapter has challenged many common assumptions 
about refugees and aid more generally. As a case study, it provides a clear 
                                                 
147 Miles, Memo to Urquhart, 30 August 1979, S-0354-0003-0012, UNA. See also: 
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rebuttal to the idea that refugees’ vulnerability automatically leads them to 
passive welfare dependency. In complete contrast to the latter assumption, 
the Palestinian refugees actively shaped the terms of their relationship with 
UNRWA and their receipt of its provisions. Rejecting any suggestion that 
the latter constituted aid, they instead insisted on receiving UNRWA’s 
services as legal entitlements and evidence of their political rights on the 
international stage. They thus made themselves into active participants in 
shaping UNRWA’s work.  
 The notion of UNRWA services as rights also meant that its work took 
on a more loaded and politicised meaning, despite the continual insistence 
from Agency management that it was apolitical. As otherwise routine 
services such as education and rations were treated as political evidence, the 
Agency’s work was drawn into the developing Palestinian nationalist 
campaign and its demands. It is within this framework that UNRWA 
became inextricably linked with the nationalist movement that took hold in 
the camps after 1967. Its activities were treated as symbols of a political 
situation, and its very existence became politicised. The Agency’s resulting 
interactions with the Palestinian nationalist movement, and the impact that 
each had on the other, are examined in depth in the next chapter.   
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Chapter Five 
UNRWA’s nationalist role: Internationalising Palestinian identity 
 
“The acknowledged status as a refugee under UNRWA rules to many refugees has come 
to acquire the character of an internationally recognised proof of their Palestinian 
identity”1 
Olof Rydbeck, UNRWA Commissioner-General, 1979 
 
The quasi-state nature of UNRWA’s role in the refugee camps raised 
questions about its intersection with the fervent nationalism that overtook 
these spaces during the thawra. Many of these questions strike at the heart of 
theories of nations and nationalism in general. Accordingly, this chapter 
examines how UNRWA acted as one of several factors that shaped 
Palestinian nationalism and national identity in the camps during the period 
1967-87. In so doing, it draws on the ideas of modernist theorists of 
nationalism, many of whom emphasise the role of the state in inculcating a 
collective national identity.  
 As discussed in the introduction, Ernest Gellner contends that modern 
states have driven and promoted nationalism to serve their own ends, 
chiefly when it comes to supporting their claims to legitimacy. Gellner 
writes that nationalism has generally arisen in the state’s ‘conspicuous 
presence’, and very rarely in its absence.2 Similarly, Benedict Anderson ties 
the rise of nationalism to the emergence and growth of the modern state, 
arguing that the latter’s control of popular institutions enabled a collective 
‘imagining’ of a shared communal identity. 3  From a post-colonial 
perspective, Robert Malley posits the state as the source of national 
sovereignty and sentiment.4  Even studies of transnational nationalist can 
retain this fixation on the role of the state. For example, when seeking to 
                                                 
1 UNRWA, Statement No. 16, November 1979, FCO 93/2243, TNA.  
2 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), ch. 1.  
3 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Ref lections on the Origin and Spread of  Nat ionalism (London: Verso, 
2006), ch.s 5-7, 10. 
4 Robert Malley, The Call f rom Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution, and the Turn to Islam (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996), pp. 58, 106-107, 158-59. 
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reframe understandings of nationalism, Rogers Brubaker conceptualised 
‘transborder nationalisms’ solely in terms of the relationship between a state 
and ‘its ethnonational kin in other states’.5 
 The Palestinian case poses several challenges to such theories. As a 
people, the Palestinians have been firmly nationalistic over the last century. 
Indeed, the Palestinian national identity was pervasive and highly effective in 
uniting a people who were dispersed across national borders and had no 
formal sources of power. Yet since at least 1948, the Palestinians have 
lacked the very nation-state that according to the theories outlined above, 
makes such national identity possible. How is this apparent paradox to be 
explained?  
 To address this conundrum, this chapter synthesises populist theories 
of nationalism with those focused on the role of the state. As shown 
throughout this thesis, Palestinian nationalism was not solely or even 
predominantly the product of state-like structures. It was a nationalist 
movement driven strongly by grass-roots action in the camps. Yet as this 
movement developed and enveloped the camps, it inevitably intersected 
with the Agency that administered them. As detailed in Chapter Four, the 
Agency acted as a ‘phantom sovereign’ or ‘shadow state’ for the refugees. 
While there is considerable scholarship on the PLO’s role in popular 
Palestinian nationalism,6 there are insufficient studies of this subject vis-à-vis 
the other Palestinian state substitute: UNRWA.  
 This chapter argues that UNRWA’s influence on Palestinian 
nationalism manifested itself in a number of ways. Firstly, the Agency had a 
                                                 
5 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010 edn), pp. 5-6.  
6 See for example: Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988); Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of  Modern National 
Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Kemal Kirisci, The PLO and world politics: A study 
of  the mobilization of  support for the Palestinian cause (London: Frances Pinter, 1986). More recently, Laleh 
Khalili has written that the ‘quasi-state structure of the Palestinian Authority’ later became a crucial such 
institution. Laleh Khalili, Heroes and Martyrs of  Palestine: The Politics of  National Commemoration  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 220. 
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direct role in shaping the Palestinian refugee identity, which was central to 
the nationalist movement in exile, through its registration criteria, and its 
provision of official identity cards. Crucially, these measures transcended the 
state borders of the five geographical fields in which UNRWA worked, thus 
facilitating a shared national consciousness across the Palestinian diaspora. 
UNRWA’s transnational registration policy therefore shaped the Palestinian 
refugee identity both conceptually and practically. 
 In terms of its activities, UNRWA had the greatest impact on the 
refugees’ thinking through its large-scale education programme. Its schools, 
first set up in the early aftermath of the Nakba, were a formative part of the 
refugees’ experiences of exile. The fact that the camp populations received 
their schooling from UNRWA generated another commonality of 
experience that was important for their collective consciousness. The 
schools further facilitated a sense of shared identity by serving as exclusively 
Palestinian environments, populated by students and teachers who were 
nearly all Palestinian refugees. Moreover, the content of the education 
programme epitomised the fusion of nationalism and internationalism that 
characterised the UNRWA-administered camps. As successive generations 
of Palestinians received their education through an internationally-managed 
programme, their ties with the wider world were magnified. This fuelled the 
internationalist tilt of the Palestinian nationalist movement.  
 There were also subtler aspects to UNRWA’s impact on Palestinian 
refugee identity. The Agency was keen to present itself as a positive 
influence, highlighting its work in promoting gender equity in the camps. 
Again, education was central here; UNRWA’s provision of free education to 
all children meant that female literacy skyrocketed within a generation, with 
resulting repercussions for women’s socio-economic status in the camps. 
Gendered ideas among the refugees, while still largely conforming to Arab 
traditions, were shaped accordingly. The 1970s saw many women participate 
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in the thawra – albeit usually in non-combative roles – as the PLO’s rhetoric 
promoted the importance of their role.  
 Finally, the intimate set-up of UNRWA’s role in the camps, and the 
primacy of the nationalist movement at this time, meant that the Agency’s 
programmes melded with the camps’ nationalist expression and became 
‘Palestinianised’. Not only were UNRWA schools named after villages in 
pre-Nakba Palestine, but the 1970s also saw the Agency’s curriculum 
infused with Palestinian history and geography, at the urging of the refugees 
themselves. The development of this national syllabus within the framework 
of an internationally-devised education programme was the clearest example 
of how the camps were characterised by this paradoxical fusion. The 
Agency, while still international and officially apolitical, was in practice 
increasingly ‘national’ and Palestinian.  
This chapter thus demonstrates the argument at the heart of this thesis: 
that UNRWA acted as an intersection between the international sphere and 
the Palestinian nationalist movement in the camps, resulting in a blend 
between the two during the thawra. To explicate this, the chapter’s first 
section examines UNRWA’s conceptual influence, specifically on the 
question of how Palestinian refugee identity was defined. The second 
section then assesses in more practical terms how UNRWA’s education 
programme helped create a collective Palestinian consciousness in exile, and 
became a conduit for transmitting nationalist ideas and discourse. By 
exploring these areas, this chapter establishes both the theoretical and the 
concrete meaning of UNRWA’s entanglement with Palestinian nationalism 
in the camps, and the consequences of this unique set-up. 
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UNRWA’s conceptual influence: Who is a Palestinian refugee? 
 
As outlined in Chapter One, it was the events of the Nakba that first 
ushered in the identity category of the Palestinian refugee. By turning the 
Palestinians into a stateless people, the Nakba destroyed the previous 
structures of their national society and upturned the former bases of 
national identity.7 Addressing this, Rashid Khalidi writes that the catastrophe 
served as a ‘great leveller’, uniting the people around their shared 
experiences of collective loss, dispossession and exile. 8  Previously all-
important identifiers like class and region were subjugated as the notion of 
the ‘Palestinian refugee’ became central to the post-1948 national identity – 
a process that Schulz refers to as the ‘recreation of identity’.9 This process 
was not fixed but mutable, and the identity category of the Palestinian 
refugee was continually shaped by the impact of subsequent changes like the 
Naksa and the thawra. This section examines another factor that was 
continuously present in shaping the development of this new identity 
category: UNRWA.  
UNRWA’s role in this regard has been overlooked in much of the 
literature, and its influence on identification practices was often unofficial. 
None of the UN Resolutions detailing its mandate to serve ‘Palestine 
refugees’ ever defined who was covered by this term.10 Instead UNRWA 
used a narrow definition that restricted its services to people - not explicitly 
Palestinians11 - who had been living in Palestine from June 1946-May 1948, 
                                                 
7 On earlier notions of Palestinian national identity, see: R. Khalidi, Palestinian Identity , ch. 7; Lauren Banko, 
The Invention of  Palestinian Citizenship, 1917-47 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), ch.s 3, 6.  
8 R. Khalidi, Palestinian Identity , p. 194. On the functioning of this phenomenon beyond the Palestinian case, 
see: Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Transnational aspects of the Kurdish question’, Working Paper, Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, 2000. 
9 Helena Lindholm Schulz, The reconstruction of  Palestinian Nationalism: Between Revolution and Statehood 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 37. 
10 Lex Takkenberg, The Status of  Palestinian Refugees in International Law (New York: Clarendon Press, 1998), 
pp. 69-70.  
11 The absence of any explicit reference to nationality was deliberate. See: Director of UNRWA Liaison 
New York, memo to Director of Administration, Relief & Information, 9 October 1978, File 
RE210/03(WB) III, Box RE7, UHA. 
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who had lost both home and livelihood in the 1948 War, and who had 
sought refuge in one of the Agency’s five areas of operation.12 This excluded 
significant numbers of people who continued to consider themselves 
refugees and to be considered as such by the majority of the Palestinian 
shatāt (diaspora). 13  Accordingly, registration with UNRWA was never 
synonymous with identification as a Palestinian refugee – a point that the 
Agency itself noted in its first annual report.14 Yet as will be shown here, it 
was hugely important in affirming and codifying their identity in the absence 
of any formal governmental structures. 
UNRWA management, ever mindful of the dangers of potential 
politicisation, continually downplayed the importance of the definition, 
insisting that it was not legal and merely served to aid the Agency’s 
operations. 15  However, in practice the definition had a much wider 
significance, creating a new conceptual category. UNRWA registration 
became a key characteristic, if not a necessary condition, of Palestinian 
refugee identity. As Peteet writes, the Agency’s registration practices were 
‘identity affirming’ for the Palestinian refugees.16 Going further, Feldman 
contends that UNRWA’s categorisation practices directly shaped Palestinian 
experiences of exile by determining whether or not they were entitled to 
assistance, protection, and recognition.17 It is argued here that the content of 
UNRWA’s definition had a conceptual as well as a practical impact, helping 
                                                 
12 ‘UNRWA: A Brief History 1950-82’, File RE100 III, Box RE2, UHA. 
13 Randa Farah, ‘The Marginalization of Palestinian Refugees’ in Niklaus Steiner, Mark Gibney and Gil 
Loescher (ed.s), Problems of  Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights (New York: Routledge, 2003), 
pp. 163-164. 
14 Howard Kennedy, 'Interim Report of the Director of UNRWA', A/1451/Rev/1, 6 October 1950, 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/EC8DE7912121FCE5052565B1006B5152, accessed 18 
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argued that the right of return should not be limited to registered refugees. John Davis, The Evasive Peace: A 
study of  the Zionist/Arab problem (London: Cox & Wyman, 1970), p. 110. 
15 Ilana Feldman, ‘The Challenges of Categories: UNRWA and the Definition of a “Palestine Refugee”’, 
Journal of  Refugee Studies, 25:3, 2012, p. 388.  
16 Julie Peteet, Landscape of  Hope and Despair: Palestinian refugee camps (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2009), pp. 64-65.  
17 Feldman, ‘The Challenges of Categories’, pp. 387-406. 
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construct notions of who the Palestinian refugees were and how they 
identified themselves.   
 At the heart of Feldman’s analysis lies the point that UNRWA’s 
definition functioned as a process rather than a singular event.18 As ever, the 
Palestinian refugees themselves were actively involved in this, frequently 
challenging the Agency’s classification policies and pushing their own 
definitions of who constituted a refugee. They particularly disputed the 
exclusions generated by UNRWA’s narrow definition; during protests of the 
kind discussed in Chapter Four, Palestinians demanded that UNRWA 
provide services to all Palestinian refugees, regardless of their registration 
status. As Feldman argues, this further demonstrates the significance of 
UNRWA’s definition and the complex ways in which many Palestinians 
perceived their refugee status, as a signifier of both loss and entitlement.19 
 
Defining a ‘Palestine refugee’: UNRWA’s identity cards 
The meaning of UNRWA’s definition was manifested practically by way of 
official identity cards issued to registered refugees who met its eligibility 
criteria. The cards were originally intended to be used as evidence of th is 
eligibility when refugees went to collect rations from the Agency’s offices. 
As such, they were a core element of the Palestinian refugee experience and 
the new form of nationalism that emerged in exile. The content of the cards 
further transcended the impact of Palestinian dispossession by reinforcing 
the refugees’ connections to their shared geographical heritage; UNRWA 
stated in a copy of its newsletter that the cards recorded the refugees’ 
respective places of origin in pre-Nakba Palestine. 20  In this way, they 
codified the refugees’ deep-seated attachments to their ancestral towns and 
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 389, 392.  
19 Ibid., p. 388, 389. 
20 Extract from Palestine Refugees Today, nd, Box GP3 PALESTINE UNRWA PUBLICATIONS, RSC. See 
also: Ilana Feldman, ‘Home as a Refrain: Remembering and Living Displacement in Gaza’, History and 
Memory, 18, 2, Fall-Winter 2006, p. 39.  
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villages. While UNRWA did not invent such attachments – they were the 
result of the historical and political factors discussed in Chapters One and 
Two – policies such as this did serve to underline and systematise them. 
In keeping with international political sensitivities, UNRWA 
continually emphasised that its ID cards were simply a practical means of 
establishing eligibility and held no further significance. Management 
reiterated that issuing such cards was standard humanitarian practice, 
pointing out that UNHCR did the same.21 UNRWA arguably underlined the 
cards’ operational function with their increasing stratification over the years, 
as budgetary restraints compelled the Agency to restrict the refugees’ levels 
of entitlement. From 1956, refugees were not simply marked as ‘registered’ 
but also issued with a letter (R, E, M or N) to denote their entitlements, 
including whether they could claim rations. ‘R’ indicated eligib ility for 
rations and services; ‘E’ for services; ‘M’ for medical aid; and ‘N’ meant that 
a refugee was registered with UNRWA but no longer eligible to receive 
services.22 The result was that despite the continuing nomenclature ‘ration 
cards’, numerous card-carrying refugees were not in fact able to claim 
rations.23 
Yet despite UNRWA’s claims, it is undeniable that the cards’ 
significance was not simply operational. The context gave them a far greater 
meaning; the majority of Palestinian refugees were stateless, with their 
Palestinian passports having lost formal international recognition after 
1948.24 With the exception of those who had taken Jordanian citizenship,25 
most registered Palestinian refugees lacked any official identification – 
                                                 
21 Interview with Matthew Reynolds, Director of UNRWA Representative Office in Washington, and 
Chris McGrath, UNRWA Liaison Officer, Washington DC, 7 April 2016.  
22 Feldman, ‘The Challenge of Categories’, p. 394.  
23 Later stratifications are detailed in: Note from DUA/Jordan to Jordanian Minister of Development, 11 
July 1968, File RE210/03(J); Resume of Criteria for Services provided to Refugees in the West Bank, 16 
November 1978, File RE210(WB) III; both Box RE7, UHA.   
24 On Palestinian passports during the Mandate, see: Banko, The Invention of  Palestinian Citizenship, ch. 5. 
25 The vast majority of Palestinians in Jordan hold citizenship of that country, but there are significant 
exceptions, including those who arrived from Gaza in 1967. See Rochelle Davis, Grace Benton, Wil l 
Todman and Emma Murphy, 'Hosting Guests, Creating Citizens: Models of Refugee Administration in 
Jordan and Egypt', Refugee Survey Quarterly , 36, 1-32, p. 13. 
     
 237 
except for their UNRWA cards.26 Accordingly, they used them not only to 
claim UNRWA services but also to verify their identity to the host states 
when applying for a laissez-passer or for permission to work.27 In this sense 
the cards took on the status of de facto passports, as vital documents in the 
processes of state bureaucracy. In fact, some Palestinian refugees in Jordan 
opted to use their UNRWA cards instead of Jordanian passports, 28 
preferring what Al Husseini describes as the ‘symbol of Palestinian 
identity’.29 
 
 <Figure 17 unavailable due to copyright> 
<Figure 18 unavailable due to copyright> 
 
UNRWA management were aware that the refugees attached this 
symbolic meaning to the cards.30 They were further aware of the practical 
implications, whereby many refugees were unwilling to give up their cards 
for fear that they would be left with no evidence of their political status and 
attached rights.31 As early as 1961, UNRWA’s Acting Director in Jordan had 
internally described the ration card as a ‘status symbol’ among refugees. He 
observed to a colleague that refugees whose circumstances had improved 
would not mind a reduction in their entitlements but would ‘resist most 
strongly’ the loss of the card itself, with petitions and protests likely if this 
were to happen.32 Outsiders observed the same phenomenon. In a 1968 
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27 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (Oxford: 
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Washington DC, 7 April 2016.  
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study, AUB scholar Usama Khalidi – himself Palestinian – noted that some 
refugees had refused employment because of anxieties about being removed 
from the ration rolls. While he argued that the politicisation of the ration 
cards had been overstated, he concluded that the refugees’ general 
association of political rights with UNRWA registration was undeniable.33  
As a result, UNRWA management held continual discussions over the 
decades about the possibility of creating a separate identification document 
that would verify the refugees’ status without automatically entitling them to 
services. Feldman writes that such a possibility was first raised with the 
Agency’s introduction in 1956 of registration category ‘N’, denoting refugees 
who remained registered but had lost their entitlement to UNRWA rations 
and certain other services because of increased income.34 This paved the way 
for later discussions about the possible introduction of a card that would 
serve to simply recognise refugee status and nothing else. In 1979, the 
Commissioner-General’s Office acknowledged that the rations programme 
had become ‘primarily political’ in its purpose, and floated the possibility of 
replacing it with a simple registration card.35 From UNRWA’s perspective, 
this would have the practical benefit of enabling them to rectify the ration 
rolls without triggering wider political anxieties among the refugees.36 Yet 
from the refugees’ perspective, the impact of such a move would be highly 
political, making their repatriation more plausible. 37 The discussion is thus 
indicative of how UNRWA’s registration policies were consistently and 
unavoidably political in their repercussions.  
 The idea of a registration card for all Palestinian refugees gathered 
momentum as nations sympathetic to the Palestinians came to join the 
                                                 
33 Usama Khalidi, ‘The Diet of Palestine Arab Refugees Receiving UNRWA Rations, up to 31st May 1967’, 
1968, IPS. 
34 Feldman, ‘The Challenge of Categories’, p. 394.  
35 ‘UNRWA’s Mandate’, Memo prepared by the Office of UNRWA Commissioner-General, 16 May 1979, 
File OR110 II, Box OR1, UHA. 
36 See for example: Louis Gendron, Confidential Memo to Chief of Eligibility & Distribution Division, 28 
May 1960, File RE120 I, Box RE3, UHA.  
37 Feldman, ‘The Challenge of Categories’, p. 400. 
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UNGA in the post-colonial era. In 1982, the UNGA formally requested that 
UNRWA issue identity cards to all Palestine refugees displaced in 1948 and 
1967, as well as their descendants, ‘irrespective of whether they are 
recipients or not of rations and services from the Agency’.38 In practice this 
was hampered by the practical difficulties of identifying Palestinian refugees 
worldwide, the attached political controversies, and the question of whether 
such a move was beyond the Agency’s mandate. 39 Yet the fact that the 
UNGA raised this issue in the 1980s demonstrates its continuing 
prevalence. 
Moreover, while the UNGA’s request was not implemented, recent 
decades have seen less comprehensive changes made to UNRWA’s 
registration system. Following the Sabra-Shatila massacre in 1982, the 
UNGA mandated UNRWA to expand its services to unregistered 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, albeit without changing its core practices of 
registration and identification. 40  In 1993, UNRWA eligibility rules were 
expanded to allow the belated inclusion of people who fitted its definition 
but had not registered in the early years after the Nakba.41 Yet these changes 
were tweaks rather than comprehensive reforms, and they all occurred after 
the thawra period considered in this thesis. The years 1967-82 saw 
UNRWA’s registration system remain restricted to the same narrow 
definition, with ration cards providing the only official identification for 
most of the stateless refugees.  
 
 
                                                 
38 UNGA Resolution 37/120, A/RES/37/120, 16 December 1982, 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r120.htm , accessed 13 August 2017. 
39 The practical difficulties were highlighted in: Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Special identification 
cards for all Palestine refugees’, A/38/382, 12 September 1983,  
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Aspects of refugee identity: Geography, generations and gender 
The restrictive nature of UNRWA’s definition of a ‘Palestine refugee’ was 
juxtaposed with the breadth of its work. UNRWA’s transnationalism, as a 
quasi-governmental body operating across five geographical fields, was 
crucial to its significance - yet this has been insufficiently studied in the 
existing literature. Feldman’s work, while providing an in-depth study of 
UNRWA’s categorisation practices, neglects to mention the importance of 
how they transcended state boundaries in the Middle East. 42  Ghassan 
Shabaneh hints at the latter when he writes of UNRWA ‘bringing the 
Palestinian refugees under one umbrella’, but does not analyse the 
implications of this. 43  This section fills the historiographical gap by 
examining the conceptual importance of UNRWA’s common registration 
policy for the Palestinian population across the Levant.  
 In order to probe this effectively, it is necessary to consider what is 
meant by the term ‘transnationalism’. According to Michael Kearney’s 
definition, transnationalism refers to processes that are anchored in and 
transcend one or more nation-states. Kearney cites migration itself as an 
obvious example of transnationalism, which underlines its applicability to 
the Palestinian case. 44  Yet while the inherently transnational nature of 
Palestinian nationalist solidarity after 1948 is an implicit theme in numerous 
works on the subject, there are few explicit studies of it. Political scientist 
Daniel Meier has provided one exception, writing that transnationalism has 
been present in the Palestinian nationalist movement in a number of guises. 
According to Meier, the refugees’ depth of connection to their homeland, 
their construction of an idealised understanding of this homeland, and their 
non-territorialised collective identity in exile, are all instances of 
                                                 
42 Feldman, ‘The Challenge of Categories’. 
43 Ghassan Shabaneh, 'Refugees, International Organizations, and National Identity: The Case of Palestine', 
New Political Science, 32:2, 2010, pp. 215, 218.  
44 M. Kearney, ‘The local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and Transnationalism’, 
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transnationalism. He specifically argues that the fidā’ī functioned as a 
‘transnational icon’ in the 1970s, enabling Palestinian mobilisation across 
numerous nation-states.45  More recently, Miriyam Aouragh has provided 
another example with her work on online activism as a case of Palestinian 
transnationalism.46  
 It is argued here that UNRWA’s registration system served as another 
instance of transnationalism. It transcended the region’s borders by 
providing a common frame of reference for registered Palestinian refugees 
across the five fields, albeit inadvertently. In constructing a standardised 
arrangement for Palestinians in five different geographical areas, UNRWA 
helped combat the differentiation created by state borders and the structures 
of the Israeli occupation. A ‘Palestine refugee’ by UNRWA’s defin ition was 
the same whether the individual in question lived in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, 
the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. This was vital in preserving Palestinian 
refugee identity as both distinctive and communal. It helped unite 
Palestinians across the fragmentation of dispossession and reinforced the 
transnationalism that had characterised Palestinian political history ever 
since the Nakba caused their dispersal. In this sense, UNRWA’s work 
actually served to counter the objective of ‘reintegration’ for which it had 
originally been established, as discussed in Chapter One. Palestinian 
nationalists quickly picked up on the implications, with Shafiq Al Hout 
describing UNRWA as a ‘crucial hub’ for the PLO’s work.47 
 The breadth of UNRWA’s registration system was not only 
geographical, but also inter-generational. Its hereditary rules enabled 
registered refugee men to pass the family ID card on to their children (as 
                                                 
45 Daniel Meier, 'The Palestinian Fiday'i as an Icon of Transnational Struggle: The Lebanese Experience', 
British Journal of  Middle Eastern Studies, 2014, 41:3, pp. 322-334. 
46 Miriyam Aouragh, Palestine Online: Transnationalism, the internet and the construction of identity (London: IB 
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47 Shafiq Al Hout, My Lif e in the PLO: The Inside Story of  the Palestinian Struggle (New York: Pluto Press, 2011), 
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will be discussed shortly, this right did not extend to women) .48 In one of 
the clearest manifestations of how UNRWA functioned as a quasi-state, 
refugee children born in exile could be issued with an ‘UNRWA birth 
certificate’. The appearance of these certificates further illustrated 
UNRWA’s fusion with Palestinian refugee ID, as they were annotated with 
the UNRWA emblem and the family’s card number, and signed by the 
relevant UNRWA Registration Officer. Along with ID cards, the birth 
certificates were used to verify the children’s refugee status when they 
enrolled in UNRWA schools (Fig. 19).49 UNRWA justified its hereditary 
policy on both principled and pragmatic grounds; the alternative would have 
generated hierarchies even within families, with services limited to those 
born before 1948.50 
 
<Figure 19 unavailable due to copyright> 
 
Critics of UNRWA contend that the hereditary nature of its work has 
enabled the continuance of the Palestinian refugee situation by hindering 
their integration into the Arab host states. Commentators Asaf Romirowsky 
and Einat Wilf, and senior Israeli politicians Shimon Peres and Benjamin 
Netanyahu, have repeatedly attributed the refugees’ continuing Palestinian 
self-identification to UNRWA’s registration policy. 51  The supporting 
evidence for such an interpretation is flimsy at best. While UNRWA did 
play a role in shaping Palestinian national identity in exile, it was not 
                                                 
48 Interview with Filippo Grandi, former UNRWA Commissioner-General, Beirut, 19 January 2015.  
49 Acting DUA/Jordan, letter to Comptroller, 4 February 1973, File RE210/03(J), Box RE7, UHA. 
50 Interview with Lex Takkenberg, Head of UNRWA Ethics Office, 9 August 2015, Amman. See also: 
‘Palestine Refugees: Review of UNRWA by the twentieth session of the General Assembly’, S-1066-0065-
07, UNA. 
51 Asaf Romirowsky, 'The Real Palestinian Refugee Crisis', The Tower, May 2014, 
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responsible for creating it. Palestinian nationalism already existed when 
UNRWA was created, and its subsequent development was predominantly 
driven by the refugees and the fidā’iyyīn - between whom there was often 
considerable overlap. The notion that Palestinian national identity would not 
exist without UNRWA cannot be reconciled with the long list of political, 
cultural and social factors that have provided the basis for the former. 
However, while UNRWA did not create Palestinian national identity, it did 
act as a significant factor in shaping its development in the decades after the 
Nakba. The role of UNRWA was thus that of influencer, not originator.  
The details of its hereditary policy drove the nature of this influence. 
Most obviously, it made possible the continuation of UNRWA’s work 
across generations. Accordingly, it facilitated UNRWA’s centrality to many 
refugee families, which was particularly significant in a setting where the 
family comprised a key social unit. It also codified existing notions of 
Palestinian refugee identity as something that could be removed only by 
resolution of their plight, and not simply phased out over time.52  
UNRWA’s registration system also affected societal dynamics within 
the camps. In particular, its patrilineal nature helped shape the gendered 
aspect of Palestinian identity in exile. It meant that while women could 
register with the Agency, they were unable to pass that status onto their 
children and were thus effectively second-class ‘citizens’ within the system.53 
This was in keeping with UNRWA’s aforementioned ‘working definition’, 
which referred to eligible Palestine refugees by way of male pronouns only. 54 
Its approach thus reinforced patriarchal social structures, both by 
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subjugating the position of women and by operating on the basis of the 
family unit, always headed by a man, rather than on equal individual rights. 
Until 1983 the Agency issued ID cards to families, not individuals.55 
The Agency justified the sexism of its hereditary policy on ‘cultural’ 
grounds, citing the need to be consistent with norms in the Arab host states, 
where citizenship was also passed down exclusively through the male line. 56 
That UNRWA established its eligibility criteria with the aim of making it 
analogous to Arab nationality laws is highly revealing. The parallel with state 
policy shows the extent to which UNRWA functioned as a quasi-state, with 
its registration taking the place of citizenship and its ID cards serving as 
sub-standard passports. It was also indicative of how the Agency relied on 
goodwill from the Arab host states, which opposed any suggestion of 
introducing a gender-blind registration system. Finally, the fact that 
UNRWA management spoke of a need to be consistent with Arab culture 
highlights the extent to which the Agency was ‘Palestinianised’. By contrast 
UNHCR – and accordingly all other refugees – use a registration system that 
does not distinguish on the basis of gender and allows both men and 
women to pass on their status to their children.57  
In broader terms, UNRWA’s patrilineal policy also typ ified its general 
conservatism. In keeping with boasts to Western donor states about its 
positive impact in facilitating stability, it was not in the Agency’s interests to 
promote any policy that might create ruptures by engendering significant 
social change. Yet notwithstanding this, it is undeniable that the nature and 
context of UNRWA’s work did affect and shape the socio-political attributes 
of the Palestinian camp communities. As explained here, its registration 
system simultaneously broadened the Palestinian refugee identity across the 
region, and narrowed it according to gender and other criteria, creating its 
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own specific policy for who was entitled to its services. The question 
remains of what impact these services themselves then had on those who 
could access them. With this in mind, the next section analyses the UNRWA 
relief programme that was most influential in its reach: education.  
 
UNRWA’s practical influence: Education  
 
Of all UNRWA’s programmes and activities, the most important was its 
standardised education system. Former Commissioner-General Davis 
described the education programme as the Agency’s ‘most significant 
contribution towards solving the refugee problem’. 58 In particular, it was 
crucial in aiding the formation of a community in exile, and enabling the 
politicisation of this community. Fawaz Turki, himself a graduate of the 
UNRWA education programme, described it as one of the factors that 
‘preserved and buoyed’ the refugees’ Palestinian consciousness in exile.59  
 Similarly, numerous scholars have characterised UNRWA’s education 
programme as the most influential of all its services. Ibrahim Abu Lughod, 
Rashid Khalidi, Julie Peteet and Maya Rosenfeld, among others, all 
emphasise the transformative impact that UNRWA’s introduction of free 
education had on Palestinian society.60 They point out that it was particularly 
significant given the historical context in Mandatory Palestine, where less 
than 30% of Arab school-age children had received an education. 61  By 
contrast, UNRWA’s comprehensive education programme meant that near-
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universal literacy was achieved among the refugees within a generation, 
opening up new employment opportunities.62  
 However, these scholarly assessments of UNRWA’s education 
programme largely focus on its socio-economic effects rather than its 
political significance. Such a focus is especially limited in view of the fact 
that education is essentially a political force, not least with regard to 
nationalism; modernist theorists have often identified it as central to the 
dissemination of a common national identity. Benedict Anderson names 
mass education as one of the ‘policy levers of official nationalism’, vital in 
enabling an ‘imagined community’ to emerge. 63  Eric Hobsbawm writes 
similarly of how schools spread national consciousness and heritage, and 
inculcate an attachment to such things in people from a young age.64 In the 
Palestinian case of course, education had an especially loaded importance - 
as noted in Chapter One, Palestinian nationalist discourse often tied 
education directly to the political cause.  
 The Palestinian belief that education formed part of their nationalist 
struggle was expressed repeatedly over the decades. In 1960, the Head of 
the AHC Office had stated that ‘the only weapon with which the 
Palestinians arm themselves…is education… which kindles enthusiasm in 
their hearts to return to their usurped homeland and liberate it from its 
usurpers.’ The AHC concluded that without education, the refugees’ 
‘blazing spirit of patriotism will be extinguished’.65 Nine years later, the PLO 
affirmed similarly in its Charter that education was a national duty, vital to 
the struggle for Palestine.66 Such ideas could also be found among the grass 
roots. In 1971, a refugee group calling itself the Palestinian Organisation for 
Solidarity and Moral Guidance distributed a tract around UNRWA schools 
                                                 
62 R. Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, p. 194.  
63 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 101, 115, 167.  
64 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), pp. 91-92. 
65 Extract from Al Ayyam, 6 September 1960, File RE230(S)I, Box RE21, UHA [UNRWA translation]. 
66 Article 7, PLO National Charter 1968, OP.32072.956.7, CUOPA. 
     
 247 
in Gaza, calling on refugees to commit themselves to education as the 
ultimate act of patriotism, the ‘first necessary requirement’ for nationalist 
goals to be achieved, and a ‘true expression for our love to our beloved 
usurped home’.67 
 This connection between education and Palestinian political 
nationalism was also observed externally. During the first intifada, social 
scientists Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari noted that the UNRWA education 
system had been significant in giving Palestinians an awareness of injustice 
and a motivation to improve their situation.68 It was no coincidence that the 
refugees tended to be the prime agents of change; nearly all registered 
refugee children attended UNRWA schools for their elementary education.69 
Nationalist figures including Naji al ‘Ali, Khalil Wazir (better known as Abu 
Jihad) and Ghassan Kanafani, along with countless fida ̄’iyyīn, were all 
graduates of UNRWA schools.70 In view of this, the UNRWA education 
programme’s connection to Palestinian national identity and the nationalist 
movement is undeniably worthy of greater investigation.  
 Yet there are few in-depth studies of how UNRWA’s education 
programme shaped Palestinian nationalism in the camps. While Abu 
Lughod and Peteet, along with Rosemary Sayigh and Riccardo Bocco, have 
all written of the refugees’ widespread belief in education as a national duty, 
assessments of UNRWA’s role have often been marginal. 71 Peteet, Bocco 
and David Forsythe all argue that UNRWA’s education programme was 
typical of schooling systems everywhere in that it helped inculcate 
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nationalism and construct national subjects - but their analyses do not 
explain the specificities of how and why it had this effect.72 Even more 
fleetingly, Kemal Kirisci writes in passing that UNRWA’s educational 
programme precipitated social and political modernisation that aided the 
nationalist movement, without unpacking this any further.73  
 In-depth studies of the politics of UNRWA’s education programme 
are therefore few in number. Of particular value to this thesis are those by 
Ghassan Shabaneh and Rosemary Sayigh. The former contends that 
UNRWA’s schooling system has provided a crucial structure for the 
refugees’ national identity, while the latter recently paved the way for new 
research when she assessed UNRWA’s role in supplying Palestinian history 
books to refugee children.74 This section builds on the foundations of both 
scholars’ works to engage with the historicity and specificities of UNRWA’s 
education programme. It extends the existing analysis so as to include an 
explicit consideration of the intersection between an internationally-
mandated schooling system and a nationalist setting. In doing so, it 
examines how the operation of the UNRWA schools impacted the 
nationalist movement in the camps.  
 
The UNRWA schools network 
One of UNRWA’s greatest contributions to the Palestinian nationalist 
movement was structural. As discussed in Chapter Four, the Agency 
established a standardised transnational system that helped maintain a 
shared Palestinian consciousness among the refugees, despite their dispersal 
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across state borders. Yet it did not only do so in conceptual terms. As 
Shabaneh has examined in some detail, UNRWA also established 
institutions that helped maintain a Palestinian identity, among which its 
schools were the most important. 75  The details of the buildings often 
reinforced this, with individual schools and even classrooms frequently 
named after towns and villages in pre-Nakba Palestine.76 In physical terms, 
the UNRWA schools were the first permanent structures to be built inside 
the refugee camps, meaning that they helped institutionalise the latter and 
reinforce their function as separate Palestinian spaces.77  
 Bocco and Peteet both argue that the physicality of the schools was 
fused with a more conceptual significance. Bocco contends that the schools 
offered both the space and the means to reconstitute the fabric of 
Palestinian society in exile, by creating new networks of solidarity. 78 
Meanwhile Peteet emphasises how they brought Palestinians together in 
spaces where their identity and collective consciousness was heightened. 
The refugees accordingly found in the schools a means to transmit a 
Palestinian national identity – and the result, unforeseen by UNRWA, was 
that its education programme inadvertently helped prepare a generation for 
what Peteet calls the ‘secular, militant nationalist activities’ of the thawra.79 
Put simply, the UNRWA schools were effective as a means for 
transmitting nationalism because they functioned as spaces that were almost 
entirely Palestinian in both personnel and ethos,80 with the added bonus of 
being internationally-legitimised. In this sense it can be argued that one of 
UNRWA’s most important contributions to the nationalist movement was 
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indirect and inadvertent; in establishing common institutions for the 
Palestinian refugees in exile, it provided spaces where both ideology and 
strategy could be disseminated among a community whose presence was 
defined primarily by their Palestinian identity. 
Even UNRWA management themselves acknowledged this. In a 1974 
article in Journal of Palestine Studies, UNRWA Public Information Officer 
George Dickerson wrote: 
One of the by-products of the UNRWA/UNESCO education 
programme has been its contribution towards the preservation of the 
Palestine refugees’ identity with the Palestine culture and within the 
wider context of Arab culture. This is partly because so many of them 
have been able to attend schools in which almost all the children are 
Palestine refugees and virtually all of the teachers are also 
Palestinians.81 
 
The importance of such majority-Palestinian environments should not be 
underestimated. The Palestinian refugees, and especially those in the camps, 
were usually marginalised in the structures of the host states, particularly 
Lebanon (as explained in Chapter Three). Although they were in the 
majority in the camps, these spaces were not formally institutionalised in the 
same way as state structures. The existence of internationally-sanctioned 
majority-Palestinian institutions was thus vital.  
Most importantly, these institutions could be found across the shatāt 
(diaspora), or at least across those parts of it in which UNRWA worked. In 
this way the schools served as another manifestation of UNRWA’s 
standardisation of the Palestinian refugees’ experiences, with individuals 
everywhere participating in the same education programme, albeit with 
some regional variations. UNRWA management themselves described the 
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programme as a ‘national system of education’82 operating ‘across frontiers’ 
and thus providing the Palestinian refugees with another shared feature of 
their exile, another common frame of reference, and another means by 
which they could create a network across the diaspora.83 Yet this was not the 
only way in which the Agency’s education shaped the burgeoning nationalist 
movement in the camps. UNRWA’s guidelines over who could be taught, 
and what they were taught, were also vitally influential features, which this 
thesis breaks new grounds in examining. Each of these features is now 
considered in turn.  
 
Educating girls 
Like UNRWA’s registration system, its education programme influenced 
notions of gender in relation to Palestinian refugee identity. However, it did 
so in a very different way. Unlike its registration system, UNRWA’s 
education programme operated on a gender-blind basis, with schooling 
available free of charge to all registered refugee children regardless of sex.84 
As UNESCO observed early on, this meant that families no longer saved up 
to educate their sons while keeping their daughters at home, as many had 
done previously.85 As a result, rates of female education among Palestinians 
increased hugely in both relative and absolute terms in the 1950s and 
1960s.86  
Both this aspect of UNRWA’s impact, and its connection to the 
Palestinian nationalist movement, have been insufficiently examined in the 
existing literature. The most relevant work comes from anthropologists 
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Rosemary Sayigh and Julie Peteet, who look at how the UNRWA-driven 
upsurge in female education gave girls of the thawra generation a greater 
voice in both family affairs and the resistance campaign.87 In this way, it can 
be argued that the Agency’s provision of girls’ schooling was a facilitating 
factor – although by no means a primary cause – in refugee women’s 
involvement in the Palestinian nationalist movement. Their participation in 
the thawra was highly active, as women played a vital role in organising 
demonstrations and petitions, carrying secret messages, transporting arms, 
and in some cases carrying out militant attacks directly.88  
This is not to say that social conservatism disappeared completely with 
the onset of girls’ education. On the contrary, conservative ideas remained 
influential in both refugee society and the UNRWA education programme 
itself. UNRWA schools were nearly all single-sex, with boys and girls taught 
separately in deference to most parents’ wishes. There is an argument that 
such gender segregation may have been indirectly progressive in facilitating 
girls’ education, as many families objected to any suggestion of sending their 
daughters to mixed schools. Indeed, UNRWA’s one coeducational school in 
Karama faced strong objections from parents.89  
Further social conservatism could be found in the Agency’s 
curriculum, which was organised along gendered lines when it came to 
vocational subjects. Thus in the 1960s and 1970s, boys received training in 
woodwork and metalwork, while girls learnt home economics (Fig. 20).90 In 
1971, the UNRWA West Bank Director deemed the latter to be ‘more vital 
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to girls’ education perhaps than any other subject’, signifying the presence of 
conservative ideas on gender at a high Agency level. 91 In this arrangement, 
UNRWA was being consistent with not only the Arab host states but also 
numerous Western education systems at the time.  
 
<Figure 20 unavailable due to copyright> 
 
Notwithstanding this segregation, UNRWA management proudly cited 
the gender equality of the education programme as one of its most positive 
effects. Former Commissioner-General John Davis wrote in his 1970 book 
of the Agency’s positive progress towards girls’ education among the 
refugees.92 That same year, the Agency’s Education Director travelled to 
Marrakech to address the Third Regional Conference of Ministers of 
Education and Ministers Responsible for Economic Planning in the Arab 
States. In his speech he highlighted how the UNRWA/UNESCO schooling 
system gave ‘equal educational opportunities’ to boys and girls, with a 
resulting major increase in female enrolment and access to higher 
education.93  His successors similarly cited the gender parity in UNRWA 
schools as a key achievement,94 and the point was also highlighted in the 
Agency's newsletter Palestine Refugees Today, sent to donor states.95 
However, the story was not entirely positive. Writing in 1973 – three 
years after the Education Director had spoken in Marrakech – scholar 
Ibrahim Abu Lughod argued that the gender gap in UNRWA schools 
remained unsatisfactory. Enrolment figures in the early 1970s continued to 
show more boys than girls, albeit at a declining rate. The gender gap 
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widened at higher levels, due to higher drop-out rates among more 
advanced female students.96 Writing in response to the critique, UNRWA 
Public Information Officer George Dickerson contended that Abu Lughod 
had overstated the gender inequality in the Agency’s Education programme 
- although he conceded that as late as 1964, boys comprised 73% of 
UNRWA’s secondary pupils. 97 It is thus clear that UNRWA’s impact in 
facilitating gender parity should not be overstated, particularly in view of the 
fact that its promotion of female education was juxtaposed with its sexist 
registration policy. Nevertheless, the mass education of refugee girls was 
undeniably significant in helping enable the increasingly public role of 
refugee women. Furthermore, the enrolment of girls as well as boys in 
UNRWA schools would become particularly important in Lebanon, the 
home of the thawra, where the education programme went furthest in its 
dissemination of Palestinian nationalism. This is examined in depth next.  
 
‘Palestinianising’ UNRWA’s curriculum  
UNRWA’s school curriculum long served as a source of tension. From the 
beginning, the Agency had adopted the curricula of the respective host 
states in its schools.98 This was in keeping with the policy implemented by 
the Red Cross before the Agency took over, 99  and was justified on the 
grounds that it would enable refugee children to later integrate into the 
higher education institutions and job markets of the various countries in 
which they lived.100 Yet Palestinian nationalists had long argued that the 
policy undermined their cause by ignoring the need to teach younger 
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generations about their own history and the reasons for their plight.101 The 
Arab host state curricula only covered Palestinian events as a fleeting part of 
wider Arab history – or, in the case of Lebanon, not at all. Fawaz Turki, 
who attended an UNRWA school in Lebanon in the 1950s, later recalled: 
The schools that UNRWA sponsored were designed – unwittingly or 
not – to raise Palestinian children on, and educate them in, accepting 
their plight of life as a preordained thing. They degraded the minds of 
Palestinian youngsters and trained, indeed pressured, them into 
viewing their reality as the norm of existence, never transcendable 
[sic] in its dimensions…. No attempt was made to explain the 
situation and the forces behind it that ruled their lives, or how they 
were to respond to them…. No courses were offered to show where 
they came from, the history of Palestine…..102 
 
Turki’s recollection typifies the fact that Palestinian complaints about the 
curriculum were often fiercest in Lebanon, where the history of Palestine 
was entirely absent from the syllabi. In the 1970s, the thawra brought such 
complaints to the forefront, with the greatest amplification in Lebanon – 
largely due to the fact that the country was the base of the thawra and the 
headquarters of the PLO at this time. The fixation on Lebanon thus 
signified the latter’s centrality to Palestinian politics; accordingly, this sub-
section focuses much of its analysis on events in Lebanon. 
However, it should be noted that developments in the Palestinian 
camps in Lebanon in the 1970s also had a wider significance across the 
shatāt. Nationalist-driven debates over what should be taught in UNRWA 
schools came to epitomise the thawra’s impact on camp norms across the 
region, while also exemplifying the agency displayed by the Palestinian 
refugees throughout their exile, and the influence that they gained over 
UNRWA’s programmes as a result. These years saw UNRWA use Lebanon 
as a testing ground in which it developed policy with the intention of later 
rollout across all fields of operations.  
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The selection of Lebanon for this purpose can be easily explained by 
the impact of the thawra and the resulting Cairo Agreement. These 
developments not only gave the Palestinians greater leverage in Lebanon 
than elsewhere, but also enabled UNRWA could experiment with its 
programmes here more freely, without the possibility of direct tension with 
the host state. UNRWA’s consequential use of the country as a test field 
means that changes here still hold a wider significance, as they were 
intended to ultimately be implemented across all fields. Studying events in 
Lebanon in this era can therefore illuminate developments within the 
Agency’s operations at this time.  
 The thawra did not create pressures on the UNRWA curriculum that 
had been hitherto non-existent. Palestinian civil society had long been active 
in camp education, ever since refugees had pioneered the early makeshift 
camp schools in the 1940s.103 After UNRWA took over in 1950, the vast 
majority of teachers in its schools continued to be registered Palestinian 
refugees themselves.104  Many remained politically organised, forming the 
activist UNRWA Teachers’ Association in 1952.105 They often also belonged 
to the fledgling nationalist movement; 106  Fatah co-founder Abu Iyad, 
communist activist Mu’in Basisu, ANM official Ahmad Husayn al Yamani 
and PFLP figure Ghassan Kanafani all worked as UNRWA teachers in the 
1950s, the former two in Gaza and the latter two in Lebanon.107  Their 
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political commitments had a direct effect on how they conducted their 
work, and drove their frequent activism vis-à-vis UNRWA.  
Numerous scholars have noted the teachers’ informal importance in 
this sense. Feldman, Al Husseini and Peteet, alongside Laleh Khalili, 
Riccardo Bocco, Oroub El-Abed and Yezid Sayigh, have all written of the 
fervent nationalism of many UNRWA teachers, and its consequences.108 
Sayigh contends that the backgrounds of most UNRWA teachers made their 
role especially significant; as they were usually from the camps and often 
very young, they instilled a sense of urgency and political commitment in 
their students. According to Sayigh, many teachers acted as a link between 
camp schools and political parties, even recruiting for the latter.109 That so 
many teachers sought to further the nationalist cause through their work is 
typical of the ongoing attempts by many refugees to challenge the situation 
in which they found themselves, and re-shape it along their own preferred 
lines. It is also indicative of the depth of their attachment to Palestinian 
nationalism - particularly in view of the fact that, as Peteet notes, they risked 
dismissal from UNRWA if caught engaging in overt political activism.110  
 What much of the existing literature does not explore sufficiently is 
how central UNRWA’s curriculum was to many of the teachers’ early 
demands. The 1950s saw both Basisu and Yamani, among others, lobby 
UNRWA to introduce Palestinian history and geography into its schools. 
When these efforts proved unsuccessful, they set about developing such 
curricula informally themselves.111 Although Basisu and Yamani were both 
later fired by the Agency for their political activities – the latter after 
distributing a pamphlet accusing UNRWA of serving Zionism – their efforts 
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had a long-term legacy.112 In 1954, students at UNRWA schools in Nahr el-
Bared camp in Lebanon demonstrated against the history curriculum, 
demanding instruction in the geography and history of Palestine. 113  The 
following year, UNRWA teachers in Lebanon put this at the forefront of 
their demands during a strike, which would be a recurrent tactic over the 
years.114 
Although the teachers were unsuccessful in their attempts to formally 
change UNRWA’s curriculum in the 1950s, some scholars have identified 
the subtler ways in which they inflected the education system with 
nationalist ideas. Rosemary Sayigh has interviewed students who attended 
UNRWA schools in this period and recall starting the day with patriotic 
songs at the teachers’ urging.115 Similarly, Philip Issa writes that Yamani and 
his colleagues had their students recite national anthems and a Palestinian 
oath, and rehearse nationalist plays.116 The teachers thus made effective use 
of the schools’ potential as an arena for inculcating a strong sense of 
Palestinian collective identity among the students. They were crucial in 
imparting a national consciousness to younger generations, countering the 
neutral stance that UNRWA formally promoted in its educational ethos.117  
The teachers’ politicisation, which had been present from the camps’ 
early days, gained a new resonance after 1967. In the OPT, the onset of the 
Israeli occupation triggered a renewed attention on what was taught in 
UNRWA schools. While the Agency continued to use the Jordanian 
curriculum in the West Bank and the Egyptian curriculum in Gaza, the 
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Israeli government was now involved in monitoring the content. 118  As 
discussed in Chapter Three, textbooks had to be approved by Israeli 
inspectors, who censored any material deemed bellicose or hostile to 
Israel.119  
Meanwhile in the Arab host states, the same period saw the thawra give 
a new impetus to long-running Palestinian grievances about the curriculum. 
As explained above, this was particularly pronounced in Lebanon, where the 
thawra was centred and the nationalist movement was most powerful. 120 
1969 accordingly saw teachers and students at UNRWA schools in Lebanon 
go on strike to demand that Palestinian history and geography be included 
in the curriculum.121 They received formal support from the Arab League, 
which officially recommended in November that year that the refugees 
should be taught in UNRWA schools about their rights to their land, ‘its 
usurpal and aggression by the Zionists, and the fight for its redemption’.122 
The PLO was also vocal on the issue, after a study by its Palestine Planning 
Centre (PPC) found that UNRWA’s history and geography textbooks were 
deficient and even inaccurate.123 
 The persistence and accumulation of these demands eventually bore 
fruit, at least in Lebanon. As outlined above, numerous factors combined to 
make Lebanon the site of ‘Palestinianisation’ efforts vis-à-vis the curriculum; 
not only was it the centre of the Palestinian nationalist movement at this 
time, but it also had a state curriculum with significant flexibility. Although 
there was one formal national curriculum for all Lebanese public and private 
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schools, the latter could choose their own textbooks. In keeping with the 
country’s sectarian system, they often opted for books that reflected the 
relevant community’s political culture; for example, it was not uncommon 
for Maronite schools to teach the history of France rather than Lebanon. 
Schools in Lebanon therefore often reinforced separate communal identities 
– and in such a setting, the idea of having a different Palestinian curriculum 
did not seem especially strange.  
 A combination of political and practical circumstances thus made 
Lebanon the most feasible field in which to ‘Palestinianise’ UNRWA’s 
curriculum. From UNRWA’s perspective, it was the ideal testing ground for 
this potentially-controversial change, in view of both the aforementioned 
fragmentation of the Lebanese curriculum and the weakness of the 
Lebanese state. Lebanon thus became central to the ‘Palestinianisation’ of 
the UNRWA curriculum. Changes followed quickly after the Naksa; in 
1969, UNRWA’s Head of Press stated to the Beirut weekly Al Ahad that the 
Agency had no objection to teaching Palestinian history and geography in its 
schools in the country.124 In fact, archival documents indicate that it had 
already quietly started looking into ways to adapt the curriculum. 125  In 
October that year, UNRWA’s Deputy Commissioner-General wrote to the 
UNESCO Director-General, seeking his formal agreement to teach the 
history and geography of Palestine to the refugees in Lebanon. In his letter, 
he cited pressure from both teachers and the Arab League as factors behind 
the change, showing once again the effectiveness of the former’s persistent 
tactics.126  
 With the conditional agreement of the UNESCO Director, UNRWA 
formed several committees to examine how to ‘Palestinianise’ the 
                                                 
124 Head of UNRWA Press and Publications, letter to editor of Al Ahad, 3 April 1969, File RE230(3)II, 
Box RE28, UHA. 
125 ‘New training activities proposed to be taken by the UNRWA/Unesco Institute of Education’, memo 
35/69, 26 November 1969, File RE230(L-1)IV, Box RE21, UHA. 
126 Acting Commissioner-General, letter to UNESCO Director-General, 22 October 1969, File RE230(1)L, 
Box RE27, UHA. 
     
 261 
curriculum. 127  The decision was made to teach Palestinian history and 
geography as a ‘special expanded subject’ within the existing social studies 
framework, thus avoiding the need to either replace Lebanese content or 
create additional periods.128  At the same time, the UNRWA/UNESCO 
Institute of Education in Beirut129 hired Palestinian educators to develop a 
Palestinian history syllabus for the elementary and preparatory levels. The 
resulting syllabus, which is now held in UNRWA’s Central Registry in 
Amman, covered Palestinian history from ancient times to the 20 th century, 
and also provided instruction on Palestinian cities, agriculture, archaeology, 
holy places and social life.130 The Institute produced several new textbooks, 
and one of the consultants, Ali Othman, developed a Teachers’ Guide for 
teaching Palestinian history.131  
 There is some uncertainty over exactly when these new subjects were 
introduced to UNRWA schools in Lebanon. A 1967 UNESCO booklet 
claimed that the changes were made as early as the 1965/66 school year, 132 
but most of the evidence belies this. The new syllabus could not be 
implemented until both UNESCO and the Lebanese government had 
approved it,133 and documents from the UNRWA archive show that this 
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process involved significant delays stretching into the 1970s.134 As late as 
1973, there was still material pending clearance from either the Lebanese 
Ministry of Education or the UNESCO Director-General. 135  While 
Commissioner-General Michelmore stated in his 1970 report to the UNGA 
that the subjects had been introduced from January that year, some parts of 
the new syllabus were still awaiting approval.136  
 Moreover, many refugees continued to complain about UNRWA’s 
curriculum in the early 1970s. The long waits for approval from UNESCO 
and the Lebanese government prompted further agitation from teachers and 
students, and accusations that UNRWA was indulging in delaying tactics. 
The hostility was so severe that UNRWA’s Acting Commissioner-General 
requested that UNESCO treat the clearance as a priority to speed up the 
process. 137 Abu Lughod’s aforementioned critique of UNRWA’s education 
system, in which he argued that its curriculum served to ‘weaken 
Palestinianism’, was published as late as 1973.138 Such evidence indicates that 
the implementation of the new syllabus was a drawn-out and difficult 
process. This may have been due to the turmoil and nervousness 
surrounding such a sensitive issue, exacerbated by the complexities involved 
in implementing change across a large bureaucracy. 
 Just as the date of the syllabus’ introduction is unclear, so it is similarly 
uncertain as to when Palestinian history and geography disappeared from 
the UNRWA curriculum in Lebanon. After the Commissioner-General’s 
comments on the new syllabus in his reports to the UNGA in 1970 and 
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1971, there was no further mention of the subject in UNRWA annual 
reports in the later part of that decade and the 1980s.139 As Rosemary Sayigh 
notes, the subjects are not taught at UNRWA schools in Lebanon today.140 
It is unconfirmed exactly when and why they were removed, but the 
evidence points to some likely possibilities. Laleh Khalili writes that the 
PLO’s departure from Lebanon in 1982 marked a downturn in the 
nationalist pedagogy that had characterised UNRWA schools there during 
the thawra,141  and Rosemary Sayigh suggests that Palestinian history and 
geography disappeared from the UNRWA curriculum around the same 
time. 142  This is a reasonable assumption, not because demand for the 
subjects would have lessened, but because the Palestinians in Lebanon lost 
considerable leverage when the PLO’s power base collapsed.  
Furthermore, the teaching of these new subjects was limited 
geographically as well as temporally. Despite early suggestions that 
UNRWA’s ‘Palestinianised’ curriculum would eventually be rolled out across 
its five fields of operation, after using Lebanon as a testing ground, there is 
no evidence that this ever happened. Formally, the Agency justified this 
geographical containment on the grounds that Lebanon was the only host 
state whose curriculum included no mention of Palestine, while the 
Jordanian, Syrian and Egyptian curricula all featured some consideration of 
the Nakba (albeit fleetingly).143 In reality the Agency’s reasoning may also 
have had a political element; Lebanon was the home of the thawra and the 
only field in which the PLO held power by formal agreement, meaning that 
UNRWA was under more pressure to listen to Palestinian demands there. 
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As Khalili argues, this gave an added leverage to the threat of teachers’ 
strikes in Lebanon, as UNRWA feared that staff across the region would 
follow suit.144 In other words, it was no coincidence that UNRWA agreed to 
change its curriculum at the time and in the place where the thawra was most 
powerful. 
However, it should not be assumed as a result that the significance of 
‘Palestinianising’ the UNRWA curriculum was limited to Lebanon. In fact, 
the adaptation of UNRWA’s curriculum along nationalist lines is 
emblematic of two key points about the history of the Agency and the 
camps across the Levant. Firstly, it is indicative of the refugees’ ongoing 
political agency. They rarely accepted conditions that they considered 
intolerable, and UNRWA often found itself in the crossfire of the resulting 
agitation. The unionised teachers were particularly effective in utilising their 
leverage against the Agency, seeking to counter the potentially depoliticising 
impact of humanitarianism by politicising UNRWA’s services in practice. 
The power of their political organisation was acknowledged at a high level; 
Commissioner-General Michelmore stated on more than one occasion that 
the Agency had opted to introduce Palestinian history and geography to its 
schools in response to pressures from the teachers.145  
 Secondly, the ‘Palestinianisation’ of the UNRWA curriculum in this 
period is a clear manifestation of the increasing fusion of Palestinian 
nationalism with UNRWA - an international organisation that had by this 
stage spent three decades closely entwined with the lives of the Palestinian 
refugees. The set-up saw the Agency become increasingly ‘Palestinianised’ 
over time, with the educational changes discussed here providing the 
clearest example of what this looked like in practice. The result was that by 
the later part of the thawra period, UNRWA was facilitating the 
                                                 
144 Khalili, Heroes and Martyrs of  Palestine, pp. 71-72.  
145 ‘Comments on Appeal from Secretary-General of the Federation of Arab Teachers’, 5 June 1970, File 
RE230(1)S, Box RE27, UHA. Michelmore, 1970 Report of the UNRWA Commissioner-General, 
paragraph 109.  
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dissemination of Palestinian nationalism not only through its transnational 
structures, but also through its programmes’ contents. Although this was 
most pronounced in the curriculum changes in Lebanon, it was by no means 
limited to this field. Instead, events in Lebanon signified a broader trend 
whereby the Agency was becoming increasingly fused with nationalist 
politics in the refugee camps across the Levant.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The history of Palestinian nationalism in the refugee camps both enriches 
and complicates conventional understandings of the relationship between 
the state and nationalism. In the Palestinian case, nationalism developed in 
the absence of a state, and was fuelled by a popular longing for it. It thus 
disproves any notion that a state is a necessary condition for a collective 
national identity to take hold. At the same t ime, UNRWA’s role shows how 
a ‘shadow state’ can emerge to fulfil some of these functions in a setting of 
statelessness. While UNRWA did not create or intentionally fuel Palestinian 
nationalism, its quasi-state role in the camps gave it an important role in 
how nationalist ideas developed and were communicated in these spaces. 
The intimacy and longevity of its presence and operations tied it inextricably 
to the shaping of the Palestinian national identity in exile.   
 As well as being the closest thing to a government for the refugees, 
UNRWA was also the only structure common to all Palestinian camps 
across the Levant. The transnational nature of its work served to unite 
Palestinian refugees across the five fields - an important and often 
underemphasised element of its importance. Although the Nakba levelled 
and unified Palestinian society, the population subsequently endured 
decades of geographical dispersal whereby they were separated by state 
borders and subject to the laws of their respective host governments. As the 
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decades of dispossession unfolded, UNRWA provided some consistency, its 
existence reinforcing the identity of the Palestinian refugees and helping 
standardise their experiences regardless of where they lived. The resulting 
commonalities were vital in facilitating a collective Palestinian national 
consciousness across the shatāt, as the Agency provided a common frame of 
reference for the refugees. Regardless of whether they lived in Lebanon, 
Jordan, Syria or the OPT, registered Palestinian refugees held the same 
UNRWA identity cards and used the same service programmes (albeit with 
some variation in the education system in Lebanon during the thawra).  
 Most important among these was UNRWA’s education programme, 
which the Agency itself acknowledged was in many ways equivalent to a 
national schooling system. Both its structures and its curriculum had a 
particular importance in transmitting the notions of Palestinian nationalism. 
It helped shape the refugees’ identity not only in overtly nationalist terms, 
but also through its norms with regard to concepts like gender. The latter is 
especially worthy of consideration when studying an era that saw the 
increasing participation of women in public life, and particularly in the 
nationalist movement and the activities of the thawra.  
 This chapter has reiterated and highlighted many of the long-term 
themes of the camps’ history. In particular, UNRWA’s acquiescence to 
demands about its curriculum is a further example of how dynamics in the 
camps were characterised by the refugees’ agency. Their political 
organisation and expression were constant features of the camps’ history; 
despite the refugees’ formal disempowerment, they exerted a considerable 
influence over their surroundings – and over the UN Agency responsible 
for their welfare. Moreover, the melding of UNRWA’s programmes with 
Palestinian nationalism is indicative of the Agency’s intimate involvement 
with the camps. This aspect of its set-up is crucial for understanding how 
UNRWA became increasingly ‘Palestinianised’ in this period, most notably 
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through the nationalisation of its curriculum in Lebanon. Significantly, this 
was a symbiotic process; just as UNRWA became ‘Palestinianised’, so the 
nationalist movement became ‘internationalised’ in its objectives and 
strategy. The PLO, as the structure encapsulating the nationalist movement 
and the organisation responsible for bringing the Palestinian refugees to 
much of the world’s attention, was central to this process. The dynamics of 
the PLO’s relationships with both UNRWA and the UN in general 
accordingly comprise the focus of the next and final chapter. 
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Chapter Six 
Palestine at the UN: UNRWA and the PLO 
 
‘UNRWA was a crucial hub for the Palestinian refugees…. It became very important 
for us [in the PLO] to focus on those who constituted its cadres [and] take advantage of 
the means that UNRWA could offer.’1 
Shafiq Al Hout, PLO representative at the UN from 1974-91 
 
From the late 1960s, the PLO served as the structural representation of the 
Palestinian nationalist movement, both in the Middle East and on the world 
stage. After Arafat and the fidā’iyyīn took over the PLO and emancipated it 
from the Arab League’s control, the organisation became increasingly fused 
with the Palestinian grass roots, most markedly in the refugee camps. The 
PLO’s new prominence and authority in the camps brought it into direct 
contact with UNRWA. With the PLO serving as what Cheryl Rubenberg 
calls ‘the institutionalised expression of Palestinian nationalism’, 2  its 
relationship with UNRWA constitutes a core element of the latter’s broader 
interactions with the nationalist movement in the camps during the thawra. 
As such, this chapter complements previous chapters’ assessments of 
UNRWA’s relationship with the grass roots, by taking a more institutional 
approach.   
 Specifically, this chapter asks how the PLO perceived and dealt with 
UNRWA in the camps during the thawra period. It takes a comprehensive 
view of the PLO-UNRWA relationship, analysing it in the context of the 
Palestinian struggle for recognition and legitimacy at the UN. It also probes 
the extent to which the PLO’s views of the Agency were aligned with those 
of the general camp populations, and asks in particular whether the PLO 
saw UNRWA’s work as beneficial or obstructive to the political goals of the 
nationalist movement. Particular attention is paid to Lebanon, as the hub of 
                                                 
1 Shafiq Al Hout, My Lif e in the PLO: The Inside Story of  the Palestinian Struggle (New York: Pluto Press, 2011), 
trans. Hader Al Hout and Leila Othman, pp. 44-45. 
2 Cheryl A. Rubenberg, ‘The Civilian Infrastructure of the Palestine Liberation Organisation’, Journal of  
Palestine Studies, 12:3, Spring 1983, p. 54. 
     
 269 
the thawra and the site of the PLO para-state at this time. In examining these 
questions, this chapter expands on numerous points established earlier in 
the thesis: the camps’ centrality to the Palestinian nationalist movement; the 
politically loaded effects of UNRWA’s work; and the intersection between 
nationalism and internationalism in the camps. 
 While much has been written about the PLO’s leading  role in the 
Palestinian nationalist movement, the existing literature tends to focus on 
the organisation’s internal dynamics and its relationships with the refugee 
communities. There is comparatively little scholarship on the PLO’s strategy 
vis-à-vis international diplomacy, although Helena Cobban, Kemal Kirisci, 
Augustus Norton and Michael Greenberg have all examined the 
organisation’s place on the world stage.3 The most comprehensive analysis 
of the PLO’s internationalist angle comes from historian Paul Chamberlin, 
who argues that global political diplomacy was a core tenet of its strategy. 
According to Chamberlin, the historiography has wrongly subordinated the 
importance of Palestinian diplomatic efforts in favour of a preoccupation 
with the fida ̄’iyyīn’s militancy.4  
 In making such an argument, Chamberlin builds on the work of 
Matthew Connelly, who convincingly made a similar case about the 
international strategy of the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in 
the 1950s and 1960s.5 By taking this approach, Chamberlin illuminates a key 
part of the PLO’s history that hitherto has been insufficiently examined. Yet 
while he pays considerable attention to the PLO’s strategy at the UN, he 
                                                 
3 Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988). Kemal Kirisci, The PLO and World Politics: A study of  the mobilization of  support for the 
Palestinian cause (London: Frances Pinter, 1986). Augustus R. Norton and Martin H. Greenberg (ed.s) , The 
International Relations of  the Palestine Liberation Organisation (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1989). 
4 Paul Chamberlin, The Global Of f ensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and the Makin g of  
the Post-Cold War Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
5 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of  the Post -Cold War 
Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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largely disregards the question of how UNRWA fitted into the picture, as 
the UN’s perceived local address for the Palestinian refugees.  
 Addressing this omission, this chapter argues that the PLO’s 
relationship with UNRWA comprised an important component of its 
overtures to the UN. As such, the latter cannot be understood without the 
former. Moreover, the PLO’s relationship with UNRWA is best examined 
within the context of its internationalist strategy in the 1970s, when it sought 
global solidarity and formal recognition on the world stage. The records of 
both the UNRWA Field Offices and the UN Headquarters, combined with 
the PLO’s communications and publications, show that the PLO perceived 
and approached the Agency as an international organisation of political 
significance; in this sense it was aligned with the views of the host states, the 
donor states, and the refugees themselves. For the PLO, UNRWA’s political 
significance was tied to its UN status. Accordingly, the PLO sought to use 
its local connections with the Agency as a way of furthering the Palestinian 
nationalist cause in the international arena. This made the Agency an 
important component of the PLO’s internationalist strategy. In showing 
how this was so, the analysis here will add another layer to this thesis’ study 
of UNRWA’s historical connections to Palestinian nationalism.   
 This chapter’s arguments are presented over two sections. The first 
section looks at the PLO-UNRWA dynamics in the sphere of international 
high diplomacy. It assesses UNRWA’s place in the PLO’s international 
strategy, as the latter sought legitimacy and formal recognition at the UN. 
The second section then explores the day-to-day interactions between the 
PLO and UNRWA in the camps during the thawra period. It examines both 
the supportive and the contentious aspects of the PLO’s interactions with 
UNRWA, from its politically-tinged criticisms of the Agency to Arafat’s 
fundraising efforts for its work. In so doing, the second section takes its 
analysis of the PLO’s strategy at the UN to a more quotidian level, assessing 
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what difference the formal international recognition of the organisation in 
1974 made on the ground.  
 By way of these arguments, this chapter enriches the historiography on 
UNRWA, the PLO and Palestinian nationalism with several new insights. It 
expands on UNRWA’s historical significance within the Palestinian 
nationalist movement, showing that it functioned at the institutional level as 
well as the grass roots, and thus making this thesis a comprehensive account 
of the subject. Importantly, the evidence of this chapter also augments 
existing understandings of the PLO’s history, which have thus far taken a 
restricted view of its internationalist approach to the UN. By showing that 
the PLO’s internationalist strategy included UNRWA, it demonstrates the 
truly multi-faceted nature of its activities and objectives. Finally, by showing 
that UNRWA’s work helped connect the nationalism of the camps to the 
international arena at the UN, this chapter provides further evidence that 
the Agency’s claims to be apolitical were rendered increasingly untenable by 
the impact of the thawra. 
 
The politics of high diplomacy: Internationalising Palestine 
 
In order to fully understand the PLO’s overtures to UNRWA, it is necessary 
to first consider the internationalist context in which it was operating. 
Palestinian national politics had been entangled with internationalism ever 
since the early twentieth century, when the League of Nations provided a 
mandate for the British governance of Palestine. International intervention 
in Palestinian politics continued with the 1947 UN Partition Plan,6 and the 
numerous UNGA and UNSC resolutions that followed the Nakba.7 The 
                                                 
6 UNGA Resolution 181, A/RES/181(II), 29 November 1947, 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7F0AF2BD897689B785256C330061D253, accessed 31 
August 2017. 
7 See for example: UNSC Resolution 54, S/902, 15 July 1948, https://undocs.org/S/RES/54(1948); 
UNGA Resolution 194, A/Res/194(III), 11 December 1948, 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/C758572B78D1CD0085256BCF0077E51A; UNGA 
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UN’s role in the creation of Israel, which became a Member State in 1949,8 
led Prime Minister Golda Meir to later describe the country as ‘the first born 
of the United Nations’. 9  Meanwhile on the Palestinian side, the 
establishment of UNRWA and the continuation of its work typified the 
ongoing presence of the UN in national affairs, as Ilana Feldman rightly 
argues. 10  Indeed, Keith Feldman writes that the UN’s continual early 
intervention in the so-called ‘question of Palestine’ made the latter ‘central 
to [the UN’s] fashioning of a postwar geopolitical order’.11 
This background is vital for understanding the positioning of Arafat’s 
PLO, which grasped both the general relevance of internationalism to 
Palestinian politics, and the particular role of the UN. Observing the extent 
to which Palestinian affairs had been determined on the world stage, the 
PLO quickly recognised the importance of attaining international legitimacy 
for the Palestinian national cause, not least at the UN. As shall be explained 
over the course of this chapter, the PLO managed its relationship with 
UNRWA within the wider context of an internationalist strategy. From the 
late 1960s, the organisation twinned its military campaigns against Israel 
with a diplomatic offensive on the world stage.  
 As already explained, the PLO’s efforts at international diplomacy have 
received minimal scholarly attention, with a small number of exceptions. In 
addition to Chamberlin’s aforementioned work, 12  Helena Cobban has 
characterised internationalism as a major theme of the PLO’s discourse and 
                                                                                                                                            
Resolution 212, A/RES/212(III), 19 November 1948; 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/EDC284B4A5508FD7852560E500670213, all accessed 
21 September 2017.  
8 UNGA Resolution 273, A/RES/273, 11 May 1949, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/044/44/IMG/NR004444.pdf?OpenElement , accessed 26 
August 2017. 
9 Golda Meir, My Lif e (London: Futura, 1976), p. 263.  
10 Ilana Feldman, Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, Authority, and the Work of  Rule, 1917-1967 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2008), p. 10. 
11 Keith Feldman, A Shadow Over Palestine: The Imperial Lif e of  Race in America (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2015), p. 30. 
12 Chamberlin, The Global Of f ensive, ch.s 1-2. See also: Paul Chamberlin, ‘The Struggle Against Oppression 
Everywhere: The Global Politics of Palestinian Liberation’, Middle Eastern Studies, 47:1, January 2011, pp. 
25-41. 
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activities. According to Cobban, the organisation was keen to reach out to 
potential allies and raise awareness of its cause among as many parties as 
possible, because it understood that its success hinged on gaining global 
recognition and support.13 Chamberlin rightly observes that it was strongly 
influenced in this regard by the precedent of the Algerian FLN, which, as 
Connelly writes, achieved much of its success by way of international 
alignments.14 
However, Chamberlin’s and Cobban’s internationalist interpretations 
of the PLO’s activities are not shared by everyone. Laleh Khalili argues that 
the 1960s actually saw a Palestinian shift away from internationalism, in 
favour of a focus on anticolonial wars of liberation. By Khalili’s reasoning 
this trend continued until the 1990s, at which point the Palestinian struggle 
regained its internationalist tilt with a new focus on international legislation 
and legitimacy.15 However, Khalili’s characterisation of the 1960s as a period 
of departure from internationalisation is misleading. While this period saw a 
reformulation of nationalist strategy, the PLO’s solidarity with anti-colonial 
struggles elsewhere – explicitly acknowledged by Khalili – actually 
constituted a continuation of internationalism, albeit in a different form. 
Indeed, this solidarity comprised the nucleus of the PLO’s strategy in the 
thawra period. 
The centrality of international diplomacy to the PLO’s strategy at this 
time is demonstrated clearly in the organisation’s communications. It 
defined itself in the context of an international revolt, writing in one 
communication that it was ‘part of the world liberation movement and the 
shared struggle’ [juz’ min ḥarakat al-taḥrir al-‘ālamī fī al-niḍāl al-mushtariki].16 
                                                 
13 Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, p. 215. 
14 Chamberlin, The Global Of f ensive, pp. 46-53. Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, pp. 4-10, 125, 146, 230-231, 
279-280. 
15 Laleh Khalili, ‘Commemorating Battles and Massacres in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon’, 
American Behavioural Scientist, 51:11, 2008, p. 1564.  
16 Mashru‘ al-burnāmaj al-siyāsī al-ṣādr ‘an al-muwwtamar al-rābi‘ liḥaraka, fataḥ, May 1980, in Raphael Israeli, 
PLO in Lebanon: Selected documents (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p. 23.  
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This positioning had a particular resonance in the anti-colonial atmosphere 
of the 1960s and 1970s, a time when colonies across Africa and Asia were 
gaining independence and rejecting the old European imperial order.17 As 
Steven Salaita notes, the emergence of Third Worldism as a self-consciously 
internationalist movement had crystallised the notion of progressive 
solidarity across the Global South.18 By characterising Israel and Zionism as 
part of the Western imperialist order, the PLO cast itself in the resistance 
mould of the global anti-colonial movement.19  
Such positioning was a continuous theme in the PLO’s messaging. In 
1969, Fatah declared the Palestinian thawra ‘a model of resistance to neo-
imperialist domination’, thus asserting both its solidarity and its wider 
relevance.20 The PLO also regularly highlighted its commonalities with other 
revolutionary movements, printing posters to celebrate the emergence or 
victories of Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, and Polisario, among others. 21 
Meanwhile its leftist contingents, the PFLP, DFLP and Arab Liberation 
Front (ALF), expressed their solidarity with workers and oppressed groups 
around the world by paying tribute to international leftist commemorations 
like May Day22 and International Women's Day.23  
 As Daniel Meier argues, there was a strategic purpose to the PLO 
positioning itself in this way. The idea that the Palestinian struggle was part 
of a broader revolutionary movement was very powerful as a means of 
mobilising support. 24  When Arafat claimed solidarity with popular 
movements in Zimbabwe, Vietnam and South Africa – as he did when 
                                                 
17 Chamberlin, ‘The Struggle Against Oppression Everywhere’, p. 27.  
18 Steven Salaita, Inter/Nationalism: Decolonizing Native America and Palestine (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2016), p. xiv. 
19 Article 22, Palestinian National Charter 1969, OP.32072.956.7, CUOPA. See also: Statement by Mr 
Yasser Arafat, 29th Session UNGA, 13 November 1974, S-0899-0013-03, UNA [UN translation].  
20 Daniel Meier, 'The Palestinian Fiday'i as an Icon of Transnational Struggle: The Lebanese Experience', 
British Journal of  Middle Eastern Studies, 41:3, 2014, p. 327. 
21 Laleh Khalili, Heroes and Martyrs of  Palestine: The Politics of  National Commemoration (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p. 16.  
22 Poster 90, PFLP collection, Palestine political posters, AUB. 
23 Poster 97, PFLP collection; Poster 113, ALF collection, AUB.  
24 Meier, ‘The Palestinian Fiday’i as an Icon of Transnational Struggle’, p. 327.  
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addressing the UN in 1974 – he fortified myths around the thawra’s 
potency.25 The Palestinian nationalist movement carried far more weight as 
an active component of a global movement than it did as a geographically 
contained campaign with limited means and little relevance outside its own 
sphere. This transnational approach to positioning a nationalist cause was 
not uncommon among stateless peoples; Hamit Borzaslan argues that the 
Palestinians were analogous to the Kurdish and Armenian nationalist 
movements in presenting their respective causes as part of a greater 
movement (and indeed, in the early 1980s the PLO had close ties with the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party).26 In taking this approach, the PLO added weight 
and value to its own actions and credentials, and greatly increased its 
potential for garnering international support, both diplomatically and in 
terms of resources.  
 It was with this in mind that the PLO pursued a series of international 
alliances in the 1960s and 1970s. It paid particular attention to the successful 
revolutions in Algeria and later Iran, which it celebrated as fellow popular 
uprisings against Western-backed imperialist regimes in the same region.27 
Their solidarity was manifested in the sharing of arms and training 
facilities. 28  Abu Iyad recalls in his memoir how the newly-independent 
Algerian government of the 1960s became the first state to supply Fatah 
with arms, and also authorised the opening of a representative office in 
Algiers.29 After the Iranian revolution in 1979, Arafat was the first foreign 
                                                 
25 Statement by Yasser Arafat, S-0899-0013-03, UNA.  
26 Marlies Casier and Olivier Grojean, ‘Between integration, autonomization and radicalisation. Hamit 
Borzarslan on the Kurdish Movement and the Turkish Left’, European Journal of  Turkish Studies, 14, 2012, 
https://journals.openedition.org/ejts/4663, accessed 29 October 2018. 
27 PLO information bulletin, 5:2, 1-15 February 1979; 5:3, 16-28 February 1979, IPS. On the PLO’s ties with 
the Iranian revolutionary regime, see: Chris P. Ioannides, ‘The PLO and the Islamic Revolution in Iran’, in 
Norton and Greenberg , The International Relations of  the Palestine Liberation Organisation, pp. 74-108.  
28 Rosemary Sayigh, The Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries (London: Zed Books, 2007 edition), p. 
140, 156. 
29 Abu Iyad with Eric Rouleau, My Home, My Land: A Narrative of  the Palestinian Struggle (New York: Times 
Books, 1981), p. 42.  
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leader to formally visit the new regime in Tehran – an alliance that the PLO 
celebrated fervently in its communications.30  
 The PLO did not only align itself with Arab and Islamic countries. Its 
political opposition to the West, particularly the USA, also facilitated links to 
the Soviet bloc.31 As early as 1956, Arafat and Abu Iyad had travelled to 
Prague to attend a meeting of the International Students’ Congress, with 
Arafat donning what would become his trademark kūfiya. 32  Over the 
decades, ties to the Soviet bloc became a mainstay of the PLO’s 
international relations, with Arafat visiting Moscow for talks and continually 
referring to the USSR as a friend and ally. 33 The PLO also forged close 
alliances with communist regimes in Romania,34  China, 35  and Cuba; the 
PLO’s Havana office openly provided significant diplomatic and material 
support.36  Yugoslavia was another close ally, and one that would prove 
highly significant for the PLO’s international strategy. It was Yugoslavian 
President Tito who first suggested that the PLO go to the UN in the 1970s, 
ushering in a watershed moment for the Palestinian nationalist movement’s 
international standing.37  
 
Palestine at the UN 
The PLO’s internationalist strategy did not only target foreign states. As 
noted above, the UN had played a central role in Palestinian politics for 
                                                 
30 Tony Walker, Arafat: The Biography (London: Virgin books, 2003), pp. 172-174.  
31 On PLO-Soviet relations see: Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, pp. 221-228; John C. 
Reppert, ‘The Soviets and the PLO: The Convenience of Politics’, in Norton and Greenberg, The 
International Relations of  the Palestine Liberation Organisation, pp. 109-137. 
32 Said Aburish, Arafat: From Defender to Dictator (London: Bloomsbury, 2004), p. 31.  
33 See for example: Mashru‘ al-burnāmaj al-siyāsī al-ṣādr ‘an al-muwwtamar al-rābi‘ liḥaraka, fataḥ, May 1980, in 
Israeli, PLO in Lebanon, p. 24; Record of Arafat meeting in Moscow in 1979 in Israeli, PLO in Lebanon, pp. 
34-73.  
34 Chief of UN Political Affairs Division, Memo to Secretary-General, 17 December 1976, S-1066-0098-
0005, UNA. 
35 For more on the PLO’s relationship with China, see: Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation , pp. 
216-221. 
36 The Palestinian-Cuban alliance is displayed in: Report of PLO representative in Havana, nd, in Israeli, 
PLO in Lebanon, pp. 147-157 [English and Spanish]. See also: Robert Thomas Baratta, ‘The PLO in Latin 
America’, in Norton and Greenberg, The International Relations of  the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, pp. 
166-195. On the opening of a PLO office in Prague see: PLO information bulletin, 3:5, 1 April 1977, IPS. 
37 Al Hout, My Lif e in the PLO, p. 127. 
     
 277 
decades – and the PLO recognised that it would need to win over the 
supranational organisation if it were to truly gain legitimacy on the world 
stage. As discussed in Chapter Four, the UN’s role in partitioning Palestine 
had led many Palestinians to be suspicious of it.38 Yet gaining recognition 
and even endorsement from the UN was a central plank of the PLO’s 
strategy. It stated in a 1976 issue of its publication PLO Information Bulletin 
that ‘exposing the Zionist-imperialist enemy to world opinion through the 
UN bodies’ was one of three strands of its struggle, the other two being 
defending the thawra in Lebanon, and ‘resisting the Zionist occupation 
forces in occupied Palestine’.39 The PLO Information Bulletin itself contributed 
to this ‘first strand’; published from 1975-91 in English, French and 
Spanish, it helped bring the PLO’s cause to a wider international audience.40 
 Fatah, which dominated the PLO from 1968, was the driving force 
behind its UN-focused approach. Fatah had long been aware of the 
importance of international diplomacy, having sent its first recorded 
communication to the UN Secretary-General in June 1965, only a few 
months after formally launching its armed struggle.41 After taking over the 
PLO, it continued to pursue opportunities at the UN. A 1980 Fatah 
document for political planning, later seized by Israeli occupying forces in 
south Lebanon, lists the aim of securing more pro-Palestinian UN 
resolutions among its objectives.42  This approach provoked considerable 
censure from some of the Palestinian diaspora, who continued to see the 
UN as an enemy force. Shafiq Al Hout, who represented the PLO at the 
UN from 1974-91, recalls in his memoir how some Palestinians saw the 
                                                 
38 Rashid Khalidi, ‘Observations on the right of return’, Journal of  Palestine Studies, 21:2, 1992, p. 33. 
39 PLO Information Bulletin, 2:10, March 1976, IPS. 
40 IPS holds issues of PLO information bulletin in all these languages from 1975-91. 
41 Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, p. 34, 216. 
42 Mashru‘ al-burnāmaj al-siyāsī al-ṣādr ‘an al-muwwtamar al-rābi‘ liḥaraka, fataḥ, May 1980, in Israeli, PLO in 
Lebanon, pp. 23-24.  
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organisation’s overtures to the UN as a betrayal, and demonstrated against 
the moves.43  
 Despite their opposition, the PLO – or at least its dominant Fatah 
contingent – insisted that winning over the UN was vital to the nationalist 
movement’s success. Its rationale was simple; while many in the PLO 
leadership shared the general Palestinian suspicion towards the UN, they 
also recognised that it had been crucial to historical Israeli successes and 
Palestinian defeats. They accordingly concluded that in order to reverse 
Palestinian fortunes, they would need to persuade the UN of their case.44 
Many argued that the content of the UN’s Charter and Resolutions provided 
a good basis for their struggle, as they supported ideas of national self-
determination and the right to repatriation. The PLO liked to reiterate this 
by referring regularly to UN norms, for example in its 1968 Charter, and in 
documentary films like the Palestine Cinema Institution’s Atfal min filistin 
(Children of Palestine).45 
 In the 1970s, the PLO’s view on the UN was further influenced by the 
changes that had occurred in the latter’s membership. As several leading 
Palestinian officials noted, by this time the UN’s composition – and 
particularly that of the UNGA – looked very different from the 1940s. The 
large-scale decolonisation of Africa and Asia had precipitated the entry of 
dozens of newly-independent states, which were largely sympathetic to the 
Palestinian cause. Moreover, the PLO had ties with many of these post -
colonial governments, often made up of former liberation movements with 
whom it identified. 
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 The significance of these states’ UN membership quickly became 
evident in how it affected the UNGA. From 1969 the latter passed a slew of 
resolutions in the Palestinians’ favour. These were particularly significant as 
they focused on the Palestinians’ political situation rather than their 
humanitarian plight, in accordance with how the PLO had long sought to 
re-frame the issue. For example, in 1969 UNGA Resolution 2535 reaffirmed 
the Palestinians’ right of return and criticised Israeli policies in the OPT.46 
The following year, two more resolutions upheld the Palestinians’ right to 
self-determination, with one drawing explicitly on the PLO’s declaration of 
solidarity by comparing their situation to that in southern Africa.47  
 In 1970, the PLO gained a new voice on the world stage when its 
representative participated in a discussion on the question of Palestine, held 
by the UNGA’s Special Political Committee.48 Subsequent years saw further 
affirmations of this kind, with UNGA Resolution 2787 even calling on 
states to provide the Palestinians with ‘political, moral and material 
assistance’ in their struggle for self-determination – the strongest indication 
yet of the discursive shift from humanitarianism to politics. As the text of 
this resolution was explicitly grounded in UN values around human rights, 
liberation, and territorial integrity, it was taken to reaffirm the views of the 
PLO leadership that the UN could be used to further their cause.49   
The UNGA’s shift towards a pro-Palestinian stance reached its apogee 
in 1974, a year described by Chamberlin as the ‘critical mass’ of international 
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support for the Palestinian cause. 50  After the Arab League formally 
recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate Palestinian representative at the 
Rabat Summit that year, the impetus quickly moved to the UN. In October, 
the UNGA voted by 105 to 4 to invite the PLO to participate in its plenary 
discussions on Palestine.51 Then in November, it formally invited Arafat to 
address the Assembly in New York. Israel opposed the invitation 
vehemently, but to no avail.52 Arafat’s speech, which was broadcast around 
the world amidst simultaneous fanfare and controversy, won the PLO an 
unprecedented level of global publicity. Its content articulated the PLO’s 
internationalist strategy, calling on UN Member States to implement the 
Palestinians’ national and political rights. 53  The same month, UNGA 
Resolution 3237 formally recognised the PLO as a UN observer entity, 
giving it a similar status to the Vatican.54  
 The PLO’s victories at this time can be explained to a large degree by 
the newly post-colonial make-up of the UNGA, which made it much more 
politically sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. The PLO leadership 
themselves acknowledged this; Arafat explicitly mentioned the significance 
of these states’ UN membership when he addressed the Assembly, as did 
AHC representative Issa Nakhleh the following day. 55  Of particular 
importance was the Algerian presidency of the UNGA in 1974, which Al 
Hout cites in his memoir as a key factor behind the PLO’s decision to go to 
the UN that year. 56  Algeria was a beacon of anti-colonial struggle to 
liberation movements everywhere and to the Palestinians in particular, 
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which made its UNGA Presidency both symbolically and practically 
important. 57  Moreover and as Connelly argues, the FLN had largely 
succeeded in its campaign for Algerian independence by forging 
international alignments, which appeared to validate the PLO’s strategy.58  
The events of 1974, and particularly Arafat’s speech in New York, 
were hugely important in boosting Palestinian morale. Despite their 
widespread opposition to the UN, the refugees largely reacted with pride to 
the sight of their de facto leader formally addressing the world stage. The 
UN’s particular history in Palestine gave the speech a special resonance; as 
Fawaz Turki later wrote, ‘there was cogent symbolism in the idea of the 
United Nations, the very international body that had caused the dispersal of 
the Palestinian people by partitioning the land in 1947, inviting them back to 
address it on their aspirations.’59 On the day of Arafat’s speech, UNRWA 
recorded nationalist demonstrations across the OPT in celebration.60 
The developments in New York also had firmly practical 
consequences. Resolution 3237 gave the PLO a higher level of UN 
recognition than any other non-state actor at the time, and allowed it to 
participate in the UNGA’s work and sessions. As such it made the 
organisation much harder to ignore. There were limitations; the PLO was 
not a full UN Member and remained excluded from the Security Council 
(UNSC), which held the greater power in resolving international disputes. 
Yet it was now unmistakeably part of the UN. To reinforce this, the UNGA 
used its clout to push for the PLO’s recognition in other parts of the UN; in 
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the same month that Arafat spoke in New York, UNGA Resolution 3236 
requested that the Secretary-General establish contacts with the PLO in 
order to help further Palestinian rights.61  
The PLO was quick to take advantage of its new opportunities, 
appointing permanent observers to the UN Headquarters in both New York 
and Geneva.62 Two years after its induction into the UNGA, Soviet pressure 
led to the PLO’s inclusion in UNSC deliberations on the Middle Eastern 
conflict.63 In a major diplomatic victory for the PLO, its representative was 
also invited to address the UNSC, and had a private meeting with the 
Secretary-General in 1976. 64  The PLO now regularly appealed to the 
Secretariat and other Member States for support and assistance on issues 
ranging from the nature of the Israeli occupation to the right of return. In 
1978, Arafat wrote to Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, calling for: 
[the Palestinian refugees’] right to return to their homes and property 
in accordance with the rules of international law, the Charter of the 
United Nations, United Nations resolutions, and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.65  
 
Arafat’s invocation of the UN Charter and UN Resolutions is highly telling 
here. By deliberately framing his argument by way of international norms, he 
implies that is the UN’s natural duty to support the Palestinian national 
cause. The letter is a clear case of the PLO’s internationalist strategy in 
action. 
 While the Secretariat never formally endorsed the PLO’s case, the 
latter’s new status at the UN certainly marked a greater diplomatic 
discussion of the ‘Palestine question’. In 1975, the UNGA established the 
Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian 
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People (informally known as the ‘Palestinian Rights Committee’), charging it 
with producing a programme for the implementation of the Palestinians’ 
fundamental rights.66 The following year, UNGA Resolution 31/110 called 
on the Secretary General ‘to prepare and submit… a report on the living 
conditions of the Palestinian people’, in consultation with the PLO as ‘the 
representative of the Palestinian people’ – a clear sign of the latter’s growing 
international legitimacy.67  
This increasingly official internationalism also came to influence the 
PLO’s political stance. In 1974 it adopted a political programme that spoke 
for the first time of establishing a Palestinian state on part of historic 
Palestine, rather than returning to the pre-Nakba borders.68 This paved the 
way for its later acceptance of a two-state solution. In this way, its increasing 
integration into the international order triggered changes in the PLO, as well 
as the other way around. Chamberlin argues that the PLO’s international 
strategy and status at the UN also led to the Palestinian nationalist 
movement becoming more cosmopolitan, progressive and global. 69  The 
question remains of what this meant for UNRWA, as the UN’s local address 
for Palestinians in the Middle East. 
 
UNRWA and the PLO’s international strategy 
UNRWA’s existence served as a manifestation of the long-running 
connections between Palestine and the international order as encapsulated in 
the UN. Specifically, the Agency’s work was an expression of the 
involvement of the UNGA in particular, which provided its mandate and to 
which it was answerable. As such, it was directly affected by the UNGA’s 
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formal recognition of the PLO in 1974. The Commissioner-General 
acknowledged this in rather dry terms in his annual report the following 
year: 
the granting to the PLO by the General Assembly of observer status at 
the UN and the Assembly’s request to the Secretary-General to 
establish contacts with the PLO on all matters relating to the question 
of Palestine…. were of significance to the Agency.70  
 
Moreover, this significance was distinctly political, despite UNRWA’s 
continual insistence that its work was completely detached from politics. 
The impact of Resolution 3237 would see the Agency drawn into the 
political discourse about Palestine in increasingly explicit terms.  
 Officially speaking, 1974 marked the beginning of UNRWA’s 
relationship with the PLO; relations could only be formally established once 
the UNGA had recognised the organisation.71 In reality, the Agency had 
been dealing with the PLO ever since the latter had come to prominence in 
the camps in the late 1960s. It had loomed particularly large in Lebanon, 
where the 1969 Cairo Agreement made the PLO the de facto governmental 
authority in parts of the country and meant that the Agency could not avoid 
working with it (as is discussed in depth in the next section). Yet despite the 
realities on the ground, UNRWA had to proceed with care, as it could not 
forge any formal agreements with the PLO without the UNGA’s 
endorsement.72 
 The Agency thus walked a tightrope in its relations with the PLO for 
five years after the Cairo Agreement. Its task was complicated further by the 
fact that even outside Lebanon, the PLO was gaining increasing prominence 
at this time. As a result, UNRWA faced further challenges and a new 
directness to its communications with the PLO in the years running up to 
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Resolution 3237. In 1970, the Arab host governments requested that the 
PLO participate in meetings on UNRWA’s education programme.73 The 
Agency had to negotiate this request in a setting whereby its largest funder 
continued to consider the PLO a terrorist organisation. In 1973, UNRWA 
management in Beirut expressed concern to New York over whether the 
Agency’s work in Lebanon, where it was compelled to work with the PLO, 
was compatible with its status as a UN organ, and with the basis on which it 
received funding.74   
The UNGA’s formal recognition of the PLO in 1974 thus made things 
slightly easier for the Agency. It now had an official framework within 
which it could justify its communications with the PLO. The aftermath of 
Resolution 3237 saw the UNRWA-PLO relationship formalised, and it was 
subsequently managed more openly. 75  Soon afterwards, the UNRWA 
Commissioner-General called on Arafat in Beirut ‘to inform him more fully  
of the Agency’s financial difficulties and their implications for services to the 
refugees’. The UN formally reported his visit, in an indication of the newly 
sanctioned state of affairs.76 Moreover from 1974, the two organisations 
held regular official meetings in Lebanon, chaired by Lebanese government 
representatives, to discuss operational issues regarding the refugees there.77 
 The PLO’s formal induction into the UNGA changed things for 
UNRWA in other ways as well. Although it continued to insist that its work 
was purely apolitical, the Agency was now inevitably drawn into the UN’s 
increasingly explicit – and increasingly political – engagement with the 
Palestinian situation. As Kemal Kirisci writes, UNRWA’s annual reports had 
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always aided UN discussions on the ‘Palestine problem’ by providing 
detailed information about the situation in the camps. In this way they 
exposed diplomatic delegations at the UN to new aspects of the issue that 
they had not previously considered, and widened the UNGA debates on the 
matter.78 Yet the events of 1974 elevated UNRWA’s role to a new level. The 
Agency’s relationship with the PLO now fell under the umbrella of 
Resolution 3236, which required the Secretary-General to ‘establish 
contacts’ with the organisation.79 As part of its fulfilment of this task, the 
Secretariat requested regular updates from UNRWA on its contacts with the 
PLO.80  
 There was more to come. In a 1976 report on the Question of 
Palestine, the UN Secretary-General cited the PLO-UNRWA relationship as 
a key part of his considerations, in view of the ‘direct interest’ of the 
Agency’s work to large numbers of Palestinians.81 The following year, the 
UNGA called for the Secretary-General to produce another report on the 
Palestinian situation, this time investigating the socio-economic impact of 
the Israeli occupation by working with UN organs, ‘particularly the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East’.82 
The meaning of UNRWA’s work thus became increasingly politicised . 
 It was not only the UNGA that incorporated UNRWA’s work in this 
way. The PLO also sought to make use of the Agency for political purposes, 
sometimes quoting its reports in official speeches at the UN and other 
international arenas. 83  When possible, the PLO cited statements by 
UNRWA officials as evidence of the justice of their cause. A 1977 issue of 
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the PLO information bulletin proudly proclaimed that the UNRWA Director in 
Gaza had ‘expressed his strong criticism of the Zionist authorities’ policies 
in the Gaza Strip’, particularly the forced relocation of refugees.84 The PLO 
was careful to include this in the PLO information bulletin, which was printed 
in European languages and designed to reach a Western audience. Evidently 
it perceived UNRWA to have sufficient clout and authority that its words 
were worth disseminating to this audience. 
 In these ways, UNRWA became increasingly entangled in the complex 
dynamics of the Palestinian issue at the UN. This was perhaps inevitable; 
despite its claims to the contrary, UNRWA’s work had never been devoid of 
politics, and indeed it had initially been intended to facilitate the refugees’ 
resettlement in the Arab host states, as explained in Chapter One. 
Moreover, its positioning gave it a particular importance. As the only UN 
body consistently present in the Palestinian setting for the second half of the 
twentieth century, it was in a unique place to provide first-hand information 
from the field.  
 Yet notwithstanding the UNGA’s endorsements and even 
requirements for UNRWA to work with the PLO, the subject remained a 
fraught one for the Agency. Its dependence on voluntary donations meant 
that it could not afford to alienate its largest donor state, the US, which 
continued to classify the PLO as a terrorist organisation until 1988.85 As a 
result, UNRWA was careful to underplay its relations with the PLO in its 
communications with the US and other major donors, which were nearly all 
Western states. This was especially pressing in view of the fact that, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, the US had already attached to its funding the 
condition of total detachment from the PLA and fidā’iyyīn groups. 86 
Accordingly, the UNRWA-PLO relationship was conspicuous by its absence 
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from donor-targeted UNRWA communications such as the regular 
newsletter Palestine Refugees Today.87 However, this absence did not reflect the 
reality in many camps, where this relationship was increasingly important to 
the Agency’s operations. 
 
Daily politics: The PLO and UNRWA in the camps  
 
While UNGA Resolution 3237 was transformative at the high diplomatic 
level, its impact on the ground was more muted. As already noted, it 
formalised a relationship that had already long existed, albeit informally. The 
question remains of how much of a difference this formalisation made in 
practice. Regardless of its status, the PLO had been on UNRWA’s radar 
since it was first created, ten years before Resolution 3237. For much of the 
1960s the relationship between the two organisations was ambiguous. 
Formally, UNRWA prohibited its employees from publicly identifying with 
the PLO and protested at the conscription of its staff into the PLA from 
1965-67. Yet as Schiff notes, the Agency stopped short of opposing contact 
with the PLO altogether, knowing this would fuel perceptions that it was 
anti-Palestinian.88  
 Both Schiff and Al Husseini write that the PLO’s rising power in the 
camps in the late 1960s greatly complicated the situation for UNRWA, 
whose mandate remained the same despite the changes on the ground.89 The 
Agency first encountered the PLO directly when the latter sought to build a 
Palestinian para-state in Jordan in the late 1960s.90 While this was short-
lived, it precipitated new themes in the UNRWA-PLO relationship that 
would dominate the subsequent decade. After Black September, the PLO 
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established its headquarters close to Sabra and Shatila camps in the Fakhani 
district of Beirut. The area became known informally as the ‘Fakhani 
Republic’, as the PLO established a para-state apparatus in Lebanon that 
included social, cultural and educational institutions, medical organisations, 
welfare services, research centres, and economic planning boards.  
As it gained legitimacy from the aforementioned Cairo Agreement, the 
PLO demanded greater recognition from UNRWA, which had little choice 
but to engage with it directly in Lebanon. Relations gradually moved from 
‘uneasy coexistence to active partnership’, in the words of Al Husseini. 91 
From the Agency’s perspective, the impact was mixed. There were some 
benefits; Schiff and Yezid Sayigh both argue that at a time when UNRWA 
was facing severe financial difficulties, the PLO’s provision of additional 
services in the camps helped relieve the level of need among the refugees 
and thus reduce pressure on the Agency.92 Yet as Al Husseini points out, the 
legitimacy of the Cairo Agreement did not remove the challenges that 
UNRWA faced in keeping its Western donors happy while working with the 
PLO.93  
The PLO took a similarly multi-faceted approach to UNRWA, 
reflecting the paradoxical views held by many refugees about the Agency 
(discussed in Chapter Four). Al Husseini argues that from the mid-1970s, 
the PLO’s policy towards the Agency had two main aims: to maintain and 
increase UNRWA’s services; and to ensure that its decisions were consistent 
with Palestinian political and humanitarian interests.94 Yet while Al Husseini 
identifies the aims correctly, they did not always result in consistent policy. 
It is in fact possible to identify three key strands of the PLO’s relationship 
with UNRWA at this time. Firstly, it loudly endorsed the refugees’ common 
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grievances against the Agency, and was keen to align itself with their 
criticisms of its work. At the same time, the PLO recognised that UNRWA’s 
services were vital to the welfare and wellbeing of many refugees, and 
campaigned behind the scenes for its work to continue. Thirdly and most 
interestingly, it also sought to use UNRWA’s camp infrastructure and 
services for its own political and nationalist purposes. Each of these three 
strands is now examined in turn.  
 
Criticising UNRWA: The PLO as opponent 
The PLO’s criticisms of UNRWA were largely grounded in the refugees’ 
general grievances, which the PLO cleverly took up as its own. In the 
process it gained clout with the refugee population and underlined its claim 
to represent them. Like the refugees, the PLO always stopped short of 
calling for UNRWA’s abolition or questioning the grounds for its existence. 
Instead it endorsed the refugees’ usual grievances: that the Agency was 
patronising towards the Palestinians, and that it was politically aligned with 
their enemies.95 It also advocated long-running demands by the refugees for 
the Agency to improve its health clinics and increase its ration provisions. 96 
 Many PLO officials were particularly keen to take up the charge that 
UNRWA was part of a Western-backed plot to resettle the refugees and 
thus undermine their political cause. UNRWA’s refusal to participate in 
Palestinian national politics was taken as evidence of this. As early as 1965, 
the PLO had issued a questionnaire for Palestinian UNRWA staff in Syria, 
seeking information about their personal backgrounds and their potential to 
contribute to the nationalist movement, either financially or through 
activities. The questionnaire also asked recipients to name up to twenty 
acquaintances who could participate ‘in preparing for the battle of 
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liberation’.97 The Agency’s refusal to distribute the questionnaire, on the 
grounds of its inappropriate political and military content, was cited as 
evidence that it was ‘conspiring’ against the refugee cause – a claim that Al 
Husseini writes was included in ‘countless’ PLO pamphlets over the years.98 
The PLO also used such claims to frame other issues, depicting the 
relocation of UNRWA’s Headquarters to Vienna in 1978 as the result of 
‘imperialist and Zionist pressures’ on the Agency.99  
 Both the PLO and the refugees applied these conspiracy theories to 
UNRWA’s service cuts, seeing them as a precursor to the Agency’s 
dissolution and the international abandonment of the refugees.100 In a 1977 
statement, the PLO accused the Agency and the US of ‘playing with the life 
of Palestinians [sic]’ by deliberately providing inadequate welfare services. 101 
Four years later, a PLO official warned the UNRWA Field Director in 
Damascus that service cuts would not be accepted, hinting that the PLO 
would unleash grievous demonstrations against the Agency if it continued 
with its planned cutbacks. 102  These moves had an impact, as PLO 
opposition became another factor that UNRWA had to consider when 
deciding whether to implement certain cuts.103 Moreover, it was sometimes a 
decisive factor; in 1979, the Deputy Commissioner-General argued against 
education cuts as they ‘would cause a serious rupture in our relations with 
the PLO’.104 Evidently, these relations were sufficiently important that they 
needed to be maintained even at a cost. 
                                                 
97 PLO information form, nd, S-0169-0002-0010, UNA [UNRWA translation]. 
98 Al Husseini, ‘UNRWA and the Palestinian Nation-Building Process’, p. 56.  
99 PLO Political Department, cable to UN Secretary-General, 26 June 1978, S-1066-0066-0004, UNA. See 
also: PLO information bulletin, 5:1, January 1979; 4:1, 30 June 1978, both IPS.  
100 See for example: PLO information bulletin, 5:2, 1-15 February 1979; 4:8, 1-15 May 1978; 4:3, 15 February 
1978; 5:1, Jan 1979; ‘PLO opposes UNRWA cuts’, PLO information bulletin, 5:11, 16-30 June 1979; ‘PLO 
warns UNRWA against reducing services’, PLO information bulletin, 5:9, 16-31 May 1979, all IPS. 
101 ‘US-UNRWA Plays with the Life of Palestinians’, PLO information bulletin, 3:17, 30 November 1977, IPS.  
102 Schiff, Refugees unto the Third Generation, p. 129.  
103 See for example: UNRWA Lebanon Director, confidential memo to Comptroller, 5 March 1970, File 
RE210/03(L), Box RE7, UHA. 
104 Deputy Commissioner-General, memo to Commissioner-General, 23 November 1979, File RE230/12 
II, Box RE94, UHA. 
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 Despite this, Al Husseini argues that the PLO’s influence on 
UNRWA’s work was ultimately limited. It failed to prevent many of the 
decisions it opposed, such as the relocation of UNRWA’s headquarters; it 
also failed to bring in many of the changes it demanded, such as the 
inclusion of protection activities within UNRWA’s general mandate. This is 
a striking contrast with the frequent success of the refugees’ grass roots 
campaigns, such as their demands for UNRWA to shift from its ‘Works’ 
programme to education in the 1950s, and their campaign for a 
‘Palestinianised’ curriculum, which was taken up by the PLO but driven by 
teachers and students. Explaining this discrepancy, Al Husseini suggests that 
the PLO’s leverage against UNRWA was limited by the fact that it could 
never establish comprehensive alternatives to the Agency’s services, due to 
its lack of territorial sovereignty and lowly status at the UN. As it could 
never threaten to replace UNRWA completely, the PLO retained some 
elements of dependence on its work.105  
 The time and effort that the PLO expended on criticising UNRWA’s 
work also indicates that it saw the Agency as a significant, if flawed, player; 
an insignificant body would surely not have warranted such exertions. 
Moreover, the PLO never crossed the line into calling for UNRWA’s 
abolition. On the contrary, it again aligned itself with the refugees in 
insisting that UNRWA must continue its work until their plight was 
resolved. For the PLO, this insistence translated into action, as behind the 
scenes it worked furtively to ensure that UNRWA’s programmes could 
continue. This aspect of the PLO’s relationship with the Agency is examined 
in depth below.  
 
 
 
                                                 
105 Al Husseini, ‘UNRWA and the Palestinian Nation-Building process’, pp. 55-56. 
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Supporting UNRWA: The PLO as fundraiser 
Officially, the PLO shared the Arab states’ position that responsibility for 
funding UNRWA lay with the Western-dominated international community, 
on the grounds of its political accountability for the refugees’ plight. 106 
However, in private the PLO recognised that UNRWA’s work was crucial 
to the refugees’ wellbeing, and as such could not be allowed to flounder. 
UNRWA staff themselves stated internally that ‘there can be no doubt 
whatsoever about desire of Arab host governments and PLO that UNRWA 
should continue provide services to refugees [sic]’.107 In the PLO’s case, this 
was not simply a desire, but a driving force behind active fundraising work 
on UNRWA’s behalf. Indeed, Schiff argues that the PLO became an 
‘important asset’ to the Agency’s fundraising efforts in the Arab world at 
this time.108 
 UNRWA first formally approached the PLO for help in raising funds 
in 1974, when it was facing a serious deficit. It asked the PLO leadership to 
seek emergency funding for its work from the Gulf states, where the Agency 
had previously had difficulties even getting appointments to see high 
officials.109 It also considered asking the PLO to approach Cuba and other 
communist states on its behalf.110 The Agency’s overtures to the PLO on 
this front provide on example of how their relationship was symbiotic, with 
each seeking to use the other to its own advantage whenever possible. It is 
also a clear case of UNGA Resolution 3237 making a difference on the 
ground; without it, UNRWA would not have been able to appeal to the 
PLO for fundraising assistance.  
The PLO leadership was receptive to the Agency’s requests. From 
1974-75, it helped secure large emergency contributions to UNRWA from 
                                                 
106 PLO Political Department, cable to UN Secretary-General, 26 June 1978, S-1066-0066-0004; ‘Recanting 
the Rabat Resolutions’, Monday Morning , 11 August 1975, S-0359-0002-02, both UNA. 
107 Rennie, cable to Beroudiaux, 4 December 1974, S-0169-0009-0010, UNA. 
108 Schiff, Refugees unto the Third Generation, p. 82. 
109 Ibid., p. 125.  
110 Rennie, cable to McElhiney, 25 November 1974, S-0169-0009-0010, UNA. 
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various Gulf states. Although these states refused to commit to regular 
contributions to UNRWA’s General Fund, their emergency donations 
helped keep UNRWA afloat that year.111 UNRWA acknowledged the PLO’s 
vital role in raising these funds; in 1975, Commissioner-General Rennie 
reported to New York that ‘reconsideration by Arab Foreign Ministers of 
increased contributions to UNRWA is result of approach to PLO [sic].’112 
Nor was this a one-off; in 1975, Arafat asked to be kept informed of 
UNRWA’s financial situation.113 Indeed, it was Arafat in particular who was 
responsible for many fundraising efforts on UNRWA’s behalf. Over the 
1970s he travelled to numerous Arab and Muslim states to appeal for 
donations. The PLO made further efforts to fundraise for the Agency at the 
1978 Baghdad Summit,114  and Schiff writes that it also directly donated 
money for use in UNRWA’s facilities.115 
 The records indicate warm and solicitous relations between the PLO 
and UNRWA leaderships over this issue, which was at odds with the 
criticisms previously discussed. In one letter in 1979, Arafat addressed 
Commissioner-General Rydbeck as ‘dear brother’.116 In another, he wrote: 
We cannot but express our appreciation for your concern and interest 
in seeking solutions to the financial crisis faced by UNRWA, in order 
to muster sufficient support for the maintenance of its activities…. We 
are in fact exerting efforts through our contacts with the responsible 
international circles concerned with a view to participating in helping 
UNRWA financially.117 
 
Their fundraising partnership remained active throughout this period. In 
1980 and 1981, Rydbeck met with Arafat repeatedly in Beirut to discuss the 
UNRWA deficit, and the PLO Chairman promised to again help raise 
                                                 
111 Schiff, Refugees unto the Third Generation, p. 83, 125.  
112 Rennie, cable to Vanwijk, 19 May 1975, S-0169-0010-02, UNA.   
113 Rennie, cable to Urquhart and Vanwijk, 13 May 1975, S-0359-0002-02, UNA. 
114 Bocco, ‘UNRWA and the Palestinian refugees’, p. 240.  
115 Schiff, Refugees unto the Third Generation, pp. 108-109.  
116 Arafat, letter to Rydbeck, 27 November 1979, File OR131 II, Box OR17, UHA [UN translation]. 
117 Arafat, letter to Rydbeck, 8 November 1979, File OR131 II, Box OR17, UHA [UN translation].  
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money. 118  Arafat subsequently approached Saudi Arabia, Iraq and even 
Japan on the Agency’s behalf. Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the PLO’s 
political department, also appealed to France to increase its contribution.119 
Again, emergency donations helped stave off total disaster for the Agency. 
 Paradoxically, these fundraising efforts occurred at the same time that 
the PLO was criticising UNRWA for being part of an international plot to 
liquidate the ‘Palestinian problem’.120 This apparent inconsistency is a sign of 
the divisions that existed within the PLO, sometimes to the degree of 
generating incompatible policy positions. The internal tensions were 
exacerbated by the fact that, like UNRWA, the PLO had to navigate the 
pressures of numerous parties. For the PLO, this meant assuring an Arab 
audience that it was not ‘selling out’ on the principle of Western 
responsibility for funding UNRWA. It publicly held fast to the official Arab 
line; when asked in a 1975 interview, PLO spokesman Abdulmohsen Abu 
Mayzar denied reports that the organisation had appealed to Saudi Arabia to 
help fund UNRWA, stating that such funding was an international 
responsibility. 121  These public denials were necessary for the PLO to 
maintain its credibility and hold together despite internal conflict. Yet the 
reference to international responsibility belied the fact that on the ground, 
this international Agency was becoming increasingly entangled with local 
Palestinian affairs. 
 
PLO politics: UNRWA and the Fakhani republic  
The aforementioned establishment of the Fakhani Republic meant that the 
PLO in Lebanon came to present UNRWA with many of the problems it 
                                                 
118 UNRWA Commissioner-General, letter to Jordanian Minister of Development & Reconstruction, 14 
March 1980, File RE230(J)V, Box RE20, UHA.  
119 Schiff, Refugees unto the Third Generation, pp. 128-133.  
120 Ibid., p. 129.  
121 ‘Recanting the Rabat Resolutions’, 11 August 1975, Monday Morning , 11 August 1975, S-0359-0002-02, 
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usually faced from the host governments.122 Schiff has written in detail of 
how questions of access, personnel and the use of facilities all became topics 
of potential disagreement between UNRWA and the PLO at this time. The 
huge controversy that surrounded the PLO – not least in the eyes of 
UNRWA’s major donors – rendered this especially sensitive for the 
Agency.123 In this sense, UNGA Resolution 3237 made little difference; on 
the ground in Lebanon at least, the Cairo Agreement and the thawra acted as 
far more meaningful turning points. This alternative periodisation explains 
why the Fakhani Republic is an important subject of study in this thesis, as 
its history juxtaposes the high diplomatic shifts of the UNGA with the day-
to-day realities of PLO-UNRWA dynamics in the camps.  
Randa Farah characterises the UNRWA-PLO relationship at this time 
in largely positive terms, contending that hostilities between the two were 
rare even though the PLO briefly ‘overshadowed or competed with 
UNRWA’.124 However, much of the evidence suggests that this depiction, 
while not inaccurate per se, may be overly simplistic. The difficulties were in 
fact plentiful. As Farah herself identifies, an increasing competitiveness 
between the PLO and UNRWA took hold as the former gained power in 
the camps.125 The PLO’s new authority meant that its patronage became as 
important and desirable to the refugees as connections with UNRWA, if not 
more so. This in turn undermined UNRWA’s authority, disrupting its 
previously exclusive status as the camps’ de facto government.  
 In practical terms, the PLO increasingly came to use the same sites and 
installations as UNRWA, albeit for different purposes. For example, the 
PLO’s Higher Political Committee sought the use of UNRWA schools to 
                                                 
122 See Chapter Three on UNRWA’s relations with the host governments.  
123 Schiff, Refugees unto the Third Generation, p. 83, 100, 104-105.   
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hold nationalistic classes for Palestinian children.126 Farah writes that this 
was sometimes due to a lack of alternatives,127 and it is true that in the case 
of the schools, there were not many other buildings in the camps of suitable 
size and design. Yet the reasons were not merely practical. As this chapter’s 
opening quotation from Shafiq Al Hout shows, the PLO was well aware of 
the strategic potential that the Agency’s work provided. Schiff, Al Husseini 
and Bocco all note that from the late 1960s, the PLO accordingly sought to 
use UNRWA’s infrastructure to extend its own authority, legitimacy, and 
support in the camps.128  
 The PLO’s efforts on this front took different forms. Al Hout recalls 
in his memoir that it particularly targeted UNRWA employees in its 
recruitment drives, aiming to use them to take advantage of the Agency’s 
network and accordingly reach as many Palestinians as possible. 129 For this 
reason, the PLO was keen to align itself with UNRWA’s Palestinian staff in 
their tensions with the Agency, as a way of winning their trust and loyalty. 
Al Husseini argues that it was here where the PLO actually enjoyed its 
greatest influence over the Agency, albeit informally. By loudly endorsing 
the demands of organisations like the General Union of Palestinian 
Teachers, it could turn small-scale grievances into national issues, and win 
itself a place at the negotiating table in the process. 130  It accordingly 
endorsed the teachers’ demands for higher salaries, and supported their 
complaints about the prohibition of political discussion in schools.131 The 
latter issue was of particular interest to the PLO, as UNRWA’s regulations 
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on staff neutrality, and specifically its ban on employees joining the PLO, 
severely limited its scope for recruitment.132  
 The PLO also took up the refugees’ aforementioned desire for a 
‘Palestinianised’ curriculum as a key issue.133 A 1974 issue of the PLO organ 
Falastin al-thawra wrote of the Agency’s ‘suspicious attempts to keep the 
people ignorant’.134 More formally, at the UNESCO General Conference 
two years later, PLO observer Ibrahim Souss spoke of the need to ‘re-
evaluate’ UNRWA’s education system, as part of the burgeoning 
relationship between the two organisations.135 This is a key example of how, 
in league with the refugees, the PLO sought to influence the Agency’s 
educational policies and professional training programmes along its 
favoured nationalistic lines.136 Souss’ intervention is also demonstrative of 
how the UN’s formal recognition of the PLO could intersect with the 
refugees’ demands on the ground, in this case by giving them a voice on the 
world stage and boosting their leverage.  
UNRWA’s own records suggest that at this time, the PLO was quite 
successful in making use of the Agency’s structures to recruit and organise 
the refugees for its own purposes. When Arafat addressed the UNGA in 
1974, for example, the PLO instructed UNRWA staff in Lebanon to 
suspend work so as to participate in demonstrations of solidarity. UNRWA 
reported that nearly all field staff left work early in the morning in 
response.137 To a lesser degree, it was also able to mobilise refugees in Gaza 
for the same cause using the structure and organisation of UNRWA schools; 
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the Agency reported agitation in Jabalia and Shati camps on the day of 
Arafat’s speech.138  
 From UNRWA’s perspective, the PLO’s encroachment on its facilities 
and services caused both political and practical problems. Hasna Rida, who 
worked as a Research Assistant for UNRWA in Lebanon at this time, recalls 
that the Agency’s relationship with the PLO was an anxious one. Agency 
management were nervous about the PLO’s power in the camps, and the 
accompanying desire of many refugees to be actively involved in the 
thawra.139 This, of course, caused concern for the Agency, which was keen to 
keep its services detached from any political affairs – an increasingly 
unfeasible objective in the camps at this time. The PLO’s use of UNRWA’s 
installations for its own purposes also caused serious practical problems, as 
these buildings were increasingly targeted in Israeli air raids.140  
 The Agency’s inability to prevent the PLO’s infringement on its spaces 
is perhaps the clearest sign of the thawra’s impact on the balance of power in 
the camps. It contrasts starkly with UNRWA’s previously straightforward 
refusal in 1965 to distribute a PLO questionnaire that was deemed 
inappropriately political. By the 1970s, the impact of the thawra had greatly 
increased the PLO’s leverage, and the situation was much more difficult for 
UNRWA, particularly in Lebanon. Its problems worsened as the Lebanese 
Civil War escalated and UNRWA’s field office in Beirut found itself 
frequently cut off from both headquarters and area offices. As a result, it 
became increasingly dependent on the PLO, the only security force to which 
it could appeal. Thomas McElhiney, who was UNRWA’s Deputy 
Commissioner-General from 1974 to 1977 and Commissioner-General 
from 1977 to 1979, spoke positively of the PLO’s role in helping the Agency 
function in Lebanon at a time when the country was ruled by chaos and 
                                                 
138 UNRWA Gaza Director, cable to Acting Commissioner-General, UR245/4, 28 November 1974, File 
RE230(G-3)II, Box RE19, UHA.  
139 Interview with Hasna Rida, former UNRWA Research Assistant, Beirut, 7 December 2016.  
140 Schiff, Refugees unto the Third Generation, p. 70, 104.  
     
 300 
terror.141 Yet the actions of the PLO in Lebanon at this time also caused 
untold problems and serious reputational damage for UNRWA.  
 The disorder of the Lebanese Civil War saw the PLO take its use of 
UNRWA installations to new heights. It infamously used the Agency’s VTC 
in Siblin to store and re-tool weapons, and hold military training for 
fida ̄’iyyīn. 142  When the Agency discovered this obvious breach of UN 
regulations, it protested to the PLO, temporarily closed the VTC, and 
disciplined the staff members responsible.143 Yet the damage was done. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, the Israeli discovery of Siblin in 1982 caused a 
furore in Israel and the US, and created serious problems for UNRWA’s 
relationships with both states.144 Occurring in the final year of the Fakhani 
Republic, the controversy marked the culmination of UNRWA’s long -
running, complex and contradictory relationship with the PLO in the camps.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The historical relationship between UNRWA and the PLO provides an 
important perspective on the Agency’s interactions with and influence on 
the Palestinian nationalist movement in the camps. This perspective is even 
more valuable because it has been largely neglected in much of the existing 
scholarship. The evidence presented here has shown that the realities of the 
situation in the camps during the thawra compelled UNRWA to engage with 
Palestinian nationalism in various forms, both among the general refugee 
population and with their institutional representatives in the PLO. As such, 
this chapter’s institutional analysis complements the grass roots-focussed 
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discussions of Chapters Two and Four, showing how UNRWA’s political 
significance was felt at multiple levels of the nationalist movement.  
 The PLO’s perceptions of the Agency serve as a further example of 
how UNRWA was universally seen as a political body, despite its claims to 
the contrary. The overt politicisation of the camps during the thawra, most 
notably in Lebanon but to a lesser degree also elsewhere, brought the reality 
of the situation into stark relief and rendered UNRWA’s ostensibly apolitical 
stance increasingly untenable. Perhaps the only idea shared by Israel, the 
Arab host states, the donor states, the refugees themselves and the PLO, 
was that UNRWA was essentially a political organisation, not merely an aid 
agency. This commonality between the PLO and so many states highlights 
its close integration with the situation and indeed its attempts to function on 
a quasi-state level.  
 Furthermore, analysis of the PLO-UNRWA relationship is vital for 
enriching existing understandings of the PLO. This chapter has shown how 
the PLO pursued its goals both at the level of high diplomatic politics, and 
by way of more everyday administrative politics in the camps. Moreover, it 
has provided a deeper perspective on the PLO’s objectives and strategy, 
showing that it promoted a version of nationalism that was self-consciously 
global, forward-looking and interconnected to contemporary movements 
around the world. This point is particularly important because it challenges 
conventional assumptions that nationalism is inherently insular, directed 
inwards rather than outwards. As such, it demonstrates how the historical 
study of Palestinian nationalism can inform wider understandings of 
nationalism in the modern era.  
 Finally, the PLO’s use of UNRWA as part of its internationalist 
strategy at the UN shows decisively how the Palestinian refugee situation 
was inextricably tied to the international arena, and particularly the UN. The 
fact that so much of this relationship played out in the refugee camps 
     
 302 
comprises another element of these spaces’ historical importance to the 
Palestinian nationalist movement – in this case, as the site of its intersection 
with internationalism. The relationship between UNRWA and the PLO 
served as a microcosm of how these apparently contrasting notions were 
juxtaposed in Palestinian history, at both the institutional and the grass roots 
level. This explicates the depth of Palestinian refugee history, and also 
explains its wider relevance to the history of the UN, globalism, and modern 
constructions of nationalism. 
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Conclusion 
 
1982 saw the PLO’s heyday come to an abrupt and drastic end. In June that 
year, the Israeli army began an 88-day siege of Beirut that devastated much 
of the city and destroyed the infrastructure established by the PLO over the 
previous decade.1  On 30 August, Arafat and an estimated 12,000 PLO 
cadres departed Lebanon by boat.2 Their new headquarters were located in 
Tunis, more than a thousand miles from historic Palestine and the refugee 
camps. These same camps, having acted as the bases of the nationalist 
movement since the late 1960s, now found themselves exposed and highly 
vulnerable, without the protection and leverage that the PLO’s power had 
brought them. The zenith of the Palestinian nationalist movement in exile 
was decisively over. 
The PLO’s departure from Beirut also marked the end of an era for 
UNRWA – not only in Lebanon, but to varying extents across its five fields 
of operation. Since the late 1960s, the Agency had functioned in spaces 
dominated by the ascendance of the Palestinian nationalist movement. Its 
work had become entwined with the latter, as it navigated the complexities 
and sensitivities of the movement’s authority. As Palestinian refugees across 
the Levant drew inspiration and encouragement from the PLO’s power in 
the region, UNRWA had been unable to escape the ramifications of the 
thawra. In such a setting, the Agency increasingly struggled to maintain its 
international and ostensibly apolitical status.  
The lessons that the Agency took from this period would have a lasting 
impact. Just five years after the PLO was routed from its base in Lebanon, 
the first Palestinian intifada began in Gaza and quickly engulfed the entire 
OPT. Contemporary studies of UNRWA tend to identify the first intifada as 
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a turning point in the Agency’s politicisation;3 it certainly engendered a new 
role for the organisation in the OPT. Yet the impact of the first intifada 
followed a long period of intense politicisation, in which UNRWA’s raison 
d’être had already been fiercely challenged and reimagined. The Agency’s 
history during the thawra era thus comprised an important phase in its 
historical development, which saw it become increasingly fused with the 
nationalistic politics of its environment.  
The nature of UNRWA’s development, and the contradictions of its 
situation, reflected the uniqueness of its set-up. At the time of its creation in 
December 1949, UNRWA constituted the UN’s first institutional response 
to a major humanitarian crisis. The fact that it predated UNHCR – and was 
never merged with the latter – ensured that UNRWA remained distinctive 
and in some ways idiosyncratic, as the only UN Agency mandated to serve 
one particular group of people exclusively. The challenges that it faced while 
doing so were indicative of the tensions inherent to its set-up as an 
international organisation fully absorbed in potent regional dynamics. In 
keeping with its intimate involvement with the Palestinian refugee situation, 
UNRWA’s uniqueness ultimately embodied the latter’s exceptionalism. 
UNRWA’s internationalism also made it emblematic of a much 
broader theme in modern Palestinian history. From the early twentieth 
century, global powers had perceived Palestine’s fate to be an ‘international’ 
issue, due to the country’s deep religious significance and its increas ing 
entanglement in questions of inter-continental migration. Governmental 
structures in Palestine appeared to verify this; the legitimacy of British rule 
in the interwar period was grounded in a mandate granted by the League of 
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Nations in 1922.4 Twenty-five years later, the British government further 
affirmed Palestine’s continuing internationalist status when it formally 
handed over responsibility for resolving the country’s problems to the 
League of Nations’ successor, the UN. These internationalist perceptions 
only continued with the UN’s direct involvement in first the partition of 
Palestine,5 and then the continuing conflicts between Israel and the Arab 
states.6  
As a UN body ultimately dependent on international support, 
UNRWA constituted the main manifestation of this internationalism among 
the exiled Palestinians. In many ways the UN’s involvement in a regional 
refugee crisis typified the norms of the post-war era, whereby such 
problems were seen to be the responsibility of the entire global community.7 
Yet more particularly, both the creation of UNRWA and its continuance 
over the decades signified the multi-faceted connections between the 
Palestinian people, the international community in general, and the UN in 
particular. The fact that UNRWA has continued to function in the same 
exceptional set-up has arguably made the global powers’ perceptions of 
Palestine as uniquely international into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Nor were 
such perceptions one-sided; Palestinian nationalists themselves, most 
notably the PLO, sought to take advantage of UNRWA’s international 
status by using it to further the international legitimacy of their cause. 
The nature of UNRWA’s relationship with the PLO was not alone in 
reflecting its internationalism. The Agency’s diplomatic relations in general 
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7 Susan Akram, 'Palestinian Refugees and Their Legal Status: Rights, Politics, and Implications for a Just 
Solution', Journal of  Palestine Studies, 31:3, 2002, p. 36. 
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were grounded in its status as an international organisation, and a semi-
autonomous one at that. It depended overwhelmingly on Western 
governments for funding, and relied on the goodwill of Israel, Syria, Jordan 
and Lebanon to be able to function in its five fields. UNRWA’s dependency 
on numerous different governments meant that its close entwinement with 
the refugees’ daily lives was juxtaposed with an inherent internationalism in 
its operations. It also added a further layer of complexity to the politics of 
the Agency’s set-up, as it had to navigate the opposing political stances of 
Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, the US, and the UK, among others.  
The nature of UNRWA’s international relations is further intriguing as 
it reveals that the conflict between these states did not always result in 
straightforward political positioning. For all their differences, Israel, the 
Arab host states, the Western donor states and even the PLO were all 
informally aligned in their shared view that UNRWA was an essentially 
political organisation. Their support for its work was in fact often grounded 
in this supposition, as they variously saw UNRWA’s operations as a way to 
promote regional stability, to keep the Palestinian issue on the global 
agenda, or to remove the economic burden that would otherwise fall on the 
host states.  
Moreover, with the exception of the PLO, these parties all opposed the 
ascendance of the Palestinian nationalist movement during the thawra, and 
were suspicious of the role UNRWA might play in enabling its progression 
in the camps. This in turn reflected their shared view that UNRWA 
functioned as a quasi-state in the refugee camps. Both the host states and 
the donor states tended to treat UNRWA as the refugees’ de facto diplomatic 
representative, regularly calling on it to manage, quell, or account for goings-
on in the camps. As this shows, UNRWA was inextricably tied to the camps 
in the international imagination, with these spaces defining how it was 
perceived by much of the world. This was underlined further by the fact that 
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much of the Agency’s relationship with the PLO played out in the camps, 
despite the fact that the majority of the PLO’s leadership were not camp 
residents themselves.  
Interestingly, this idea of UNRWA as a politicised quasi-state was one 
shared by the majority of refugees themselves. Like the states discussed 
above, the refugees grounded their views of UNRWA’s political significance 
in its UN status. Yet their understandings of it also took a particular form. 
In the refugees’ eyes, the UN had erred in 1947 when it sanctioned the 
partition of Palestine and thus enabled the creation of the state of Israel and 
the Nakba. According to this view, UNRWA served as a form of 
‘compensation’ from the international community in general and the UN in 
particular – of which they continued to be suspicious. As such, the Agency’s 
services comprised not aid but entitlements, and were in fact evidence of the 
refugees’ international political rights.  
 With this in mind, the refugees supported the continuation of 
UNRWA’s work. They feared that its suspension would mean the 
international abandonment of their cause, and thus clung to its continuance 
as a sign that their plight – and particularly the right of return – had not 
been forgotten. Yet at the same time, they were far from subservient or 
meek in their dealings with the Agency. On the contrary, this thesis has 
shown that the refugees demonstrated considerable agency in shaping the 
nature of UNRWA’s work, be it by opposing resett lement, calling for 
education, demanding the ‘Palestinianisation’ of the curriculum, or pushing 
for the Agency to play a greater advocacy role. Despite their structural 
powerlessness, the refugees were remarkably successful at organising 
themselves in order to exploit the little leverage they held over UNRWA. 
Ultimately, the Agency needed the refugees’ cooperation in order to 
function, and they were highly effective at taking advantage of this.  
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 As this shows, the history of UNRWA’s work is relevant not only to 
studies of internationalism and high politics, but also to more general 
histories of the Palestinian refugees’ experiences. Indeed, much of the 
Agency’s historiographical value stems from the fact that it directly 
connected the global arena of the UN to the quotidian affairs of the 
Palestinian refugee camps. Intimately involved with these spaces, UNRWA 
played a vital role in defining and demarcating the camps; along with 
checkpoints and socio-economic conditions, it was the presence of Agency 
institutions that helped distinguish the camps from surrounding areas and 
even from the rest of the shatāt. In turn, the camps’ spatial peculiarities 
facilitated their key role in driving the thawra, with the refugees once again 
demonstrating their agency by using the possibilities of their surroundings to 
further the national cause. Studying UNRWA’s history thus illuminates not 
only the place of Palestine in high politics and global diplomacy, but also the 
development and significance of the Palestinian refugee camps as spaces.  
 The camps’ histories both complement and challenge conventional 
understandings of modern Middle Eastern history. On the one hand, the 
significance of chronological watersheds like 1967 is underlined by 
examining the changes precipitated in the camps by the events of that year. 
At the same time, this thesis has shown that the refugee camps’ 
distinctiveness precludes the possibility of understanding them simply as 
subordinates to the wider history of the region. The camps’ own histories 
are marked not only by large-scale regional turning points like the Naksa, 
but also by the impact of the thawra, the cuts in UNRWA services, and the 
dynamics of the Agency’s relationship with the PLO.  
 The intimacies and intricacies of UNRWA’s involvement with the 
camps meant that the latter’s political development in this period inevitably 
had an impact on the Agency’s work – and vice versa. Once again, the 
refugees’ agency came into play, as they used the momentum of the thawra 
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to push through their long-held demands for a Palestinian national 
curriculum in UNRWA schools. At the same time, UNRWA’s quasi-state 
role in the camps shaped the development and expression of the nationalist 
movement therein. Its transnational nature provided a common frame of 
reference for the Palestinians across the Levant and thus reinforced their 
shared national consciousness, while its registration policies and education 
programme helped inculcate a sense of Palestinian national identity in the 
refugees. As a case study, the Palestinian refugee camps thus counter 
modernist theories that posit the presence of a state as a necessary condition 
for the emergence of nationalism. UNRWA’s role shows how a ‘shadow 
sovereign’ can emerge in this setting to fulfil some of the usual state 
functions, not only in terms of service provision but also in facilitating a 
shared national consciousness and identity.   
This thesis has shown decisively that the exclusion of UNRWA from 
much of the existing literature has been not only unfortunate, but 
erroneous. It has resulted in a partial understanding of the history of the 
PLO, the Palestinian refugee camps, and the nationalist movement in exile. 
The centrality of Palestinian politics to the modern Middle East makes this 
oversight all the more regrettable. Over the second half of the twentieth 
century, UNRWA functioned as an integral part of the Palestinian refugee 
experience, in not only socio-economic but also political terms. As such, its 
exclusion from much of the relevant historiography – explained in part by 
the inaccessibility of the Agency’s archive in Amman – needs to be 
addressed and reversed. This research has opened the door for future 
studies to examine other overlooked aspects of UNRWA’s history, such as 
the dynamics of its relationships with UNCCP, UNHCR and UNESCO; the 
trajectory of its political positioning following the end of the thawra era; and 
the history of its standing with Arab governments in the Gulf and Maghreb.  
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 The findings presented in this thesis do not only illuminate the history 
of UNRWA, as important as that is. They also show that the nature of the 
Palestinian nationalist movement was more complex than is often 
understood. While grounded in the social memory of pre-1948 Palestine, 
and the collective trauma of national dispossession, Palestinian nationalism 
was not simply an invocation of a lost mythical golden age. It was instead 
self-consciously international, contemporary, and outward-looking, with 
tenets grounded in global norms and institutions. The increasing fusion of 
UNRWA’s work with the Palestinian nationalist movement over the years 
1967-82 demonstrates the latter’s forward-thinking nature, and the former’s 
entwinement with the politics of its surroundings. As this thesis has shown, 
examining this intersection between the national and the international is vital 
not only for illuminating Palestinian history, but also for informing wider 
studies of nationalism, migration, camps, collective memory, and the 
dynamics between people and state in the modern era. 
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Appendix A:  
List of official UNRWA camps in Gaza 
 
 Camp Date 
established 
Area (sq km 
approx) 
Original 
population 
Population  
in 2018 
1 Bureij 1950s 0.5  13,000 41,088 
2 Deir el-Balah 1948 0.17  9,000 24,525 
3 Jabalia 1948 1.4 35,000 119,486 
4 Khan Younis 1948 1.27  35,000 84,325 
5 Maghazi 1949 0.6 Data 
unavailable 
30,101 
6 Nuseirat c.1948 0.68  16,000 77,761 
7 Rafah 1949 1.23 41,000 120,526 
8 Shati 
(‘Beach’) 
c.1948 0.52 23,000 84,077 
 
Source: https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/gaza-strip, accessed 29 
May 2018. Additional information kindly provided by Matthias Schmale, 
UNRWA Director in Gaza, and Rafiq Abed, Chief of UNRWA 
Infrastructure & Camp Improvement Programme in Gaza, via email, 29 
May 2018. 
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Appendix B:  
List of official UNRWA camps in Jordan 
 
 Camp Date 
established 
Area  
(sq km) 
Original 
population 
Population  
in 2018 
1 Amman New 
(‘Wihdat’) 
1955 0.48 Data 
unavailable 
57,000 
2 Baqa’a 1968 1.4 26,000 119,000 
3 Husn 1968 0.77 12,500 25,000 
4 Irbid 1951 0.24 4,000 28,000 
5 Jabal el-
Hussein 
1952 0.42 8,000 32,000 
6 Jerash (‘Gaza’) 1968 0.75 11,5000 29,000 
7 Marka 
(‘Hitten’) 
1968 0.92 Data 
unavailable 
53,000 
8 Souf 1967 0.5 Data 
unavailable 
19,000 
9 Talbieh 1968 0.13 5,000 8,000 
10 Zarqa 1949 0.18 8,000 20,000 
 
Source: https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan, accessed 23 
March 2018. 
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Appendix C:  
List of official UNRWA camps in Lebanon 
 
 Camp Date established Population in 2018* 
1 Beddawi 1955 16,500 
2 Burj al-Barajneh 1948 17,945 
3 Burj Shemali 1948 22,789 
4 Dbayeh 1956 4,351 
5 Ein el-Helweh 1948 54,116 
6 El Buss 1950s† 11,254 
7 Jisr el-Basha Data unavailable 
(destroyed 1976) 
n/a 
8 Gouraud Data unavaialble  
(evacuated c.1963) 
n/a 
9 Mar Elias 1952 662 
10 Mieh Mieh 1954 5,250 
11 Nabatieh Data unavailable 
(destroyed 1974) 
n/a 
12 Nahr el-Bared 1949 n/a (27,000 in 2007)‡ 
13 Rashidieh 1936/1963§ 31,478 
14 Shatila** 1949 9,842 
15 Tel al-Zaatar  c.1949  
(destroyed 1976) 
n/a (60,000 in 1976) 
16 Wavel (‘al-Jalil’) 1949 8,806 
                                                 
* The original population sizes of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon were not 
recorded. UNRWA does not publish data about the sizes of the camps in Lebanon due 
to contention over where it provides services. 
 
†  El Buss was originally built in 1939 to house Armenian refugees. In the 1950s the 
Lebanese government rehoused Palestinian refugees there. See: El Buss Camp, 
https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon/el-buss-camp, accessed 23 March 
2018.  
 
‡ Nahr el-Bared camp was destroyed in 2007 in fighting between the Lebanese army and 
the Palestinian Islamist group Fatah al-Islam. It is currently being reconstructed. See: 
https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon/nahr-el-bared-camp, accessed 29 May 
2018.  
 
§ The French government originally constructed Rashidieh camp in 1936 for Armenian 
refugees. In 1963, UNRWA expanded and developed the camp to accommodate 
Palestinian refugees from Gouraud. See: https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-
work/lebanon/rashidieh-camp, accessed 23 March 2018. 
 
** Sabra neighbourhood is connected to Shatila and is sometimes counted separately, 
although it is not an official UNRWA camp.  
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Source: https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon, accessed 17 May 2018. 
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Appendix D:  
List of official UNRWA camps in Syria 
 
 Camp Date 
established 
Area  
(sq km) 
Population in 2011 
(prior to Syrian war) 
1 Dera’a 1950-51 1.3 10,500 
2 Ein el Tal* 
(‘Hindrat’) 
1962 0.16 6,000 
3 Hama 1950 0.06 8,000 
4 Homs 1949 0.15 22,000 
5 Jaramana 1948 0.04 18,658 
6 Khan Dunon 1950-51 0.03 10,000 
7 Khan Eshieh 1949 0.69 20,000 
8 Latakia** 1955-56 0.22 10,000 
9 Neirab 1948-50 0.15 20,500 
10 Qabr Essit 1948 0.02 23,700 
11 Sbeineh 1948 0.03 22,600 
12 Yarmouk** 1957 2.1 148,500 
 
Source: https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/syria, accessed 23 March 
2018. 
 
The sizes of the original populations of the Palestinian refugee camps in 
Syria were not recorded. 
                                                 
* Ein el Tal, Latakia and Yarmouk are ‘unofficial’ refugee camps that were established by 
the host governments but still receive most UNRWA services.  
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Appendix E: List of official UNRWA camps in the West Bank 
 
 Camp Date 
established  
Area 
(sq km) 
Original 
population* 
Population  
in 2018 
1 Aida 1950 0.71  3,150 
2 Am’ari 1949 0.096  6,100 
3 Aqbat Jabr 1948 1.67 30,000 8,600† 
4 Arroub 1949 0.24  9,850 
5 Askar 1950 0.119  18,500 
6 Balata 1950 0.25 5,000 27,000 
7 Beit Jibrin 
(‘Azza’) 
1950 0.027  1,337 
8 Camp 
Number 1 
(‘Ein Beit el-
Ma’) 
1950 0.045  4,600 
9 Deir ‘Ammar  1949 0.162  2,200 
10 Dheisheh  1949 0.33 3,000 15,000 
11 Ein el-Sultan 1948 0.87 20,000 3,800‡ 
12 Far’a  1950 0.26  7,100 
13 Fawwar 1949 0.27 3,000 9,500 
14 Jalazone 1949 0.253  9,450 
15 Jenin 1953 0.42  14,000 
16 Kalandia 1949 0.42  9,950 
17 Nur Shams 1952 0.21  7,350 
18 Shu’fat 1965   12,500-
24,000§ 
19 Tulkarm 1950 0.18  21,000 
                                                 
* Original populations were not recorded for the majority of camps in the West Bank. 
Aqbat Jabr, Balata, Dheisheh, Ein el-Sultan and Fawwar are the exceptions. 
 
† The population of Aqbat Jabr fell drastically in 1967, when around 25,000 residents 
fled. See: https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/west-bank/aqbat-jabr-camp, accessed 
24 March 2018. 
 
‡ An estimated 18,000 Palestine refugees fled Ein El-Sultan in 1967. See: 
https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/west-bank/ein-el-sultan-camp, accessed 24 
March 2018.  
 
§ There are 12,500 Palestine refugees registered as living in Shu’fat, but UNRWA 
estimates the actual number of residents is closer to 24,000. See: 
https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/west-bank/shufat-camp, accessed 24 March 
2018. 
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Source: https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/west-bank, accessed 23 
March 2018. 
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